



The labor markets in the United States and in Germany could hardly be more different. The 
USA, with its tremendous job growth, is often held up as the prime example of the job-
creating power of unfettered markets, while Germany is seen as the textbook case of an 
overregulated European labor market stifling employment growth. For many policy advisers 
the lessons are clear: if Europeans want to emulate the success of the Americans, they must 
deregulate their economies. On the other hand, economists in the USA, impressed with 
Germany's income growth and social stability, have shown increasing interest in the role that 
nonmarket institutions play in the German context. 
Institutional Frameworks and Labor Market Performance provides an in-depth analysis of 
the functioning of various labor market institutions in both the USA and Germany. In close 
studies of the regulatoty differences between the two countries, the authors examine the 
impact of those institutions on economic performance. On the basis of their findings they 
argue that the choice is not one between regulation and deregulation, but rather between 
different forms and degrees of regulation. 
The authors discuss all the factors that influence the functioning of labor markets, 
including: 
• educational and vocational training systems 
• personnel recruitment, selection, and dismissal 
• work organization and hours of work 
• labor law and labor relations 
The book brings together leading specialists from the USA and Germany and will be of 
interest to students and practitioners in economics, political science, and the sociology of 
work. 
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AND LABOR MARKET 
PERFORMANCE 
Friedrich Buttler, Wolfgang Franz, Ronald Schettkat and 
David Soskice 
INTRODUCTION 
While Germans are fascinated by tremendous U.S. job growth during the last 
decades, Americans are equally captivated by income growth and social stability in 
Germany. In Europe the United States is often regarded as the example of the job-
creating power of unfettered markets, whereas Germany is seen as an example of 
an overregulated economy and an especially overregulated labor market, both of 
which have prevented employment from growing. The suggestion to European 
politicians is to deregulate their economies and become like the U.S. but Americans 
themselves are worried about income stagnation and dispersion, about the trade 
deficit, health insurance coverage, and the instability of employment. 
The list of institutions that were alleged to cause inefficient labor markets in 
Europe (Giersch 1985) is long: Collective bargaining, sticky wages and a distorted 
wage structure reduced the allocative efficiency of labor markets; strong unions 
increased insider power, kept wages high and excluded outsiders; legislation 
extended workers' representation and participation in decision-making processes; 
employment protection laws made dismissals not impossible but very costly, 
leading employers to be reluctant in hiring; unemployment benefits-replacement 
ratios as well as the duration of eligibility-have been alleged to be a major 
distortion of the incentive structure which led to inefficient searches, inefficient 
skill adjustments, mismatches, and persistent long-term unemployment. 
Deregulation to (re-) achieve an undistorted incentive structure was (and is) the 
clear policy advice following from this analysis. Searching for opportunities to 
deregulate became one of the main tasks of politicians, and in the UK and the U.S. 
such deregulation was probably most widely applied. In Germany, the government 
created a commission for deregulation whose task was to target areas of public 
intervention and justify their deregulation (see Donges 1992). However, recent 
economic and social problems in the U.S. and the UK produced doubts about the 
efficiency of this strategy. 
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Americans look to Japan and Germany when developing proposals to increase 
the efficiency of their economy. The process of European unification received 
substantial attention in the U.S. (see Ulman et al 1993). Japanese-style work 
organization and employment stability; German-type apprenticeship systems, 
works councils, and unions attracted the interest of American economists and 
politicians. The Clinton administration aims at introducing new labor market and 
social institutions. "The philosophy here is very simple: Unless people have the 
security they need to adapt to future, I believe they will seek security by trying to 
preserve the past" (Robert Reich, speech 1993). 
This raises some questions. Are the institutional features of the industrialized 
economies converging? Can the most favorable institutional arrangements of one 
country simply be transplanted into another country's institutional framework (see 
Chapter 4)? To what extent do these policy proposals rely on real world factors not 
included in theoretical models, which can completely change how particular 
institutional arrangements will work (see Chapter 9)? 
Critics of the welfare state tended to overemphasize economic efficiency. Welfare 
state programs also try to achieve other goals such as equality. To evaluate such 
programs one must undertake a cost-benefit analysis. "In a cost-benefit framework, 
the net social return from transfer programs is positive if the social value of the 
increase in security among individual citizens is greater than the social value of any 
lost growth or productivity. Simply showing that programs have distortionary 
effects or inefficiency costs to the economy is not sufficient to argue against them" 
(Blank and Freeman 1994). 
Although welfare institutions are designed to achieve various purposes, they may 
neverthel~ support the search for economic efficiency. Regulations are not necessarily 
"politics against the market," but they can very well complement markets. If natural 
rigidities are taken into account, and if dynamic efficiency rather than allocative 
efficiency in a static framework of analysis is used for the evaluation of the impact of 
institutions, the conclusion may look quite different from results obtained with static 
analysis. That is to say that the real world should not be evaluated with reference to the 
first best solution, but that second or third best may be the appropriate reference for the 
evaluation of institutions. Natural rigidities should not simply be taken as market 
imperfections but as features which are part of the way markets function (Gordon 
1990). Given the possibility of different paths of developments one may have, for 
example, a low-skill labor market equilibrium as well as a high-skill labor market 
equilibrium. Which of the two equilibria can be reached depends substantially on the 
institutional framework (Finegold and Soskice 1989; Soskice 1993). That is to say, 
careful evaluations need to take the institutional frameworks into account rather than to 
evaluate specific regulations in an isolated way. 
TRENDS IN U.S. AND GERMAN LABOR MARKETS 
The trends in unemployment of the two economies are probably surprising: While 
the unemployment rate in the United States declined from about 5 percent in the 
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early 1960's to 3.5 percent in 1968-1969, Germany experienced virtually no 
unemployment until 1973 (Figure 1.1 and Table 1.1, first columns). From 1960 to 
1972 the average unemployment rate was below 1.0 percent in every year except the 
recession period of 1967-1968, when the rate increased to 1.8 percent. The German 
labor market was characterized by excess demand which was panly accommodated 
through the employment of "guest workers," i.e., foreign workers, which increased 
from 1.3 percent to 10 percent of total employment between 1960 and 1973. 
The spurt in the German unemployment rate began in 1974. While unemploy-
ment in the United States evolved more cyclically, with peaks in 1975 and 
1982-1983, Germany experienced a rise in unemployment in two steps, but with 
little decline between 1975-1980 and 1983-1988. In the period 1983-1990 the 
official German unemployment rate was above that in the U.S., which would not 
have been so remarkable except for the stark contrast in the opposite direction 
during the 1960's and 1970's. However, looking at adjusted German unemploy-
ment figures (Table 1.1, column 2), which are comparable to U.S. definitions, 
reveals that between 1984 and 1990 unemployment rates do not differ as much as 
suggested by the official German figures. In fact, in some years both numbers are 
virtually identical. "Low" unemployment in the U.S. was "high" unemployment in 
Germany. But nevertheless, employment trends differed substantially (columns 6 
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Figure 1.1 Unemployment Rates in Germany and the United States 
Source. OECD (1993) Economic Outlook, 53: 218 
3 
F. BUTTLER, W. FRANZ, R. SCHETTKAT, D. SOSKICE 
Table 1.1 shows also the high and growing share of long-term unemployment in 
Germany, compared to its small share in the U.S. Long-term unemployed persons 
constitute a major challenge to labor market policies because older people and those 
with health deficiencies are considerably overrepresented in this group. The reason 
for this development of high long-term unemployment is that the probability of a 
transition to employment decreases with the duration of unemployment because 
unsuccessful job seekers become discouraged and/or firms use unemployment as a 
screening device in order to identify the unknown productivity of an applicant. 
Note that the employment series in Table 1.1 refer to the private nonfarm sector. 
The reason for this restriction is that employment in the public sector is subject to 
country-specific regulations concerning protection against dismissals and the like. 
Moreover, employment series in the agricultural sector include {unpaid) family 
workers, which renders time series data on hours, wages, and productivity less 
reliable. The rise in employment in the U.S. amounts to 76 percent growth over the 
past three decades. This growth cannot be explained by the high and increasing share 
Table 1.1 Summary Measures of Unemployment, Employment, and Hours 
Share Employed Annual 
Unemployment of Long-Term Persons Hours per 
Rate Unemployed (millions) Worker 
FRG FRG us FRG us FRG us FRG us 
Average official adjusted 
Over 
Interval 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
1961-1964 0.6 0.4 5.8 n.a. n.a. 20.2 62.5 2,081 1,799 
1965-1969 1.0 0.7 3.8 9.1 2.1 a 20.2 70.5 2,003 1,816 
1970-1973 0.8 0.6 5.4 7.1 3.5 20.8 77.9 1,909 1,796 
1974-1979 3.5 3.0 6.8 15.3 5.5 20.1 88.0 1,803 1,759 
1980-1984 6.0 5.3 8.3 23.2 8.9 20.3 97.6 1,734 1,722 
1985-1990 7.3 6.2 6.1 35.8 7.5 20.8 110.1 1,675 1,709 
Sources: Adjusted unemployment rare: Abraham and Houseman 1993; other sources see below. (For 
column notes below-numbers in brackets refer ro citations in 'Notes' below.) 
Sources-. [l] Official News of rhe Federal Labor Office, Germany. [2] German Institute of Economic 
Research, quarterly national accounts. [3] IFO-lnsrirure, Munich. [4] Economic Report of rhe 
President, February 1992. [5] Survey of Current Business. [ 6] Economic Indicators. [7] Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. [8] Abraham and Houseman {1993: 49). 
Note. ' refers ro 1967-69 only; long-rerm unemployment is defined as unemployment lasting longer 
than 12 months. 
Notes for Germany and U.S. by column number {); numbered sources appear in brackets [] ar rhe end 
of each note, see Table 1.2. 
Germany (1) Registered unemployed persons as a percentage of civilian labor force (including self-
employed) (1 ]. (2) Adjusted ro approximate U.S. concepts [8]. (4) Percentage of unemployed more 
than one year. Figures prior to 1966 are nor available [l ]. (6) Including self-employed persons; private 
nonfarm sector [2 ], (8) Per year; aggregate economy; including self-employed persons (2 ]. 
U.S. (3) Unemployed persons as a percentage of civilian labor force [7]. (5) Percentage of unemployed 
more than one year. Figures prior ro 1967 are nor available [7]. (7) Including self-employed persons; 
private non-farm sector [4]. (9) Per year; aggregate economy; including self-employed persons [5]. 
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of part-time employment in the U.S. but is rather caused by the higher employment 
elasticity of economic growth in the U.S. (Schettkat 1992). It is remarkable that 
American job growth is visible over the whole time period and not limited to the 
1980's as sometimes assumed by proponents of the "American job machine." 
Another difference between American and German labor market development is 
the decline in hours worked per employee as evidenced by columns 8 and 9 of 
Table 1. 1. Taken at face value, in Germany, annual hours per employee have fallen 
from 16 percent above the U.S. level in the beginning of the 1960's to 2 percent 
below by the end of the 1980's (see Bell and Freeman in this volume). To a major 
extent this is due to a specific aspect of German wage determination totally absent 
in the U.S., namely a perceived trade-off between wage increases and negotiated 
reductions in weekly working hours. 
In view of the unfortunate developments of the German labor market in the 
1980's, the unions urged for reductions in working time in order to redistribute the 
burden of unemployment. The metal industry took the lead when it pushed 
working time reduction through in the strike of the summer of 1984, which was 
one of the longest and most costly in recent German history. However, given the 
loss of international competitiveness of the German economy and the considerable 
difficulties stemming from the financial burdens of German unification, there are a 
growing number of voices in the political arena calling for a reversal of the 
tremendous reduction of working time. On the other hand, work-sharing has been 
proposed and implemented as a measure to prevent unemployment. 
In a recent econometric study on American and German wage and price 
determination, Franz and Gordon (1993) find that during the 1970's and 1980's 
in Germany there emerged a growing discrepancy between the labor market and 
industrial capacity so that the unemployment rate consistent with the constant-
inflation utilization rate of capacity increased sharply, while in the U.S. this rate 
was fairly stable. In addition there is empirical evidence that the relationship 
between unemployment and vacancies, the so-called Beveridge curve, has shifted 
outwards, which may indicate higher mismatch in the labor market (see e.g., Franz 
1991 and Chapter 13 in this volume). 
Table 1.2 displays data on wage and price changes, productivity growth, and the 
rate of capacity utilization (displayed as the deviation from the 1960-1990 mean 
rate). Wage and price changes in the U.S. decelerated markedly in the second half of 
the 1980's despite higher capacity utilization than in the first half, which may be 
explained by lagged wage and price adjustment to earlier low utilization, as well as by 
lower oil prices. The figures for Germany in the l 980's show relatively low and stable 
wage and price inflation with relatively high capacity utilization. As a summary 
measure of the development of wages, prices and productivity columns 9 and 10 in 
Table 1.2 show the time pattern of labor's share of income for both countries, i.e., 
gross labor compensation as a share of national income. The German share has 
fluctuated around its mean of 67.8 percent but shows no trend, i.e., it is roughly 
equal to its mean in both 1961-1964 and 1985-1990. In contrast the U.S. labor 
share exhibits a one-time jump in the early 1970's, with little movement in other 
5 
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Table 1.2 Summary Measures of Wages, Prices, Productivity, and Labor's Share (annual 
percentage growth rates). 
Growth Growth Rate 
Nominal Rate of of Actual 
Wage GDP &a/Product Productivity labor's 
Growth Dejlator Wage Growth Share 
Average FRG us FRG us FRG us FRG us FRG us 
Over 
Interval 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 JO 
1961-1964 9.4 3.3 3.6 1.0 5.8 2.3 4.9 3.4 67.6 69.0 
1965-1969 7.3 5.3 2.7 2.9 4.6 2.4 5.2 1.8 63.2 70.0 
1970-1973 12.4 7.0 6.3 3.8 6.1 3.2 4.6 2.3 66.9 73.3 
1974-1979 7.9 8.2 4.S 6.6 3.4 1.6 3.7 0.6 69.8 73.5 
1980-1984 5.0 7.3 3.9 6.3 1.1 1.0 1.6 0.9 71.5 74.6 
1985-1990 4.3 4.1 2.5 3.7 1.8 0.4 2.4 0.6 67.9 73.2 
Sourcer. [l] Official News of the Federal Labor Office, Germany. [2] German Institute of Economic 
Research, quarterly national accounts. [3] IFO-Institute, Munich. [4] Economic Report of the 
President, February 1992. [5) Survey of Current Business. [6) Economic Indicators. [7) Bureau of 
Labor Statistics. [8) Abraham and Houseman (1993: 49). 
Noter. Notes appear in column number (); numbered sources appear in brackets [). 
Germany (l) Hourly nominal wage cost including employer's contributions to social security; private 
nonfarm sector [2]. (3) Private nonfarm sector [2]. (5) = (1) - (3). (7) Real value added per hour 
worked, 1985 = 100, private nonfarm sector [2). (9) Unadjusted labor's share as displayed in the 
national accounts, i.e., total wage bill divided by national income; aggregate economy [2 ). 
U.S. (2) Employment cost index linked to average hourly earnings index times compensation of 
employees divided by wages and salaries. Includes employer costs for employee benefits; private nonfarm 
sector [5) and [7]. (4) Private nonfarm sector [5 ). (6) = (2) - (4). (8) Output per hour, private 
nonfarm business sector [7]. (10) Definition same as for Germany [4]. 
periods. Given the widespread characterization of the German labor movement as 
strong and the American as weak, it is clearly surprising to find that the German 
labor share of income declined much more in the late l 980's than did the American. 
Employment developments are one but not the only indicator of economic success. 
For example, the enormous job growth in the U.S. may be paid for by inefficiencies, 
that is by low productivity growth and hence income stagnation (Freeman 1988b). 
Germany, on the other hand, experienced high rates of productivity growth (Figure 
1.2) which were in pan made possible by a "lean labor force," that is low labor force 
panicipation. Productivity is measured by output per hour worked and this may be an 
incomplete measure, if high productivity growth is achieved by the exclusion of less 
productive workers or by the exclusion of activities with low productivity, like many 
services. It may well be that high productivity growth-the efficiency of the 
employed workers-is paid for by a loss in less efficient production. Therefore, 
income per capita of the working age population may be a more appropriate measure 
for the comparison of the overall economic performance between the U.S. and 
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and Germany has been much higher than the difference in growth of income per 
capita indicating the greater importance of income transfers in Germany. 
Although the U.S. experienced, without doubt, more employment growth than 
Germany, the view that a sclerotic German labor market is not able to reallocate 
labor between industries is certainly mistaken. On the contrary, the German labor 
market managed substantial reallocation of labor with stagnating overall employ-
ment so that some industries were expanding while others were shrinking 
simultaneously (Table 1.3). Structural change in the U.S., on the other hand, took 
place by diverging but positive employment growth rates (Appelbaum and 
Schettkat 1990, 1993). Spurred by the tremendous increase in demand after the 
unification of the two Germanies the West German economy added 1.8 million 
jobs between 1990 and 1992. This hardly suppons the view that the sclerotic 
German economy is unable to increase employment. 
REGULATION AND DEREGULATION: THE CHANGING 
VIEW ON INSTITUTIONS IN ECONOMICS 
Microeconomic analysis of the functioning of institutions along the lines of the 
new institutionalism, as well as research on innovation processes, produced insights 
into natural rigidities. Contract theory (Coase 1937; Williamson et al 1975) 
emphasizes the costs of transactions and suggests that the choice of institutions 
should be looked at as an optimization between market and nonmarket (hierarchi-
cal) transactions. Neither market nor nonmarket transactions are costless. Market 
transactions produce costs for searching, contracting etc., nonmarket transactions 
produce costs for personnel, negotiations etc. However, an important difference is 
that market transactions-at least in their pure sense-are short-term oriented 
(spot market) whereas the latter are always long-term oriented. The latter therefore 
reduce short-term flexibility but may improve long-term flexibility (Buttler 1987). 
Of course, stability (long-term contracting) reduces the ability to react to 
temporary shocks, but on the other hand, higher stability opens up completely new 
and different paths of development. There may not only be a difference between 
short-run and long-run optimization but there may also be differences in what can 
actually be achieved. That is to say that institutions not only influence the cost side 
but that they also influence output, quantitatively as well as qualitatively. 
Research on innovation processes (Rosenberg 1982; Nelson and Winter 1982; C. 
Freeman 1989), for example, show that in a technological dynamic environment, spot-
market transactions may produce prohibitive costs and stifle innovation. Long-term 
relationships are required to engage in innovation processes with uncertain outcomes. 
Employment security, for example, may be necessary to ensure workers' cooperation for 
productivity improvements. Indeed, insiders get preferred access to new technology, 
promoting employment security in more innovative industries (Schettkat 1989). 
However, there are also other reasons for stable employment. The great bulk of working 
rules cannot be codified, therefore tacit knowledge embodied in the firms' employees as 
well as in the organization become imponant (David 1975). 
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Table 1.3 The Structure of Employment Growth by Industry in the FRG and the U.S. (in percent) 
Germany U.S. 
Shares Growth Shares of Shares Growth Shares of 
of (compound Shares of New fobs of (compound Shares of new jobs 
Employment annual rates) New fobs in Services Employment annual rates) New fobs in Strvkts 
1987 1979-1987 1979-1987 1979-1987 1987 1979-1987 1979-1987 1979-1987 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
All Industries Number (000) 26,350 709 109,854 14,467 
Percent 100 0 100 100 2 100 
Agriculture/Mining 5 -2 -39 4 0 1 
Industry 41 -1 -107 25 0 -2 
Construction 6 -3 -50 6 2 7 
Nondurable Manufacturing 10 -1 -31 6 -1 -2 
Durable Manufacturing 23 -1 -35 9 -2 -9 
Information and Knowledge Mfg 2 2 9 3 1 2 
All Services Number (000) 14,197 1,751 78.595 14,688 
Percent 54 2 247 100 72 3 102 100 
Information and Knowledge Services 22 2 117 47 28 3 44 44 
Education 5 3 34 14 8 1 7 6 
Communication 3 1 6 3 2 2 2 2 
Finance, Insurance, Real Estate 4 3 30 12 7 3 12 11 
Business and Professional 3 5 42 17 6 7 18 18 
Public Administration 8 0 4 2 5 2 6 6 
Other Services 31 2 130 53 44 2 57 56 
Health Services 6 3 42 17 8 3 11 11 
Social Welfare Services 3 5 32 13 3 5 6 6 
Personal and Recreation exc. HH 2 2 8 3 3 3 4 4 
Private Household 0 -2 -1 -1 1 -2 -1 -1 
Eating/Drinking Places, Hotels 3 2 15 6 6 4 11 11 
Retail Trade 9 1 13 5 12 2 11 10 
Wholesale Trade 4 1 15 6 4 2 5 5 
Guard, Ocaning and Repair 1 3 4 2 3 4 6 6 
Transportation/Public Utilities 5 0 4 1 5 1 4 4 
Sourrn: Appelbaum and Schettkat 1990; calculations are based on unpublished data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics, Current population survey for U.S.; from Statistuchea Bundesarnt, 
Mikrounsus for Germany 
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These arguments may be more important if the firm's environment is less stable 
and if products change quickly. Whereas detailed working rules are worth 
developing in the case of mass production, in small batch production this produces 
prohibitive costs. The production process relies on workers' cooperation. Too many 
unforeseen events happen which cannot be handled as with "flexible cooperation." 
That is to say, that quick responses to volatile product markets may require stable 
rather than unstable employment. 
Often flexibility is equated with mobility that is numerical or external flexibility. 
In this sense it means the ability of firms to adjust their work force by hiring and 
firing. But flexibility can also mean skill flexibility and may be achieved without any 
observed mobility in the labor market (Sengenberger 1987). The link between 
specific tasks and workers is an imponant difference between work organization in 
the U.S. and Germany. Whereas the task-worker link tends to be narrowly defined 
in the U.S., it is much weaker in Germany and this, together with a highly skilled 
work force, allows for internal adjustment as an alternative to external adjustments. 
A similar case has been put forward with respect to human resource develop-
ments. Human capital theory suggests that investments in firm-specific human 
capital are causing higher employment stability because firms want to preserve these 
investments. This is perfectly good reasoning in a basically stable world where only 
unforeseen temporary shocks occur. In an uncertain world, however, the causation 
may be the other way round: Higher employment stability may be a necessary 
precondition for firms and employees to make specific human capital investments 
(Blinder and Krueger 1992; Buttler and Walwei 1992). Institutions that stabilize 
the economy and reduce uncertainty may be a precondition for certain investments 
and associated risks. The German apprenticeship system may be a good case, where 
firms invest in skills for young workers to a high degree (see Chapter 8). The closer 
the actual labor market would come to the idealized market model, the greater 
would be the risk for specific human capital investments, and the lower would be 
the propensity to carry these risks.The latter has led to investigations on whether 
regulations are functional or disfunctional, whether they are endogenous or exo-
genous; whether they are codified best practice or external constraints (Chapter 12). 
Greater wage flexibility has been proposed as the key measure to adjust and to 
reallocate the labor force. Collectively negotiated wages in Europe supposedly 
destroyed the price-signal function of wages and thus slowed economic restructur-
ing and led to stagnating employment. However, work on the impact of the degree 
of centralization in wage bargaining on employment performance (Freeman 1988a; 
Calmfors and Driffill 1988) showed that economies with centralized bargaining 
systems-which typically show low wage dispersion-experienced a comparable 
employment performance as economies with decentralized bargaining 
systems-which typically show wide wage dispersion. Economies positioned in the 
middle of a decentralized-centralized spectrum suffered most from low employ-
ment (Appelbaum and Schettkat 1993). 
Linda Bell and Richard Freeman (1985) have pointed out that wage flexibility is 
often implicitly used as a synonym for downward wage flexibility. Undoubtedly, 
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downward flexible wages will preserve jobs in declining industries, but the wage 
flexibility coin has two sides, it also means upward mobility of wages. Upward 
wage flexibility causes jobs in the more productive industries to expand less than 
those with lower upward wage flexibility. Bell and Freeman conclude that a certain 
degree of wage flexibility is necessary to ensure mobility of workers but that the net 
impact of wage flexibility needs to be calculated by subtracting job losses at the 
upper end of the productivity scale from job preservation at the lower end of the 
productivity scale. For the U.S., the authors conclude that employment expansion 
could have been greater with less flexible wages. 
An important allegation against employment protection laws and subsequent 
costs is that these measures increase labor costs and thus lead to lower employment 
levels. They secure jobs for those employed, but by reducing the overall level of 
employment they exclude the unemployed: "It's a nice job if you can get one." 
Giuseppe Bertola (1992) argued that hiring and firing should not just be added to 
labor costs, as one would do in a static analysis, but that the dynamic effects of 
these costs need to be investigated. From his analysis he concludes that positive 
firing costs may well increase the level of employment. However, the impact of 
employment protection laws may be overestimated, because usually functional 
equivalents like short hours subsidies exist (Abraham and Houseman 1993 and 
Chapter 12 in this volume). 
It is also argued that positive firing costs are necessary to achieve a social 
optimum. If employers would not carry firing costs, frequent dismissals may result. 
But dismissed workers cause costs for the society. They have less income to be 
spent, they rely on unemployment insurance benefits, etc. Positive firing costs 
endogenize at least parts of the social costs subsequent to dismissals into the 
decision-making process of the firm. 
The intention of this short discussion is to show that the impact of institutions 
on economic performance is ambivalent. Institutions and regulations may limit the 
degrees of freedom of individual action, but they also reduce uncertainty (North 
1990) and may create opportunities for action not available otherwise. In this 
sense, the decision is not one between regulation and nonregulation but rather one 
between different degrees and different forms of regulation. 
THE PLAN OF THE BOOK 
The functioning of labor markets in any industrialized economy is influenced by 
the regulation of the following areas: 
1 work organization; 
2 bargaining; 
3 vocational training; and 
4 employment adjustments (e.g. matching processes, employment protection). 
The U.S. and Germany differ substantially in the ways these areas are regulated. For 
example, employment protection is well established in Germany but the U.S. can 
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be characterized as "employment at will." This creates different costs and opponuni-
ties. Higher degrees of employment protection may slow employment adjustments 
to shocks. However, there are functional equivalents to hiring and firing, i.e. 
variations of average hours worked (see Chapter 12). Table 1.4 gives an overview of 
the main institutional characteristics of the U.S. and German economies. 
The contributions of the volume are organized by the following sub-topics: 
Work Organization 
Using a large survey of establishments Paul Osterman analyzes the impact of new 
modes of work organization-like broad job definitions, team work, employee 
problem-solving groups, quality circles-on productivity. Made in America 
(Dertouzos et al. 1989) emphasized the importance of flexible work organization. 
Although there is a broad debate, it is not known how many firms undertake 
flexible work organization and which do not. Today, since skill requirements are 
not technologically determined, the questions asked are: How much training is there 
and why do some employers train more than others? In particular Paul Osterman's 
contribution seeks to provide an answer for the following set of questions: 
1 What is the distribution of work organization practices across American firms?; 
2 What determines which employers adopt the bundle of practices which are 
currently termed "high performance work practices?"; and 
3 Are the training practices of establishments related to the nature of their work 
organization and other aspects of the establishment structure? 
The Osterman survey establishes a positive association between high perfor-
mance work systems and training efforts. For instance, the higher skilled the core 
jobs the more training is provided. Payment of efficiency wages is associated with 
higher levels of spending on training, while blue-collar workers are less likely to 
receive training. Also, a higher share of female core workers reduces training effort. 
The positive impact of flexible work organization on training holds only for more 
recently introduced innovations. 
German-type works councils generate substantial interest in the U.S. because 
they seem to enable cooperative relationships between workers and management. 
They can serve as "a direct channel of communication between workers and 
management" (Freeman 1976) and they may be an efficient measure to create voice 
(Hirschman 1970). Bernd Frick and Dieter Sadowski give an overview of the 
literature on the economic impact of works councils in Germany and conclude that 
former studies were too ambitious in trying to establish a comprehensive measure 
for economic performance. The authors concentrate instead on a more specific 
measure, which is the impact of works council on personnel turnover. Works 
councils have a strong influence on the level of dismissals where they can object to 
them. The analysis, based on a large survey of establishments in Germany, shows 
that in establishments with a works council the turnover rate over a two-year period 
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Furthermore, works councils seem also to reduce quits but they seem not to have a 
negative impact on hiring rates. The works council's "voice" apparently fosters the 
economic survival of the firm in periods of contraction, thereby serving the 
interests of insiders. In expansionary periods, however, works councils tend to 
reduce the use of overtime work and thereby foster the recruitment of outsiders. 
The conditions that might make one country's policy more or less transferable 
elsewhere are examined in the contribution by Daniel Hamermesh. He develops 
specific guidelines that can indicate when policy transfers are more likely to be 
successful. Hysteresis phenomena are considered to be a major obstacle against 
simple policy transfers. Hamermesh then compares policies restrictions on hours 
worked in Germany and the U.S. to study differences between these two countries. 
He emphasizes the quite neglected distinction between patterns of hours per week 
and hours per day. Unusual patterns of working hours are found for the U.S. 
where a significant fraction of the labor force either works long hours on few days, 
or, more commonly works relatively short hours over many days per week. 
Compared to the U.S., the German working hours pattern is much closer to a 
standard "forry-hours-five-day-workweek." 
Bargaining 
Why do Americans and Germans work different hours is the question asked by 
Linda Bell and Richard Freeman. Germans work shorter hours than Americans, 
who have, together with the Japanese, the longest hours of work. This, however, is 
a recent trend. The U.S. was among the earliest countries to establish the eight-
hour-five-day workweek and vacation time expanded considerably after World War 
II. In the 1950's and 1960's Americans worked considerably fewer hours than 
Germans and not until the 1980's did German hours worked fall below American 
hours worked. Based on microdata sets Bell and Freeman investigate the potential 
causes for this gap which include demographics, labor supply responses, institu-
tions like strong unions and works councils, the legal framework, and preferences. 
Do individualized bargaining systems produce results which fit individuals' 
preferences better than collective bargaining systems? 
Bell and Freeman find that although American workers work more hours than 
do workers in Germany and other European countries, they are still more likely to 
prefer additional hours than are German and other European workers. Further-
more, Germans are predisposed to further reductions in hours and more Germans 
than Americans are satisfied with the hours they actually work. The authors 
hypothesize that the difference partially reflects more subtle supply behavior in the 
form of responses to differences in labor market inequality, and present some 
suggestive evidence that people in settings with greater earnings inequality work 
more than those in settings with less inequality. 
Interindustry wage differentials gained substantial attention in recent years 
(e.g. Krueger and Summers 1987; Dickens and Katz 1987) and macroeconomic 
studies emphasized on bargaining systems (e.g. Calmfors and Driffill 1988; 
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Freeman 1988; Soskice 1990). The chapter by Lutz Bellmann and Joachim 
Moller analyzes wage levels and wage structures in Germany as compared to the 
U.S. The authors give an overview of wage setting in Germany, present results 
of previous studies on wage differentials and analyze wage differentials with a 
large individual data set which comprises all employees covered by social 
security insurance. Their study is comparable to the Krueger-Summers study of 
the U.S. but the analysis concentrates on German men working full-time in 
order to reduce the noise in the data. 
Formal qualifications are more important for explanations of wage differentials 
in Germany than they are in the United States or in Sweden. That is, investments 
in human capital are rewarded in Germany where collective wage agreements in 
every industry classify certain qualificational groups. However, even when 
controlling for human capital variables "unexplained" interindustry wage differ-
entials remain and these seem to have increased during the 1980's. 
Following Weitzman's article (1983) the connection between pay schemes, 
employment and inflation is widely discussed. Blinder (1990) highlights the 
proposed relationship between pay schemes and labor productivity. Vivian 
Carstensen, Knut Gerlach and Olaf Hubler ask why few firms in Germany 
have introduced profitsharing schemes and they discuss the incentives as well as 
the impacts of profitsharing programs on firms' productivity trends. In their 
empirical investigation the authors find a great variety of profitsharing schemes 
in Germany. Larger firms are more likely to have a profitsharing scheme. 
Additionally, low competition and high market shares seem to foster such 
schemes. It may well be that profit sharing is used mainly in successful firms to 
motivate their work force. Due to the great variety of actual profitsharing 
schemes and the influence of nonpecuniary variables and participatory 
arrangements the relationship between profit sharing and productivity is not as 
clear cut as found in other studies. 
Vocational Training 
Why do German firms train is the main question Wolfgang Franz and David 
Soskice analyze. According to the standard Becker model employers should not 
invest in general training, but in Germany they do train apprentices in marketable 
skills although no sanctions or penalties exist for firms that do not train. The 
authors provide a short overview of the basic institutional features of the so-called 
dual educational system in Germany, which combines practical training in firms 
with more theoretical education in publicly financed schools. Based on a theoretical 
model, Franz and Soskice argue that large companies carry a net financial burden 
for the training of their apprentices. Although apprentices get high-quality training 
in marketable (general) skills, apprentices also pick up company-specific skills 
which would be costly if "outsiders" were hired. In smaller firms, by contrast, 
training costs seem to be overestimated. The authors suggest that apprentice 
training can be done at low or no net costs. 
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Employment Adjustments 
Robert Flanagan criticizes the standard labor market model in economics, which 
relates mobility in labor markets to variations in employment levels only. This is in 
stark contrast to the observed high mobility in labor markets (see Chapters 11 and 
13 in this volume). Employer search and hiring behavior in economic models 
became a black box in the face of increasingly sophisticated formulations of how 
workers identified and accepted job offers. Flanagan's contribution provides a 
review and interpretation of the recent literature on how the structure of 
information in labor markets can influence the effect of institutional interventions 
in those markets. Policy intervention, such as targeted wage subsidies, advance 
notice of layoffs, restrictions on dismissals, and pay compression, are investigated. 
The extension of the basic model by signaling and screening allows Flanagan to 
show why group specific wage subsidies fail to produce the effects predicted by the 
standard model. Signaling effects can overcompensate cost reduction effects which 
are the main ingredient in the standard model. 
Differences in the job mediation processes in the U.S., Germany, and other 
European countries are analyzed by Friedrich Buttler and Ulrich Walwei. In 
Germany, as in some other European countries, public employment services are in 
a monopoly position, in contrast to the institutional arrangements in the U.S. 
International comparisons show that a monopoly of public employment services 
does not necessarily open the way to high placements through these agencies. 
Public and private services can coexist but the coexistence can lead to substantial 
signaling effects. More effective employment services could reduce the unemploy-
ment duration and thus reduce the equilibrium rate of unemployment. The 
authors discuss possible consequences of public and private mediation agencies. 
Job turnover, the gross creation and destruction of jobs, is distinct from labor 
turnover, which captures the conclusion and completion of employment contracts. 
Gross job creation and destruction is much higher than net variation as recent 
empirical studies have shown (e.g. Leonard 1987). Knut Gerlach and Joachim 
Wagner review the literature and present an empirical analysis for Germany and 
the U.S. Even in periods of minor net changes in jobs, gross variations are high and 
the latter varies much less over the business cycle. "The main point of all this is that 
labor demand is a more complex issue than is reflected by consideration of the neo-
classical theory of production, as useful as that theory has been" (Hamermesh 
1993). Do smaller firms grow faster than larger ones? Gerlach and Wagner 
investigate this question on the basis of a large sample of firms in Lower Saxony 
and found no such effect, which is in contrast to recent findings in American 
studies. 
Susan Houseman and Katharine Abraham investigate the employment 
response to output variations in the U.S. and in Germany. Although dismissals are 
more costly in Germany than in the U.S., subsidized shon-time work and lower 
overtime premiums in Germany allow for speed and volume adjustments in hours 
worked similar to those in the U.S. The difference between the two countries lies 
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mainly in the means used to achieve the adjustments. In the U.S. average hours 
worked remain constant while the number of persons employed varies. In Germany 
average hours worked vary but the number of employed persons remains more 
stable. In the long run, however, in both economies the number of persons 
employed is reduced as a reaction to demand reductions. In a longitudinal analysis 
within Germany, Houseman and Abraham do not find evidence that the Works 
Constitution Act of 1972-which actually strengthened workers' rights-as well 
as the Employment Promotion Act of 1985-which actually released restrictions 
on the conclusion of fixed-term employment contracts-affected the adjustment 
behavior of firms substantially. 
A shon overview of changes in regulations potentially affecting the functioning 
of labor markets in Germany is given in the contribution by Ronald Schettkat. He 
attributes the sharp decrease in overall labor market mobiliry in Germany to 
macroeconomic conditions rather than to changing incentive structure. The excess 
supply of labor has shortened the hiring chain, that is decreased in job-to-job 
mobility. Beveridge curves and matching functions for the U.S. and Germany are 
compared. He further argues that the analysis of matching processes should be 
based on flow data rather than on stock data which hide the actual dynamics of the 
labor market. The author concludes that empirical evidence suggests that the 
functioning of labor markets in Germany did not deteriorate over time. 
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WORK ORGANIZATION AND 
TRAINING IN AMERICAN 
ENTERPRISES 
Paul Osterman 
Interest in new forms of work organization has exploded in America. Behind this 
emphasis is the view that gains in productivity depend upon adoption of new 
modes of work organization, models which entail innovations such as broad job 
definitions, use of teams, employee problem-solving groups, and quality circles. 
Indeed, the U.S. Department of Labor has established an "Office of the American 
Workplace" aimed at encouraging the spread of these innovations. 
Despite the growing policy commitment to these new forms of work organiz-
ation several basic questions remain unanswered. We do not know how many firms 
are engaged in reorganizing work nor can we explain which firms undertake these 
efforts and which do not. With respect to the first question one widely cited 
national estimate comes from the Commission on the Skills of the American 
Workforce, which claimed that five percent of employers are so-called High 
Performance Work Organizations (1990). However, the Commission has never 
described clearly the source of this estimate. 
With regard to the second question, systematic study of the determinants of 
adoption, the literature is extremely sparse. There is little or no systematic research 
that takes work organization as the dependent variable and tests hypotheses found 
in the literature. Adequate data have not hithertofore been available to take the 
discussion very much beyond anecdotal evidence. 
The substantial interest in diffusing these new forms of work organization has 
raised the ancillary question of whether firms and schools are providing enough 
training to enable effective use of these systems. After a long social science debate 
concerning the trajectory of skill, the presumed tendency is now in the direction of 
upskilling and the question is under what circumstances it is occurring and whether 
the pace is fast enough. This perspective is given additional weight by data which 
seem to show a substantial twist in the wage structure in the direction of increased 
demand for skill (Levy and Murnane 1993; Katz and Murphy 1992). 
The research on the determinants of training across organizations is also less than 
satisfactory. There are several representative national surveys of individuals (such as 
a supplement to the Current Population Survey and the National Longitudinal 
Survey of Youth) as well as some surveys of firms. Examples of firm surveys include 
those conducted by the American Society of Training and Development (Carnevale 
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1990), The Conference Board (Lusterman 1985), and Training Magazine. 
However, the technical quality of the employer surveys is somewhat mixed. 1 
These surveys tend to show that the aggregate volume of training expenditure is 
quite high and that the distribution of training is very much biased toward 
managers and white-collar workers and away from blue-collar employees. 
(Lynch1990; Osterman and Kochan 1993; Brown 1990). However, these studies 
typically contain little contextual information on firms and so we cannot 
understand which kinds of employers do what. 
The emphasis on work organization and productivity has also added a slightly 
different twist to the skills debate. The older discussion of the skill trajectory of 
new technology often carried with it the implicit assumption that once the 
technology was in place how it was used was foreordained. This "technological 
determinism" view left little space for choice. The more recent discussion, with its 
emphasis on international comparisons, shows quite clearly that the same 
technology can be deployed in different ways and with different impacts upon skill. 
This is the central lesson of the international automobile industry research 
(MacDuffie 1991; Womack et al. 1990; Brown et al. 1991; Adler 1993). This 
finding in turn transforms the older question-"what is the impact of technology 
upon skill" into the issue now more commonly debated in policy circles-"how 
much training is there and why do some employers train more than others?" In 
other words, skill has come to be seen as the outcome variable which in turn is 
determined by choices which vary across employers. 
This chapter takes up three questions, which emerge from the foregoing 
discussion: 
• What is the distribution of work organization practices across American firms? 
• What determines of which employers adopt the bundle of practices which are 
currently termed "high performance" practices? 
• How can the training practices of establishments be related to the nature of their 
work organization and other aspects of establishment structure? This includes, 
but is not limited to, the more narrow but important question of whether it is 
true that establishments which adopt elements of High Performance Work 
Organizations (HPWO) tend to provide more training for their employees than 
do other enterprises. 
The chapter employs a new, nationally representative, survey of establishments-
described in the next section-to answer these questions. Following the description 
of the survey, the chapter analyzes the incidence of shifts in work organization and 
estimates several models explaining variation across establishments in the use of 
these new work systems. The chapter then turns to training and seeks both to 
explain variation in training effort across establishments and to understand whether 
shifts in work organization are associated with heightened training. The chapter 
concludes with a brief discussion of the relevance of these findings to Germany. As 
noted earlier, the chapter draws substantially from two previous articles (Osterman 




The survey upon which this chapter is based was conducted in the summer and fall 
of 1992 and contains 875 observations on American establishments. 2 An 
establishment is defined as a business address and is distinct from a company. For 
example, each assembly plant of General Motors is an establishment, as is the 
corner gas station. Establishment-based sampling is more likely to produce accurate 
data on work practices than questions addressed to officials in corporate headquar-
ters. The sampling universe was the Dun and Bradstreet establishment file which 
purports to be a list of all establishments in the nation.3 Considerable effort was 
devoted to the selection of the most knowledgeable respondent within the 
establishment and this person was often not on the human resource staff. 4 
The sampling was limited to establishments with fifty or more employees in 
nonagricultural industries. 5 Nonprofit organizations were also eliminated. The 
sampling was size stratified in order to create adequate samples within size 
categories and appropriate weights are used to create a representative sample of 
establishments. The response rate was 65.5 percent.6 
A final point regarding the survey procedure concerns the unit of analysis within 
the establishment. Many variables were collected for the entire establishment. 
However, detailed information on work organization was obtained only for CORE 
employees. This is because no single answer regarding, say, job training is likely to 
be applicable to all occupational groups within an establishment. It was not 
practical to collect ILM data on all job families and so the notion of a CORE job 
was developed. The CORE job was defined as: 
The largest group of non-supervisory, non-managerial workers at this 
location who are directly involved in making the product or in providing the 
service at your location. We want you to think of the various groups directly 
involved in making the product or providing the service and then focus on 
the largest group. For example, these might be assembly-line workers at a 
factory or computer programs in a software company, or sales or service 
representatives in an insurance company. 
The distribution of CORE jobs was: 14.3 percent professional/managerial; 19.0 
percent sales; 6.0 percent clerical; 18.3 percent service; and 42.3 percent blue-collar. 
FLEXIBLE WORK ORGANIZATION 
In order to describe and analyze the distribution of more flexible work systems we 
must define and operationalize the idea. The problem is that there is no single 
accepted definition. While it seems fair to say that the many scholars who have 
written on the topic have the same broad set of practices in mind each author 
places somewhat different emphasis. 
The survey asked about a series of practices (all with respect to the CORE job 
family) and I will focus on the four most often seen as most central to transformed 
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organizations: self-directed work teams, job rotation, use of employee problem-
solving groups {or quality circles), and use of Total Quality Management {later in 
the chapter I will also examine Statistical Process Control but for the present 
purposes this is too specialized to manufacturing). For each the respondent was 
asked whether or not the practice was employed in the establishment and if so what 
percentage of CORE employees were involved. The precise definitions given for 
each practice are shown in Appendix A. 7 
The first tabular results showed the distribution of each practice for two levels of 
penetration: whether the practice is used at all and whether at least 50 percent of 
CORE employees are involved (see Tables 2.1 (a) and 2.1 (b) in Appendix B). 
It is dear that if we simply ask whether or not a given practice is used among any 
fraction of CORE employees then we would conclude that the elements of flexible 
work are quite widespread. For example, over half of the establishments use teams 
and 33.5 percent of the establishments employ TQM. 
The story becomes different, however, when we examine penetration. Looking at 
the intermediate category of 50 percent or more employees involved, the rates fall 
sharply. Each practice falls by roughly 15 percentage points. 8 Even so, the 
distribution of self-directed work teams is surprisingly widespread. There is dearly 
some discontinuity between the extent of usage of this practice and the others. 
The manufacturing/blue-collar patterns are similar in that there is a substantial 
diffusion of the practices at any usage level and there is a drop-off when one sets a 
50 percent threshold for participation. Self-directed teams appear less widespread 
in manufacturing than elsewhere in the economy9 but the other practices are more 
common. 
These data lead to the natural question of whether the practices form groups from 
which emerge identifiable patterns which might be thought of as the new 3YStems 
discussed in the literature. A second table (Table 2.2) revealed how the practices 
cluster together when a 50 percent penetration threshold is set (no conclusions are 
changed when other thresholds are imposed). It appears that there is no single major 
dominant cluster of practices. There is some representation for each of the possible 
combinations and in most of the cases the distribution of clusters seems rather even. 
A final question, which is virtually imposed by the popular discussion, is whether 
it is possible to provide a summary figure regarding the use of High Performance 
Work Organizations. The numerous definitions in the scholarly literature might 
lead one to suspect that this is a difficult question to answer and nothing in these 
data suggests otherwise. As already noted, there is no dominant pattern. 
Pushed to arrive at a definition, it might be reasonable to characterize an 
organization as "transformed" if there are at least two practices in place with 50 
percent or more of CORE employees involved in each. By this definition 36.6 
percent of the entire sample, 43.0 percent of nonmanufacturing, and 35.9 percent 
of manufacturing establishments are of the new breed. 10 These estimates are 
considerably higher than those commonly cited and although the definition is 
admittedly arbitrary it is likely that the truth is much closer to these figures than to 
those found in popular accounts. 
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Explaining the Distribution of Work Practices 
The next step is to try and understand why some establishments have adopted these 
various work practices while others have not. 
The independent variables are intended to test many of the explanations which 
have appeared in the literature concerning variation in the adoption of flexible 
work practices across establishments. These explanations can be clustered in several 
categories: 
Markets and Strategy 
One would expect that the nature of an establishment's competitors and of its 
market would influence the choice of work systems. However, the relationships are 
not necessarily simple and straightforward. Consider first competitive pressure. 
Normally, one might expect that an establishment selling in a market with many 
competitors will be under pressure to adopt the most productive possible work 
system and this may indeed lead to elements of flexible work organization. 
Offsetting this, however, is the consideration that new work systems represent 
considerable investment and firms which face very competitive market situations 
may be operating on too tight a margin to undertake these long-run investments. 
The variable measuring the competitiveness of product markets is called 
COMPETIV (for definitions see Table 2.3). 11 
In addition to the degree of competition in the market it is also important to 
consider the identiry of the competitors. Much of the pressure to adopt new 
production systems has come from the example of foreign competitors and this 
would seem to be strongest for enterprises which compete in international markets. 
In addition to this market argument it seems reasonable to expect that establish-
ments which operate in international markets are more likely to be exposed to new 
ideas and practices. 12 The variable INTERNAT is a dummy variable which takes 
on the value of" l" if the establishment sells in international markets. 
A second aspect of an establishment's market concerns its competitive strategy. 
Much of the current discussion posits that employers face two broad competitive 
choices, one which implies competing on cost and the other in which the 
establishment competes on the basis of qualiry, variery, and service (Piore and 
Sabel 1984; Cuomo Commission 1988; Kochan and Osterman 1991). In popular 
discussion the former is referred to as the "low road" and the latter as the "high 
road," on the assumption that the latter carries with it the implication of more 
generous employment conditions (wages, etc.) and new work systems. 
The survey contained a set of questions intended to distinguish among these 
strategies. I assigned 100 points to the goal of competing on cost and then asked 
the respondents to indicate how many points three other competitive 
strategies-qualiry, variery, and service-would receive for their establishment in 
comparison. For example, if competing on qualiry was twice as important to the 
establishment as competing on cost it would be assigned 200 points. I employ the 
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first principle component of the three variables and this component is termed 
STRATEGY. Larger values of this variable imply greater use of the "high road" 
strategy. 13 
Technology 
An important aspect of technology is its complexity. It is reasonable to expect that 
the gains from the introduction of flexible work systems, and hence the likelihood 
of observing them, are greater under more rather than less complex technologies. 
This is measured by the variable SKLEV which takes on the value of "1" if the 
production process requires high levels of skill and "O" otherwise. 14 
Values 
It is well known from anecdotal evidence that firms which appear to observers to be 
similar with respect to markets, technology, and other structural characteristics 
nonetheless differ considerably in the human resource practices. 15 One possibility is 
that the values of the firm-for example the extent to which the enterprise is seen 
as a community or a "family" -might be important. This consideration is given 
weight by the observation that Japanese employers have more of a community or 
stakeholder view of their enterprise than do Americans and that this helps explain 
various work practices (Dore 1973; Lincoln and Kalleberg 1990). Kochan et al. 
(1984) cite management values as an important determinant of HR practices. 
About 50 percent of the survey instrument contained a long series of questions 
about benefits, particularly work-family benefits, and about enterprise values 
regarding these benefits. This portion of the questionnaire was administered prior 
to the work organization questions which are the subject of this chapter and hence 
the respondents' reply on values was unrelated to any suggestion which might have 
been implanted by the work organization section. In the context of asking about 
benefits the respondent was asked "In general, what is your establishment's 
philosophy about how appropriate it is to help increase the well being of employees 
with respect to their personal or family situations?" Establishments that responded 
(on a five-point scale) that it was "very" or "extremely" appropriate are assigned "1" 
on a dummy variable (called VALUE). 16 
Firm Environment 
An increasingly common argument is that some companies fail to transform their 
work organization because such transformations are long-term investments with 
considerable upfront costs and uncertainty. Many firms, so it is alleged, face 
pressures from investors to emphasize short-term profits at the expense of such long-
term investments (Porter 1992; Jacobs 1991). The variable HORIZON measures 
the extent to which the establishment feels such pressure. 17 
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There are several other environmental features which may influence adoption of 
new work systems. Establishments which are part of larger organizations (e.g. a 
branch plant) may receive greater resources, information, and technical assistance 
in adopting flexible work organization. In addition, they may be more likely to 
adopt flexible work systems due to isomorphic processes of coercion and mimicry 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Pfeffer and Cohen 1984; Baron, et al. 1988). A 
dummy variable LARGER takes on the value of "l" if the establishment is part of 
larger organization. 
Size is likely to be related to adoption but the direction is ambiguous. On the 
one hand, smaller establishments have fewer resources to devote to human resource 
innovations. This expectation is born out by the literature on training which 
demonstrates clearly that smaller firms train less than do large ones (Brown 1990). 
On the other hand, the literature on corporate reorganization and decentralization 
(as well as the policy discussion of networks) carries with it the implication that 
smaller establishments, which are not weighed down by the heavy hand of 
corporate bureaucracy, are more agile and likely to adopt new production 
techniques. In order to test for possible non-linear effects of size I use a step 
function, i.e. a series of size dummy variables. The omitted category is 100-499 
employees. 
The organizational sociology literature suggests that the AGE of an establish-
ment should inversely influence its rate of adoption of innovations because 
organizational forms tend to be "frozen" at birth (Stinchcomb 1965). Finally, 
whether or not a union is present seems important although the expected direction 
of the effect is not clear. There is considerable anecdotal evidence of instances in 
which unions have opposed the kinds of work rule changes which are implied by 
transformed systems but there are also instances in which unions have been 
cooperative and helpful in the process (Katz 1985; Cappelli and Sherer 1989). The 
net effect is an empirical question. The variable UNION measures whether 
employees at the establishment are covered by a union. 
The models also include dummy variables for the CORE occupations and for 
industry. 18 
Estimation 
An important difficulty is that there is no single obvious way to estimate a model 
explaining adoption of flexible work practices. I will take three approaches to an 
overall characterization of the establishment. First, I will estimate a logit model in 
which the dependent variable takes on the value of" l" if an establishment engages 
in at least one of the practices at the 50 percent level of penetration and "0" 
otherwise. The advantage is that this is straightforward and readily interpretable. 
The problem is that it is a bit arbitrary in that an establishment with 49 percent 
penetration is classified as "O." A second approach is to use principal components 
analysis to create a new variable which is constructed from the percentage of 
penetration of each of the four practices. I therefore create an index that is the first 
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principal component of the four penetration variables and this is treated as a 
dependent variable. 19 The third approach is to estimate an ordered probit model in 
which the dependent variable ranges from zero to four, with each point on the 
scale representing an additional work practice at the 50 percent penetration level. 
Taken together these three dependent variables seem to represent the range of 
ways one might think about an overall characterization of an establishment. One 
model (the logic) asks whether any practice is used at all at the 50 percent level, 
another (the ordered probit) asks how many practices are used at the 50 percent 
level, and the third (the principal components) treats penetration as a continuous 
variable and creates an index of the four practices. The advantage of these different 
models is that we can see which findings are robust across specifications. 20 
Results of the estimations are presented in Table 2.4. The first column 
contains coefficients for logic model concerning whether the establishment engages 
in any practices at the 50 percent level of penetration, the second column 
contains the principle component model and the third column is the ordered 
probit. The logic coefficients have been transformed so that they have a direct 
interpretation. 21 
Several conclusions come through quite strongly. Most impressive is the 
importance of managerial values. In all equations the coefficient on VALUE is 
positive and significant. This is especially striking given that the question was asked 
in the context of attitudes toward employees' social and economic welfare and not 
in regard to specific issues of work organization. Evidently, independent of any 
productivity gains to be had from flexible work organization, establishments which 
believe that they have responsibility for employee welfare are more likely to adopt 
innovative work practices. 
It is also striking that enterprises that sell in international markets are more likely 
to adopt work reform. This result holds independently of the overall level of 
competition in the market. One possible interpretation of this pattern is that 
establishments that are exposed to international markets learn more quickly than do 
others about alternative work practices. 22 
The third variable that produces consistently strong results is skill level. As the 
skill levels required by an enterprise's technology increase so does the use of the 
various work organization innovations. 
These models also support the view that establishments which follow the "high 
road" are more likely to adopt flexible work practices. In addition, being part of a 
larger enterprise, i.e. being a branch plant or office, also increases the likelihood of 
adoption of elements of flexible work organization. Finally, smaller enterprises, the 
lowest category and the omitted 100-499 category, seem more likely to use 
innovative work practices. 
In none of the equations is there evidence in support of the time horizons 





We now turn to a more careful examination of the determinants of training and 
how training effort is related to shifts in work organization. 
It is quite difficult to devise questions which accurately capture the training effort 
of firms. Firms do not keep good or standardized data on their training expendi-
tures. When asked to estimate the amount spent on training some firms will 
estimate their actual program costs while others will compute program costs plus 
the costs of the employee's time spent in the program while still others will impute 
an overhead rate to cover fixed costs (facilities, training staff, etc.). 
To complicate the measurement problem further, a great deal of employee 
development or "training" occurs informally on their job. Supervisors, coworkers, 
mentors, etc. all are important "trainers" for employees as they improve their 
proficiency. 
To obtain estimates of training effort which were consistent across establish-
ments the survey asked about a relatively narrow, but still important, form of 
training: the fraction of the CORE employees who attended formal off-the-job 
training (which could occur in vestibules, rooms at the work site, or in educational 
institutions). In addition, we asked about the number of days per year spent in 
such training. 
Table 2.5 confirms that two broadly held views are supported in these data. 
Blue-collar employees receive less training (in the sense that a smaller percent 
receive it) than do white-collar workers. In addition, for blue-collar workers 
training increases with establishment size. The latter finding, however, is not true 
for white-collar/professional employees, for whom the relationship between 
establishment size and training is the inverse of what we would expect. For those 
employees who do receive formal off-the-job training the training time spent does 
not seem to vary a great deal by occupation or establishment size. 
Explaining the Variation in Firm Training Practices 
Why do some firms provide more training than do others? In this section I will test 
a number of explanations commonly found in the literature. The dependent 
variable in the models that follow is the percent of the CORE employees who 
receive formal off-the-job training. 
Work Organization The key issue in the current debate, as I have already noted, 
is whether newer "transformed" forms of work organization require more skills and 
training. I will enter these variables in three ways into models explaining training 
effort. Initially I will simply use an index which is the number of practices which 
are in place at the fifty percent or more level of involvement by CORE employees. 
This index can range from zero to five.24 In subsequent models I will examine 
whether it makes a difference how recently the practices were introduced. 
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Make or Buy Firms have a choice between training their own employees or 
instead hiring employees who already possess the requisite skills. Driving this choice 
is the extent of available external supply, the extent to which the needed skills are 
highly firm-specific, the importance of socialization in firm procedures and culture, 
and the cost of internal training. 
The survey asked about the first and second most important hiring criteria and I 
recoded the open-ended replies into several categories: prior skills, personality and 
behavioral traits, and ability to learn. In the models that follow I include a dummy 
variable which takes of the value of "l" if prior skill was both the first and the 
second most important hiring criteria for CORE jobs. 
Employee Characteristics Previous literature on training (e.g. Lynch 1991) has 
demonstrated that women tend to receive less on-the-job training than do men and 
that training is positively correlated with level of education. I include variables 
measuring the percent of the CORE employees who are women and the average 
educational attainment of CORE employees. 25 
Internal Labor Market Structure The risk inherent in substantial trammg 
investments is that employees will leave and take the training investment with 
them. Internal labor market structures which create incentives to remain are a 
solution to this problem (Lazear 1987; Ryan 1984; Doeringer and Piore 1972). 
Three variables capture several alternative policies along these lines. The establish-
ments were asked how much preference was given to internal vs. external 
candidates in filling vacancies in the internal labor market and they were also asked 
how much weight was given to seniority in choosing among internal candidates for 
promotion. These are two measures of job ladders and are included in the models. 26 
In addition to job ladders another commonly cited strategy for retaining 
employees is to pay above market wages. This strategy, sometimes termed 
"efficiency wages," can pay for itself provided that the gains, in this case reduced 
turnover and retention of workers in whom the firm has invested, exceed the cost. 
The survey asked whether the establishment paid CORE workers a wage higher 
than that paid to comparable employees in local firms and a variable measuring the 
response is included. 27 
Skill and Technology The amount of training should obviously be related to the 
level of skill required in the job. This is measured by the variable SKLEV which 
takes on the value of "l" if the production process requires high levels of skill and 
"O" otherwise. 28 In addition, standard human capital theory predicts that when 
skills are enterprise-specific training provided by the firm will be more extensive 
(because the fear of turnover will be lessened). The variable SPECIFIC measures 
the extent of skill specificity. 29 
Institutional Considerations There are several characteristics of the establish-
ment which might be expected to influence the extent of training. One 
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consideration is size. Most of the training literature has found that small firms 
provide less formal training than do large ones (Bishop, undated). This may be due 
to greater fears of turnover among small firms (who are less able to develop lengthy 
job ladders) or fewer resources or managerial slack to devote to training. 
A second institutional consideration concerns the values of the enterprises' 
managers. The strategic choice literature in industrial relations (Kochan et al 
1986) suggests that managerial values may be important in selection of work 
organization and this may also be true with respect to the degree of investment in 
the work force. The values variable will be the same question employed earlier 
regarding attitudes toward the personal and family welfare of employees. 
The presence or absence of a union may be important. Unions can be expected 
to serve as a pressure group, or voice mechanism, pushing for increased investment 
in employees and hence one would expect a positive association between unionism 
and training effort. On the other hand, unions sometimes may act as protectors of 
traditional job rights and this may diminish the extent of training. 
The sociological literature on institutions suggests that certain "non-market" 
considerations may influence the extent of training programs (Meyer and Scott 
1991). The survey asked whether or not the establishment was part of a larger 
organization. If it is then pressures for organizational conformity and legitimation 
within the context of bureaucratic structures may lead to more extensive training 
(DiMaggio and Powell 1983; Pfeffer and Cohen 1984; Baron et al 1988). In 
addition, establishments that are part of larger organizations (e.g. a branch plant) may 
receive greater resources, information, and technical assistance. A dummy variable 
LARGER takes on the value of"l" if the establishment is part of larger organization. 
In general, it is reasonable to expect that the greater importance an establishment 
gives to human resources as part of its competitive strategy the greater the effort 
devoted to training. The survey asked "when senior management makes important 
decisions regarding long-run competitiveness how important are human resource 
considerations?" If the reply was very or extremely important, the variable 
HRROLE was coded "1." 
Finally, controls are included for the occupational group of the CORE job. As 
already noted, most prior research suggests that, all else constant, blue-collar 
workers receive less training than do higher level white-collar employees. 
Results 
Variable means and definitions are provided in Table 2.6 and Table 2.7 contains 
the estimated model. Because the dependent variable-percentage of the CORE 
employees who receive formal off-the-job training-is truncated both at zero and 
one hundred the appropriate estimation technique is the Tobie model. 
The central findings are: 
1 Use of high performance work systems are positively associated with increased 
training effort. 
30 
WORK ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING IN AMERICAN ENTERPRISES 
2 There is, indeed, a trade-off between make or buy. Firms which place heavy 
emphasis on hiring employees with previously acquired skills are less likely to 
provide training. 30 
3 The fraction of the CORE labor force that is female is negatively associated with 
training effort. On the other hand, there is no relationship between education 
level and training. 
4 The more highly skilled the CORE job, the more training is provided. However, 
contrary to expectations, jobs with specific skills are less likely to include 
employer provided training. This is the only coefficient in the model which is 
directly inconsistent with prior expectations. 
5 Jobs ladders do not seem to be related to training. However, payment of 
efficiency wages is associated with higher levels of training. 
6 Values are strongly related to training propensity. Two additional institutional 
variables are also important: The importance accorded to human resource 
considerations and whether or not the establishment is part of a larger organiz-
ation. In addition, unionism is also significantly related to training effort by 
establishments. 
7 Blue-collar employees are, all else equal, less likely to be the recipients of formal 
off-the-job training than are white-collar workers. The same is true for service 
employees. 
In summary this equation performs very well. It is clear that the new 
"conventional wisdom" is correct: flexible forms of work organization are 
associated with heightened training. It is also apparent that the training effort of a 
given establishment is determined by a mix of standard economic as well as 
institutional considerations. 
Returning to the theme of the relationship of work organization to training, one 
additional question can be addressed: Whether the impact of flexible work 
organization upon skill and training is permanent or rather associated with the 
recency of the innovation. Table 2.8 presents the coefficients of the work 
organization variables using alternative specifications which address these questions 
(the rest of the equations are the same as the earlier one). 
The survey asked firms the date at which they introduced each of the work 
organizational innovations which are captured in the index. In the first panel the 
index includes only those innovations which had been in existence for longer than 
five years at the time of the survey while in the second panel only those innovations 
which are five years or younger are included. It is clear that the positive impact of 
flexible work organization upon training holds true only for the more recently 
introduced innovations. The most natural interpretation of this finding is that once 
the innovation has been in place for a length of time it becomes sufficiently 
routinized so that additional training (beyond that provided by establishments 
which have not introduced the work organization changes) is not necessary. This, 
however, is speculative and alternative interpretations are also possible.31 
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A BRIEF COMPARISON WITH GERMANY 
There is no survey of German establishments which is comparable to the U.S. 
survey employed above. It is not possible, therefore, to engage in comparative 
econometric modeling of work systems and training. It is, however, possible to 
draw on a variety of sources to develop a rough sense about how patterns of work 
organization compare across the two nations. 
The standard story is that several elements of the German industrial relations 
system combine to bias firms strongly in the direction of what we have here termed 
"high performance work systems." These elements include extensive but broad 
occupational training generated by the dual apprenticeship system, the presence 
and substantial power of works councils in most establishments, strong industrial 
unions, and inhibitions on layoffs. The training system provides the skill basis for 
high performance work and also makes the implementation of such systems 
cheaper for any given firm. Works councils provide an internal lobby for 
broadening work and for using employees to their maximum potential. The strong 
unions make it difficult to use wage cutting as a competitive strategy and this helps 
force employers on the "high road." Layoff restrictions commit the firm to making 
the most of its incumbent work force (Streeck 1988). 
A series of industry studies, some within Germany and some comparing 
Germany to other nations, support the view that the logic outlined above is 
operative. Peter Berg concludes from his comparison of U.S. and German auto 
plants that "In general, German plants show greater willingness to move away from 
traditional Taylorism and expand the use of labor than U.S. plants." (Berg 1992: 
12). Berg also finds that the plants that make greater use of flexible work systems 
also engage in more training. In a similar vein, Lowell Turner and Peter Auer find 
that auto plants in Germany are converging to the use of teams (termed "group 
work"), total quality management, and just-in-time inventory systems (Turner and 
Auer 1992). Turner and Auer caution that the actual implementation of these 
workplace innovations varies in important ways across sites and across nations. 
However the broad picture they paint is movement toward flexibility in Germany. 
Kern and Schumann (1989) examine chemicals, electronics, and machine 
building as well as automobiles in Germany. On the basis of their survey they 
conclude that work is becoming more skilled and that a new occupational category, 
which they term "controllers," is emerging as the central player in these industries. 
These controllers are at the boundary of blue- and white-collar work and think of 
themselves as semi-professionals. Finally, the comparative studies conducted by S. 
J. Prais and his colleagues at Britain's National Economic Institute confirm that 
Germany (compared to Britain) makes heavy use of skilled employees in settings 
which give them considerable autonomy. 
Taken as a whole these case studies and limited surveys provide reasonably 
convincing evidence that what I have termed high performance work organizations 
are widespread in Germany and that their incidence is increasing. Having said this, 
we must also recognize that we have said nothing about the economic performance 
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of these work systems. Indeed, the recent difficulties of the German economy and 
the widespread perception that the cost structure of German firms may be too high 
raises difficult issues about the interrelationship between the physical productivity 
gains that flexible work systems seem to provide and the costs associated with 
attaining and maintaining these systems. This important question should be the 
topic of further research. 
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NOTES 
1 The response rate to the widely cited Training Magazine survey was 15.8 percent. 
2 After eliminating cases with missing variables and a few establishments that slipped into 
the survey inappropriately the final sample size used in this chapter is 694. 
3 In their comparison of this file with alternative sampling frames (the unemployment 
insurance files, the telephone White pages, direct enumeration, and Chamber of 
Commerce membership listings) Kalleger et al (1990) found that for a local area .the 
Dun and Bradstreet file and the unemployment insurance files yield representative 
samples and are the most preferred. For creating a national sample the Dun and 
Bradstreet file is the only practical choice. 
4 While in many cases a human resources person might be appropriate I wanted to avoid 
an automatic selection of people in this position. The reason for the concern was chat 
years of open-ended interviews with firms suggested to me chat too often HR staff, even 
at the establishment level, are not in touch with work organization. Therefore, the 
introductory letter said 
In order to get the best possible answers we need the cooperation of the most 
senior person at your location in charge of production of goods and services. For 
example, in manufacturing this might be the plant manager. In a non-
manufacturing setting it might be the head of the office or the manager 
responsible for operations. 
The interviewers worked with the establishment to identify the most knowledgeable 
respondent. In the end 46 percent of the respondents worked in the human resources 
function. 
5 According to the Dun and Bradstreet file, establishments with 50 or more employees 
represent just 10 percent of all establishments. However, according to the May, 1988 
Current Population Survey they represent 51 percent of all employees. 
6 The survey was conducted by the Universiry of Massachusetts Center for Survey 
Research. The response rate is well above that of other comparable surveys. It is possible 
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to estimate response rate bias by using variables in the Dun' s file. I estimate a logit model 
in which the dependent variable was the probability of response and the independent 
variables were size, a dummy if the establishment was manufacturing, a dummy variable 
if the establishment was a headquarters of a multibranch firm, and a dummy variable if 
the establishment was not pan of a larger enterprise. The manufacturing dummy and 
the headquaners dummy were significant. Transforming the coefficient at the mean 
value of the variables indicated that the probability of response increased by 5 percentage 
points if the respondent was manufacturing. A similar calculation revealed that 
probability of response decreased by 8 percentage points if the establishment was a 
headquaners. However, even among nonmanufacturing headquaner firms the response 
rate in the survey was 59.1 percent. The weights used in this chapter are adjusted to 
reflect nonresponse. 
7 As several people have pointed out, the survey did nor directly observe the actual work 
practices. There may be a tendency of respondents to exaggerate, in the direction of 
socially acceptable responses, their actual practices. However, as already noted, 
considerable care was taken to work with the most knowledgeable available respondent. 
Funhermore, as the statistical results below demonstrate, the responses are nor simply 
noise; they are correlated in sensible ways with explanatoty variables. Nonetheless, as is 
true in all surveys of this kind, the point estimates of the practices should be treated with 
caution. 
8 The results of Lawler et aL (1992) are broadly consistent with mine. They find char 56 
percent of the Fortune 1000 firms in their sample have quality circles and that 47 
percent have self-managed work teams. In both cases the modal degree of penetration is 
below 20 percent for those firms which do have the practice (Lawler et aL 1992: 20-22). 
9 Jan Klein (1991) suggests char this may be because self-managed work reams place 
strains on the inventoty management system in manufacturing. 
10 The Commission on the Skills of the American Workforce used the criteria of whether 
firms hired on the basis of a skill as opposed to behavior or ability to "get along." They 
assumed that firms which sought hard skills used them and hence were high performance 
organizations. The distinction between hard skills and behavioral skills is not concep-
tually clear, nor is the assumption that one can go from knowing about hiring rules to 
understanding work organization. However, leaving aside these problems the current 
survey can also provide estimates along these lines. We asked establishments an open-
ended question of what were their first and second most imponant hiring criteria for 
CORE jobs. We coded their responses into various categories. By the criteria of 
establishments which listed hard skills as their first most important hiring criteria 36.2 
percent were high performance and if we use the more stringent standard of hard skills 
being both the first and second most important criteria then the figure is 13.2 percent. 
11 The respondent was asked whether there were many firms selling products or services 
which competed with the establishment, a few firms, or no such firms. The variable is 
coded "l" if there are many competing firms and "O" if there are no competing firms or 
a few competing firms. 
12 For example, in the automobile industry quality circles were included in contract 
language as early as 1973 but were only implemented on a wide scale after pressure from 
Japanese competitors became intense (Katz 1985). 
13 The eigenvalue for the first component was 1.896 and the proportion of variance 
accounted for by this component was 63.2 percent. 
14 Respondents were asked to characterize the skill level of the CORE jobs on a 1-5 scale 
and SKLEV is coded "l" if the reply was very skilled or extremely skilled. 
15 In the computer industry Data General and Digital Equipment Corporation come to 
mind as pairs of firms which over the years have had very different approaches. In the 
steel industry USX and National or Inland are examples. 
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16 The distribution of responses on the five-point scale was 1.7 percent "not appropriate," 
9.4 percent "a little appropriate," 33.0 percent "moderately appropriate," 42.9 percent 
"very appropriate," and 12. 8 percent "extremely appropriate." 
17 The respondent was asked to indicate on a five-point scale the extent of pressure the 
establishment felt from investors or any larger organization of which it was part to attain 
short-term profits at the expense of long-term investments. This five-point scale was 
recoded into a dummy variable which takes on the value of "1" if the respondent felt 
"very much pressure" or "extreme pressure." 
18 Cases were dropped in which there were missing values on the usage of any of the 
practices. In addition, three establishments in mining were dropped because of 
collinearity problems. 
19 The index is 0.55*TQM Penetration + 0.43*Team Penetration + 0.38*Rotation 
penetration + 0.59*Quality Circle Penetration. The first principal component accounted 
for 44 percent of the variance and had an eigenvalue of 1.752. 
20 In unreported regressions (using Tobit models) I also estimated models in which the 
dependent variables were the percentage penetration of each practice. The results of 
these equations are available upon request. The results are generally comparable, but 
slightly weaker, than those reported here. In particular, the strategy variable and the 
variable measuring whether the establishment is part of a larger organization were 
significant in the questions for teams and job rotation but not in the quality circles or 
TQM equations. 
21 In order to interpret logit coefficients as the marginal change in a probability given a 
one-unit change in the independent variable they need to be transformed. The 
transformation is evaluated at the mean probability in the sample. 
22 Causality may run in the other direction, however. That is only firms that are productive 
due to their adoption of flexible work organization are able to compete internationally. 
In order to resolve the direction of causality, data on timing both of work reforms and 
entry into international markets are necessary. 
23 Lawler et al (I 992) present the results of significance tests of simple (i.e. unconditional) 
correlation coefficients between presence of TQM and some independent variables. They 
find that size, manufacturing, and presence of foreign competition of positively 
correlated with use of TQM while unionization is negatively correlated (Lawler et al 
1992: 97-98). 
24 In addition to the practices analyzed earlier, the use of Statistical Process Control is 
included here. 
25 The respondent was asked to characterize the education level of CORE employees as 
being "mostly dropouts," "about equal high school dropouts and graduates (with no 
further education)," "mostly high school graduates," "about equal, high school 
graduates and at least some college," "mostly at least some college." In this model the 
dummy variable takes on the value of "1" if the response was in the first three categories 
(mostly high school graduates or less) and "O" otherside. 
26 Two variables were created to measure ladders: One if the respondent said that when a 
vacancy occurred it was very or extremely important to fill it with insiders (versus not 
important, slightly important, or moderately important) and one that used the same 
scale to measure whether seniority was used as a criteria for choosing which insiders to 
promote. 
27 The question asked was whether for the establishment's CORE employees there was a 
policy in place to pay wages which were higher, the same as, or lower than employees in 
comparable occupations in the same industry in the same geographic area. The variable is 
coded as "1" if the policy was to pay a higher wage. 
28 Respondents were asked to characterize the skill level of the CORE jobs on a 1-5 scale 
and SKLEV is coded "1" if the reply was very skilled or extremely skilled. 
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29 Respondents were asked whether the skills in the CORE job were easy to transfer, 
moderately difficult to transfer, or very difficult to transfer to firms in other industries. A 
dummy variable was coded "l" if the skills were very difficult to transfer. 
30 Richard Murnane points out to me that this finding may be inconsistent with the 
common observation that more educated employees (who receive higher pay offers) also 
receive more training by firms. However, the finding in this chapter is best interpreted as 
referring to particular skills, not general education. 
31 For example, the actual substance of the work organization innovation may differ across 
period of time. 
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APPENDIX A 
The following are the definitions that the interviewers used when the respondent requested 
clarification. 
Sdf-directed Work Teams Employees supervise their own work, workers make their own 
decisions about pace and flow and occasionally the best way to get work done. 
Job Rotation Self-explanatoty example: In some banking firms you spend six months in 
the real estate division, six months in pension plans, etc. Simply rotating jobs. 
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Problem-solving Groups/Quality Circles Quality programs where employees are 
involved in problem solving. 
Total Quality Management Quality control approach that emphasizes the importance of 
communications, feedback, and teamwork. 
APPENDIX B 
Table 2. 1 (a) Percent at any Percent Level of Penetration 
All Manufacturing 
% % 
Teams 54.5 50.1 
Rotation 43.4 55.6 
TQM 33.5 44.9 
QC 40.8 45.6 
Nothing 21.8 16.0 

























































































Table 2.3 Definition of Variables 
1 = A union is present 
0=Nounion 
Definition 
Years since establishment founded 
1 =establishment's product market is competitive 
0=not 
1 = establishment sells in international markets 
0=not 
1 = feels pressure from investors or large organization for 
shon-term profits 
0=not 
1 = CORE job very or extremely skilled 
0=not 
1 = establishment pan of a larger organization 
0=not 
Principal component of points assigned to variery, service, 
and quality relative to cost 
1 = it is very or extremely appropriate for establishment to 
accept responsibiliry for personal and family well 
being of employees 
0 = otherwise 
1 = establishment has 50-99 employees 
1 = establishment has 500-999 employees 
1 = establishment has 1000-2499 employees 
















WORK ORGANIZATION AND TRAINING IN AMERICAN ENTERPRISES 
Tabk2.4 Determinants of Flexible Work Practices (T Statistics) 
Logit;Any Principal Ordered Probit; 
Practice Components, No. of Practices 
>50% Four Practices >50% 
UNION 0.067 -0.176 -0.110 
(I.211) (I.461) (0.973) 
AGE -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
(1.984) (0.551) (0.738) 
COMPETIV 0.065 -0.197 -0.079 
(I.431) (I.989) (0.836) 
INTERNAT 0.172 0.267 0.330 
(3.194) (2.338) (3.05} 
HORIZON -0.017 0.066 0.026 
(0.347) (0.587) (0.248) 
LARGER 0.090 0.575 0.441 
(I.827) (5.371) (4.21) 
VALUES 0.163 0.578 0.509 
(3.854) (6.131) (5.56) 
SKILL 0.099 o.410 0.300 
(I.956) (3.781) (2.92) 
STRATEGY 0.058 0.079 0.108 
(2.906) (2.378) (3.43) 
SIZE 1 0.083 0.264 0.325 
(I.767) (2.549) (3.25} 
SIZE3 -0.317 -0.567 -0.647 
(3.254) (2,646) (3.06) 
SIZE4 0.177 0.183 0.263 
(1.269) (0.646) (0.983) 
SIZE 5 -0.192 -0.211 -0.257 
(0.783) (0.382) (0.495) 
CONSTANT -0.478 -1.715 -0.257 
(3,533) (6,126) (0.495) 
Log Likelihood -388.467 R2 =0.242 -886.67 
N 694 694 694 
Note-. The equations also include controls for CORE occupation and industry. 
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Table2.5 Skill Level and Skill Trends 
All Blue Collar Professional/Technical 
% % % 
Skill Level 
Not skilled 1.8 0.2 0.0 
Slight skill 19.5 23.7 0.0 
Moderate skill 43.2 57.2 14.5 
Very skilled 28.1 18.7 63.9 
Extremely skilled 7.2 0.05 21.5 
Change in skill 
No change 38.1 37.4 29.1 
Less complex 3.5 11.4 0.0 
More complex 39.9 36.0 51.1 













Table 2.6 Variable Definitions and Means 
Definition Mean 
Percent of CORE employees who receive formal off-the-job 0.320 
training 
1 if most CORE employees have a high school degree or less 0.61 
education; 0 otherwise 
Percentage of CORE employees who are women 0.435 
1 if establishment pays CORE employees more than 0.365 
comparable workers in the same occupation in the same 
industry in the local area; 0 otherwise 
1 if it is very or extremely difficult to use the skills of the 0.139 
CORE job elsewhere; 0 otherwise 
1 if it is very or extremely important to give preference to 0. 708 
insiders in filling vacancies; 0 otherwise 
1 if it is very or extremely imponant to use seniority to 0.303 
determine which incumbents are promoted to vacancies; 
0 otherwise 
Number of Work Organization Innovations implemented at 1.306 
the 50 percent or more level of penetration 
1 if skills are the first and second most imponant hiring criteria 0.133 
for the CORE job; 0 otherwise 
1 =A union is present 0.237 
0=Nounion 
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Percent in QC 
Percent in SPC 
Definition 
1 = establishment pan of a larger organization 
0=not 
1 = it is very or extremely appropriate for establishment to 
accept responsibility for personal and family well being of 
employees 
0 = otherwise 
1 = establishment has 50-99 employees 
1 = establishment has 500-999 employees 
1 = establishment has 1000-2499 employees 
1 = 2500+ employees 
1 if Human Resources Depanment involved in major strategic 
decisions; 0 otherwise 
1 if CO RE job blue collar 
1 if CORE job sales 
1 if CORE job clerical 
1 if CORE job service 
1 if CORE job professional/technical 
Number of innovative work practices which have been 
introduced in the past five years 
Number of innovative work practices which are more than five 
years old 
Average percent of CORE employees in teams (including 
zeros) 
Average percent of CORE employees in job rotation 
(including zeros) 
Average percent of CORE employees in TQM (including 
zeros) 
Average percent of CORE employees in qualiry circles 
(including zeros) 
Average percent of CORE employees in statistical process 























Table 2.7 Tobit Estimate of Off-the-Job Training (T Statistics) 
Edu 0.009 
(0.146) 




















Hire Skill -0.221 
(-2.808) 








Ladder 1 0.011 
(0.197) 










Log Likelihood -629.227 
N 733 
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Table 2.8 Coefficients for Alternative Work Practice Variables (T Statistics) 
I. Recent Index 0.065 
(2.991) 
2. Old Index -0.013 
(-0.382) 
3. Separate Practices 
Percent in teams -0.032 
(-0.509) 
Percent in rotation -0.237 
(-3.380) 
Percent in TQM 0.147 
(2.048) 
Percent in QC 0.178 
(2.411) 
Percent in SPC 0.200 
(2.158) 
Note: Each panel refers to a Tobit equation which includes the additional variables 
shown in the preceding table. The "New Index" includes only the workplace 
innovations which had been put in place within five years of the survey and the "Old 
Index" includes only the innovations which had been put in place earlier than five 
years before the survey. The variables "percent in teams" and so on are the percentage 
of CORE workers involved in each of the practices. 
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AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
The Impact of Workers, Participation in Germany 
Bernd Frick and Dieter Sadowski 
WORKS COUNCILS: AMERICAN HOPES AND GERMAN 
DEVELOPMENTS 
Many observers of the current state of industrial relations in the United States 
believe that only a major legal reform will be able to compensate employees for the 
loss of protection that is due to the decline of private-sector unionism. The 
constitution of a legal "backbone" to foster cooperative relationships between 
employers and employees is said to be indispensable, especially for "high 
performance work organizations" (a term developed by Osterman). Paul C. Weiler 
(1990) compares the relative merits of direct government regulation of the terms 
of employment with an overhauling of the National Labor Relations Act that 
would ease the union presentation process (by instant elections, for example) and 
help to foster company unionism. Both types of reform are, on the one hand, 
supposed to make unionizing efforts more attractive for employees who are 
appalled by bureaucratic national unions, and, on the other hand, to weaken the 
resistance of management against the rigidities of centralistic bargaining. 
Weiler convincingly demonstrates that a central regulation of the terms of 
employment is likely to fail because of the variety and dynamics of individual 
employment relationships and the difficulties of close monitoring, unless employee 
representatives fulfil this task. Although he apparently prefers real unions and full-
fledged collective bargaining to government regulation, he sees no realistic chance 
to gain sufficient parliamentary support for the necessary reforms. He therefore 
puts forward the "second best" proposal under the current American circum-
stances, and that is to provide by law "Employee Panicipation Committees" 
(EPCs) in each establishment. The specific model he has in mind "is the West 
German Betriebsrat, or Works Council, an inhouse procedure through which the 
employees at local works sites address and help resolve a range of employment 
issues. By all accounts, such mandatory works councils have played a valuable role 
in the evolution of West German human resource policy" (Weiler 1990: 284). 1 
The mandatory constitution of EPCs would solve most of the problems of 
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union recognition and "busting." Weiler's EPCs appear indeed similar to our 
Betriebsriite, though by intention he rejects the German stipulation of binding 
outside arbitration in codetermination issues. 2 According to his proposal employees 
represented by an EPC should enjoy precisely the same right-and need-to strike 
as nowadays union members engaged in collective bargaining (Weiler 1990: 290). 
"In West Germany the Works Council has the responsibility of administering and 
enforcing both the collective agreement negotiated by the union for the industry 
and a much more extensive body of employment standards law. Thus arbitration in 
lieu of a right to strike, evolved as a natural method for resolving what is often a 
disagreement about the application of these general standards to particular cases" 
(Weiler 1990: 290). According to Weiler, American labor policy has not 
established this incongruous and unwise, because "all-too-easy" regime of binding 
interest arbitration to help employees bargain for protective employment standards. 
Given the enthusiasm with which other authors comment upon the German 
company and works constitution, one can get the impression that the "German 
model" should at best be transferred unmodified. In his knowledgeable and lucid 
analysis of the German system Smith (1991: 276) for example takes the following 
position: "In a decade of conservative rule in West Germany (in the 1980's) not 
one step was taken to water down Codetermination Law one iota. In this period, 
West German corporations out-invested, out-trained, and out-exported their 
counterparts in such countries without Codetermination Law such as Britain and 
America." 
Even when discounting this rather all-inclusive statement about the causes of a 
comparatively successful economic decade in Germany, it is worth mentioning that 
the 1980's saw indeed a growing importance of the works councils in German 
industrial relations: 
The 1984 collective agreement concerning the reduction of weekly working 
hours in the metal industry for example had to be filled by works agreements, a 
sort of plant-level collective agreement concluded by the works council and 
management. At the Siemens AG more than fifty different agreements were 
concluded. 
The growing tendency even for subsidiaries of big companies (such as Opel 
and IBM) to leave their respective employers' associations at least indirectly 
strengthens the works councils as the workers' representatives. 
The conclusion of "opening" or "hardship clauses" which allow single 
companies in special circumstances to undercut minimum wages (in the steel 
and metal industry of East Germany, for example) also alters the role of works 
councils. It is very likely that works councils will become more and more 
important as bargaining agents, possibly pursuing goals that are different from 
the ones of their respective industry union. The more frequent works 
agreements become, the more likely it is that works councils contribute to a 
change of the German system of industry unionism toward a system of 
enterprise unionism. The tensions associated with such a development are not 
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new (Sadowski 1985), but the present currents apparently favor a decentraliz-
ation of industrial relations in Germany. 
Our last casual observation concerns the slow but distinctive emergence of 
European works councils, albeit in the weaker French version as a consultative 
body only. It must be noted, however, that the efforts for an EC directive on 
European Company Law, the Societas Europaea, have essentially been halted 
because of the unresolved issue of the appropriate form of worker participa-
tion. Though French companies were the first here, the general works council 
of VW had already carefully monitored the acquisition of SEAT in the early 
1980's, and the newly established Euro-works council at VW also fits into the 
traditional system of general and company works councils (Turner 1992: 
35-38). 
Instead of continuing to provide anecdotal evidence about the salience of works 
councils and instead of further quoting judgments about their relative merits, we 
will contribute to the economic analysis of works councils, using previously mostly 
unaccessible data from different sources.3 To accomplish this task, we will firstly 
review the few available studies on the effects of works councils (as well as unions) 
on the economic performance of firms. As they are rather inconclusive, we turn, 
secondly and mainly, to the impact of works councils on plant-level employment 
decisions, a certainly underresearched area. The lack of econometric studies of 
works councils' impact on productivity, turnover, and other aspects of firm 
performance is all the more deplorable as it goes along with a generally favorable 
assessment of councils in the literature, as Freeman (1991: 332) correctly states. 
Our concentration on nonwage issues is warranted by the minor and indirect role 
works councils play in wage matters. We find a considerable, presumably value-
added increasing impact of works councils on personnel turnover. Our interpreta-
tion of the mechanism underlying the reduction of turnover costs suggests some 
modifications of recent economic analyses of works councils. Finally, we ask 
whether the German experience supports Weiler's proposal for Employee 
Participatory Committees in the United States. 
CODETERMINATION AND AGGREGATE ECONOMIC 
PERFORMANCE: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
Company performance can be measured by a variety of indicators, including 
productivity levels and growth, financial performance including profitability, 
investment in human and physical capital as well as in research and development, 
and job generation. 
Contrary to the United States, econometric work on the effects of workers' 
representation on economic performance-be it at the sectoral level (trade unions) 
or at the plant level (works councils) is rather limited (see Tables 3.8-3.10 in the 
Appendix). Most studies on the influence of trade unions repon negative, but 
statistically insignificant coefficients of union density on some productivity measure 
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(usually value added, total factor productivity, or gross domestic product per 
employee). A comparative analysis of studies looking at the impact of works 
councils on productivity cannot support comprehensive conclusions about the 
effect of workers' representation either. The variability of findings across studies 
using differing definitions of variables, specifications, time periods, industries and 
levels of aggregation does not allow us to conclude there is an effect, much less 
specify its direction and magnitude (Belman 1992: 58). Thus, to the extent that a 
clear pattern does emerge from the empirical studies we find that codetermination 
does not have pronounced economic consequences one way or another (also 
Hodgson and Jones 1989). 
There are several reasons, why the results of the "aggregate" studies presented in 
the Appendix are controversial and inconclusive. It is apparently very difficult to 
isolate the productivity effects of plant-level representation because an analytical 
approach requires large longitudinal samples with a large number of independent 
variables. Additionally, there are other methodological problems which have not 
been solved yet. The most important ones are, first, the assumption of identical 
production functions in firms with and without works councils, and, second, the 
problem of endogeneity of works councils. Given these methodological problems 
and empirical difficulties, we try to pursue a different path. We assume that an 
analysis of the impact of codetermination in specific policy fields, such as hirings 
and dismissals, health and safety, etc. is more rewarding, because the variables are 
easier to operationalize, the necessary data is easier to collect and the findings suffer 
less from methodological problems. In the following section we will demonstrate 
the advantages as well as the shortcomings of our approach by analyzing the impact 
of works councils on personnel turnover.4 The data we analyze in this section have 
been collected by Biichtemann and Holand (1989) to evaluate the labor market 
consequences of the Employment Promotion Act of 1985. It is a representative 
survey of 2,392 private enterprises from industry and the service sector with at least 
five employees and was conducted in the spring of 1987. 5 From the total sample 
only those firms have been selected that provided plausible and consistent answers 
to all questions relating to the number of new hires, dismissals, and voluntary 
quits. 
In a first step, we identify the conditions under which works councils are likely 
to be elected. Since works councils are not obligatory, they do not exist in many, 
especially small firms. Only 24 percent of all private enterprises {employing 60 
percent of the private sector work force) have a works council (see also Frick 
1994). Table 3.1 contains the results of a logistic regression with the variable 
"presence {or otherwise) of a works council" as the dependent variable.6 
The probability that a works council has been elected increases with firm size and 
firm age, and is higher in manufacturing industry than in construction, retail trade 
and the service sector. Additionally, the percentage of qualified employees has a 
positive, the percentage of part-time employees and women has a negative 
influence on the likelihood that a works council has been elected. While these 
results may have been expected, there are two surprising findings: 
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Table 3.1 Determinants of the Presence of a Works 

























- 2LL Base Model 
-2LL Full Model 
Pseudo-R2' 100 
Number of Cases 
Cases Correctly Classified 
+ not significant 






















































Our proxy for sectoral union density (the percentage of employees covered by 
collective agreements protecting them from loss of income or employment due to 
technical change) is not statistically significant. It is certainly true that this measure 
is far from optimal, but to our knowledge no better proxy-variable is available.7 
In firms reporting problems in recruiting qualified personnel and in firms 
experiencing (large) variations in labor demand, works councils are more likely 
to exist. 
This last result and the question of causality lead us to a more detailed 
examination of the effects that works councils have on hiring and dismissal 
decisions9 as well as on voluntary quits. 
50 
WORKS COUNCILS, UNIONS, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
CODETERMINATION IN DISTINCT POLICY FIELDS: 
EMPIRICAL EVIDENCE ON PERSONNEL TURNOVER 
Although it has often been argued that employment protection in Germany has a 
strong collective component (Biichtemann 1993; Buttler and Wallwei 1990), there 
is very little empirical evidence whether and to what extent works councils 
influence employers' dismissal decisions. Since the legislation requires that the 
works council has to be informed of or even consulted on almost all personnel 
decisions in the firm, the works council certainly has an unparalleled participative 
role in German firms, which goes well beyond any voice function of trade unions 
in the Anglo-Saxon tradition (FitzRoy and Kraft 1985: 542). The question to be 
answered in the following section is whether and to what extent works councils 
fulfill the legislators' as well as their constituents' expectations. 
Employment Protection Legislation, Works Councils, and Personnel 
Turnover 
According to section 1 of the Dismissal Protection Act of 1969, dismissals must 
not be "socially unwarranted;" this means that they must be justified in terms of 
either the conduct of the individual employee or the operational requirements of 
the enterprise.9 Prior consultation with the works council is a prerequisite for the 
validity of any dismissal (sections 102-103 Works Constitution Act). 10 The works 
council must be informed within one week and has one week in which to respond 
to an ordinary dismissal. In cases of extraordinary dismissal, i.e. for severe 
misconduct, the works council must be informed immediately and has three days 
in which to object to the dismissal. The works council may either give its consent, 
remain silent, express its misgivings, or even lodge a formal contradiction (figure 
3.1 on page 55). If the works council objects to the dismissal, the employee 
generally has a claim to continued employment pending a judicial decision or until 
a settlement has been reached. Special procedures are applicable to collective 
dismissals, depending on the number of employees affected and the size of the 
firm. In general, employers must inform and consult the works council communi-
cating inter alia the reasons for the proposed dismissals, the timetable for their 
implementation, and the number of employees affected. 11 Not only the employees 
affected but also the works council may contest collective dismissals on the grounds 
that improper criteria were used for the selection of employees to be laid off. In 
firms with more than 20 employees the employer must, at the request of the works 
council, negotiate a social plan. 12•13 In the case of hirings, the rights of the works 
council are much weaker, because the employer must only inform the worker 
representatives (section 99 of the Works Constitution Act). 
If works councils have a significant impact on dismissals, the respective rate 
(dismissals per 100 employees) should be significantly lower in firms with a works 
council than in enterprises without plant-level representation. An adequate 
empirical test of this hypothesis requires a large sample of private enterprises that 
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have to obey to the Dismissal Protection Act on the one hand and to the Works 
Constitution Act on the other hand. 14 During the two-year period May 
1985-April 1987, the firms in the sample on average had a turnover rate of 35 
percent. 15 In firms with a works council the respective percentage was 26 percent 
only, in those without a works council it was 38 percent. The number of dismissals 
per 100 employees is 7.8 in firms with a works council and 14.6 in firms without a 
works council. The average number of voluntary quits is 10.4 in the former firms 
and 15.7 in the latter ones. In both types of firms the remaining 8 percent are due 
to the expiration of fixed-term contracts (including apprenticeships) and quits 
because pension age has been reached or deaths. Finally, the number of new hires is 
22.6 in firms with a works council and 33.1 in firms without plant-level 
representation. 
Since dismissals are not only influenced by the existence of a works council, but 
also by the economic situation of the enterprise and, probably, by structural 
characteristics of the sector a firm belongs to, other possible determinants of 
dismissals have to be analyzed simultaneously. To test for the influence of works 
councils on the hiring and firing policies of firms, our estimated equations are of 
the general forms: 16•17 
ln(RATE/(1-RATE)) = Po+ P1 WOCOUNC+ PjFIRM+ PkSECTOR+ e; 
where 
RATE: Dismissal rate, quit rate, and hiring rate respectively, 
WOCOUNC: Presence of a works council, 
FIRM-. Vector of firm characteristics, 
SECTOR: Vector of industry characteristics. 
Dismissals 
Table 3.2 shows the results of our first regression. Looking at the control variables, 
we see (as probably expected) that the dismissal rate declines as firm size and firm 
age increase. In construction, dismissal rates are significantly higher than in 
industry. Labor intensive firms and firms experiencing seasonal fluctuations in 
product demand have higher dismissal rates than firms with otherwise identical 
characteristics. 18 Dismissal rates are c.p. lower in firms with a high percentage of 
qualified personnel (measured by the percentage of employees who have completed 
at least an apprenticeship and the percentage of apprentices among the whole staff). 
Apparently, firms are more reluctant to dismiss workers in case of changes in 
demand, the higher training costs and specific human capital investments are, i.e., 
the higher the qualification of the firm's work force, the slower the adjustment of 
personnel. The sectoral unemployment rate has, other things equal, a significantly 
positive influence on the dismissal rate, indicating that the "reputation costs" of 
dismissals are lower when unemployment is high (Ehrenberg 1986). 
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+ not significant 
Determinants of Dismissals in German Companies• 
B SEB T 
0.061126 0.014860 4.113"' 
-0.671075 0.059375 -11.302· .. 
-1.120375 0.123846 -9.047' .. 
-1.600803 0.125815 -12.723' .. 
-0.070877 0.210400 -0.337+ 
0.295359 0.135351 2.182 .. 
0.112078 0.118762 0.944+ 
0.036884 0.122798 0.300+ 
0.168144 0.164093 1.025+ 
-0.166620 0.027983 -5.954"' 
-0.081527 0.069007 -1.181+ 
0.004529 0.001759 2.574"' 
0.302628 0.055858 5.418 ... 
0.171059 0.057379 2.981"' 
0.067540 0.089943 0.751 + 
-0.008068 0.001276 -6.322' .. 
-0.005024 0.001101 -4.563"' 
-0.002078 0.001178 -1.763' 
0.000261 0.001916 0.136+ 
0.000701 0.001402 0.500+ 
-0.010193 0.002324 -4.385'" 
-0.225074 0.068544 -3.284"' 
0.001973 0.002502 0.788+ 
-1.069517 0.209759 -5.099"' 
• As estimates are from a log-odds model, to derive the marginal effect of a change in one of 
the independent variables on the dismissal rate its coefficient has to be multiplied by 
y/(1 - y), where y is the mean of the dismissal rate (0.128). 
But there are some more remarkable findings, too: 
- The most important one in this context is that-other things equal-firms with 
a works council have a dismissal rate which is 2.9 percentage points lower than 
the one experienced by firms without a plant-level interest representation. 19 
Firms that report problems in filling their vacancies have significantly higher 
dismissal rates than otherwise identical firms. 
Surprisingly, union density (admittedly imperfectly measured as the 
percentage of employees covered by collective agreements protecting them 
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from loss of income or employment due to technical change) has no influence 
on the dismissal rate. 
Although the inclusion of interaction terms (presence of a works council with 
the other independent variables) left the findings of the estimate virtually 
unchanged, some of the results are worth mentioning: First, the influence of works 
councils on dismissals (as well as on voluntary quits and hirings) decreases with 
firm size, i.e., it is smaller in large than in small firms, indicating that reputation 
costs rise as firm size increases. Second, and even more surprising, is the fact that 
works councils apparently foster work force reductions in firms that reduced their 
staff (the interaction of WOCOUNC and CHEMPLOY is significantly positive).20 
Although the data do not allow a test of our hypothesis, it seems reasonable to 
assume that work force reductions in firms with a works council are often achieved 
by negotiating a social plan, thus avoiding dismissals without financial compensa-
tion and thereby reducing worker resistance. 
Third, the interaction of WOCOUNC and PERCUNION is not statistically 
significant in either of the three estimates. We interpret this as an indicator that the 
two institutions complement each other. Empirical studies using cross-sectional as 
well as longitudinal individual data conclusively demonstrate that union members 
enjoy a much higher employment stability than workers that are not unionized 
(Schmidt 1991; Schasse 1991). Thus, the findings of these studies and our own 
estimates point into the same direction. 
Quits 
Looking at the determinants of voluntary quits (see. Table 3.3), a similar picture 
emerges: Larger and older firms have significantly lower quit rates, as have firms 
with seasonal fluctuations in product demand and/or short-time work. In 
construction the quit rate is significantly lower, in traffic and communication it is 
significantly higher than in manufacturing. 
More important for our analysis are the following findings: 
Firms with a works council on average have a quit rate which is 2.4 percentage 
points lower than the one in firms without plant-level interest representation. 
Once again, union density is not statistically significant. 
Firms that report hiring problems have a significantly higher quit rate than 
otherwise identical firms without problems in recruiting qualified personnel. 
Firms with high dismissal rates have, other things equal, also high quit rates, 
indicating the importance of "reputational goodwill." According to the 
estimates, a one percent increase in the dismissal rate causes the quit rate to rise 
by more than five percentage points. 
Looking at the interaction variables, it appears that works councils in particular 
reduce the quit rate of qualified personnel. However, at the same time, the quit rate 
of women is higher in firms with a works council. Given the underrepresentation of 
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Table 3.3 Determinants of Quits in German Companies• 
Variable B SEB T 
UNEMPRATE 0.026167 0.010765 2.431" 
FSIZE49 -0.346005 0.043699 -7.918 ... 
FSIZE99 -0.570298 0.090049 -6,333·" 
FSIZEIO0+ -0.523248 0.091626 -5.711°" 
BANK&INS 0.078696 0.151555 0.519+ 
CONSTRUC -0.182478 0.097583 -1.870' 
RETAIL 0.050115 0.085557 0.586+ 
OSERVICES 0.057826 0.088472 0.654+ 
TRAFFIC 0.322589 0.118198 2,729·" 
FIRMAGE -0.084216 0.020343 -4.140 ... 
SINGLE -0.030988 0.049722 -0.623+ 
LABCOST -0.000411 0.001272 -0.323+ 
HIREPROB 0.185200 0.040498 4.573 ... 
SEASON -0.074502 0.041423 -1.799· 
SHORTTIME -0.107682 0.064792 -l.662· 
CHEMPLOY -0.004601 0.000931 -4.943"· 
PERCQUAL -0.000043 0.000797 -0.054+ 
PERCBLUE -0.000153 0.000849 -0.180+ 
PERCPART 0.003732 0.001380 2,704""· 
PERCFEMA 0.001152 0.001010 1.140+ 
PERCAPPR 0.002518 0.001693 1.487+ 
WOCOUNC -0.171691 0.049505 -3.468 ... 
PERCUNION 0.000620 0.001803 0.344+ 
DISRATE 2.378780 0.124291 19.139 ... 
CONSTANT -1.699027 0.154691 -10.983··· 
Notes: 
Adj R2' 100 42.1 
F-Value 50.0 




+ not significant 
• cf. foomote a, Table 3.1. The mean of the quit rate is 0.142. 
women in German works councils, one is tempted to argue that women might be 
discriminated against not only by employers, but also by their male colleagues. 
Certainly, this interpretation is subject to the qualification that works councils also 
foster the recruitment of female employees {Table 3.4). 
Costs of Quits and Dismissals 
Since our data do not allow reliable estimates of the aggregate number and the 
average costs of quits and dismissals, we have to supplement our estimates and 
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inferences by data from other sources to give a full account of the impact of 
dismissal protection and codetermination on firms' firing and hiring behavior. In 
1990, the Federal Labor Office registered approximately 6.7 million job 
terminations (Bundesanstal t fur Arbeit 1991 : 15 31). Apart from persons retiring 
from the labor force (740,000 in 1990, cf. Verband Deutscher Renten-
versicherungstrager 1991: 202), half of these job terminations were employer 
initiated: 1.9 million people lost their job due to a dismissal, 800,000 due to the 
expiration of a fixed-term contract and 200,000 due to a "voluntary" agreement 
including a severance payment (cf. Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit 1991: 755, 1531 and 
own calculations). According to the most recent survey, which covers the year 
1984 (Hemmer 1988: 62), the average severance payment in the context of a 
social plan amounts to DM13,400 or roughly four gross monthly incomes. At the 
aggregate level, severance payments make up less than one percent of total labor 
costs (Kaukewitsch 1990: 469). Thus, it is not surprising that the majority of 
personnel managers does not perceive either the Works Constitution Act or the 
Dismissal Protection Act to be a major obstacle to necessary employment 
terminations. Instead, firms are usually able to realize the majority of all in-
tended dismissals without incurring severe financial and/or legal difficulties 
(Kayser and Friede 1984: 20, 38).21 Although it is difficult to reach a safe 
conclusion about the net economic impact of works councils on the employment 
behavior of firms, 22 our findings lend some support to the following assumption: 
Since hiring and training costs are usually higher than firing costs, 23 firms on 
average benefit from the presence of a works council with regard to their user 
costs of labor: The "savings" due to avoided voluntary quits apparently more than 
compensate the additional spendings for severance payments and the costs of 
codetermination. 24 
Hirings 
Apart from a few notable exceptions, the determinants of hirings are quite similar 
to the factors influencing dismissals and quits. Consistent with our previous 
argument is the finding (Table 3.4) that firms with a high quit rate have high hiring 
rates, indicating that firms with a low standing or a bad reputation in the labor 
market are unable to pursue an "integrative" personnel policy. According to our 
estimate, a 1 percent increase in the dismissal rate (quit rate) causes the hiring rate 
to rise by more than eight (nearly six) percentage points. 
Turning to the exceptions we note: Contrary to what would have been predicted 
by proponents of labor market deregulation, neither the existence of a works 
council nor union density has a significantly negative influence on the hiring 
rate-on the contrary, union density has a significantly positive influence. 
This dearly conflicts with the findings of Blanchflower et al. (1991), Leonard 
(1992) and Long (1993) who have found that in Great Britain, the United States, 
and Canada unionizacion reduces employment growth significantly-by about 
2-4 percent per year.25 
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Table 3.4 Determinants of Hirings in German Enterprises" 
Variable B SEB T 
UNEMPRATE 0.033524 0.012022 2.789"' 
FSIZE49 -0.532345 0.048276 -11.027 ... 
FSIZE99 -0.597222 0.103184 -5.788 ... 
FSIZEIO0 -0.499626 0.104985 -4.759' .. 
BANK&INS 0.231823 0.162884 1.423+ 
CONSTRUC 0.100589 0.106553 0.944+ 
RETAIL 0.139633 0.093162 1.499+ 
OSERVICES 0.142738 0.096690 1.476+ 
TRAFFIC 0.338092 0.131474 2.572' .. 
FIRMAGE -0.154100 0.022933 -6.720 ... 
SINGLE -0.054157 0.056522 -0.958+ 
IABCOST -0.001594 0.001379 -1.156+ 
HIREPROB 0.337230 0.046343 7.277"' 
SEASON 0.084588 0.045902 1.842' 
SHORTTIME -0.110562 0.070936 -1.559+ 
CHEMPLOY 0.021553 0.001205 17.881 ... 
PERCQUAL 0.000507 0.000859 0.590+ 
PERCBLUE -0.000263 0.000914 -0.287+ 
PERCPART 0.005610 0.001509 3.719' .. 
PERCFEMA 0.002332 0.001129 2.065 .. 
PERCAPPR 0.001845 0.001881 0.981 + 
WOCOUNC -0.008431 0.055605 -0.152+ 
PERCUNION 0.004562 0.002006 2.274 .. 
QUITRATE 0.445113 0.118902 3.744 ... 
DISRATE 0.626836 0.121241 5.170' .. 
CONSTANT -0.583756 0.167788 -3.479"' 
Notes: 
Adj R2" 100 34.8 
F-Value 38.8 
N of Cases 1,767 
' p< .10 
.. p<.05 
''"p< .0l 
+ not significant 
• cf. footnote a, Table 3. l. The mean of the hiring rate is 0.306. 
They argue, first, that union wage effects make employees more costly for union 
firms than for nonunion firms and that union employers therefore tend to 
substitute capital for labor to a greater extent than will nonunion employers, thus 
depressing employment growth. A second argument is that unionization restricts 
the firm's ability to make downward adjustments of its work force because it 
imposes costs on such adjustments (through job security provisions, severance 
payments, etc.), thus making union firms more reluctant to expand their work 
forces than nonunion firms. Finally, a third argument is that unionization lowers 
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profitability, thus reducing the incentive of union firms to invest in new capital, 
because the return from this investment will be lower than in nonunion firms. 
In Germany, due to the specificity of the "dual model" of interest representa-
tion, these effects26 are unlikely to occur for different reasons: First, plant-level 
industrial relations are usually characterized as being cooperative (Hohn 1988; 
Weltz 1977), with the works councils being rather "syndicalistic." Second, since 
collective (wage) agreements are binding for all employers belonging to the 
respective employers' association and are therefore applied to unionized and 
nonunionized workers alike, union wage differentials are negligible (Wagner 1991). 
Once again, at least two of the interaction terms deserve our special attention: 
First, works councils foster especially the recruitment of women and blue-collar 
workers. Second, and even more important, works councils tend to "speed up" 
additional recruitments in growing firms (the coefficient of WOCOUNC and 
CHEMPLOY is significantly positive). 
Summary 
1 In Germany, firms with a works council have c.p. lower dismissal and lower quit 
rates than those without such worker representation. 
2 Firms with a works council, that due to developments in the product market 
have to increase/decrease the size of their work force, are able to realize higher 
hiring and dismissal rates than firms without a works council. The works 
council's "voice" apparently fosters the economic survival of the firm in periods 
of contraction, thereby serving the interests of the core groups of the work force. 
In periods of expansion, works councils tend to foster the recruitment of 
outsiders, thereby partly avoiding overtime work (including its wage premiums) 
for insiders. 
3 According to our estimates, union density does not affect turnover rates in firms, 
indicating that works councils and unions are to a considerable degree comple-
mentary, rather than competing institutions. 
4 The influence of works councils depends on the skill, gender, and status mix of 
the firm's work force, with the higher qualified white-collar males showing the 
highest employment stability. 
This bias in interest representation raises the question of the representativeness 
of works councils. The next section will therefore examine in more detail the works 
councils' policies toward one particular group of employees, the disabled. 
Works Councils and the Employment of Disabled Workers 
Although the selection of the disabled as our "target group" for further analysis 
might seem arbitrary at first, it can be justified with several arguments: According 
to the German Handicapped Act of 1974,27 public and private employers with 
more than fifteen jobs must employ a certain number of severely disabled persons 
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(6 percent of total staff), otherwise they have to pay a monthly compensation of 
DM200 for each quota position they have failed to fill with a severely disabled 
person (Brandt 1984; Kotthoff and Ochs 1989; Semlinger and Schmid 1985).28 
The works councils have, inter alia, the task to observe whether their respective 
employer fulfills his legal duties. Not only according to the Handicapped Act, but 
also to the Works Constitution Act they are obliged to foster the integration of 
older and/or disabled persons.29 On the one hand, they have far-reaching 
consultation rights in the case of dismissals, because according to sections 15-22 of 
the Handicapped Act, public and private employers not only have to apply to a 
special Government Office (''Hauptforsorgestelle") for permission to dismiss a 
severely disabled employee, but they also have to consult the works council prior to 
the application. If the employer nevertheless decides to dismiss a disabled 
employee, the works council is obliged to panicipate in the respective public 
hearing. 30 On the other hand, works councils should closely cooperate with the 
employer and the local labor office to foster the recruitment of disabled persons.31 
Before we turn to the empirical findings, a short description of our unique data 
sets is warranted. Firms employing more than fifteen workers are required to repon 
annually on their total employment and the number of disabled persons among the 
work force. These reports give public enforcement agencies their initial opportuni-
ties to detect employment deficiencies. If accessible, they provide social scientists 
and economists with genuine "hard data." Our data is a random sample of 765 
public and private employers from the state of Rhineland-Palatinate and covers the 
years 1982 and 1985. These annual reports also include some information on 
individual characteristics of the disabled persons who are working in these firms. 
Since large firms were deliberately overrepresented when collecting the data, our file 
consists of more than 12,500 persons and covers the year 1985. Second, we use a 
stratified random sample of dismissal records provided by the above-mentioned 
public enforcement agency from Rhineland-Palatinate. The size of the representa-
tive sample is 196, the data once again covers the year 1985 (for details see 
Sadowski and Frick 1992). Finally, we analyze a representative sample of private 
enterprises with more than fifteen employees located in the West German counties 
of Rhineland-Palatinate, Hesse and Saarland (n = 1,005) which was collected in 
1989 (for details see Sadowski and Frick 1993). 
More than 82 percent of all disabled wage and salary earners were "internally 
recruited," i.e. they received their official recognition when they were already 
working with their present employer. The remaining 18 percent were already 
disabled by the time they were hired; 70 percent of all disabled employees are 
between 45 and 59 years old, 32 the average age is 49 years. Some 67 percent have 
been working with their present employer for more than ten years, average tenure 
is nearly 17 years (Sadowski and Frick 1992). 
Looking at Table 3.5, it appears that-even after controlling for industry 
characteristics and firm size-firms in which a works council exists have a significantly 
higher percentage of disabled employees than firms without a works council (see also 
Sadowski and Frick 1990; for an econometric analysis see Frick 1992a). 
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Table 3.5 Works Councils and the Percentage of Disabled Employees among the Work 
Force (1985) 
Firm Siu Small4 
Without 3.45 
Works Council (276l 













• Small: 16-29 employees, medium: 30-99 employees, large: 100 employees and more. 








Given the above-mentioned legal restraints, it is cenainly surprising that the risk 
of dismissal for a severely disabled employee is not very much less than that for a 
nondisabled employee (Frick 1992a; Sadowski and Frick 1992): Approximately 80 
percent of the employment relationships are terminated and only 20 percent are 
continued after the procedure stipulated by the Handicapped Act. Furthermore, 
nullification contracts based on the mutual consent of the panies often serve as 
functional equivalents to dismissals.33 An employer's application is usually followed 
by a formal procedure, in which the employer himself, the employee, the local 
labor office, and the works council as well as the spokesperson of the disabled34 
present their respective points of view. Following the oral presentation and after an 
appreciation of the parties' written statements, the public authority mentioned 
above decides whether a continuation of the specific employment relationship is 
possible. The attitude of the works council can be interpreted as an "early signal" to 
the employer of how the employees view the dismissal decision. No reaction at all 
or explicit approval indicates that the employees do not view the dismissal decision 
as an offence against their "reciprocity expectations" (see Chapter 4). The 
expression of misgivings or even a formal contradiction however means that the 
employees interpret the dismissal decision as a violation of "legitimate" norms. The 
empirical evidence presented in Figure 3.1 shows that works councils are usually 
supportive of the employers' point of view. In more than 70 percent of all 
applications the works council either explicitly approves the employers' decision or 
it keeps silent. In only 13 percent the works councils express their misgivings 
(dismissal is socially unacceptable, no social plan has been designed, etc.), and in 
16 percent they lodge a formal contradiction (employers' arguments are not valid, 
other employment opponunities within the firm exist, etc.). In the case of all 
employees, the latter two percentage shares are 6 percent and 8 percent respectively. 
This shows that works councils oppose the dismissal of severely disabled employees 
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D All employees 
■ Disabled employees 
Approval Silence Misgivings Contradiction 
Figure 3.1 Attitudes of Works Councils toward Dismissals 
Sources: Holand (1985: 98); Sadowski and Frick (1992: 129) 
The seemingly high degree of consensus between employers and works councils 
is at least to some degree a statistical artifact, because in more than 55 percent of all 
cases the employees themselves had no objections against the dismissal either. If 
these cases are excluded, the percentage of applications for dismissal in which the 
works councils lodged objections, increases from 29 percent to more than 41 
percent (see Figure 3.2). If the application is founded with operational reasons 
(such as plant closing, lack of demand, technical reorganisation) the percentage of 
objections is 49 percent, in the case of personal misconduct of the employee (such 
as unsatisfactory performance, unjustified absence from work, violation of safety 
regulations) the respective share is 39 percent only. Dramatic differences occur if a 
distinction between externally and internally recruited persons is made. In the case 
of the former group, works councils support only 20 percent and 24 percent of 
their disabled colleagues by lodging objections against the application, in the case 
of the latter group the respective percentage shares are significantly higher (44 
percent and 69 percent). 
As already mentioned, the overall percentage of continued employment 
relationships is approximately 20 percent. As can be seen from Figure 3.3, the 
attitude of the works council is one of the most important factors influencing the 
outcome of the procedure: In cases where the works council supports the 
employers' point of view either by explicit approval or by silence, the percentage of 
continued employment relationships is significantly lower (15 percent and 37 
percent respectively) than in those cases where the works council either expresses its 
misgivings or formally contradicts the employers' arguments (27 percent and 48 
61 




















I Internally recruited 
43.8% 
Figure 3.2 Percentage of Applications in which Works Councils Lodged Objections 
percent respectively).35 The main reason for the considerable difference between 
operational and personal reasons (22 percent vs. 41 percent) is that in the former 
case the discretion of the Government Office is usually severely restricted. 
In cases where no works council exists (not shown in Figure 3.3), the percentage 
shares of continued employment relationships are very similar to the ones that 
occur if the interest representation supports the employers' decision (see Sadowski 
and Frick 1992: 127-135). 
Interest Heterogeneity among Workers Representatives in the Case of Hirings 
and Dismissals 
Both the spokesperson of the disabled as well as the works council is obliged to foster 
the (re-)integration of the disabled (see section 80 of the Works Constitution Act. 
and section 23 of the Handicapped Act). Since the works council is equipped with far-
reaching rights to codetermination, especially in the field of dismissals, and, to a lesser 
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I Objections - 47.8% 
Figure 3.3 Attitudes of Works Councils and Percentage of Continued Employment 
Relationships 
extent in the case of recruitments, it has often been argued that the spokesperson of 
the disabled can only be successful in representing the specific interests of his/her 
clientele if he/she closely cooperates with the works council (see Kotthoff 1988). On 
the other hand, it is equally possible that works councils, representing the interests of 
the whole staff, oppose the employment of hitherto extraneous disabled workers 
("outsiders"). Their reasons for a more or less pronounced resistance are manifold: 
First, and most important, productivity of disabled persons is often assumed to be 
below average. Second, five additional holidays and more frequent as well as longer 
sickness spells cause significantly higher absenteeism among disabled employees (see 
Stephan 1991). Third, it is often argued that jobs which are suitable to disabled 
persons should be reserved for long-term employees with more or less severe health 
problems. Since the spokespersons by virtue of their legal duties place less emphasis 
on these arguments, conflicts of interest are likely to occur between the two bodies of 
plant-level interest representation. 
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Table 3.6 shows that in 5 percent and 24 percent respectively works councils and 
spokespersons disagree with regard to their attitude toward a planned dismissal. 
What is most interesting in this context is that works councils tend to support 
disabled persons that had been working with their present employer prior to the 
occurrence of their disability ("internally recruited") whereas the spokespersons 
tend to support those persons that had already been disabled by the time they were 
hired ("externally recruited"). 
Table 3.7 shows that works councils alone apparently fail to foster the (re-) 
integration of the disabled: In firms without any interest representation the 
percentage of externally recruited disabled employees is slightly higher than the one 
in firms with a works council only (for an econometric analysis see Sadowski and 
Frick 1993: 85-90). In firms with a works council and a spokesperson, however, 
the percentage of disabled employees is more than 0.5 percentage points higher 
than in firms with a works council only or with no plant-level representation at all. 












• I works council agrees, spokesperson has objections 
2 works council has objections, spokesperson agrees 
3 works council and spokesperson have objections 





Table 3. 7 Percentage of Disabled Employees and Workers' Representation 
Percentage of Disabled Employees 
Total Number 
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It appears that a "manifold" worker representation has a positive impact on the 
employment opportunities for the disabled. In any case, it is the "insiders" among 
the disabled that workers' representatives care for, a tendency that is more 
pronounced in larger establishments. It is rather surprising that the spokesperson 
cannot increase his/her influence by becoming a member of the works council. If 
he/she is a member of the works council, the average percentage of disabled 
employees is 4.4 percent, if he/she is not, the respective percentage share is 5.3 
percent (Sadowski and Frick 1993: 56, 73). Apparently, the spokespersons are 
more likely to act on behalf of their constituents within as well as outside the firm, 
if they do not have to pay attention to the interests of the "representative" member 
of the respective work force. 
Summary 
1 Works councils do make an unambiguous difference in favor of the employment 
of disabled persons. Although usually supponive of the employer's position, 
works councils above all tend to suppon those persons who became disabled 
while they had been working with their present employer. The works council's 
position strongly increases the disabled person's chance for reinstatement. 
2 Works councils considerably reduce the recruitment of disabled outsiders, 
particularly in large enterprises. Here works councils fall strikingly shon of their 
legal and public policy task to foster the employment of disadvantaged worker 
groups. Apparently, the respective costs of norm-violation are rather low 
compared to the importance of worker solidarity with health-impaired insiders. 
3 Only the additional institutionalization of a spokesperson of the disabled, with 
rather weak consultative rights and symbolic power only (representing general 
moral norms) reverses this bias of worker representation. 
4 A works council strengthened by a spokesperson realizes a higher employment of 
disabled persons. Nevertheless, it is surprising that a spokesperson who is not a 
member of the works council is more successful with regard to the integration of 
his/her clientele than an "integrated" spokesperson. 
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
Most of our findings regarding the impact of works councils can be understood as 
part of a cooperative arrangement to protect firm-specific human capital by 
inducing workers to take a longer run view of the prospects of the firm and 
bringing workers' interests more in line with those of owners (Freeman and Lazear 
1993: 26; Smith 1991: 277). We merely need to allude to the rationale of internal 
labor markets with seniority payments and employment stability as their dominant 
features. Bargaining power in the political arena of the firm appears not to be based 
on the "one-person-one vote" principle of equality, but on relative labor market 
scarcity. In our view, there are at least two findings that require a modification of 
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the basic neoclassical theory of internal labor markets: 
1 Given the more frequent as well as the longer spells of sickness absence of 
disabled employees and the large discrepancy between productivity and wages 
compared to non-disabled employees (Stephan 1991; Sadowski and Frick 
1993), 36 the activities of worker representatives in favor of their disabled 
colleagues cannot solely be justified in terms of the specific human capital of the 
disabled. Apparently, adherence to and violation of moral group norms and the 
costs thereof should be considered, too. 
Assuming that plant-level industrial relations are primarily governed by 
noncontractual exchanges, these exchanges require the accumulation of trust 
between the employer and his employees (vertical trust) and among the employees 
themselves (horizontal trust) {Wintrobe and Bretton 1986: 537). Trust, loyalty, 
and commitment on behalf of the work force are best achieved by pursuing a 
policy of social integration which prevents the open discussion of the question of 
power in the firm and fulfills the "reciprocity expectations" of the employees.37 
Disregarding the reciprocity norms can result in social disintegration, various forms 
of withdrawing performance and negative effects on the work forces' motivation in 
general. Therefore, economic rationality always includes guaranteeing social 
integration in the firm. "In the chronological context of the work biography, the 
firm can allow for these reciprocity concepts by interpreting the performance of the 
employees as investments which are not immediately rewarded but honoured ... in 
the course of the working life. Hence, if the investment pays off only with the 
length of employment in the firm, remaining in the firm becomes a motivating 
rationale" (Kohli et al 1983: 31). Since the firm as an actor is forced to protect its 
autonomy by creating loyalty and motivation to work, its treatment of long-term 
employees attains special importance for the process of socialization in the firm. If 
this treatment conflicts with the reciprocity concepts of the work force, this sets an 
example for the young and mobile employees how the firm will some day "honor" 
their present performance. This is detrimental to the development of a close 
identification with the firm and of social skills relevant to the firm. If this concept 
is applied to the internal recruitment and deployment of disabled persons, we can 
explain why, apart from legal regulations, informal agreements and moral consider-
ations play an important role. Since works councils are usually dominated by the 
same groups that make up the majority of the disabled working population (males 
aged 45-55 years with long tenure) it is very likely that there is a high degree of 
consensus between the employees and their interest representation (Pick 1988: 
227). Therefore, the works council especially in this context acts as a collective 
"voice institution," serving as "a direct channel of communication between workers 
and management" (Freeman 1976: 364; see also Hirschman 1970). As the available 
evidence shows (Frick 1992a), it is primarily firms with a high percentage of older 
workers and a low turnover rate that usually have a high percentage of severely 
disabled wage and salary earners in their work force. Since a high percentage of old 
workers and a low turnover rate are, among other things, indicative of an 
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"integrative" personnel policy, a high percentage of disabled employees is 
apparently part of the costs firms have to pay when pursuing a considerate 
personnel policy. On the other hand, firms with a low percentage of old workers 
and a high turnover rate usually have a low percentage of disabled employees. This 
does not mean, however, that these firms in the long run have lower user costs of 
labor. If the employment of the disabled elicits a high degree of suppon and loyalty 
from the healthy as well as from the disabled employees, it might be cheaper than 
paying the monthly compensation. This will be more likely, if not only the health-
impaired but also the healthy employees can assume that in the case of disability 
they will not be dismissed, but either promoted to another less strenuous job or 
that their workload will be reduced. As for example Akerlof (1984: 79-83) has 
shown, workers' perception of their firms' personnel policy, i.e., whether they 
perceive it as being "just" and "fair", has an enduring effect on their productivity. 
To the extent that the employment of the disabled, especially if they had already 
been employed by the firm before the disability occurred, meets the work forces' 
conceptions of equity and fairness, the long run user costs of labor can be much 
lower in a firm with a high percentage of disabled employees than in a comparable 
one with a low percentage of disabled wage and salary earners. 
2 The surprisingly strong influence of the largely symbolic spokesperson on the 
employment of disabled insiders as well as outsiders (more or less independent 
of his/her membership in the works council) indicates that societal norms play 
an imponant role in intrafirm decision-making processes. 
Drawing on the economic value of norm compliance and symbolic institutions, 
that is on the economic relevance of the legitimacy of employment decisions, 
probably means that we are leaving the field of the "New Institutional Labor 
Economics" and sliding into the sociology of organization and politics (March and 
Olsen 1989), before even taking up the empirical challenge and testing the 
economic propositions of Freeman and Lazear (1993) on works council behavior in 
an uncenain world. However, if law and norm compliance shape expectations of 
employees who do not know yet whether they once will have to rely on those 
norms of social integration, it is economically wise for employers to take such given 
expectations into consideration. Furthermore, it is then rational for all stake-
holders, including the state and the unions, to consider seriously efforts to develop 
or influence norms of "good" behavior, i.e., to participate in firm politics and 
preference-shaping activities. 
3 Our empirical analyses have left out many areas of personnel policies, such as 
possible wage effects of works councils, their influence on investments and 
technical progress, their role in working-time flexibility, to name the most 
important. Despite our evaluation of the economic impact of works councils on 
dismissals and quits, we fail to determine an economically and/or socially 
"optimal" turnover rate, against which the actual rates could be judged. So far, 
we cannot say whether there is an "excess sensitivity of dismissals and quits to 
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fluctuations in product demand" (Hall and Lazear 1984) and, therefore, we are 
unable to formulate any public policy conclusions for Germany, much less for 
the United States. 
In the specific German context, it is the works councils, not unions, that exert a 
voice role in employment decisions. This seems to qualify Blachflower and 
Freeman (1992: 68) who, in a recent survey of unionism in advanced OECD 
countries state: "We know of no study that rejects the union 'exit-voice' trade-off 
for any country." Although we have placed the works council in the center of our 
analysis, there can be no doubt that the two institutions complement each other 
and that works councils are highly dependent on extra-firm institutions to 
function. This is not the place to give a detailed account of the formal and the 
factual allocation of rights and other resources between the different participants 
and stake-holders in German industrial relations. However, to avoid premature 
conclusions from our partial analysis of works councils, we quote Streeck's (1991: 
319) appraisal of the interdependence of works councils, unions, and labor law: 
"West German industrial democracy-its so-called 'works constitution' -is now 
the main mechanism by which unions represent their members vis-a-vis employers . 
. . . Since works council and enterprise-level-codetermination are based in law, 
employers cannot hope to govern workplaces and firms unilaterally." 
Although this statement keeps silent about the firm-centristic, syndicalist 
dynamics in the relationships between works councils and unions, it stresses the 
important institutional bases of German works councils. Any attempt just to 
implement mandatory works councils without simultaneously creating the 
necessary institutional infrastructure neglects the interdependencies in the system 
of labor market institutions, nationally organized industry unions, government 
intervention, and the system of labor courts. Gottesman's critique of Weiler's 
Employee Participatory Committees with their limited information and consulta-
tion rights rests exactly on this argument: "(Those features) are but a small part of a 
much larger mosaic that regulates German labor law, and it is that larger mosaic 
that explains the success of the works councils" (Gottesman 1991: 2806). 
Our preliminary analysis can shed some light on the interplay of those 
institutions that determine employee turnover in Germany. At best, like all 
comparative industrial relations research, we hope to inform the discussion about 
the pretended "representation gap in the American workplace" (Weiler 1990: 297) 
and to invite the institutional fantasy of future reformers. 
NOTES 
1 For more literature in a similar line cf. Weiler (1990: 284, note 73). 
2 On this issue cf. Owen-Smith et al (1989: 64-88). 
3 Given the large body of literature, it is certainly not appropriate to describe once more 
the institutional setup of German industrial relations and labor market regulation. For 
an introduction the reader is referred to Abraham and Houseman (I 993: 11-29). 
Chmielewicz (I 990) gives a concise account of the legal essentials of workers' 
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participation on the supervisory boards of companies-which deal with company 
policies-and through works councils-which are concerned with local personnel 
policies. We also refrain from reviewing the numerous, often inspiring projects on works 
councils using qualitative designs and almost exclusively sociological points of departure 
(cf. Kissler (I 992: I 50-157) for a detailed list of projects with primary data; and cf. 
Osterloh 1992 for an encyclopedic overview). 
4 The most obvious disadvantage of our econometric approach is that we can only 
distinguish between firms with a works council and those without plant-level interest 
representation. Due to data limitations, we are not able to take into consideration the 
variance of works councils' behavior. Based on a large number of detailed case studies 
Kotthoff (1981) and Kotthoff and Reindl (1990) document the discretion works 
councils usually have. 
5 We would like to thank Christoph Biichtemann, formerly at the Wissenschaftszentrum 
Berlin, for making the data available to us. 
6 For a description of the explaining variables (operationalization, means and standard 
deviations) see Table 3.8 in the Appendix. 
7 Since no densiry measure is available for the service sector, we had to use this proxy 
variable (cf. Warnken and Ronning 1989: 262). In the manufacturing sector (n = 29 
two-digit industries) both variables are highly correlated (r> + 0.70). The surprising 
result may also be due to multicollinearity, because individual, firm, and industry 
characteristics proved to be relatively good predictors of union membership (cf. Schmidt 
1991; Lorenz and Wagner 1991; Windolf and Haas 1989). 
8 With "dismissals" we denote permanent layoffs due to operational requirements of the 
enterprise as well as disciplinary dismissals due to personal misconduct or dismissals due 
to other personal reasons. 
9 These regulations explicitly exclude small firms with less than six employees and 
employees who have not yet completed a minimum probationary period of six months. 
Biichtemann (1990) estimates that approximately 12 percent of all civilian employees 
(excluding civil servants and apprentices) belong to one of these two groups. 
10 Recall that only a minoriry of all private enterprises (24 percent) does have a works 
council. 
11 Mass dismissals must also be reported in advance to the regional Labor Office one month 
prior to proceeding with the reduction in personnel. 
12 This obligation can be enforced through a process of binding arbitration. 
13 For an economic analysis of job security regulations in Germany cf. Buttler et al 
(1992). 
14 So far, only a limited number of studies exists, which analyze the influence of works 
councils on the dismissal behavior of firms. These studies produced controversial and 
inconclusive results, because they did not distinguish between voluntary quits and 
dismissals (cf. Kraft 1986) or they did not use state-of-the-art econometrics to isolate 
the genuine impact of plant-level representation (cf. Falke et al. 1981; Holand 1983, 
1985) on dismissals. 
15 The annual net turnover rate that can be calculated from this figure is 18 percent. This is 
slightly lower than the respective figures to be found in official statistics published by the 
Federal Labor Office (26-27 percent, cf. Amdiche Nachrichten der Bundesanstalt fiir 
Arbeit, 1988: 296-297, 1680). The reason for this discrepancy is that our sample 
excludes small firms with less than five employees, newly founded enterprises and 
enterprises belonging to the primary sector. These firms are known to have above average 
turnover rates. 
16 Since our data are cross-sectional and responses are constrained to lie between 0 and I, 
the dependent variables are specified in log-odds form. Therefore, the results of our 
OLS-estimates might suffer from heteroscedastic residuals. In order to test for the 
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efficiency of our parameter estimates and the consistency of the standard errors, we re-
estimated every model using WLS-techniques. These estimates produced vinually 
identical results. Since the coefficients of our works council variable are likely to be 
biased due to endogeneity, we also used the 2SLS-estimator, which left the coefficients 
of the dummy-variable unchanged. 
17 Recall that the period for which our data has been collected (May 1985-April 1987) was 
a boom period in which especially large firms contributed to job growth. Moreover, 
dismissal rates were lower and quit rates higher than during an economic downturn. 
Thus, we have to be cautious in generalizing the findings of our estimates. We thank 
Daniel Hamermesh for drawing our attention to this caveat. Unfonunately, we do not 
have comparable data from a recessionary period to reestimate our models. 
18 In a similar context Biichtemann (1993: 295) argues therefore: "it appears that 
endogeneous economic factors and efficiency considerations rather than exogeneously 
imposed layoff and dismissal restraints account for the high degree of employment 
stability observed for the overwhelming majority of firms in (West) Germany." 
19 This conflicts with the findings of Biichtemann (1993: 284) who argues that "the mere 
existence of a works council has no statistically significant impact on firms' firing 
behavior when other variables such as firm size, industry, skill level of the work force, 
and demand fluctuations are controlled for." Unfonunately, he does not present the 
estimates on which his conclusion is based. 
20 The results of these estimates are not reponed here, but can be obtained from the 
authors on request. 
21 A major reason is that only a small minority of all dismissals is disapproved of by the 
works councils. 
22 When analyzing the impact of turnover and employment stability on the performance 
of the firm, Osterman (1987) comes to a similarly cautious conclusion. 
23 Although there is abundant evidence supponing the assumption that adjustment costs 
are asymmetric (for the United Kingdom cf. Schiantarelli and Sembenelli 1993; 
for the Netherlands cf. Pfann and Verspagen 1989; for Great Britain and the 
Netherlands cf. Pfann and Palm 1993; and for France cf. Bresson et al 1992), no 
comparable studies for Germany have been published so far. Since firing costs in 
Germany are lower than in France, but higher than in the United Kingdom (cf. 
Bentolila and Benola 1990), we assume that the above-mentioned asymmetry also holds 
true for Germany. 
24 The latter costs have been estimated at DM 356 for 1982 and at DM440 per employee 
for 1986 (cf. Niedenhoff 1987: 13). In both years, this equals approximately 0.7 percent 
of total labor costs. 
25 The findings of Machin and Wadhwani (1991) for Great Britain are more in line with 
the estimates presented above. They argue that the relationship between unionism and 
employment growth is not a constant one. Using longitudinal plant-level data, they find 
a negative correlation for the period 1979-1984 and a positive one for the 1970's. 
Additional regression analyses with the percentage change in employment 1985-1987 as 
the dependent variable also show that the existence of a works council and union density 
do not have any influence on the hiring behavior of firms. The results are not reponed 
here, but can be obtained from the authors on request. 
26 Even in the Anglo-Saxon literature there is no consensus about the possible effects of 
unionization on the economic performance of the firm (for a detailed secondary analysis 
of studies from the United States cf. Belman 1992 and from Great Britain cf. Metcalf 
1993). 
27 This act is pan of a comprehensive legal framework to foster the (re-)integration of 
severely disabled persons into the labor market and to stabilize their individual 
employment histories. Apan from the quota system and the dismissal protection 
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regulations, some other instruments of the Handicapped Act are wonh mentioning: 
- A general obligation to preferential employment of the severely disabled. 
- The election of an additional spokesperson to represent the interests of the severely 
disabled at the plant level (for a comprehensive overview see Semlinger/Schmid 
1985). 
Apparently, neither the quota system nor the general obligation to affirmative action 
have a considerable impact on employers' general propensity to employ severely disabled 
persons (Frick 1992a). 
28 Until 1990, the monthly compensation was DM150 per month. 
29 The severely disabled are persons officially recognized as having a permanent reduction 
in their capacity to work of at least 50 percent. Official recognition is the responsibility 
of a special welfare agency ("Vmo,;gungsamt") and solely based on a medical diagnosis. 
In 1990, the number of disabled persons that were gainfully employed was approxi-
mately 775,000 (cf. Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit 1992: 94). Additionally, about 109,000 
disabled wage and salary earners are working in small enterprises with less than 16 
workers which are not obliged to employ disabled persons (cf. Arbeitsgemeinschaft 
1991: 101). Together with approximately 121,000 unemployed disabled persons (cf. 
von Henniges 1993: 44), slightly more than one million disabled persons are either 
working or looking for work. 
30 The number of applications immediately follows the business cycle. It slightly increased 
between 1975 and 1980, peaked in 1982 and declined substantially during the second 
half of the 1980's. Today, the figures for the western pan of Germany are nearly 
identical with the ones from the mid-1970's. 
31 Although generous wage and training subsidies are available to employers willing to hire 
disabled persons, the acceptance of these subsidies is remarkably low. For an empirical 
analysis cf. Frick (1992b). 
32 In Germany severely disabled persons can retire at the age of 60. Therefore only a 
minority of 8 percent of all disabled employees is between 60 and 64 years old. 
33 Furthermore, it has to be taken into account that disabled employees are highly 
concentrated in capital intensive and large firms relatively less exposed to fluctuations in 
product demand (cf. Sadowski and Frick 1989). Since these firms are more likely to offer 
stable employment, disabled wage and salary earners are on average less likely to be 
dismissed than nondisabled employees. 
34 In 38 percent of the establishments covered by the quota system a works council exists 
and in 32 percent a spokesperson of the disabled was elected (Frick 1992a). The 
spokesperson has information and consultative rights only, that are by far weaker than 
the ones guaranteed to the works council (cf. Jopen 1988). 
35 In a multivariate analysis, where we controlled for a number of individual characteristics 
of the disabled persons (age, sex, education, tenure, attitude toward the dismissal, etc.) 
and some characteristics of their respective employers (size, industry, percentage of 
disabled employees), the expression of misgivings or a formal contradiction by the works 
council proved to have a positive and statistically significant effect on the probability of 
reinstatement. The mere existence of a works council did not have any influence. The 
results of the logistic regression model are not reponed here, but can be obtained from 
the authors on request. 
36 These findings also explain why firms have an interest in early retirement options for the 
disabled, who can retire at the age of 60 already: Notwithstanding the reduced 
individual productivity, collective agreements as well as the reciprocity expectations of 
the work force usually prevent any reduction in pay. In this case the option of early exit 
can be interpreted as a socially acceptable functional equivalent to an otherwise necessary 
dismissal (cf. Frick and Frick 1994). 
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37 Kohli et al (1983: 29) define the reciprocity norm as "the basic concept of justice and 
equity under which individuals organize their social actions .... On the one hand, this 
involves the expectation that the utilization of labor in the firm does not endanger the 
lifetime protection of the capacity for work. On the other hand it is felt that the 
employees furnish the firm with an investment, based on their continuous performance, 
their willingness to accept responsibility, their reliability, etc.-i.e. especially the 
noncontractual elements of their work-for which the firm will reward them with 
special benefits if their performance capacity should diminish some day." 
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Author(s) 
Addison et al (1989) 
Kraft (1992) 
Lorenz and Wagner ( 1991) 
Schnabel (1989) 
Schnabel and Wagner (1992) 
Mainusch (1992) 
Note. 
• WR: Workers' Representation 
Table 3.8 Productivity Effects of Trade Unions 
Sample/ Data 
30 two-digit manufacturing 
industries organized by 12 
different unions 1983 
20 two-digit manufacturing 
industries organized by 6 
different unions 1970-1987 




29 two-digit manufacturing 
industries 1982-1984 
29 two-digit manufacturing 
industries 1983 
Productivity Measure(s) 
Value Added per 
Employee 
Annual Increase of 
Total Factor 
Productivity 
Value Added per 
Employee 
Gross Domestic Product 
per Employee 
Percentage of Revenues 
Spent on R&D 
Percentage of Employees 
Working in R & D 
Profit Rate 





of Metal Workers', 
Chemical Workers', 





Effect of WR" 
Negative, but insignificant 
Mixed results: significantly 
positive in the most 
imponant sectors (metal 
and chemical industries), 
significantly negative 
in other sectors 
Negative, but insignificant 
Negative, but insignificant 
Positive, but insignificant 
Negative, but insignificant 
Significantly negative 
Author(s) Sample/ Dlllt1 ProduaillitJ MellSUrr(s) Indict11or(s) of WR' E.ffeaofWR' 
Addison ettd. (1993) 43-54 establishments from Net Profit Before Taxes/ Presence of Works Council Negative, but insignificant 
manufaauring industry Fixed Capital 
in Lower Saxony and Baden- Log(Value Added) Positive, but insignificant 
Wiirttemberg 1990 /91. Capital Investment/ Significantly negative 
Capital Stock 
Net Capital Investment/ 
Capital Stock 
Positive, but insignificant 
Log(Wage per Employee) 
Average Percentage Wage Drift 
Significantly positive 
Significantly negative 
FilZRoy and Kraft (1985a) 61/62 medium and large firms Profitability Presence of Works Council WC: Significantly negative 
in the metal-working industry (Casbflow/Capital Stock) Union Density U: Significantly positive 
1977/1979 Average Hourly Wage WC: Nerctive, but insignificant 
U: Signi candy positive 
Salaries per Employee 
and Year 
WC: Significantly negative 
U: Significantly positive 
FilZRoy and Kraft (1985b) c:f. FitzRoy and Kraft Value Added per Presence of Works Council WC: Significantly negative 
(1985a) Employee Union Density U: Positive, but insignificant 
Index of Participation IP: Significantly positive 
Index Squared SIP: Significantly negative 
FilZRoy and Kraft (1987a) c:f. FilZRoy and Kraft Total Factor Productivity Presence of Works Council WC: Significantly negative 
(1985a) Union Density U: Significantly positive 
FilZRoy and Kraft (1987b) c:f. FitzRoy and Kraft Value Added per Employee Presence of Works Council WC: Significantly negative 
(1985a) Union Density U: Significantly positive 
FilZRoy and Kraft (1990) 57 medium and :%n firms Innovative Activities Composite Works Council- Significantly negative 
in the metal-wor · g industry (Proportion of Sales Consisting Union Density Index 
1979 only of New Products Introduced 
Over a Five-Year Interval) 
Kraft (I 986) c:f. FitzRoy and Kraft Turnover (Dummy-Variable Presence of Works Council WC: Positive, but insignificant 
(1985a) High vs. Low Ac:c:ording Union Density U: Negative, but insignificant 
to Management) Inda oflndividual Voice IIV: Significantly negative 
Notn: 
• WR: Workers' Reprc,cntatlon 
• Due to musing values, the number of cases varies depending on the spec:ific:ation. 
Author(s) 
Bcnclli et al. (1987) 
Sample/ Data 
8 two-digit manufacturing 
industries 1954-1976 
40 codetcrmined and 18 
noncodctermined firms 
1973-1983 
40 codctermined and 18 
noncodctcrmined firms 
1973-1983 
Table 3.10 Productivity Effects of Codetermination 







Jan. 1978-April 1983 
Average Monthly Stock 
Return Jan. 1975-Junc 1976 










Effect of CD' 
Although not statistically significant, 
the return variances arc lower in 
industries subject to parity codctcrmination 
than in other industries. This 
pattern is not observed in other European 
countries. 
The return variance of the ponfolio of 
codctermincd firms declines significantly 
following the imposition of codetcrmination. 
Since the same phenomenon 
occurs in firms not subject to 
codctcrmination, the imposition of the 
law had apparently no discernible impact 
on the stock return variance. 
In the case of firms directly affected 
by codetcrmination, average monthly 
stock returns decreased by 0.008 percent 
during the period immediately prcccding 
its imposition; in the case of 
noncodctermincd firms the respective 
decline was even larger (0.013 percent). This 
diffi:rcncc was not statistically significant. 
(continwtl) 
Author(s) 
Bcndli ttal. (1987) 
Gurdon and Rai (1990) 
Svcjnar (1982) 
Nou-. 
• CD: Codctcrmination 
Table 3.10 (Continued) 
S4mpk/Dflla 
42 matched pairs of 
firms (codctcrmined 
and non-codctcrmined) 
1970-1976 vs. 1977-1982 
Pro,,h«tivity Memure (s) 
Earnings Before Interest 
and T axcs/T otal Assets 
Net Income/Total Equity 
Dividends/Net Income 







Net Investment in Fixed 
Asscts/T otal Assets 
Labor Costs/Total Sales 
63 largc enterprises Stock Value of Plant and 
(37 alfca:ed and 26 Equipment/Number of 
unalfca:cd by Codctcrmination Employees 
Act 1976) 1970-1985 Change in Revenue per 
14 tw0-digit manufacturing 
industries 1950-1976 
Unit of Labor 
Change in Profits per 
Unit of Capital 
Value Added per Hour 
Worked by Production 
Workers 









1951 and of Works 
Constitution Acts 
1952 and 1972 
Effoao/CD. 
There is no cvidcna: at all that 
codctcrmination affi:cts firm policies: 
Using parametric and nonparamcttic 
test proa:durcs, the authors find that 
none of the mean comparison tests 
produced statistically significant 
results. 
The capital-labor ratio inacascd 
significantly more in firms that were 
not aJrcctcd by 1976 lcgislation. The 
introduction of legislation led to a 
significantly lower productivity and a 
significantly higher profitability 
in codctcrmined firms. 
In general, the establishment of co-
determination through the 1951, 1952, 
and 1972 laws had no pcra:ptible 
dFcct on productivity. In mining, 1972 
legislation had a significantly negative 
productivity dFcct; in iron and steel, 
none of the three laws had a significant 
impact. 
WORKS COUNCILS, UNIONS, AND FIRM PERFORMANCE 
Table 3.11 Operationalizations, Means, and Standard Deviations 
Standard 
Variable Optrationalization Mean Deviation 
Depmdmt Variables 
DISRATE Dismissals as a Percentage of Employees 0.13 0.26 
QUITRATE Quits as a Percentage of Employees 0.14 0.22 
HIRERATE Hires as a Percentage of Employees 0.31 0.45 
Sector Characteristics 
UNEMPRATE Unemployment Rate 6.87 2.63 
PERCUNION Percentage of Employees Covered by 
Collective Agreement Against Loss 
of Income or Employment Due to Technical 
Change (Proxy for Union Density) 0.13 0.19 
INDUST Industry (Reference Category) 0.30 0.46 
CONSTRUC Construction Industry 0.14 0.34 
RETAIL Wholesale and Retail Trade 0.22 0.41 
TRAFFIC Traffic and Communication 0.04 0.20 
BANK&INS Banks and Insurances 0.03 0.17 
OSERVICES Other Services 0.27 0.44 
Firm Characteristics 
SINGLE Multi-plant Enterprise (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.22 0.42 
LABCOST Wages as a Percentage of Sales (in percent) 31.5 18.1 
WOCOUNC Presence of Works Council (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.24 0.43 
SEASON Seasonal Output Fluctuations (O = no, 1 = yes) 0.63 0.48 
SHORTTIME Short-time Work Between 1985 and 1987 (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.11 0.31 
HIREPROB Problems in Hiring Personnel (0 = no, 1 = yes) 0.34 0.47 
CHEMPLOY Change in Employment 1985-87 (in percent) +0.13 29.8 
FIRMAGE Firm Age (in Years) 47.7 49.0 
Firm Size Measures 
FSIZE19 5-19 Employees (Reference Category) 0.49 0.50 
FSIZE49 20-49 Employees 0.41 0.49 
FSIZE99 50-99 Employees 0.05 0.21 
FSIZEl00+ 100 and more Employees 0.06 0.23 
Characteristics of Employees 
PERCFEMA Percent Female 0.35 0.27 
PERCAPPR Percent Apprentices 0.08 0.12 
PERCQUAL Percent Qualified Personnel 0.55 0.26 
PERCPART Percent Part-time Employees 0.11 0.16 





Daily and Weekly Hours in the FRG and the U.S. 
Daniel S. Hamermesh 
INTRODUCTION 
The increasing ease of international communications has raised interest in 
comparing policies, including labor-market policies, in different economies. 1 While 
the comparisons may have some inherent intellectual interest, presumably their 
main purposes are to instruct policy-makers in the countries involved (and perhaps 
in other countries too) about potentially attractive innovations that have succeeded 
elsewhere and that merit importing. The ultimate goal is to broaden the menu of 
policy choices by providing information on the successes and failures of the 
alternatives in different countries. 
Such comparisons are implicit in the deluge of Western economists who, 
beginning in the late 1980's, descended on Eastern Europe and the former Soviet 
Union offering advice on economic restructuring. This was not an example of 
mutual learning, of each country hoping to improve its array of policies, but rather 
one of policy export. Ideally the purpose was to discover the particular indigenous 
problems chat might require tailoring the policies being exported to the countries 
that were supposed to be aided. 
In this chapter I consider the potential of these exercises for generating 
successful policies in the labor market. I examine in general terms the conditions 
that might make one country's successful policy more or less successfully 
transferable elsewhere. The analysis models various generic policies to consider 
what might make an optimal policy choice in one labor market more or less 
attractive in another. Specific guidelines chat can indicate when policy transfers are 
more likely to be successful are then developed. 
To begin considering whether this fairly general set of considerations is useful 
beyond focusing our thoughts about labor-market policy, I examine and compare 
German and American policies that set restrictions on hours worked. This leads 
naturally to studying differences in hours of work between the two countries, and 
to the quite neglected area of variations in patterns of hours of work per day and 
per week. 
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CONDITIONS FOR THE TRANSFERABILITY OF POLICY 
I abstract here from several international differences that will obviously make 
policies that are optimal in one country suboptimal in another. I assume through-
out that there is a well-defined social welfare function (SWF), or that policy-
makers have an explicit maximand, and that these functions or maximands are 
identical in each country. Clearly, if there are different maximands, optimal 
policies in the face of identical shocks or conditions will differ across countries. 
Obversely, if a country's maximand changes to approximate another's more closely, 
a policy is more likely to be transferred successfully. Similarly, different tech-
nologies or endowments, including the amount of innate talent embodied in the 
labor force, will also dictate that optimal policies will differ among labor markets 
even in the face of identical preferences. 
Throughout I examine the optimal choices by one society along a particular 
dimension of policy after each in a series of shocks. This is equivalent to comparing 
optimal choices among otherwise· identical countries that differ only in the nature of 
the past choices they have made and shocks they have faced. It enables me to isolate 
what generates differing optimal policies even when tastes and technologies are 
identical. Moreover, it highlights the factors (beyond the obvious differences in tastes 
and technology) that produce greater differences or similarities in optimal policies. 
The general pattern of analysis considers the optimal policy choice, P~, before a 
first shock to the labor market occurs, the choice P; after it occurs, and where 
necessary the policy P; after it disappears. In each of the examples below I explore 
how the choices made in response to the first shock condition the choice of 
subsequent policies, thus presenting the nature of the hysteresis in the economy. 
It should be clear that optimal policies do not differ because of any legislative, 
political or bureaucratic rigidity. There are no costs of adjusting policy in these 
models: Policies are changed immediately in response to current conditions and the 
shock. All the results hold in long-run equilibrium, i.e., international differences in 
optimal labor-market policies are long-run differences. 
The specific models examined below have the same general properties, and the 
processes that generate the sequence (P~, P;, P;) are the same. These are: 
1 P~ is chosen given the SWF, the initial technology and the initial endowments 
of Iabor, skill, and other inputs. 
2 As a result of this choice, skills and the returns to skill and raw Iabor change. 
3 After this change a productivity shock occurs, essentially changing the nature of 
production. 
4 In the face of this shock a new policy, P;, becomes optimal and is implemented. 
5 As a result of this new shock and of the particular choice P;, skills and the 
returns to skill and raw Iabor change again. 
6 The productivity shock disappears. 
7 In light of its disappearance a new optimal policy, P;, is chosen, P; -:t, P~. The 
new policy differs from P~ because the choice P; altered the underlying set of 
endowments and returns. 
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Two Examples Without Externalities 
In this subsection I examine two particular labor-market policies that produce no 
labor-market externalities. Consider first an effective minimum wage wm below 
which no one will be employed. The policy is chosen because society believes it is 
unfair for anyone to work below this wage and legislates its desires. 2 I assume the 
policy has no impact on the productivity of other workers. Its only effect is to 
disemploy those whose productivity is below wm, as in Meyer and Wise (1983). 
The SWF in this case is: 
SWF= Z(wm) fl U(w;) fluco) (1) 
iew;.w,. iEw<w,. 
where I assume that workers with productivity below the minimum receive an income 
at some base amount set for convenience at zero, and that z: U'> 0, Z", U" < 0. 





n U(w) n U(0) (2) 
where I now denote the two parts of the SWF without the subscripts. Society 
chooses a minimum wage wmo to balance the gain from avoiding having anyone 
paid below the minimum against the loss in social welfare of having some workers 
displaced from their jobs and their earnings reduced to zero. 
Let the distribution of productivity at the start of Period 0 be uniform on the 
interval [ Wo - "o/2, Wo + "o/2]. Then any worker whose productivity is below wmo 
receives zero earnings, so that a fraction [ wmo - Wo + "o/2] / a0 of the labor force is 
not working. During the period of nonwork from the start to the end of Period 0, 
the productivity of nonemployed workers deteriorates at the rate <5.3 At the end of 
Period 0 the wage distribution for this segment of the population is thus shifted 
left by <5 percent. 
At the start of Period 1 the economy experiences a shock that shifts the 
distribution of productivity of the remaining employed workers to: 
The shock could, for examples, be a skill-using technical change, or a sudden 
additional accumulation of physical capital that is q-complementary with skill. 
Whatever the cause, it is exactly the kind of shock that is consistent with the widely 
noted increase in the dispersion of earnings in the United States during the 1980's 
(e.g., Bound and Johnson 1992). In the face of this shock a new minimum wage is 
chosen to maximize (1). With the increase in the average wage of those workers who 
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remained employed after the initial policy wmo was imposed, the policy that maximizes 
(1) after the shock becomes w,.1 > W..o, 
The new higher minimum causes some additional workers (those for whom 
w.,1 > w> w.,0) to lose their jobs. Their productivity and that of workers whose 
productivity at t= 0 was below w..o depreciate at a rate 6 during Period 1. At the 
end of Period 1 one group of nonemployed workers has productivity on the 
domain [(Wo- ao/2)(1- 6)2, w.,0 (1 - 6)2], another on the domain [w.,0 (1 - 6), 
w.,1 (1 - 6) ], and employed workers have productivity ranging from w.,1 to Wo + a1/2. 
At the start of Period 2 the shock that stretched the distribution of productivity to 
the right disappears, and the upper bound on productivity reverts to Wo + a0/2. The 
minimum wage that maximizes (1) is, however, no longer W..o, The depreciation of 
the skills of those who were disemployed by the previous minimum wage policies, 
w.,0 and w.,1, has changed the distribution of productivity from what it was at the 
start of both Periods O and 1. Even though the wages of employed workers have not 
changed since the start of Period 0, the deterioration of human capital leads to a new 
optimum minimum wage policy, w,.2, that differs from w,.0• In particular, the shapes 
of Z and U ensure that w.,1 > w,.2 + w,.0•4 The failure of the optimal minimum to 
revert to its initial value stems solely from the hysteresis that is induced by the policy 
itself. Were costs of adjusting the policy instrument added to the model only the time 
paths, not the equilibrium optimal policies, would differ from those presented here. 
The difference between w,.0 and w,.2 is within one country. But comparing two 
countries in which the distributions of wages of currently employed workers appear 
identical, the discussion shows that we cannot transfer a policy from Country O to 
Country 2 on the basis of these distributions. Transferability is only possible if we 
know the entire history of the distributions of wages in the two countries or have a 
complete inventory of the skills of both populations and know how those skills 
combine to generate output and wages. Simply pointing to identical distributions 
of wages of current labor-force members is not sufficient to justify claiming that 
the policy in Country O is appropriate for Country 2, even with identical social 
welfare functions and other current indicators. 
I have demonstrated the role of policy hysteresis in labor demand in the context 
of a minimum-wage policy. The model could be applied mutatis mutandis to its 
close cousin, the overtime premium. If instead we base the assumption about the 
depreciation of human capital on total worker-hours, the results follow through. 
The policy sequence could be a 50-percent premium for overtime hours after H' 
hours per week; a shock that causes society to change standard hours to only 
H' - K; and, after the shock disappears, a new policy with standard hours part way 
between H' and H' - K From an initial equilibrium the changed policy leads 
employers to reduce total worker-hours (labor-demand is at least somewhat elastic), 
which leads to the depreciation of human capital as total worker-hours employed 
drop. This depreciation leads to a different equilibrium after the shock disappears. 
Similar hysteresis, and similarly nontransferable policies, can arise from workers' 
decisions about labor supply in models of taxes and transfers rather than the 
employers' decisions that underlay the hysteresis in the previous model. Consider a 
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balanced-budget policy that offers all workers a guaranteed income of T and 
finances it by a flat-rate tax on earnings at rate t. I assume hours per period are the 
same for all workers, that each person has the same reservation wage w ·en, 
w •1 > 0, and that the i'th person will remain in the work force if net earnings 
exceed the reservation wage, i.e., if (1 - t) W; > w ·er). Then given the distribution 
of wages, W; ~ f(w), society's goal is to maximize the SWF: 
SWF= TI U([l - t]U{+ T), TI U(T), (3) 
iE(I- t)w;,, w'(D iE(I- t)w< w'(D 
subject to the balanced-budget condition for taxes and transfers: 
l:T {all i} = l:tw;{i e (1 - t] W;> w ·c 7)}. 5 
At the start of Period O society chooses an optimal transfer T0 and the tax rate t0 
that is dictated by the balanced-budget requirement in the face of the labor-force 
withdrawal induced by the income and substitution effects created by this policy. 
The skills of the fraction of the population that is induced to leave the labor force 
by the choices of T0 and t0 deteriorate during Period 0. 
A shock occurs at the start of Period 1 that alters the w· ( T) at a given T, for 
example, an exogenous change in the number of young children at home. This leads 
to a new tax/transfer policy described by the set (T1, t 1). After the shock disappears 
and the function w ·en shifts back to its original form, the change in the distri-
bution of wages/productivity that had resulted from the deterioration of the skills of 
those who left the work force leads to a new policy, (T2, t2), that differs from (T0, 
t0). The same result would be produced if we assumed that the shock were, as before, 
a temporaty change in the distributions of wages/productivity. Also as before, the 
discussion suggests that knowledge of wage distributions at one point in time is 
insufficient to justify transferring policies between countries. 
An Example With an Extemality 
A somewhat different reason for the nontransferability of policy arises from 
hysteresis in the generation of externalities. Externalities induced by the accumula-
tion of human capital guarantee that the optimal choice of policies that affect 
human capital cannot be based simply on current conditions, and cannot merely 
compare current conditions among economies. Consider an economy where 
production is carried on using two types of labor, L1 and L2 (the capital stock is 
ignored). There are no births and deaths, so that: 
L1 are skilled workers, who must be retrained at the start of each period. Even 
though it is not directly effective in production after the period when it is given, for 
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N periods thereafter the training does increase efficiency. It can thus be thought of 
as engineering skills that make workers more productive immediately and that also 
enhance society's stock of general knowledge. 
In each period the productivity of trained workers is augmented or reduced by a 
random shock 8, where: 
Pr{8,= 8} = Pr{8,= -8} =0.5. 
Accounting for all these features, output in period t is: 
(4) 
where H denotes the effective stock of durable knowledge, and Fis a two-factor 
production function with the standard properties, with F1 > Fi if L1 = Li. at the 




Consider a myopic training policy that maximizes Yr but ignores the N-period 
impact (the externalities generated by training). A farsighted policy would 
maximize the discounted stream of expected output, would enhance welfare, but 
would not imply anything different about the hysteresis in the choice of policy.7 
The optimal myopic policy chooses L •1, such that: 
1 F; [l + 8,] - Fi -=-----
H, F 
(5) 
The optimal policy trains the marginal worker so that the value of the training (in terms 
of output) through direct production and the impact on the stock of knowledge is equal 
to the reduction in output when the worker is shifted out of the unskilled work force. 
At t+ 1 a new shock to skilled workers' productivity occurs, 8,+ 1, leading to a 
new optimum for the skilled work force, L 01,,+l· Even if 8,+ 1 = 8,, L;,r+ 1 -:1; L;, 
unless 8 ,+ 1 = 8 ,- N- In this simple specification the optimal policy will change with 
probability .5 even if the shock remains unchanged. 8 The optimal policy will differ 
at t+ 1 because the history of productivity shocks produces a different set of 
externalities at time t+ 1 than existed at t. 
Were we comparing two economies (labor markets) J and Kata point in time 
using this simple model, the optimal training policies would differ unless: 
N N 
I: 8J.,-; = I: 8K.,- i• 
i•O i•O 
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The existence of externalities that arise from training requires different training policies 
in countries that appear identical in terms of the nature of production and the recent 
shocks that have affected the labor market. As in the other examples the knowledge 
required to transfer policies optimally exceeds what one might have thought is needed, 
and far exceeds the information that is likely to be available to the policy-maker. 
Positive Implications 
Since it deals with optimal policy, this discussion would appear to have only 
normative consequences. I believe it has positive implications too. Just as one can 
use price theory to study phenomena that appear to result from alleged cultural 
differences (Becker and Stigler 1977), this analysis tells us about the conditions 
under which we can expect imported policies to achieve their stated goals. In 
particular, it implies that an optimal policy will be transferred with greater success: 
1 the more similar have been the patterns of shocks to the two labor markets; and 
2 the more similar their past policy choices have been. 
The comparison obviously depends on the term "similar," which requires specificity to 
be useful. In the case of shocks-to productivity or to the distribution of wages-greater 
similarity means that the time paths of the shocks to the two labor markets have exhibited 
greater cros.HX>rrdation. If policy choices have been made optimally, nothing more needs 
to be considered, since the similarity of past policies has resulted from the similarity of 
past shocks. If not, past departures from optimality in the countty whose policy is 
exponed ensure that the policy will be suboptimal in the imponing countty, other things 
equal. Obviously, imponing failed policies makes little sense. 
The general point here is in some ways qualitatively similar to the analysis of 
appropriate technology in the literature on economic development (e.g., Pack 1988). 
In that discussion factor endowments that differ across economies imply different 
optimal technologies. As such, the discussion rested on static models in which policy 
was exogenous. The issue here is dynamic, though, in that the analysis demonstrates 
that even when two economies appear to be currently identical one country's policy 
will be inappropriate for the other to the extent that their histories differ. This point is 
also somewhat similar to the discussion of European unemployment and the role of 
hysteresis in affecting current macroeconomic outcomes (e.g., Blanchard and 
Summers 1986; Franz 1987). It differs from that too, for here the differing histories 
have themselves resulted from different past choices about policies, so that today's 
optimal policy depends on the dynamic effects of past policy choices. 
HOURS LAWS: UNITED STATES AND THE FEDERAL 
REPUBLIC OF GERMANY 
In the remainder of this study I examine weekly hours and days of work in the 
Federal Republic of Germany (FRG hereafter) and the U.S. The different 
outcomes are instructive because: 
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1 They show how two economies at roughly the same average wage level can have 
sharply different patterns of hours and days that have changed over time in 
different ways; 
2 They indicate how little we know about daily and weekly work schedules at a 
time when rapid changes in patterns of labor-force participation may be 
generating changes in consumers' demands for retail and other firms' schedules; 
and 
3 They may themselves result from differences in policies between the two 
countries. 
Consider first the policies that might affect the mix of hours and days. Hours 
laws can be very specific (e.g., limits on weekly hours of teenage strawberry pickers 
in Oregon) or quite general (e.g., general limits on weekly hours). For the purposes 
of this chapter I restrict the discussion to the general cases of limits on hours per 
week or per day, as in the example outlined on pages 79-80. The basic law on 
hours in the United States has been remarkably unchanged since the passage of the 
Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938. Workers must be paid a 50 percent premium 
over their regular hourly pay (including premiums for shift work, incentive pay, 
etc.) on all hours in excess of 40 per week, though in some cases (mainly 
governmental subunits) compensatory time can be provided in lieu of overtime 
pay. Note that there is no daily limit on hours beyond which the overtime 
premium must be applied in the U.S. 
The situation is different in the FRG. For adults long-standing legislation limits 
the regular workday to 10 hours in a workweek limited to 48 hours.9 The legislative 
constraint is hardly relevant, as collective and other agreements limit the normal 
workday to 8 hours. Note that in the FRG there are constraints on both daily and 
weekly hours. 
Any differences in outcomes may in some ways illustrate the policy hysteresis 
outlined in the previous section. In particular, they could reflect the results of 
differences in the histories of policies regulating hours of work in the two countries. 
The extent to which this hysteresis is responsible is not known and is not the 
subject of this chapter. What we do know is that simply moving to identical 
policies in the two countries would not generate outcomes that are independent of 
their predecessor policies. 
WEEKLY AND DAILY HOURS IN THE FRG AND THE U.S. 
There have been numerous studies of differences in working time among 
industrialized countries, including the U.S. and the FRG, and of changes in work 
hours over time (e.g., Blyron 1985; Owen 1989). More technical studies have 
examined employers' demand for workers and hours in the context of the formal 
structure of production (see pages 90-92). There has been no formal examin-
ation of substitution by employers among additional workers, hours per week, 
and hours per day, or by workers among additional weeks per year, hours per 
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week, and hours per day. The reason is very simple: Nearly all of our labor-force 
surveys, the main source of the underlying information, ask questions about 
weekly hours, so that information on this third margin of choice is rarely 
available. 
As background I consider here the available evidence on differences and changes 
in weekly and daily hours in the U.S. and the FRG. Figure 4.1 graphs the 
cumulative distribution of workers by weekly hours actually worked in the two 
countries for 1970 and 1990 (1989 in the FRG). Two series are presented for the 
FRG in 1989, the first the standard German data, the second from the European 
Labor Force Survey in which the questions resemble those in the American Current 
Population Survey more closely. The figure begins at 30 hours per week because 
there are only tiny differences in the distributions below 30 hours. Several facts 
stand out from the figure: 
- In 1970 average weekly hours were longer in the FRG than in the U.S. This 
had reversed by 1990. 
- In 1970 a greater fraction of German than of American workers had short 
workweeks. Also, a greater fraction of German workers had long (~45 hour) 
workweeks. In 1990 the opposite was true of both short and long workweeks. 
Except for a slight increase in the variance of weekly hours there was little 
change in the distribution of hours in the U.S. over these two decades. 
Changes in the FRG were much more substantial, with a large drop in the 





~ 80 .. 
i 70 ... 
0 .. 60 C 
GI 
f:! 60 GI a. 
GI 40 -~ .. 
Ill 30 :i 
E 
















Hours per week 
U.S.1990 
---- FRG 1989, EUROST 
60 
------ FRG 1970 
Figure4.1 Hoursperweek-U.S. (1970, 1990); FRG (1970, 1989) 
90 
POLICY TRANSFERABILITY AND HYSTERESIS 
This information is fairly well known to students of labor markets in the two 
countries. Much less known are the data on days per week in conjunction with 
weekly hours worked. 
There are no published data on the hours/days distinction for the United States. 
One can, however, use the 1977 Quality of Employment Survey to generate 
tabulations for the U.S. on usual weekly hours and usual days worked per week. 
Respondents were asked to check each day that they usually worked, and were 
asked, "The 'forty-hour week' is a very common term .... During the average week 
how many hours do you work, not counting the time you take off for meals?" I 
believe this question elicits information on usual hours, but that its design reduces 
the concentration of responses at 40 hours per week. 
A very similar table can be created for Germany using the 1990 wave of the 
German Socio-Economic Panel (GSOEP). The data on weekly hours are the 
response to the question, "How many hours on average is your actual work time 
[per week] including overtime?" Days are the response to the question, "How 
many days per week do you usually work?" [Author's translations.] 
Tabulations from the American survey are shown in Table 4.1, while the 
German results are in Table 4.2. As in the data on actual weekly hours 
Table 4.1 Usual Hours and Days, United States, 1977 (% Distribution) 
Salaried 
All Workers" Workeri 
Weekly Hours 
10-20 2.5 1.4 
20.1-30 7.1 5.1 
30.1-35 8.7 9.3 
35.1-39 9.6 12.6 
39.1-40 32.2 27.4 
40.1-44 8.3 6.9 
44.1-47 7.8 10.7 
47.1-54 13.0 14.4 
54.1-69 9.0 10.1 
>69 1.9 2.2 
Days 
1 0.0 0.0 
2 0.5 0.4 
3 1.6 1.2 
4 2.2 1.4 
5 81.0 86.2 
6-7 14.9 10.9 
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Table 4.2 Usual Hours and Days, FRG 1990, (% Distribution) 
Salaried Hourly Paid 
Al/Workm' Workenb Worken< 
Hours 
10-20 6.2 8.8 5.6 
20.1-30 5.6 7.6 3.9 
30.1-35 1.9 2.1 1.8 
35.1-39 32.7 13.4 36.7 
39.1-40 22.2 34.7 26.0 
40.1-44 11.7 10.1 9.2 
44.1-47 8.4 8.0 7.4 
47.1-54 7.3 10.9 5.7 
54.1-69 3.2 3.5 2.8 
>69 0.8 0.9 0.9 
Days 
1 0.1 0.1 0.0 
2 0.7 0.9 0.6 
3 1.3 2.2 0.3 
4 1.4 1.7 0.6 
5 86.3 83.2 89.5 
6-7 10.2 11.9 9.0 
Source-. Calculated from the 1990 Wave (7) of the German Socioeconomic Panel, 





presented in the figure, these data show that higher percentages of American 
workers have usual workweeks of less than 35 hours, or more than 47 hours, 
than do their German counterparts. The distributions of days also differ, at 
least in these samples: More Americans usually work fewer than 5 days, or more 
than 5 days, than do German workers. There is more dispersion in both weekly 
hours and days per week in the American labor force. This difference may be 
another reflection of the much discussed (and infrequently directly demon-
strated) greater flexibility of the American labor market than its European 
counterparts. 
There are two quite striking and hitherto unnoticed differences in work time 
between the two countries. In the U.S. salaried workers are more likely than hourly 
paid workers to be working exactly five days per week. In the FRG the opposite is 
the case. There is also an interesting difference in the length of the workweek by 
type of worker. In the U.S. salaried workers are more likely to be working long 
weeks than are hourly paid workers, but less likely to be working short weeks. In 
Germany they are more likely to be working long weeks or short weeks-there is 
much more dispersion in their weekly schedules, both regarding days and weekly 
92 
POLICY TRANSFERABILITY AND HYSTERESIS 
hours. Any explanation of these differences is obviously just speculation; but one 
sensible story is that the much greater extent and strength of German (blue-collar) 
unionism leads to much greater standardization of work schedules among hourly 
paid workers than in the U.S. 
Cross-tabulations of weekly hours and days per week from the QES data are 
presented in Table 4.3, both in total and separately for salaried and hourly paid 
workers. 11 Unsurprisingly, long workweeks in terms of hours are associated with long 
workweeks in terms of days. There are, though, some workers (2.8 percent of the 
total) who put in no more than 40 hours per week but who work 6 or 7 days; and 
0.4 percent of the total work more than 40 hours, but fewer than 5 days per week. 
Similar tabulations can be made {on the larger samples) from the 1990 wave of 
the GSOEP. These are presented in Table 4.4 in exactly the same format as the 
Table 4.3 Distribution of Hours and Days, United States, 1977 
(% Distributions)• 
Days 
Hours 1-4 5 6-7 Al/Days 
All Workersb 
10-30 2.6 5.7 1.3 9.6 
30.1-39 0.6 17.1 0.7 18.4 
39.1-40 0.8 30.7 0.8 32.3 
40.1-47 0.4 13.4 2.3 16.1 
>47 0.0 14.0 10.0 24.0 
All Hours 4.3 81.0 15.1 
Salaried Workers' 
10-30 1.4 4.1 1.0 6.5 
30.1-39 0.4 21.2 0.4 22.0 
39.1-40 1.0 25.8 0.6 27.4 
40.1-47 0.2 16.4 1.0 17.6 
>47 0.0 18.7 7.9 26.6 
All Hours 3.0 86.2 10.9 
Hourly Paid Workersd 
10-30 3.0 7.8 1.7 12.5 
30.1-39 0.8 13.6 1.0 15.4 
39.1-40 0.6 36.4 1.0 38.0 
40.1-47 0.6 11.1 3.2 14.9 
>47 0.0 8.6 10.7 19.3 
All Hours 5.0 77.5 17.6 
Source. Calculated from the Quality of Employment Survey, 1977 
Noter: 






Table 4.4 Distribution of Hours and Days, FRG, 1990, 
(% Distributions)• 
Days 
Hours 1-4 5 6-7 Al/Days 
All W orkersb 
10-30 2.5 8.0 1.2 11.7 
30.1-39 0.6 32.6 1.5 34.7 
39.1-40 0.2 20.4 1.6 22.2 
40.1-47 0.1 17.7 2.3 20.1 
>47 0.1 7.6 3.6 11.3 
All Hours 3.5 86.3 10.2 
Salaried Workers< 
10-30 4.1 10.0 1.5 15.6 
30.1-39 0.5 25.7 1.7 27.9 
39.1-40 0.1 14.7 1.7 16.5 
40.1-47 0.1 22.7 2.6 25.4 
>47 0.2 10.1 4.4 14.7 
All Hours 5.0 83.2 11.9 
Hourly Paid Workersd 
10-30 1.2 7.2 1.1 9.5 
30.1-39 0.2 37.1 1.1 38.4 
39.1-40 0.0 24.6 1.4 26.0 
40.1-47 0.0 14.6 2.1 16.7 
>47 0.1 6.0 3.3 9.4 
All Hours 1.5 89.5 9.0 
Source: Calculated from the 1990 Wave (7) of the German Socioeconomic 
Panel, produced by the Deutsches lnstitut for Wirtschaftsforschung 
Notes: 




tabulations for the U.S. A somewhat greater percentage (4.3 percent of the total) 
than in the U.S. works no more than 40 hours per week on 6 or 7 days. This is 
mainly the reflection of the shorter standard workweek in the FRG. But even 
workers who are obviously less than full-time constitute about the same percentages 
{1.3 and 1.2 percent) of the labor force in both countries. Not surprisingly, a 
smaller proportion (only 0.2 percent) of German workers work long hours on few 
days than in the U.S. 
Clearly, a not insignificant fraction of both the American and the German labor 
forces works highly unusual schedules, either long hours on few days, or, more 
commonly relatively short hours over many days per week. This suggests there is a 
substantial payoff to beginning the investigation of hours/days choices on both 
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sides of the labor market. That payoff is likely to increase as the importance of 
goods-producing industries, with their ability to rely on inventories of output and 
their need for workers' simultaneous presence at a location containing a large 
capital stock, decreases. 
The distribution of hours and days depends, of course, on the interactions 
among workers' tastes, the daily fixed costs of working that they face, and the 
nature of the technology that combines days, daily hours and workers. There is 
unfortunately no direct evidence on employers' and workers' weekly schedules of 
days and hours. In March 1989, however, the EC conducted surveys of employers 
and firms in eight countries that enable us to compare employers' and workers' 
weekly schedules of hours. Table 4.5 shows the results for the FRG. Comparing 
the data on operating hours (from the employers' survey) and those on contractual 
hours (from the workers' survey), it seems clear that the distribution of operating 
hours is shifted far to the right of the distribution of contractual hours. This leaves 
substantial scope for part-time work, for workers whose weekly schedules in the 
same job are dovetailed, and for overtime work. The existence of very long 
operating hours in industry (less so in retail) also demonstrates the scope for and 
existence of shift work. 
Table 4.5 Operating and Contractual Hours, 
Industry and Retail, FRG, 1989 
(% Distribution) 
Operating Contractual 
Hours % Hours % 
Industry 
<40 25 <35 0 
40-60 48 35-38 56 
60-80 18 38-40 43 
80-120 5 40-42 1 
>120 2 >42 0 
(No reply) 2 0 
TOTAL 100 100 
Retail 
<45 37 <35 0 
46-50 27 35-38 12 
51-55 16 38-40 83 
56-60 4 40-42 0 
61-65 10 >42 1 
66-75 0 
>76 0 
(No reply) 6 4 
TOTAL 100 100 
Source. European Economy, 1991, Appendix Tables 
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EMPLOYMENT-HOURS SUBSTITUTION AND THE 
EFFECT OF POLICY 
Simply linking differences in the distributions of days and hours to the difference in 
the structures of hours policies is not very informative. Serious studies of the effects 
of hours policies on the choice of daily and weekly schedules have not been made 
even within a country. What we have instead are demand-side studies of the shape 
of the labor aggregator, L= L(E,H), and studies of the impact of overtime 
penalties on the choice between workers E and weekly hours H Fortunately, many 
of these have been based on U.S. and German data, so that we do know a little bit 
about these issues. 
A full treatment is contained in Hamermesh (1993, Chapter 3), but Table 4.6 
presents a partial tabular survey of the research that includes all the studies based on 
the U.S. and the FRG. The German research in the first part of the table presents 
elasticities of output Y with respect to various inputs of hours and workers, or 
substitution elasticities between pairs of inputs H, E, and capital K The first set of 
American studies indicates the degree of substitution between part- and full-time 
workers. 
Hart and McGregor (1988) show clearly that the returns to inputs of hours are 
not increasing. Hart and Kawasaki (1988) measure fixed and variable labor costs 
more carefully than anyone else. They find that the effects of labor-cost increases 
on the demand for both workers and hours are more important than any 
substitution, and that both E and H are p-substitutes for capital. Konig and 
Pohlmeier (1988 and 1989) attempt to measure the prices of hours and workers by 
calculating indexes of overtime premia and various employee benefits. Theirs are 
the only available studies that provide direct estim<ites of worker-hours substitution. 
They imply that workers and hours are p-complements and that they are p-
substitutes for capital. The results indicate that it may be possible to aggregate 
workers and hours, but the aggregator is clearly not multiplicative. 
Using quite similar methods Owen (1979) finds easy substitution between the 
two groups of workers, while Ehrenberg et aL (1988) imply that substitution is 
much more difficult. Montgomery (1988) presents the most useful results in this 
group, as his microeconomic data obviate the need to account for the possible 
endogeneity of supply. His data suggest a small degree of substitution between full-
and part-time workers. 
The second group of studies estimates equations describing firms' demand for 
employees and hours. The American research computes the demand for employees 
as a function of the ratio of the cost of (what the authors believe are) per-worker 
benefits to the wage rate. All three use waves of the same detailed set of establish-
ment data. The elasticities indicate the percentage change in employment in 
response to an increase of 1/3 in the price of an hour of overtime (changing the 
penalty from 50 to 100 percent). They imply that, at a comtant input of worker-
hours, a higher effective per-hour cost imposed by an increased overtime penalty 
induces some p-substitution from hours to employees. Franz and Konig (1986) 
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Table 4.6 Studies of Worker-Hour Substitution and the Ovenime Penalty 
Study Data &suits 
Germany 
Han and Manufacturing 1/rH= 0.87 
McGregor industries, 1968-1978 1/rE= 0.30 
(1988) 7/vOvenimc "' 0 
Han and Manufacturing, annual, 0 b1<> 0 HK> O; 
Kawasaki 1951-81 scale effects exceed 
(1988) substitution effects 
Konig and Manufacturing, OEH= -0.16 
Pohlmeier quanerly, 1969-1985 0£1(= 0.62 
(1988) OHK= 0.12 
Konig and Manufacturing, Om= (-0.40, -0.78) 
Pohlmeier quanerly, 1969-1985 OEK= (1.02, 1,41) 
(1989) OHK= (0.72, 1.51) 
Franz and Manufacturing, quanerly, 
Konig (I 986) 1964-1984. Elasticity 
with respect to: 
H E 
Overtime penalty: -0.04 -0.10 
Standard hours: 0.99 -1.09 
United States 
"Full-time, Pan-time 
Owen (1979) Industries and 4.35 
occupations, 1973 
Ehrenberg Industries, 1984 0.21 
et al (1988) 
Montgomery (1988) Plants, 28 cities, 1980 0.67 
Percent change in E given a 
one-third increase in the 
price of ovenime: 
Ehrenberg ( 1971) Manufacturing, 1966 1.6 
Nussbaum and Manufacturing, 1966-197 4 2.0 
Wise (1978) 
Ehrenberg and 1976; Manufacturing: (0.5, 1.1) 
Schumann (I 982) Nonmanufacturing: (1.0, 2.1) 
examine a factor-demand system in which the effect of changing standard weekly 
hours and raising the overtime penalty can be studied. The interesting result, 
consistent with Hart and Kawasaki, is that raising the overtime penalty reduces 
employment (through the scale effect on the demand for worker-hours). 
Taken together, if we ignore capital (which the German studies suggest is 
wrong), this research implies that hours and workers are p-substitutes in demand. 
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The empirical work is far from extensive enough, though, to allow any conclusions 
about the strength of this substitution, and thus about the size of the impact of a 
change in hours laws on employers' relative demand for workers and hours. 
CONCLUSIONS, AND THE NEED FOR RESEARCH ON 
THE HOURS/DAYS DISTINCTION 
In this exploratory study I have demonstrated the difficulties attendant on 
transferring policies between economies. Even if current labor-market outcomes are 
identical, a policy that is optimal within one country will be suboptimal within an 
otherwise identical country unless the two have long identical histories of both 
policies and outcomes. While the point is not directly testable, I have attempted to 
illustrate differences in outcomes under currently similar (but not identical) laws 
regarding overtime. 
The genesis of the differences between German and American hours laws and 
contractual restrictions is beyond the scope of this analysis, and is really an issue in 
law and economics. How the time paths of these institutional changes have affected 
patterns of work-days and work-hours is, though, appropriately analyzed using the 
framework I have developed here. But until we know much more about how 
patterns of work-days and work-hours differ between the two countries, we cannot 
answer that comparative question (or even say very much about hours policies within 
a country). The evidence presented in pages 85-89 is the first available on this 
distinction. At this point all we know is that the data, which may not be fully 
comparable across the two countries, suggest there is more dispersion in weekly 
hours and in days worked per week in the American than in the German labor force. 
To be useful any examination of the threefold distinction in labor input (days, 
hours and workers) must be based on several countries. This is partly because 
policies that affect agents' choices differ among countries, so that without 
accounting for their effects any conclusions based on outcomes in one country are 
not generalizable. Partly too, underlying patterns of tastes, including those that 
generate differences in participation, will alter equilibrium hours and days worked. 
(For example, more two-worker households in one country create more incentives 
for its retailers to expand opening hours.) These considerations dictate studying 
these choices in more than one economy. 
This modeling and estimation should yield several outcomes: 
1 Information on patterns of and differences in days and hours of work in the two 
countries; 
2 Understanding the determinants of these differences in the context of models of 
employers' and workers' choices among participation (or number of workers), 
days and hours; and 
3 Comparisons of the impacts of international differences in policies and 
institutions that affect choices about hours and days, and the role of policy 
hysteresis in generating the time paths of these outcomes. 
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NOTES 
1 Among the many recent examples are trans-national comparisons of the U.S. economy 
and labor market to those of Australia and Sweden (Caves and Krause 1984; Bosworth 
and Rivlin 1987). 
2 This view is embodied in the Webbs' notion of a social minimum wage (Webb and 
Webb 1920) and still underlies much of the rhetoric about this policy 
3 This deterioration is consistent with a variety of evidence on the depreciation of 
unusued skills, including, e.g., Mincer and Polachek, 1974. 
4 The weak inequality becomes strong at all but specific combinations of the b and a;, 
5 This representation of the tax/transfer policy is like that in Fair (1971). 
6 The productivity shock applies only to Type 1 labor to minimize the notation. The 
results are qualitatively the same if the shock applies instead to the productivity of Type 
2 labor or to both groups' productivity. 
7 The only difference in (5) is the addition of terms in F(L 1,r+i• L2,,+J, i= 1, ... N, in 
the numerator of the right-hand side. 
8 If we assume a steady rate of depreciation of the externality rather than the one-hoss 
shay depreciation in the model, the probability that H,+ 1 = H, becomes vety small. 
9 Erdmann (1957); U.S. Congress, Office of Technology Assessment, Biological Rhythms, 
1991, Table A-1. 
10 The sources are Employment and Earnings, June 1970, June 1990; Statistiches Jahrbuch 
for die Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and, 1970, 1989; and Eurostar, Labour Force Survey, 
Results 1989. 
11 The 66 workers included in the total but not in either of the two categories list 
themselves as paid by other methods, e.g., commission, piece rate, daily, etc. 
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WHY DO AMERICANS AND 
GERMANS WORK DIFFERENT 
HOURS? 
Linda Bell and Richard Freeman 
The simple fact is that (Germany is) ... organized like a collective leisure 
park. 
(Chancellor Kohl, quoted in Financial Times Survey on Germany, 
October 25, 1993: 1) 
Americans are crazy workaholics ... because they haven't a clue how to live. 
(sophisticated Berliner, quoted in coffee shop) 
At the outset of the 1990's German workers worked fewer hours over the year than 
did workers in the United States and in most OECD European countries. Several 
pathbreaking IG Metal! contracts in the l 980's and 1990 will lower normal 
German work hours in the next several years1 unless Germany alters its policies 
along lines laid out in the Rexrodt Report. 2 On the other hand, it is difficult to see 
any factors reducing work hours in the United States. 
The difference between the hours worked by Americans and by Germans-that 
places the U.S. second to Japan in time worked in the OECD3 and that makes 
Germany a "collective leisure park," according to Chancellor Kohl-is a recent 
phenomenon. In the not so distant past the United States led the developed world 
in reductions in hours worked. Shorter working time was a major goal of American 
labor since the turn of the century. The U.S. was among the earliest countries to 
establish the eight-hour-five day workweek. The U.S. expanded vacation time after 
World War II. In the 1950's and early 1960's Americans worked considerably 
fewer hours than Germans and other Europeans. Not until the 1980's did German 
hours worked fall below American hours worked. 4 
What has caused the gap between the average hours worked by Americans and 
the hours worked by Germans in recent years? Is the difference a matter of 
demographics-such as differences in the age, family, or educational composition 
of the populations? Does the gap reflect labor supply responses to incentives? What 
is the role of institutions-Germany's stronger unions, works councils (which have 
codetermination rights over work hours), or legal regulations-in the gap in time 
worked? Finally, are differences in hours worked due to different tastes for work 
caused perhaps by different norms of effort and relative pay? 
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This chapter examines these questions using microdata from the International 
Social Survey Program, the May 1985 Current Population Survey, the 1989 EEC Ad 
Hoe Survey of the Labor Market, and other sources. In contrast to studies that deal 
strictly with observable hours of work, we also examine preferences for work 
schedules as revealed in surveys of attitudes. We begin by describing the recent hours 
gap between Americans and Germans using a variety of sources of data. We then 
contrast preferences for work versus leisure between workers in the two populations 
and compare these preferences with OECD European country norms. We find that 
although American workers work more hours than do workers in Germany and other 
European countries they are still more likely to prefer additional hours than are 
German and other European workers. Similarly, although Germans work fewer hours 
than Americans, they are more predisposed to further reductions in hours than are 
American workers and workers in other European countries. The data suggest that 
while Americans are unique in the sense of working long hours and desiring longer 
hours of work, Germans are also unique in working relatively few hours and desiring 
less work. We cannot explain the U.S.-German difference in hours worked and 
preferences for work by standard labor supply factors. We hypothesize that the 
difference may partially reflect more subtle supply behavior in the form of responses 
to differences in labor market inequality, and present some suggestive evidence that, 
in fact, people in settings with greater earnings inequality work more than those in 
settings with less inequality. 
HOURS WORKED IN THE U.S. AND GERMANY 
Line 1 of Table 5.1 presents OECD estimates of annual hours worked of American 
and German workers that constitutes the basic "fact" that motivates this study. The 
In differential between the two estimates suggests that in 1990 German employees 
in 1990 worked approximately 10 percent fewer annual hours than did their 
American counterparts. While substantial, this estimate understates the full 
difference in market activity between the two populations because the ratio of 
employees to working age population also differs. In 1990, 86 percent of American 
men panicipated in the work force compared to 81 percent of German men, while 
68 percent of American women were in the work force compared to 57 percent of 
German women. 5 Adjusting for differences in the employment to population ratios 
in the two countries {line 2) produces a differential in working hours per adult of 
0.19 In points. Although a complete accounting of why Americans work more than 
Germans would explore differences in work force participation as well as in the 
hours worked of employed persons, we concentrate on the latter issue, or in 
explaining the roughly 10 percent differential between annual hours worked by 
employed persons in the two countries. 
To examine the factors that may underlie the difference in hours worked per 
employee we use the following identity: 
AH= (H+ EH)/Hx (JI) x (D) x WW 
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Tabk 5.1 Hours Worked in the U.S. and Germany, 1990' 
U.S. Gtrmany In Differential 
Part A. Hours Worked per Year 
1. Annual Hours Worked 1750 1589.00 0.10 
2. Employment/Population (15-64) 0.73 0.66 0.09 
3. Annual Hours per Adult 1272 1047 0.19 
4. Vacation Time in 5-day weeks 2.5 6.2 
5. Holiday Time in 5-day weeks 2.0 2.4 
6. Vacation and Holiday/52 0.09 0.17 0.08 
7. Vacation and Holiday Share of Payroll 0.08 0.15 
8. Hours Per Working Week 38 36 0.05 
9. Annual Hours Worked (52 * (8) * 1-(6)]) 1798 1551 0.15 
Part B. Work Schedules 
10. Distribution of Hours/Week 12 11 
<24 4 2 
25-29 5 3 
30-34 7 31 
35-40 37 29 
41-45 30 17 
>45 
11. Days Worked Per Week 4.9 4.8 
12. Distribution of Days 
Usually Work Saturday 24 12 
Usually Work Sunday 12 4 
Work 7 days a week 3 1 
13. Work Shifts 
On shift schedule 22 8 
Night work 13 8 
14. Moonlighting (2nd job) 
Usually work a second job 8 2 
Sometimes work a second job 18 5 
Sources: German Figures, lines 1-3, OECD; lines 4-7, Owen, 1989, table 2; lines 8, 11-13 EEC, 
table 21; lines 10, 14 ISSP 
U.S. figures, lines 1-3, OECD; lines 4-7, Owen, 1988, lines 8, 11-13, Shank; lines 10,14 ISSP 
Note: • Approximate figures. 
This divides AH, annual hours worked per employed person into: 
1 H, hours worked per day on a job, which both countries legislate; 
2 EH, extra hours worked per day-overtime at a given job or moonlighting on a 
second job; 
3 D, days worked per week, which depends on whether workers are full-time or 
pan-time and the prevalence of work during weekends; and 
4 WW, weeks worked per year, which are largely determined by the extent of 
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vacation and holiday days but are also affected by unemployment and the 
prevalence of contingent employment as well. 
Unfonunately, microdata are not available from a single data source for all of the 
components of equation (1) above. Thus, we estimate the components of (1) from 
diverse data sources that do not necessarily add to the OECD differentials on line 1. 
Lines 4-7 of Table 5.1 summarize differences in annual work hours in the two 
countries that arise from differences in vacation and holiday time. Consistent with 
analyses of working time that stress the imponance of vacation and holiday time as 
the major cause of country differences in annual work time (Owen 1986, 1988), 
the data suggest that such differences are the primary factor behind greater 
American work hours. Differences in weeks of vacation and holiday time translate 
into a 17 percent reduction in worktime in Germany compared to 9 percent 
reduction of worktime in the United States, and therefore contributes 0.08 In 
points to the annual hours gap between the two countries. 
In addition to the sizable differences in weeks worked per year between American 
and German workers there are also differences in hours worked per day and days 
worked per week in the two countries. For example, estimates of hours worked per 
week from the CPS (U.S.) and EEC (Germany) show that Americans average 38 
hours compared to 36 hours for Germans (line 8)-a 0.05 In point differential. 
Combining these numbers and the vacation and holiday figures in line 8 gives an 
estimated annual hours worked for Germans of 1,554, which is a bit below the 
OECD figures, and an estimate for the U.S. of 1,798, which is a bit above the 
OECD figure, and suggests an In differential of 0.15 in working hours over the year. 
The bottom panel of Table 5.1 examines in greater detail differences in work 
schedules between Americans and Germans using data for the U.S. from the March 
1985 CPS and 1989 ISSP, and data for Germany from the 1989 EEC Study and 
ISSP. Line 10 shows that the distributions of hours per week differ substantially 
between the two countries, and suggests that differences in the average hours worked 
per week are not due primarily to Germans working less than the standard weekly 
hours but to Americans working more hours. Line 11 shows that although both 
countries have institutionalized the basic 5-day working week, Americans put in a 
bit more time than their German counterparts (4.9 days per week versus 4.8 days 
for Germans). The distribution of days (line 12) tells a similar story: Americans are 
twice as likely to work Saturdays, three times as likely to work Sundays, and three 
times as likely to work 7 days a week as are Germans. Finally, Americans are also 
more likely to do shift work and night work; and are more likely to moonlight with 
second jobs than are German workers. In sum, the message of Table 5.1 is that 
along all dimensions of work time, Americans work more than Germans. 
Has the hours worked gap among employees "always" existed or is it a relatively 
recent phenomenon? The evidence in Figure 5.1 shows that the gap is not a 
longstanding historical pattern, although the exact timing of the crossover in hours 
worked is debatable. Maddison's estimates in the upper panel show that from 1870 
to 1929 Americans worked about the same number of hours as Germans; but that 
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Figure 5.1 Ln Differential in Annual Hours Worked per Employee, U.S. vs. Germany 
(1870-1984; 1970-1990) 
Sources: Top Panel: Maddison, A. (1987) "Growth and Slowdown in Advanced Capitalist 
Economies," Journal of Economic Literature, June: 686. Bottom Panel: OECD Economic 
Outlook, 1992 
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they worked less hours from the 1930's and through 1984, with the gap rising 
from 1929 to 1950 and then declining. The OECO data in the bottom panel show 
Americans working fewer hours in 1970 but more hours by 1973, and an 
increasing gap thereafter. Evidence from Owen (1986, 1989, 1990) and the ISSP 
estimates suggest that U.S hours surpassed German hours worked by the early 
1980's, at least, consistent with the OECO figures. Indeed, while in the 1970's and 
l 980's the U.S. standard workweek did not change, weeks worked per year seem to 
have increased. Owen (1988: 43) estimates that from 1975 to 1986 the full-week 
vacation time of nonagricultural wage and salary workers in the U.S. fell by 13 
percent and the BLS reports a drop in paid holidays and vacations from 1980 to 
1989 in medium and large firms (BLS 1990). By contrast, Germans continued to 
reduce their work time, lowering the standard hours worked per day (from 8.1 in 
1960 to 7.9 in 1986), reducing days per week (from 5.5 in 1960 to 5.0 in 1970), 
and adding more vacation days (Owen 1989, Table 2). Since the employment to 
population ratio rose in the U.S. relative to Germany from the early l 970's to the 
1980's, while unemployment rates in the U.S. fell relative to those in Germany, 
measures of time worked per adult strengthen the conclusion that the longer U.S. 
hours worked is a relatively recent phenomenon. 6 The observed shift over time in 
who works more makes any "cultural" explanation of the 1990's U.S.-German gap 
dubious to us. 
A Comparison with Hours Worked in the OECD 
Table 5.2 presents estimates on hours worked for full-time manufacturing workers 
in European OECO countries and the United States using data from yet another 
source, the Federation of German Employers Associations (BOA). Ac.::ording to 
the BOA figures, full-time manufacturing workers in the United States and 
Germany are "outliers" in the hours they work. Column 1 shows that U.S. 
manufacturing workers work 130 hours more per year than the average number of 
hours worked in European OECO countries (column 1). Similarly, German 
workers work 131 hours fewer than the average European OECO worker annually 
(column 1). Columns 2-4 of the table show that in terms of vacation and holiday 
time, U.S. workers have below average time off and German workers have above 
average time off when compared to their European counterparts. Finally, column 5 
of the table shows that full-time U.S. manufacturing workers work 0.7 hours more 
per week and German workers about 1.7 hours fewer per week, than the typical 
OECO European worker.7•8 
In sum, a multicountry perspective on the U.S-German hours worked gap 
suggests that both countries are extreme in their working hours. U.S. workers work 
more on average than workers in most European countries. German workers work 
less. 
106 
WHY DO AMERICANS AND GERMANS WORK DIFFERENT HOURS? 
Table 5.2 Hours Worked by Full-time Manufacturing Workers• 
in OECD Countries, 1990 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Vacation and 
Vacation Time in Holiday Time in Holiday Hours per 
Annual Hours 5-day Weeks 5-day Weeks Weeks/52 Working Week 
Austria 1,714 5.3 2.5 0.15 38.6 
Belgium 1,737 4.0 2.2 0.12 37.8 
Denmark I,672 5.0 2.0 0.13 37.0 
Finland 1,716 8.0 1.8 0.19 40.0 
France 1,763 5.0 2.0 0.13 39.0 
Germany 1,643 6.0 2.5 0.16 37.6 
Greece 1,840 4.4 1.8 0.12 40.0 
Ireland 1,810 4.2 1.6 O.il 39.0 
Italy 1,764 6.3 1.8 0.16 40.0 
Luxembourg 1,792 5.4 2.0 0.14 40.0 
Netherlands 1,709 6.9 1.4 0.16 38.9 
Norway 1,718 4.2 2.2 0.12 37.5 
Ponugal 1,935 4.4 2.8 0.14 43.0 
Spain 1,790 4.7 2.8 0.14 40.0 
Sweden 1,784 5.4 2.2 0.15 40.0 
Switzerland 1,864 4.7 1.6 0.12 40.6 
U.K 1,769 5.0 1.6 0.13 38.8 
United States 1,904 2.4 2.2 0.09 40.0 
Average 1,774 5.1 2.1 0.14 39.3 
U.S.-Avg 130 -2.7 0.1 -0.05 0.7 
Germany-Avg -131 0.9 0.4 0.02 -1.7 
Sources: Federation of German Employers' Association (BOA) using information from European sister 
organizations. Supplied by Bureau of Labor Statistics, Department of International Labor Statistics 
Notes: • Data do not include short-time or part-time workers. Unwcightcd averages are from countries as 
listed. 
Hours Worked in the ISSP 
To obtain data on American and German hours worked from a comparable micro 
survey we turn to the 1989 International Social Survey Program (ISSP). The ISSP 
is a program of cross-national collaboration carried out by research institutes that 
conduct annual surveys of social attitudes and values. The virtue of the survey is 
that it seeks to ask similar questions in identical form in the participating nations. 
In 1989 the surveys focused on work, with numerous questions exploring attitudes 
toward work time and effort. Although the ISSP would seem the perfect data 
source for a study of this sort it is not ideal for several reasons. First, questions on 
hours worked are limited to weekly hours, and exclude vacation or holiday time. 
The survey does not therefore permit us to evaluate difference in hours worked per 
day or days worked per week in the two countries. Second, earnings relate to yearly 
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earnings rather than to hourly pay. Third, there is no useful measure of assets or 
wealth in the study. Fourth, despite the attempt for comparability, not every 
question is phrased the same way across countries, and different countries do not 
always ask the same questions in any given year. Despite these limitations, the ISSP 
is the best available cross-country data set for our purposes and provides us with 
additional information on work preferences. 
Table 5.3 presents estimates of ISSP-based hours worked by American and 
German workers from 1985 to 1989.9 While the mean level of hours exceeds that 
shown in line 8 of table 1 and column 7 of Table 5.2, the gap in hours is a 
comparable 0.05 ln differential for all workers. However, the figures for all workers 
Table 5.3 Average Hours Worked by Germans and Americans 
1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1989 (Adjusted)' 
All 
Germany 43.63 41.57 41.19 40.71 39.19 39.78 
U.S. 42.45 41.58 40.93 41.22 41.43 41.43 
Difference -1.18 0.01 -0.26 -0.51 2.24 1.65 
In Difference -0.03 0.00 -0.01 0.01 0.06 0.04 
Male 
Germany 46.17 44.78 43.59 44.06 42.74 43.31 
U.S. 44.72 44.90 43.63 44.94 45.32 45.32 
Difference -1.45 0.12 0.04 0.88 2.58 2.01 
In Difference -0.03 0.00 0.00 0.02 0.06 0.05 
Female 
Germany 38.68 36.16 39.17 35.48 34.20 34.80 
U.S. 38.06 37.76 38.24 37.49 37.17 37.17 
Difference -0.60 1.60 0.93 2.01 2.97 2.37 
In Difference -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.06 0.08 0.07 
35 + hours 
Germany 47.11 44.52 44.04 43.77 42.59 43.06 
U.S. 47.14 46.38 46.12 46.07 46.71 46.71 
Difference 0.03 1.86 2.08 2.30 4.12 3.65 
In Difference 0.00 0.04 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.08 
Union 
Germany 42.34 40.90 40.31 40.74 39.46 40.16 
U.S. 43.25 42.85 42.95 43.31 40.16 40.16 
Difference 0.91 1.95 2.64 2.57 0.70 0.00 
In Difference 0.02 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.02 0.00 
Self-Employed 
Germany 56.55 51.83 50.95 52.75 47.55 48.68 
U.S. 44.48 42.86 41.39 42.29 40.10 40.10 
Difference -12.07 -8.97 -9.56 -10.46 -7.45 -8.58 
In Difference -0.24 -0.19 -0.21 -0.22 -0.17 -0.19 
Source. ISSP 1985-1989 
Note: 
• Hours adjusred for second job hours for German workers to account for differences in the hours 
worked question in the two countries. 
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mask considerable differences in hours worked for key demographic groups. 
Because 58 percent of German workers in the ISSP were male versus 52 percent of 
American workers and 83 percent of German workers are full-time versus 79 
percent of American workers, the aggregate hours figures understate the difference 
in work time among demographic groups. Differences in hours worked among both 
men and women exceed those for the aggregate (lines 2 and 3). And when we look 
only at full-time workers, the gap in hours nearly doubles, to 4 hours worked per 
week or 0.09 In points. 10 Only among the self-employed is the difference reversed. 11 
In sum, there is a sizable hours worked difference between Germans and 
Americans, that is a relatively recent phenomenon, and that reflects both the 
relatively long hours worked by Americans and the relatively shon hours worked by 
Germans. 
PREFERENCES FOR HOURS WORKED 
How much do Germans and Americans want to work? Would Germans prefer to 
work more hours? Do Americans want reduced hours? Which of the two 
populations seems closer to attaining its preferred number of hours worked? While 
economists often eschew self-repons of preferences, the difficulties in standard 
labor supply analysis suggest that evidence on preferences can illuminate hours 
worked issues. 
Table 5.4 tabulates the responses to the key question about preferences for hours 
worked by American, German, and other European OECD workers on the ISSP: 
Think of the number of hours you work and the money you earn in your 
main job, including regular overtim,:. If you only had one of these three 
choices, which of the following would you prefer: work longer hours and 
earn more money; work the same number of hours and earn the same 
money; work fewer hours and earn less money. 
The results in Part A show a striking U.S.-German difference. Although the 
majority of both populations are "satisfied" with their hours of work, a dispropor-
tionately large number of Americans want to work more hours than want to work 
fewer hours (33 percent versus 6 percent in the first panel) while the proportions of 
Germans who want to work more hours is roughly equal to the proportion who 
want to work fewer hours (14 percent versus 10 percent). Strong differences in 
preferences for work are also shown for males, union workers, and self-employed, 
with U.S. workers preferring relatively longer hours, and German workers relatively 
fewer hours, and with Germans more satisfied with their actual hours worked. 
The results in Part B show a similar difference at all levels of actual work. Even 
among workers putting in greater than 45 hours per week significantly more 
Americans want to work longer than want to work fewer hours. 12 
Is the U.S.-German gap in preferences due to the fact that U.S. workers are 
more work minded than workers elsewhere or to the fact that Germans are less 
work-minded? Comparison with the OECD averages (weighted by sample size) in 
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Table 5.4 Feelings about Work Effort (% of workers with preference) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Mort Hours/Mort Pay Samt Hours/Samt Pay Ftwtr Hours/Less Pay 
Part A: Demographic Differences 
All 
U.S. 32.67 61.83 5.51 
German 13.50 76.41 10.09 
Difference -19.16 -14.58 -4.58 
Male 
U.S. 37.18 57.18 5.65 
German 12.32 77.13 10.56 
Difference 24.86 -19.95 -4.91 
Female 
U.S. 27.54 67.11 5.35 
German 15.16 75.41 9.43 
Difference 12.38 -8.30 -4.08 
Union 
U.S. 38.55 56.63 4.82 
German 11.54 78.57 9.89 
Difference 27.02 -21.94 -5.07 
Self Employed 
U.S. 36.78 50.57 12.64 
German 14.81 70.37 14.81 
Difference 21.97 -19.80 -2.17 
Part B: Hours Worked Differences 
1-10 hours 
U.S. 61.54 38.46 0.00 
German 33.33 33.33 33.33 
11-20 hours 
U.S. 28.26 63.04 8.70 
German 12.50 82.14 5.36 
21-30 hours 
U.S. 39.71 54.41 5.88 
German 25.71 68.57 S.71 
31-35 hours 
U.S. 28.57 69.05 2.38 
German 19.05 76.19 4.76 
35-40 hours 
U.S. 27.33 70.00 2.67 
German 9.83 81.69 8.47 
41-45 hours 
U.S. 29.33 64.00 6.67 
German 17.57 75.68 6.76 
46-50 hours 
U.S. 39.33 52.81 7.87 
German 17.65 64.71 17.65 
SO+ hours 
U.S. 37.59 52.48 9.93 
German 15.91 59.09 25.00 
(continued) 
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Table 5.4 (Continued) 
(]) (2) (3) 
More Hours/More Pay Same Hours/Same Pay Fewer Hours/Less Pay 
Pan C: OECD Comparisons 
United States 32.67 61.83 5.51 
Germany 13.50 76.41 10.09 
United Kingdom 23.77 68.05 8.17 
Austria 22.59 71.53 5.88 
Netherlands 17.54 70.16 12.29 
Italy 31.03 62.43 6.53 
Ireland 30.37 64.64 4.99 
Nonhern Ireland 26.85 67.59 5.56 
Norway 24.36 68.70 6.93 
U.S.-Wt. Avg. 8.14 -6.30 -1.83 
Germany-Wt. Avg. -11.03 8.28 2.75 
Source: ISSP 1989 
Note: Responses to the question asked of every working individual "Think of the number of hours you 
work and the money that you make in your main job, including regular overtime. If you had only one 
of three choices, which of the following would you prefer? (I) Work longer hours and earn more 
money; (2) Work the same number of hours and earn the same money; (3) Work fewer hours and earn 
less money" 
Part C of the table shows that both statements are true. A far greater number of 
U.S. workers prefer to work longer hours than the European norm, and fewer 
American workers prefer shorter hours. Similarly, fewer Germans desire to work 
more hours and more Germans chose to work fewer hours than is the average 
throughout the OECD countries surveyed here. 
Since the ISSP question specifically includes overtime pay, it is possible that the 
different answers across countries reflect responses to differences in the rate of 
overtime pay. For example, the overtime rate in the U.S. (1.5 times regular pay) 
exceeds the overtime rate in Germany (1.25 times regular pay), which ought to 
induce Americans to favor additional (or overtime) work to a greater extent than 
Germans. The fact that U.S. and German workers are "outliers" among OECD 
workers suggests that an overtime explanation for the difference is not likely. 
Moreover, the fact that self-employed workers in the U.S. and Germany show 
similar preferences as other workers in the countries also contravenes this view. 
Still, the explicit inclusion of overtime in the ISSP work preference question is a 
valid concern which we address more directly below. 
What meaning should be attached to the finding that a disproportionate larger 
share of Americans wish to work more hours than they are currently working or 
to the fact that a substantial share of Germans would like to work fewer hours? In 
a static competitive market equilibrium with no adjustment costs or constraints all 
workers would work to equate their marginal rate of substitution of work for 
leisure and the wage they receive, and would report no desire to change their 
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hours of work. In a more dynamic setting (random shocks that disturb this static 
equilibrium) some workers would want to work more and some would want to 
work less, but the numbers in each category would presumably be the same. 
Viewed in this way, the data in Panel C suggest that the more institutionalized 
German market produces a distribution of working hours and pay that is nearer 
to equilibrium (the largest proportion of workers chose to work the same hours 
and roughly equal numbers repon they wish more and less hours) whereas the 
flexible decentralized American labor market is in greater disequilibrium (a 
smaller proponion are satisfied with their hours and a disproportionate share want 
to work more hours)-failing to supply the amount of work desired by the 
population at the relevant pay, or alternatively generating unfulfillable demands 
for work hours. 
Corroborating Evidence on Preferences 
We have checked the reliability of the Table 5.3 difference in German and U.S. 
work preferences by examining the responses of workers on two other surveys that 
ask comparable questions. 
The May 1985 CPS contained detailed questions on work scheduling and 
preferences for hours worked among U.S. workers, 1ding the following 
question: 
If you had a choice would you prefer to work: (1) the same number of hours 
and earn the same money; (2) fewer hours at the same rate of pay and earn 
less money; (3) more hours at the same rate of pay and earn more money? 
Since the CPS asks about usual hourly earnings (exclusive of overtime), this 
question asks for work preferences at one's normal pay. Table 5.5 gives our 
tabulations of the responses of American workers. The pattern corroborates the 
pattern in the ISSP. While a majority of American workers are satisfied with their 
hours worked, many more want to work more hours than want to work fewer 
hours at the going rate. This is true for men and women, for the self-employed, 
and for union workers. When the responses are disaggregated by actual time 
worked, moreover, we replicate Shank's (1986) finding that the proportion 
wanting to work more hours falls with hours worked. 13•14 
The 1989 EEC survey of worktime preferences asked the following question 
that provide comparable information about German workers: 
Assuming that your present hourly rate remained unchanged, would you like 
to work less, as long, or longer? 
This question abstracts from issues of ovenime pay and is therefore comparable to 
the 1985 CPS question. The responses, tabulated in part A of Table 5.6, diverge 
noticeably from the ISSP figures for Germans. Instead of a roughly symmetric 
distribution around current work time, many more Germans prefer less work time 
to more work time. 
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Table 5.5 Choices over Hours Worked and Pay, U.S. Employed, 1985 CPS Supplement 
(% of Workers with Preference) 
(1) (2) (3) 
Mort Hours/More Pay Same Hours/ Same Pay Fewtr Hours/Less Pay 
Pan A: Demographic Characteristics 
All Workers 27.0 65.2 7.8 
(n = 47,054) 
Male Workers 29.1 64.5 6.4 
(n=24,066) 
Female Workers 24.7 65.9 9.4 
(n=22,993) 
Union Workers 22.2 69.3 8.5 
(n = 1,978) 
Self-Employed 25.4 65.3 9.3 
(n =3,889) 
Pan B: Hours Worked Characteristics 
Working <35 Hours 42.6 52.4 4.9 
(n= 8,502) 
Working35+ Hours 23.5 68.0 8.5 
(n· = 38,552) 
Working 35-39 Hours 29.0 63.4 7.7 
(n = 3,751) 
Working 40-49 Hours 23.8 68.9 7.3 
(n = 28,312) 
Working 50-59 Hours 20.7 66.4 12.8 
(n =3,957) 
Working 60+ Hours 16.2 67.3 16.5 
(n= 2,532) 
Source: CPS May 1985 Supplement on Work Schedules and Dual Job Holders 
Note: Responses to the following question: "If you had a choice would you prefer to work: (1) the same 
number of hours and earn the same money; (2) fewer hours at the same rate of pay and earn less 
money, or; (3) more hours at the same rate of pay and earn more money?" 
A follow-up to this question on the 1989 EEC asked workers to indicate how 
many hours per week they actually preferred to work. Part B of Table 5.6 contrasts 
this response to actual hours worked, and shows that Germans want to reduce 
hours from 35-40 to 30-34, with a resultant average gap between actual and 
desired hours of 2 hours. 
A second question on the EEC relevant for determining work preferences asked 
workers to chose between a pay increase for the same amount of work or a work 
hours decrease for the same amount of pay worded as follows: 
If the choice were offered in the next wage round between an increase in pay 
for the same hours of work and shorter working time for the same pay you 
get now, which would you prefer? 
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Table 5.6 EEC Survey Evidence on German Preferred Working Hours 
PartA 
Perr:mtage of Workm Preferring Less, the Same, or longer Working Hours at the Same Rate of Pay 
All Men Womm <30 30-49 >49 
Work Less 38 41 35 30 37 36 
WorkAsLong 55 54 55 58 57 57 
Work More 4 4 4 11 4 4 
PartB 
Distribution of Desired and Actual Working Hours 
Average <20 20-24 25-29 30-34 35-40 41-45 45+ 
Actual Hours 36 3 5 5 7 71 3 6 
Desired Hours 34 3 7 7 19 55 5 3 
PartC 
If the Choice Were Offered in the Next Wage Round Between an Increase in Pay for the Same 
Hours of Work and Shorter Working Time for the Same Pay You Get Now, Which Would you 
Prefer? 
Increase in Pay 



























This is a difficult question to analyze because it specifies neither the increase in 
pay nor the added leisure time (although presumably respondents would consider 
marginal changes in pay and in working time). 15 The results, given in Part C of 
Table 5.6, are close to the ISSP results for German workers, showing just about as 
many choosing higher income as less work time, a pattern to be expected if workers 
are considering modest changes from an equilibrium situation. 
Figure 5.2 (opposite) Percentage of Workers Who Prefer to Work Fewer Hours, Same 
Hours, or More Hours at the Same Rate of Pay 
Source. EEC (1991) European Economy, March: table 22. CPS: tabulated from May 1985 
CPS Supplement 
Note: The question in the EEC survey was: "Assuming that your present hourly rate 
remained unchanged, would you like to work less, as long, or longer?" 
The question in the CPS survey was: "If you had a choice, would you prefer to work: the 
same number of hours and earn the same money; fewer hours at the same rate of pay and 
earn less money; more hours at the same rate of pay and earn more money?" 
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Figure 5.2 combines the results of the 1985 CPS Survey and 1989 EEC Survey 
for the U.S. and Germany. It shows extremely large differences in preferences 
between the two countries, which therefore strengthen the ISSP findings. The EEC 
evidence that Germans want to reduce work hours is, moreover, consistent with the 
trend in German working hours and the importance attached by German trade 
unions to a negotiated reduction of work hours in the future. 
Additional evidence that American and German workers have different preferences 
for work can be found in responses to other questions in the ISSP. For example, if 
Americans work more and want to work more than Germans and Europeans, they 
should give more work-oriented (pro-work) responses to other work-related questions 
as well. Table 5.7 shows that they do. Americans are more likely to report that they 
work hard "even if it interferes with the rest of (their) lives" than are Germans and 
other Europeans. Similarly, Germans are less likely to work hard "even if it interferes 
with the rest of their lives" than are their European and U.S. counterparts, and more 
likely to respond that they work "only as hard as they have to." 
Finally, we offer the following short list of responses to different qualitative 
questions in the ISSP as corroborative evidence that American and Germans have 
markedly different attitudes about work. First, in response to a question asking if 
people work just for the money, 18 percent of Americans compared to 33 percent 
of Germans say they work just for the money. Second, asked if they would work 
without pay in their job, 67 percent of Americans said yes compared to 59 percent 
of Germans. Third, asked if leisure was important to them, 40 percent of 
Americans said yes compared to 74 percent of Germans. 
All told, the impression from the ISSP is that American workers are more "into" 
work than are Germans and other European workers. In the same vein, Germans 
seem to be less into work than their European and li.S. counterparts. The puzzle is 
why large differences in actual hours worked have failed to quell American 
workaholicism and a German love of leisure. 
Preferences over Time 
If the U.S.-German difference in work preferences always held we would wonder 
if it reflected the particular (cultural) way Americans and Germans answer 
questions of this type, rendering the responses suspect to an economic analysis of 
the actual hours gap. If preferences changed over time, particularly in ways 
consistent with changes in hours worked, we would have greater confidence in 
believing the differences. Data reported by Katona et al (1971) for German and 
American workers in the 1960's show that the gap in preferences, like the gap in 
actual hours, must have developed in the 1970's and 1980's. Specifically, they 
compare responses to the following question: 16 
Some people would like to work more hours a week if they could be paid for 
it. Others would prefer to work fewer hours per week even if they earned 
less. How do you feel about this? 
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Table 5.7 Feelings About Work Effort: "How Hard Do You Work?" (% with Preferences) 
Hard But Not So 
Only as Hard As Have To lntt:rft:rt:s Hard Evm if it lntt:rft:rt:s 
All Workers 
Germany (n = 628) 16.56 48.89 34.55 
Great Britain (n = 720) 5.69 36.94 57.36 
United States (n = 852) 7.63 31.10 61.27 
Ausuia (n = 869) 9.67 43.50 46.84 
Netherlands (n = 692) 7.37 63.87 28.76 
Italy (n = 581) 7.75 43.72 48.54 
Ireland (n = 477) 10.48 38.99 50.52 
N. Ireland (n = 333) 7.81 32.73 59.46 
Norway (n = 1070) 12.24 43.74 44.02 
U.S.-Wt. Average -1.96 -11.89 13.86 
German-Wt. Average 6.97 5.90 -12.86 
Male Workers 
Germany (n = 391) 15.0S 48.12 36.83 
Great Britain (n = 450) 5.37 33.76 60.87 
United States (n = 504) 8.22 28.44 63.33 
Ausuia (n = 324) 9.92 47.22 42.86 
Netherlands (n = 443) 8.80 62.53 28.67 
Italy (n = 354) 8.19 41.81 50.00 
Ireland (n = 309) 11.97 35.92 52.10 
N. Ireland (n = 196) 7.14 33.67 59.18 
Norway (n = 598) 13.55 43.81 42.64 
U.S.-Wt. Average -1.84 -14.16 16.00 
German-Wt. Average 4.99 5.52 -10.50 
Female Workers 
Germany (n = 249) 18.75 50.00 31.25 
Grear Britain (n = 329) 6.08 40.73 53.19 
United Stares (n = 402) 6.97 34.08 58.96 
Ausuia (n = 365) 9.32 38.36 52.33 
Netherlands (n = 249) 4.82 66.27 28.92 
Italy (n = 227) 7.05 46.70 46.26 
Ireland (n = 168) 7.74 44.64 47.62 
N. Ireland (n = 137) 8.76 31.39 59.85 
Norway (n .. 472) 10.59 43.64 45.76 
U.S.-Wt. Average -1.97 -9.45 11.44 
German-Wt. Average 9.81 6.47 -15.27 
Union Workers 
Germany (n = 197) 17.26 51.78 30.96 
Grear Britain (n = 274) 5.47 40.15 54.38 
United Stares (n = 89) 5.62 32.58 61.80 
Ausuia (n = 419) 10.26 46.54 43.20 
Netherlands (n = 199) 8.54 64.32 27.14 
Iraly (n = 159) 6.29 45.91 47.80 
Ireland (n = 191) 7.85 45.02 47.12 
N. Ireland (n = 149) 8.05 38.26 53.69 
Norway (n = 606) 12.54 44.22 43.23 
U.S.-Wt. Average -4.32 -13.32 17.65 




Germany (n = 59) 
Great Britain (n = 84) 
United States (n = 100) 
Austria (n = 94) 
Netherlands (n = 40) 
Italy (n = 175) 
Ireland (n = 96) 
N. Ireland (n = 50) 
Norway (n = 61) 
U.S-Wt. Average 
German-Wt. Average 
Source. ISSP data, 1989 
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Table 5.7 (Continued) 





































Notts: Responses to the following question asked of every working individual. "Which of the following statements best 
describes your feelings about your job?: (!) I work only as hard as I have to; (2) I work hard, but not that it interferes 
with the rest of my life, and; (3) I make a point of doing the best work I can even if it sometimes interferes with the 
rest of my life." 
American responses to the survey are similar to those in the ISSP and CPS 
surveys. Specifically, 34 percent of U.S. workers responded that they wanted to 
work more while only 10 percent wanted to work less, with the majority of workers 
(56 percent) satisfied with their work hours. German responses, on the contrary, 
were strikingly different from the ISSP: 44 percent of German workers wanted to 
work more, 7 percent wanted to work less, and 49 percent were satisfied and 
happier not to change their working hours (Katona et al. 1971: table 9-5). On net, 
the survey results suggest that Germans had a greater desire to work than 
Americans-the net balance favoring work was 24 percentage points in the U.S. 
case and 37 percentage points in the German case-indicating that at least in the 
1960's, German attitudes toward work were similar to American attitudes today. 
The fact that Germans would choose to work more hours when their incomes were 
lower than American incomes in the 1960's fits nicely with standard income effects 
in labor supply. The fact that Germans have reduced their desire for hours as their 
incomes have risen in the 1970's and 1980's is also consistent. What is odd is that 
in the 1990's, with comparable living standards, Americans and Germans are so 
different and so extreme in their preferences for work. 
TOWARDS AN EXPLANATION OF THE WORK HOURS 
GAP 
Documenting the fact that differences exist in the hours and preferences of 
German and American workers naturally leads to the question of why these 
differences occur. Axe they due to differences in taxation that affect marginal wages 
or public provision of goods that has an income effect on workers? Axe differences a 
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function of cultural attitudes or are they related to institutions? Is there something 
inherently different in the structure of pay and the system of rewards in the two 
countries? In this section we explore the plausibility of two alternate explanations 
for the gap-a standard labor supply interpretation stressing differences between 
the two countries in the value of an extra hour of work, and a more subtle supply 
explanation stressing differences in the structure of pay and the rewards to effort in 
the two countries. 
A Standard Supply Explanation 
Several facts favor a labor supply interpretation of the work hours and preference 
gap differences between U.S. and German workers. First, average (and marginal) 
tax rates for a typical German production worker are roughly 30 percent higher 
than tax rates for a typical U.S. production worker. 17 This difference implies that 
the rewards to working extra hours are smaller in Germany even at the same rate of 
pay. Second, social income (welfare transfers, health care, unemployment 
insurance; subsidized college and university education, and, apprenticeship 
programs) is more generous in Germany than in the U.S., which should increase 
demand for leisure through the income effect. 18 
Turning to changes over time, the rise in real income in Germany over the last 
twenty-five years should, according to standard theory, encourage greater leisure 
over work. By contrast, real earnings have not grown in the U.S. over much of the 
same period, and have fallen for large portions of the working population, 19 which 
might necessitate working harder to maintain a given living standard. In the 
1980's, significant tax changes in the U.S. substantially reduced the progressivity of 
federal taxes, possibiy encouraging preferences for additional work among large 
segments of middle-income American workers.20 
Unfortunately, the ISSP data do not allow us to estimate the labor supply 
parameters needed to test the standard supply model. The hourly earnings variable 
in ISSP is constructed from information on annual earnings and weekly hours and 
is therefore not independent of reported hours worked. The annual earnings data 
are, moreover, reported in ranges of annual earnings, leading to measurement error 
of actual earnings, with resultant negative bias in estimates of the effects of hourly 
pay on hours worked. Finally, there is no data in the ISSP on assets or wealth. 
Given these problems, we examined the possible effect of income and substitu-
tion effects on hours differences across countries as follows. We first estimated 
reduced form hours equations of the form: 
In Hours= /(Country, Demographics, Union Status) (2) 
where country is the country-specific dummy variable controls; the demographic 
variables include controls for gender, marital status, prime age working age status, 
household size, and education; and union status is equal to 1 if the individual is a 
union member and zero otherwise. Preferences for work as revealed by qualitative 
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responses to a set of work-related questions were included in certain specifications 
of the model. 21 The coefficients from the individual country specific dummy 
variables are then used to estimate an auxiliary regression of the form: 
Country Dummy= f (Income, Hourly Earnings) (3) 
using the eight individual country dummy variables plus constant term from 
equation (2) above, and aggregate data on income and earnings within countries. 
Equation (3) tests the importance of income and earnings in explaining hours 
differences across countries abstracting from the effects of demographics and union 
density. 
Ordinary least squares estimates of equation (2) are presented in Table 5.8 for all 
workers, male workers only, and full-time workers only for all of the countries in 
the 1989 ISSP. Column 1 includes country-specific dummies and shows that U.S. 
workers work an average of 6 percent more hours per week than do German 
workers, and work significantly more hours than workers in all other surveyed 
European OECD countries with the exception of Ireland. Note, however, that in 
these data the hours worked by Germans are not particularly low: the Netherlands, 
U.K and Northern Ireland, and Norway have lower hours worked than Germany. 
These regressions are thus better attuned to treat the greater work time of 
Americans than the low work time of Germans. The addition of demographic 
information and union membership in column 2 does little to reduce the gap 
between the U.S. and other countries, nor between the U.S. and Germany. 
Column 3 adds a set of dummy variables that measure responses to several 
questions on attitudes toward work. These measures enter the equations in a 
complicated way that is not always consistent in later calculations. The most 
powerful and important variable is whether or not people say they work hard even 
if it interferes with their lives. Inclusion of these attitude variables reduces the 
differences in hours worked between U.S. and German workers, although not 
between U.S. and most other European OECD countries. 
Columns 4-9 of the table perform the same analysis on a subsample of male 
(columns 4-6) and full-time (columns 7-9) workers. The coefficient estimates in 
columns 4 and 7 confirm that differences in usual weekly hours of work between 
U.S. and German workers are smaller among male workers and are larger among 
full-time workers. The addition of demographic controls and qualitative 
preferences reduces the difference between U.S. and German males in hours 
worked but not between the U.S. and other countries. The demographic and 
qualitative variables are less important in explaining differences in hours worked 
among full-time U.S. and German workers. 
In sum, the Table 5.8 calculations show that some of the U.S.-German differences 
are associated with attitudinal or demographic differences but that the big gap in 
hours between Americans and Western Europeans cannot be so explained. 
Table 5.9 presents estimates from auxiliary regressions using the country specific 
dummy variables plus the constant in Table 5.8 as dependent variables, and 1989 
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Tabk 5.8 Hours Regressions• 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
German Dummy -0.056 -0.051 -0.022 -0.043 -0.018 -0.002 -0.074 -0.057 -0.03(: 
U.KDummy -0.076 -0.131 -0.121 -0.002 -0.057 -0.049 -0.048 -0.025 -0.014 
Austria Dummy 0.010 -0.037 -0.020 -0.006 -0.036 -0.021 -0.029 0.014 0.029 
Netherlands Dummy -0.094 -0.114 -0.089 -0.074 -0.059 -0.037 -0.119 -0.121 -0.099 
Italy Dummy -0.024 -0.083 -0.065 -0.047 -0.085 -0.077 -0.028 -0.005 0.007 
Ireland Dummy 0.038 0.049 0.051 -0.002 0.038 0.039 0.008 0.035 0.038 
N. Ireland Dummy -0.109 -0.154 -0.150 -0.067 -0.120 -0.119 -0.099 -0.064 -0.058 
Norway Dummy -0.093 -0.142 -0.122 -0.079 -0.091 -0.084 -0.154 -0.135 -0.12S 
Female Dummy - -0.267 -0.268 - - - - -0.078 -0.079 
Union Dummy - -0.043 -0.038 - -0.083 -0.079 - -0.079 -0.073 
Married Dummy - -0.051 -0.053 - 0.045 0.037 - 0.023 0.018 
Supervisor Dummy - 0.106 0.090 - 0.065 0.052 - 0.047 0.032 
Prime Age Dummy - 0.026 0.038 - 0.016 o.oi8 - -0.004 0.007 
Work Most Important - - 0.007 - - 0.024 - - 0.018 
Leisure Most Important - - 0.034 - - 0.021 - - 0.022 
Advance Important - - 0.032 - - 0.007 - - -0.001 
Job not only for money - - 0.014 - - 0.006 - - 0.010 
Work hard if interferes - - 0.064 - - 0.064 - - 0.061 
Quality should determine pay - - 0.013 - - 0.014 - - 0.028 
N 3,953 3,953 3,953 2,430 2,430 2.430 3,179 3,179 3,179 
Adjusted R2 0.014 0.166 0.175 0.008 0.040 0.053 0.069 0.163 
Notes-. Qualitative questions asked of respondents (ISSP 1989). Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statements. Variables are 1 if 
agreed, 0 if disagreed. 
Education categorical controls were included in all regressions. 
• Dependent variable : In (hours). 
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Table 5.9 Auxiliary Regressions• 
(2') (5') (B') 
Al/Workm Male Workers Full-time Workers 
In Income 0.084 0.055 0.031 
(0.102) (0.074) (0.085) 
In Average Hourly Earnings -0.004 0.022 -0.128 
(0.166) (0.120) (0.139) 
R2 0.111 0.085 0.174 
Sources: Aggregate Country Income data for 1989-OECD Historical Statistics, 1960-1990. 
Aggregate Country Earnings data for 1989-ILO Yearbook of Labor Statistics, 1992 
Notes:' Dependent Variable: Country Dummy Coefficients from In hours Regressions. 
Country Dummy Coefficient Variables are taken from Table 5.8 regressions by column number as 
indicated. 
Number of Observations in each case is 9. 
country-specific data on personal disposable income per capita (from OECD 
Historical Statistics) and average hourly wages (from ILO Yearbook of Labor 
Statistics). The auxiliary regressions offer no support for the idea that differences in 
In hours across countries are explained by differences in either mean hourly earnings 
or personal income, and therefore no support for the view that basic labor supply 
factors can readily explain these differences. 
In sum, there remain substantial differences in hours worked across countries 
after accounting for demographics, preferences, and average wages and income. In 
the case of the U.S. and Germany at least, differences in attitudes toward work 
seem to matter in determining actual hours worked, although less so for full-time 
workers. 
Are Attitudes Toward Work Related to Incentives? 
Given the difficulties with estimating a labor supply model in the ISSP data, we 
consider next whether the information on preferences in the survey can be used 
to evaluate the importance of labor supply factors. Is there evidence that 
differences in preferences for work are explained by the incentives that affect 
labor supply? 
To the extent that differences in the preferences of American and German 
workers reflect different marginal valuations of an extra hour of work, the impact 
of earnings on preferences should differ across countries. An extra hour of work in 
Germany should be valued less compared to an extra hour in the U.S., since 
Germany has relatively high taxes and generous public income. We can test this 
idea by estimating equations linking preferences for work to a set of country 
controls, and demographic and union controls and to hourly earnings, since 
measured earnings are exogenous in this specification. 22 
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Results of the probit models using worker preferences are presented in Table 
5.10 for all workers. The preference question asks workers (see Table 5.4) to 
indicate whether they would chose to work more hours at more pay, the same 
number of hours at the same pay, or fewer hours at less pay. Workers who say that 
they wish to work more hours receive a value equal to 1, and all other responses 
receive a value of zero. The earnings variable obtains a significant negative 
coefficient in columns 2, 5, and 8, indicating that for all the groups of workers, 
those with higher earnings are less likely to want to work more hours-an income 
effect. But the differences between U.S.-German and U.S.-European preferences 
for longer work (column 1) are not consistently and uniformly muted by the 
inclusion of In earnings, demographic, union status, and other qualitative controls 
(column 2). The country-specific interaction terms (column 3) are not significant, 
suggesting that differences in preferences are not related to differences in the 
marginal valuation of an extra hour of work as so measured. Columns 4-6 repeat 
the analysis for male workers, and columns 7-9 for full-time workers, with 
qualitatively similar conclusions in all cases. There is no support in the probits that 
U.S.-German differences in preferences for work are explained by earnings 
differences. 
In addition to the regressions above, other factors make us wary of a standard 
labor supply interpretation of the U.S-German hours and preferences gap. First, 
although tax rate and social income differences favor reduced work effort in 
Germany relative to the U.S., they do not necessarily favor reduced work effon 
between German workers and workers in many other European countries with 
similar taxation and welfare state benefits. Second, estimates of rather modest 
wage, wealth, and marginal tax effects in determining U.S. vacations (Green and 
Poterban 1987) suggest that marginal decisions are unlikely to explain large 
differences between work effon in the United States and in Germany and Europe. 
Hours Differences and Earnings Inequality 
How then are we to explain sizable differences in the preferences and work hours of 
American and German workers? In this section we take a different approach to this 
question, focusing not on differences in the average valuation of an extra hour of 
work, but instead on differences in the distribution of rewards that determine the 
average. 
In the decentralized U.S. labor market, which produces relatively high earnings 
inequaliry among workers, the rewards to greater effort are large and the penalties 
to slack substantial. By contrast in the highly centralized German labor market, 
which produces relatively low earnings inequality across workers and imposes 
institutional laws that make employee dismissal difficult, the rewards and penalties 
to greater effon are presumably less extreme. If earnings inequality allows for a 
system of rewards that encourages working harder, then the U.S.-German hours 
and preference gap may represent different payoffs to effon which are not related to 
differences in mean (tax and social mcome adjusted) earnings but are instead 
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Table 5.10 Probit Estimates of Preference• 
AllWorkm MaleWorkm Full-Time Workm 
--
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (B) (9) 
German dummy -0.667 -0.613 -0.334 -0.883 -0.892 -0.721 -0.693 -0.692 -0.729 
(0.116) (0.125) (0.345) (0.156) (0.167) (0.494) (0.130) (0.139) (0.425) 
U.Kdummy -0.169 0.159 -0.055 -0.132 0.279 0.187 -0.103 0.233 0.168 
(0.085) (0.162) (0.240) (0.110) (0.199) (0.326) (0.094) (0.183) (0.289) 
Austria dummy -0.189 -0.007 0.044 -0.206 0.097 0.231 -0.155 0.056 0.106 
(0.083) (0.160) (0.221) (0.106) (0.195) (0.279) (0.089) (0.180) (0.243) 
Netherlands dummy -0.511 -0.533 -0.485 -0.633 -0.634 -0.234 -0.605 -0.704 -0.299 
(0.098) (0.104) (0.254) (0.122) (0.129) (0.332) (0.112) (0.120) (0.306) 
Italy dummy 0.007 0.216 0.129 -0.037 0.269 -0.080 0.010 0.269 0.182 
(0.091) (0.159) (0.241) (0.117) (0.196) (0.317) (0.101) (0.182) (0.266) 
Ireland dummy -0.059 -0.249 -0.332 -0.129 -0.313 -0.305 -0.031 -0.266 -0.299 
(0.092) (0.101) (0.172) (0.117) (0.129) (0.241) (0.099) (0.110) (0.189) 
N. Ireland dummy -0.135 0.117 -0.145 -0.163 0.175 -0.263 -0.184 0.080 0.095 
(0.105) (0.175) - (0.136) (0.217) (0.399) (0.118) (0.199) (0.352) 
Norway dummy -0.148 0.128 0.732 -0.283 0.063 0.301 -0.195 0.114 0.553 
(0.094) (0.146) (0.306) (0.121) (0.178) (0.443) (0.106) (0.162) (0.383) 
German ·1n earn -0.159 -0.089 0.021 
(0.187) (0.312) (0.224) 
(continued) 
Table 5.10 (Continued) 
AllWorkm MaleWorkm Full-Timt Workm 
(I) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
U. K. 'In earn 0.135 0.041 0.031 
(0.114) (0.156) (0.143) 
Austria 'In earn -0.051 -0.141 -0.055 
(0.121) (0.147) (0.132) 
Netherlands 'In earn -0.031 -0.242 -0.256 
(0.144) (0.184) (0.180) 
Italy 'In earn 0.059 0.231 0.061 
(0.122) (0.157) (0.144) 
Ireland'ln earn 0.071 -0.004 0.038 
(0.114) (0.152) (0.129) 
N. Ireland'ln earn 0.178 0.296 -0.022 
(0.172) (0.229) (0.210) 
Norway'ln earn -0.336 -0.133 -0.240 
(0.694) (0.212) (0.189) 
In earn -0.147 -0.154 -0.124 -0.123 -0.184 -0.172 
(0.041) (0.055) (0.057) (0.078) (0.048) (0.062) 
Log Likelihood - -1788.06 -1783.01 -1190.54 -1149.89 -1145.91 -1537.68 -1459.06 -1456.88 
N 3,315 3,315 3,315 2,005 2,005 2,005 2,716 2,716 2,716 
% PositiveN 26.37 26.37 26.37 29.83 29.83 29.83 26.47 26.47 
Notts: 
• Dependent Variable: = 1 if individual prefers to work longer hours for more pay, =0 otherwise. 
Qualitative questions asked of respondents ISSP, 1989. Respondents were asked whether they agreed or disagreed with the following statements. Variables are 1 if agreed, 
0 if disagreed. Columns 1,4,7 include no controls. The remaining columns contain controls for demographics and union status (female, primeage, married, supervisor 
and union dummy variables), educational category controls, and controls for worker preferences as given in Table 5.8. Individual earnings were adjusted using purchasing 
power parity 1989 equivalents from OECD Labor Force St4tistia. Earnings are net of taXCS in all countries. 
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related to differences in earnings variance among workers. Put differently, the U.S. 
wage determining system may be closer to a tournament or piece rate wage 
system-you work hard to advance, to keep the good job, to keep from falling 
into a shallow safety net-whereas the German wage determining system and 
social benefits system is closer to a guaranteed annual income. 
Our notion that it is the difference in the payoff from working many hours or 
working few hours or working more or less hard that motivates people to work 
many hours diverges from normal labor-supply analysis, but is consistent with the 
basic economics of incentives. It suggests that the "right" substitution variable in 
explaining hours is not the wage (holding fixed for income) but the difference in 
lifetime earnings from working more hours or not working more hours, where 
lifetime earnings would reflect advancement, the loss of income from loss of job, 
etc. From this perspective, inequality of earnings is a proxy measure of the 
potential gain/loss from working more, and hours worked should be longer the 
greater the level of earnings inequality. 
Table 5.11 presents statistics on earnings and hours to gauge the plausibility of 
such a link. Column 1 of the table lists the mean of In hourly earnings in dollars in 
each country (using 1989 purchasing power equivalents). Column l' then ranks 
each country according to the pay of its workers (with a rank of 1 indicating the 
highest pay country and a rank of 9 indicating the lowest pay country). Columns 2 
and 2' do the same thing for the variance of In earnings across countries. Finally 
columns 3 and 3' list mean weekly hours and rank respectively. As is clear from the 
table, differences in hours worked across countries do not appear to be related to 
differences in mean earnings, but do appear to be related to differences in earnings 
inequality. For example, four countries with the highest hourly earnings 
Table 5.11 Relationship between Hours Worked and Earnings 
(J) (J ') (2) (2') (3) (3') 
Mean 
Mean Variance Weekly 
ln(Earn) Rank ln(Earn) Rank Hourf Rank 
U.S. 2.054 4 0.820 2 46.712 2 
Germany 2.205 1 0.236 8 42.589 7 
U.K 1.912 5 0.338 5 44.425 5 
Austria 1.584 8 0.386 3 45.975 3 
Netherlands 2.070 3 0.275 6 41.506 8 
Italy 1.849 6 0.363 4 45.070 4 
Ireland 1.103 9 1.048 1 47.849 1 
N. Ireland 1.845 7 0.261 7 42.779 6 
Norway 2.201 2 0.161 9 38.765 9 
Source. ISSP 1989 
Nota: 
• Data pertain to usual hours worked for full-time workers (working 35+ hours). 
Individual earnin~ were adjusted using purchasing power parity 1989 equivalents from OECD 
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Tabk 5.12 Hours Dilferences and Earnings Inequality 
Dq,endmt Variabk: mean of In hours 
Al/Workers MakWorkn:r Full-Time Workn:r 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) 
Std ln Hourly Earnings 0.272 0.577 0.537 0.128 0.354 0.383 0.106 0.493 0.468 
(0.107) (0.070) (0.089) (0.070) (0.051) (0.058) (0.120) (0.149) (0.135) 
Mean Female 0.116 0.026 0.558 0.698 
(0.332) (0.358) (0.733) (0.666) 
Mean Supervisoty 0.266 0.347 0.178 0.164 -1.479 -1.555 
(0.161) (0.196) (0.080) (0.081) (0.483) (0.438) 
Mean Union 0.741 0.750 0.235 0.259 -0.494 -0.298 
(0.161) (0.163) (0.079) (0.082) (0.425) (0.395) 
Mean Married -0.008 -0.092 0.209 0.223 1.467 1.334 
(0.235) (0.262) (0.140) (0.140) (0.499) (0.456) 
Mean Prime Age -2.158 -2.043 -1.009 -1.077 -0.247 -0.288 
(0.258) (0.303) (0.130) (0.145) (0.425) (0.385) 
Mean ln Hourly Earnings -0.036 0.027 -0.238 
(0.048) (0.026) (0.109) 
Adjusted R2 0.190 0.813 0.808 0.093 0.760 0.761 -0.010 0.304 0.430 
Number of Observations is equal to 24 in all regressions. 
Source. ISSP, 1985-1989 
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inequality-Ireland, the U.S., Austria, and Italy-also rank as the top four in 
hours worked, with identical hours worked and inequality rankings. Similarly, the 
four countries with the lowest inequality ranking-Norway, Germany, Northern 
Ireland and The Netherlands-have the lowest work hours, again with identical 
hours and inequality rankings. The only exception to this pattern of matching 
seems to be in Austria and Northern Ireland. 
The Table 5 .11 rankings do not control for demographic differences and contain 
limited information about the relationship between hours and earnings inequality. 
In order to control for demographics and union density while evaluating the link 
between hours worked and earnings inequality, we pool information across 
countries from the 1985-1989 ISSP, and regress mean In hours on the standard 
deviation in earnings in each country and a set of demographic and union density 
controls (limited by availability in all years). The results of these regressions are 
given in Table 5.12. The table shows a statistically significant link between hours 
worked and earnings inequality which is independent of differences in demo-
graphics (column 2) and mean earnings (column 3) and is robust for a subsample 
of men (columns 4-6) and full-time workers (columns 7-9). 
In sum, the results offered here are consistent with the idea of a link between 
hours worked and earnings inequality across countries, and suggest that American 
workers may work more hours and German workers may work less hours because 
of differences in the structure of rewards and penalties for work effort in the two 
countries. 
CONCLUSIONS 
This chapter has documented several facts of note. First, significant differences exist 
in the hours worked by American and German workers. Our estimates suggest that 
in 1989-1990, German workers worked between 10-15 percent fewer hours on 
an annual basis than did U.S. workers. Large differences between U.S. and German 
work hours appear to be driven, at least in part, by the fact that U.S. workers work 
comparatively long hours relative to workers in other OECD European countries, 
and that German workers work relatively short hours. Forces at work in Germany 
today suggest that if anything, differences in the actual hours worked between 
Americans and Germans will widen in the 1990' s. 
Second, sizable differences exist in the preferences of U.S. and German workers 
for work. Responses to a series of qualitative questions from a number of surveys 
paint a clear picture-Americans have a greater desire for work than do Germans. 
Although a majority of American workers are satisfied with their working hours, 
far greater numbers would prefer more over less work if given the choice. Among 
Germans the opposite preferences prevail, with greater shares of German workers 
preferring less over more work. Although American workers are extreme among 
surveyed OECD countries in their desire for work, Germans are equally extreme in 
their desire for leisure. The preference for work gap between Americans and 
Germans, like the hours gap, is wide for these reasons. 
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Third, differences across countries in hours worked are not related statistically to 
income and earnings, and differences in preferences do not represent distinct 
responses to earnings across countries. 
Fourth, we present empirical evidence that workers work longer hours in 
countries with high earnings inequality and shorter hours in countries with low 
earnings inequality, that suggests a different sort of labor supply interpretation of 
the U.S.-German work hours gap. In Germany the payoffs to working more may 
be limited by a centralized system that encourages uniformity in pay. In the U.S. 
high earnings inequality may be responsible for the view that the harder Americans 
work and the harder they say they want to work, the more likely will the unequal 
system reward their good efforts. 
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NOTES 
For example, the 1990 IG Metall agreement specifies an agreed weekly hours reduction 
to 36.0 effective January 4, 1993 and a further reduction to 35.0 hours effective January 
10, 1995. For more detailed information on these agreements see Bosch (1992). 
2 This report calls for considerable greater work effort on the part of Germans. Chancellor 
Kohl has stated "With ever shorter working hours, rising wage costs, and ever longer 
holidays, our competitiveness is in danger" (quoted in Financial Times Survey of 
Germany, October 25, 1993: 1). 
3 Given the higher female participation in the United States, American workers actually 
work nearly as many hours as the Japanese per adult person. Ciimilarly, although 
Luxembourg ranks slightly above the United States in annual hours according to the 
Germany Employers' Association data, it lies below the U.S. annual hours after 
adjustment for the higher employment to population rate in the United States. 
4 The precise period when U.S. and German hours crossed varies depending on whose 
estimated hours worked one uses. All estimates that we know of suggest however that the 
crossover occurred no earlier than the 1970's, and moreover, all estimates indicate a 
substantial widening of the gap after 1983. 
5 In addition, there were modest differences in unemployment rates (OECD Employment 
Outlook 1992) which would effect the uniformity of the annual estimated hours across 
the working population. 
6 A further refinement in hours comparisons is also possible: estimating lifetime hours 
worked by taking account of years of retirement and life span. We have not made 
estimates of lifetime hours worked. 
7 Note that the annual hours in column 1 provide estimates of the In differential in U.S. 
and German hours of 0.15, and are therefore consistent with the OECD data calculated 
adjusted differences for all workers. 
8 The data are establishment survey equivalent data provided by European sister 
employer associations to the German BDA. Estimates of German work hours and 
vacation time are roughly consistent with OECD data, although the differences 
between countries in holiday time are somewhat larger in this source. These differences 
presumably reflect actual differences caused by the sample of full-time as opposed to all 
workers. 
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9 The hours question asked of U.S. and German workers were not identical. The question 
was phrased to U.S. workers as, "How many hours did you work last week, how many 
hours do you usually work a week, at all jobs?" The same question was phrased to 
German workers as, "How many hours per week do you normally work in your main 
job, including ovenime?" Two possible sources of noncomparability arise in this context. 
First, German workers hours explicitly include normal ovenime hours, where U.S. 
workers hours should, but may not. Second, German hours should correspond to the 
main job and not all jobs, whereas the U.S. hours question explicitly correspond to all 
jobs. In order to correct this difference reponed second job hours are added to the hours 
of German workers who repon a second job, and it is this adjusted figure that is used in 
the regression analysis. 
10 The difference is due to the fact that the U.S. hours distribution is more variable and a 
greater percentage of U.S. workers (24 percent) are working less than full-time (35 
hours per week) than German workers (I 9 percent). 
11 The large difference between the hours of German and American self-employed workers 
is due in pan to the fact that the U.S. distribution of self-employed hours is far more 
variable (the standard deviation of hours is 17.08 in the U.S. and 10.40 in Germany). 
For example, when we consider the preferences of full-time self-employed in the two 
countries, the hours differences narrow-German full-time self-employed work 52.5 
hours and Americans work 50.4 hours. 
12 Note also the U-shape to the relation between hours worked and preference for work 
among Americans. The proportion of Americans who want to work more hours 
compared to the proponion who want to work fewer hours falls as hours worked rises 
from less than 35 to 35-40, and then rises after 45 plus hours. 
13 An interesting test of the meaning of rhe hours preference question would be to isolate 
the frequency of behavioral changes in people who said they preferred more/fewer hours 
in ensuing periods. The group rotation. structure of rhe CPS would permit such an 
analysis to be conducted; although we have not evaluated this issue. 
14 Note that this differs from the ISSP result in Table 5.4. Given the much larger CPS than 
ISSP sample and the law of diminishing marginal value, we find this pattern more 
believable. Americans may be workaholics, but when they reach 60 plus hours, enough 
work seems to be enough work. 
15 It also has a problem because it poses a situation in which the marginal rate of 
substitution of goods for leisure is not equal to the wage. People would do better with 
some mixture of a higher wage and change in hours. 
16 The U.S. question was asked in 1966; the German question in 1968. 
17 For example, the average taX rate for a typical German production worker in 1991 was 
37 percent (including social security contributions). The average tax rate for a typical 
American production worker was 27 percent in 1991. For more details on the 
institutional structure of the tax codes in each country see OECD (1990). 
18 For example, Esping-Anderen's (I 990) "de-commodification" scores for the welfare 
programs of various countries gives the U.S. the lowest score-considerably below 
that for Germany. Empirically, the countries with high "de-commodification" 
indices (most notably Sweden, Norway, Netherlands, and Sweden) have low hours 
per employee in the OECD data, while the three countries with the least "de-
commodification" scores (the U.S., Japan, and Canada) rate very high in hours 
worked per employee. 
19 A substantial literature has arisen chaning the course of real earnings stagnation in the 
U.S. since 1970. See Levy and Murname (1992) for an excellent summary of the 
literature. 
20 Major taX reform legislation was passed in 1981 and 1986. For details on these changes 
see Pechman (1991). 
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21 Questions asked respondents to agree or disagree with the following statements: 
(a) work is the most important activity; 
(b) leisure is not important; 
(c) advancement in my job is important; 
(d) I work at my job not only for the money; 
(e) I work hard even if it interferes with the rest of my life; and 
(f) quality should determine pay 
Variables were coded as = 1 if respondent agreed with the statement and =0 otherwise. 
22 Using workers' responses to questions about their preferences for work as opposed to 
actual hours worked in an hours regression eliminates the endogeneity between annual 
weekly earnings and hours discussed above, and therefore allows us to test the 
importance of earnings differences in preferences for work. 
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ON INTERINDUSTRY WAGE 
DIFFERENTIALS 
Lutz Bellmann and Joachim Moller 
INTRODUCTION 
Following Krueger and Summers (1987, 1988) several studies have demonstrated 
that, even after carefully controlling for human capital and job characteristics, 
sizable interindustry wage differentials remain. These differentials seem to be 
remarkably stable over space and time and there is evidence for a similar pattern of 
differentials for employees in different occupations (Katz and Summers 1989). 
Obviously, these results are in conflict with the standard neoclassical theory of 
wage formation which states that wage differentials for workers with equal skills 
and comparable job conditions should be equalized by market forces. Krueger and 
Summers (1988: 280) hence conclude that the empirical evidence presented in 
their study "shifts the burden of proof to those wishing to interpret wage 
differentials in terms of simple competitive models." 
Important theoretical alternatives to standard competitive theory are provided by 
efficiency wage or rent-sharing models. From the standpoint of efficiency wage 
theories, wage differentials can occur because effort per worker depends on the wage 
level in an industry-specific manner. In rent-sharing or bargaining models 
differences of the firms' ability to pay and of the workers' power to extract rents 
from the employers explain the wage structure. Since both theories refer to a 
context of monopolistic competition, they can be seen as complementary rather 
than competing explanations of actual existing wage patterns (Krueger and 
Summers 1988; Barth and Zweimiiller 1992). 
A further branch of literature stresses the role of labor market institutions for 
explaining the structure and flexibility of wages and hence for the macroeconomic 
performance of different countries in general (cf. Grubb et al. 1983; Soskice 1983, 
1990; Bean et al. 1986; Calmfors and Driffill 1988; Freeman 1988; Jackman 1989; 
Rowthorn 1992). Taking this approach into account, the claim of Krueger and 
Summers (1988) has to be questioned that wage differentials are similar across 
countries with completely different institutional settings. Recent empirical studies 
(Edin and Zetterberg 1992; Zanchi 1992; and Barth and Zweimiiller 1992) 
provide evidence that factors such as the degree of centralization of the wage 
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bargaining process, the organization of wage negotiations, and the objectives of the 
negotiating parties are indeed important determinants of the structure and 
dynamics of industrial wages. 
To assess the hypothesis that institutions play an important role in the structure 
and development of remuneration schemes, international comparisons are 
necessary. The aim of our investigation is to complement the microdata evidence 
on interindustry wage differentials presented by Krueger and Summers (1988) and 
Katz and Summers (1989) for the United States and Edin and Zetterberg (1992) 
for Sweden, with corresponding results for the Federal Republic of Germany. Our 
chapter is organized as follows. Pages 127-129 outline the institutional conditions 
for wage bargaining in Germany and contrasts this to the U.S. setting. Pages 
129-134 develop our own research strategy after reviewing previous findings 
concerning the determination of interindustry wage differentials. The following 
section, pages 134-137, discusses the data set, the construction of variables and 
the method used for the estimation of earnings functions on the basis of 
employment statistics from the Federal Employment Services. 1 Pages 137-145 
report the results of these estimates for Germany, then pages 145-149 discuss the 
findings and compare it to the international evidence. Finally, some conclusions are 
drawn in the last section, pages 149-151. 
THE INSTITUTIONAL CONDITIONS FOR WAGE 
SETTING IN GERMANY AND THE UNITED STATES 
There is no need to discuss the various concepts to classify countries with respect to 
the degree of centralization of wage bargaining {Bruno and Sachs 1985; Tarantelli 
1986; Calmfors and Driffill 1~88; Freeman 1988; Blyth 1979). Definitions of 
corporatism would include aspects of the degree of centralization, the degree of 
cooperation between trade unions and employers' representatives in wage 
bargaining and the system of regulation of industrial conflicts. 2 The authors cited 
above have emphasized different factors characterizing the process of wage setting: 
the level of wage negotiations; 
the extent of coordination between trade unions and employers associations; 
the extent of unionization; 
the duration of the contracts. 
What follows will describe the wage setting institutions in the United States and 
Germany according to these criteria. 
The United States ranks lowest in the corporatism indices proposed by Bruno 
and Sachs (1985) or Calmfors and Driffill (1988). Wage negotiations occur 
predominantly at the enterprise and plant level and there is no traditional 
involvement by central organizations in bargaining. The main U.S. labor 
confederation, the AFL-CIO, does not bargain for its affiliated unions and 
therefore has never signed a wage contract. Most of the collectively bargained 
agreements must be ratified by individual unions members. Kochan and Wever 
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(1988) show that wage concessions are negotiated at the plant or firm level with 
some local unions significantly altering the industry-wide contract of the national 
union in the light of plant or firm-specific conditions, thus causing decentralization 
of the wage bargain. Vroman and Abowd (1988) also point out that the greater 
importance of job security in the l 980's was accompanied by decentralization. 
Streeck (1988) has stressed this factor for Germany, too. Patterns of bargaining 
relationships between firms and industries make bargaining more centralized than it 
is expressed by the formal bargaining structure. The United States system exhibits a 
largely unstable and complex network of pattern bargaining, with 195,000 
collective agreements affecting about 25 percent of the labor force (at the end of 
the 1970's). Synchronization of contract renewals is very low and contracts have a 
long duration-often three years. 
During the 1970's cost-of-living adjustments clauses (COLA) in collective 
agreements tended to increase the union/nonunion wage differential (Flanagan 
1984). Furthermore, the COLA clauses and the structural change toward non-
union sectors have contributed to a decrease of union density from about 31 
percent (1970) to about 18 percent (1985) (Capelli 1983; Mitchell 1986; Freeman 
1988). 
In Germany, collective agreements now regulate a vast and complex range of 
issues affecting wages, working time, and working conditions. Both of the 
negotiating parties must employ large staffs of experts to keep abreast of collective 
agreements within the branches they represent. A recent survey finds that (in 
1990) 2,982 agreements were negotiated at the sector level in the (preunification) 
Federal Republic of Germany, and 1,913 at the enterprise level (Bispinck 1991). 
The total number of agreements in force at the end of the year was 24,695 at the 
sector level and 8,754 at enterprise level. These figures exclude works agreements 
negotiated between management and work councils. 
With the exception of a few companies-such as Volkswagen and the large oil 
companies-which have often negotiated innovative and progressive single-
employer agreements with their trade union counterparts, company-level 
agreements follow those for their sector with only slight modifications. 3 
The majority of agreements concern pay, and usually have a twelve- to fifteen-
month lifespan. Agreements on nonpay questions are normally of longer duration 
and comprise the majority of agreements currently in force. Collective agreements 
signed by unions affiliated to the General Federation of German Trade Unions 
(Deutscher Gewerkschaftsbund, DGB) and in force at the end of 1990 covered 
nearly 19 million of about 29.6 million employees. Not included in this figure are 
those contracts that cover fewer than 1,000 employees, almost exclusively involving 
single-employer agreements. The 1.85 million civil servants (Beamte) are also 
excluded. Their conditions of employment are set, not by collective bargaining, but 
by legislation (after consultation with the relevant unions). 
Although agreements involving the two largest unions-IG-Metall and the 
Union of Employees in the Public Service (OTV)-also cover the largest number 
of workers, there is no close relationship between the scope of collective regulation 
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and the size of the union. For example, the Union of Employees in Commerce, 
Banking, and Insurance (HBV), with a much smaller membership, covers almost 
as many employees as OTV. 
The gap between the contractually agreed wage and actual rates differs greatly 
from industry to industry and from region to region as a result of varying 
conditions in product and labor markets. Unfortunately, published statistics on 
actual and contractual wages are not comparable either conceptually or with respect 
to the skill grouping employed. A recent employer survey that asked directly about 
this gap, concluded that only 15 percent of employers paid exactly the negotiated 
rate, while actual pay exceeded negotiated pay by an average of 14 percent (Brandes 
et al. 1991; Meyer 1994). This gap seems to be stable, since the aggregate 
wage drift, which had been a significant phenomenon in Germany in the 1960's, 
more or less disappeared in the 1970' s and 1980' s (see, for instance, Franz 1991: 
262ff.). 
According to official statements, German unions have regarded egalitarian pay 
policies as a priority. The 1970's did indeed see a narrowing of differentials, but 
these widened again in the 1980's. Pay differentials are greater for white-collar than 
for manual employees, though the gap between the median rates for the two 
groups has been closing-a trend which has encouraged the development of 
common pay scales Qacobi et aL 1992: 250). 
In the early 1980's DGB-membership decreased slightly, by 300,000, a loss that 
had been fully recouped by 1990. Trends in union density have been uneven: from 
1950 to 1960 it fell from 35.7 to 31.0 percent, then stagnated at around 30 
percent during the 1960's; it rose to about 32 percent in the 1970's before falling 
back once more to 29 percent in the 1980's Qacobi et al 1992: 232). The DGB 
does not seem to be strong when measured by density. But since the groups with 
high density rates (blue-collar workers in the strong manufacturing sector and 
employees in the public sector) occupy strategic positions, the unions are in a 
position to negotiate pace-setting agreements. In addition, the system of industrial 
unionism and sectoral collective bargaining hardly leaves any room for a nonunion 
sector. Only very small employers could pay below union rates without provoking 
their employees to join a union. 
HYPOTHESES AND PREVIOUS FINDINGS 
Hypotheses Concerning Interindustrial Wage Differentials 
Although investigation of interindustrial wage patterns has a long tradition, the 
seminal work of Krueger and Summers (1988) has raised renewed interest in this 
topic. The discussion focuses on three areas. The first concerns the magnitude of 
wage differentials for equally skilled workers under the same working conditions 
and, more specifically, the role of industry affiliation in explaining wage differen-
tials after having controlled for other influences. Second, if competitive theories 
cannot sufficiently explain interindustrial wage patterns, attention shifts to 
135 
LUTZ BELLMANN, JOACHIM MOLLER 
noncompecicive hypotheses and their testing. A third area concerns the relationship 
between a given wage structure or a given degree of wage dispersion and employ-
ment. In Germany, for instance, the lase topic was intensively discussed during the 
1980's. 
1 To assess the importance of interindustry wage differentials, Krueger and 
Summers (1988) and their followers have tested the reduction in the residual 
variance obtained by the inclusion of industry dummies in earnings functions in 
which they had already controlled for a large variety of individual or job character-
istics. According co standard neoclassical economics, real wages should be equal co 
marginal productivity and just compensate for the disutility of work in competitive 
equilibrium. Hence wage differentials for employees with equal skills under similar 
working conditions should only be transitory. In view of overwhelming empirical 
evidence for persistent and substantial interindustry wage differentials this postulate 
is clearly contrafaccual. 
At least three explanations are used co reconcile competitive labor market theory 
with the empirical findings. First, it is argued chat some industries pay higher wages 
co compensate for unpleasant characteristics of the jobs they offer (working 
conditions, risk of unemployment). Second, the observed differences in wages 
across industries may arise from a lack of worker mobility, particularly among 
experienced workers, allowing the effect of industry shocks to persist for some time 
(Helwege 1992). Third, differences in unmeasured ability could explain wage 
differentials, at least to some extent. The last hypothesis is perhaps the most 
promising candidate to rescue the competitive labor market view. Several authors 
have emphasized chat unmeasured ability could lead to serious omitted-variable bias 
of the estimates. There are different approaches to deal with this problem. If 
longitudinal and cross-sectional information for industry switchers is available, 
fixed-effects models can be estimated (Krueger and Summers 1988; Gibbons and 
Katz 1987; Blackburn and Neumark 1987). This approach, however, eliminates 
the problem chat observationally similar workers might be unequal only under the 
assumption chat unmeasured productive ability is 
(a) invariant over time, 
(b) fully revealed, and 
(c) equally rewarded in all industries. 
Along these lines, Gibbons and Katz (1992) have shown chat, to invalidate the 
unmeasured labor quality hypothesis, it is not sufficient to show chat interindustry 
wage differentials obtained by fixed-effect estimation are similar to cross-section 
estimates. If the endogeneity of job changes is not taken into account, severe 
selectivity bias might arise (for example, workers moving from a low-paying 
industry co a high-paying industry could be high-ability workers). The strategy of 
Gibbons and Katz (1992) is co restrict their sample co industry switchers for which 
an exogenous cause of job loss can plausibly be assumed (plane-closing, for 
example). The corresponding fixed-effect estimates reported by these authors are 
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supponive for explanations based on true industry differentials. By contrast, they 
also find a positive influence of pre-displacement wages on post-displacement wages 
which can be taken as evidence for the importance of individual effects (workers' 
traits). Thus, neither the pure unmeasured-ability hypothesis nor the pure industry-
effects approach provides suitable explanations for the empirical results. 
2 If the tracks of standard competitive theory are left behind, interindustry wage 
differentials obtained from estimated earnings functions could be explained by 
several hypotheses [cf. Katz and Summers 1989 for the U.S.; Hubler and Gerlach 
1990 and Wagner 1991 for Germany; Hofer 1992 for Austria]. The most 
prominent postulates of the efficiency wage theory are: 
1 Some industries pay high wages in order to reduce the quit rate (turnover 
version). 
2 High profits indicate a high ability to pay and workers aim at participating in 
these rents (fairness version). 
3 The higher the capital intensity of an industry and the more complicated the 
implementation of job supervision methods, the higher the expected losses from 
shirking; in these cases positive wage differentials are paid to prevent shirking 
(shirking version). 
Another line of argument concerns the market structure: Firms with consider-
able market power in the goods markets can pay more because they earn high rents. 
Industries may also differ to the extent to which labor is capable of appropriating its 
share of the rents earned in that industry. Insider/Outsider theory (Lindbeck and 
Snower 1988) may help to explain the bargaining power of the incumbent work 
force in a context of rent-sharing. 
A further topic, stressed by Burda (1991), is that industry or firm-specific 
human capital has varied effects on productivity in different branches. According to 
Burda, "it is reasonable that in-house experience is more valuable in chemical and 
metal industries than in trade or personal services" (Burda 1991: 15). Hence it is 
necessary to capture interaction effects of human capital and industry variables. 
3 The consequences of a cenain degree of wage dispersion for employment are 
by no means clear-cut. On the one hand it is argued that high wage dispersion 
would imply relatively low wages at the bottom end of the scale, thereby reducing 
the unemployment caused by minimum wages. Among others, the German 
Council of Economic Advisers (1985) and Soltwedel and Trapp (1988) have 
claimed that more flexibility of sectoral wages would promote employment. It has 
also been argued that the high degree of intersectoral wage differentiation is an 
important factor behind the relative employment success of the United States. On 
the other hand, regulatory mechanisms which lead to a lower degree of dispersion, 
have a twofold effect. They raise wages at the bottom end of the scale, but hold 
down wages at the top. Rowthorn (1992: 511) states: "These two features have 
opposite implications for employment, and the job stimulating effect of wage 
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restraint at the top end may conceivably outweigh the negative effect of high wages 
at the bottom." Hence the relationship between wage dispersion and employment is 
generally an empirical question. An increasing interindustry variation of wages only 
leads to employment growth if interindustry wages differentials decrease more in 
industries with lower productivity growth rates than in industries with higher 
productivity growth rates. Bell and Freeman (1986) empirically find, both for the 
United States and the Federal Republic of Germany, a positive correlation between 
relative sectoral productivity growth and the development of wage differentials. 
They conclude, therefore, that the employment success of the United States cannot 
be explained by the high wage flexibility in the United States as compared to the 
apparent lower flexibility in the German system. In contrast to this finding, a study 
of the OECD (1986) and Licht (1989) report opposite empirical results. An 
intermediate position is taken by Rowthorn, who cites evidence that wage 
dispersion has stimulated employment since 1973, but concedes that "this is by no 
means certain and any such effect is probably small" (1992: 512). 
Previous Studies on Wage Differentials for Germany 
These pages survey some of the previous German studies on interindustry wage 
differentials using different approaches to test the various hypotheses presented 
above. Fels and Gundlach (1990) use evidence from aggregate data to assess 
hypotheses about interindustry wage differentials. Schettkat (1993) investigates 
some of the hypotheses by comparing results for the microdata set of Krueger and 
Summers (1988) with those obtained for aggregate German data. Other studies on 
interindustry wage differentials are based on different sets of microdata for the 
Federal Republic of Germany. 
Hubler and Gerlach (1990) explicitly attempt to test (versions of) efficiency 
wage theories. They use the first wave (1984) of the German Socioeconomic Panel, 
a representative cross-section of West German households, and a 10 percent 
random sample for all employees in the federal state of Bremen (1981). Controll-
ing for a variety of individual and job characteristics they use 21 (22, respectively) 
sector dummies. One of their basic results is that "substantial sectoral wage 
differentials remain" (1990: 112). A further important conclusion of the authors is 
that the compensating-differentials hypothesis is in conflict with the data. The 
evidence for the efficiency wage theory is mixed, no single version can be favoured. 
Wagner (1991) has studied interindustry wage differentials on the basis of 
earnings functions for 1979 and 1985. Restricting the observations to males only, 
his data set4 includes more than 11,000 cases for both years considered. Wagner 
estimates industry effects for 24 sectors but does not report adjusted standard 
deviations. On the basis of unadjusted standard deviations he concludes that the 
wage dispersion over industries has increased between 1979 and 1985. Although 
there are some important deviations in some cases, the correlation coefficient of 
interindustrial wage differentials for both years is 0.73. Wagner also studies the 
determinants of wage differentials. He finds neither evidence for the hypothesis of 
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compensating differentials nor for the fair wage version of efficiency wage theory, 
but some of his results support the turnover version. According to his findings, the 
hypothesis of a positive correlation between wage differentials and capital intensity 
has to be rejected. 
Burda (1991) investigates the interindustry wage structure for the Federal 
Republic of Germany at the I-digit level. His data set is based on the 1985 wave of 
the German Socioeconomic Panel. Using the same control variables as Krueger and 
Summers (1988) his estimates indicate "a similar interindustry wage structure as 
found in the United States, albeit with tighter variance" (1991: 17). He also 
reports significant interaction effects which markedly reduce the standard deviation 
of wage differentials. Moreover, he finds evidence for a negative correlation of the 
extent of job supervision and wage differentials which is supportive for the shirking 
version of efficiency wage theory. In his conclusion he favors "a shared-rent 
interpretation of the interindustry wage differentials, with rents deriving from 
industry or firm-specific human capital which only accumulates over time" (1991: 
18). 
Helwege and Wagner (1991) examine the structure of wages in the United 
States and the Federal Republic Germany using data from wage surveys in 1979, 
1985, and 1987. Restricting the sample to full-time male salaried workers, wage 
differentials are calculated for 24 industries. Controlling for schooling, experience, 
tenure, and regional effects they were somewhat puzzled to find a number of 
industry differentials statistically not significant even for the United States. The 
authors attribute this to three reasons: 
a more homogeneous group of workers included in the sample; 
2 use of tenure as a control variable; and 
3 small sample size. 
Nevertheless, the results for both countries also show substantial differences 
between industries. Comparing the two countries, striking similarities are found 
for the lowest-paying industries. For example, in 1979 four of five lowest-paying 
industries in the United States are also among the five lowest paying industries in 
the Federal Republic of Germany. The basic conclusions of the authors is that a 
correlation between the interindustry wage differentials in the two countries does 
exist, but that this correlation has been substantially overestimated by previous 
studies (Krueger and Summers 1987 and Katz and Summers 1989). 
In addition to Helwege and Wagner (1991), comparisons of the structure of 
industry wages between the United States and the Federal Republic of Germany 
were part of further studies including Wagner (1990), Burda (1991), and Zanchi 
(1992). 
Plan of Our Study 
This chapter aims at studying the effect of institutional settings on wage formation 
and wage differentials, and therefore the focus is on international comparisons of 
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Mincer-type wage functions. 5 Our empirical study is based on a sufficient large 
microdata set that allows to estimate accurately wage differentials for detailed 
industry categories. These estimates are to be compared with existing estimates for 
the United States and Sweden.6 
As outlined in pages 127-129, company-level agreements in Sweden and the 
Federal Republic of Germany follow those for their industry very closely, whereas 
in the United States industry-wide contracts are significantly altered at the plant or 
firm level. In the former countries specific wage categories associated with skill 
grades, age or seniority are apparently defined in agreements on higher level than in 
the United States. Hence for employees belonging to the same age group and 
holding a certificate of educational and/or vocational training of a given type, a 
more uniform treatment within a given industry can be expected for Sweden and 
Germany compared to the United States. Following Edin and Zetterberg (1992) 
and Zanchi (1992), it can be postulated that estimated industry wage differentials 
in Germany or Sweden should be more sensitive to the inclusion of human capital 
variables than in the United States. 
To assess the absolute and relative importance of a given type of variables for 
explaining the wage structure, the effect of the exclusion of these variables from the 
general model will be studied. This strategy has also been adopted by Krueger and 
Summers (1988), Edin and Zetterberg (1992), and others. 
Our data set does not allow the estimation of fixed effects and contains no 
information about the causes of industry switches. Hence our empirical analysis cannot 
contribute much to the debate of true-industry effects versus unobserved-ability 
explanations. Nevertheless, some valuable insights can be gained if one looks at industry 
switchers separately. If substantial differentials for this subgroup were found, either the 
competitive labor-market hypothesis would be invalid or industry switchers could be no 
representative subsample of the work force. Furthermore, it is possible to determine the 
differences in wages between movers and stayers. Since newcomers dispose of little or no 
industry-specific human capital it can be expected that movers earn less. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
The Data 
The following estimates use a very large cross-sectional microdata set drawn from 
the Employment Register of the Federal Employment Services. The main purpose 
of our investigation is to compare industry effects at the level of 2-digit industries 
for the Federal Republic of Germany to those reported by Krueger and Summers 
(1988) and Katz and Summers (1989) for the United States. The U.S. findings are 
estimated with individual data collected by the Bureau of the Census for the May 
1974 and 1979 and from the 1984 Current Population Survey. Our data are not 
available for 1974, so the results are directly comparable only for 1979 and 1984. 
Being interested in the development of our estimates over time, the estimations for 
the German data set were carried out also for 1989. 
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Since the industry classification on the 2-digit level is not congruent between the 
Federal Republic of Germany and the United States, 3-digit level industries were 
appropriately aggregated to obtain a similar classification scheme for the German 
data.7 
It should be stressed that the data source employed here is especially suitable for 
a disaggregated study of wage differentials. The social insurance procedure 
introduced in 1973 compels employers to report every year all earnings above a 
certain minimum for those employees who are subject to a health or unemploy-
ment insurance or who are participating in a pension scheme. 8 There are legal 
sanctions for misreporting (Cramer 1986), and classification into industries is 
performed by experts of the Federal Employment Services.9 As shown by 
comparisons with Microzensus data, the register covers practically all dependent 
employment in the private sector, i.e., almost 80 percent of total employment in 
the Federal Republic Germany. The remaining 20 percent consists of civil servants, 
self-employed, unpaid family workers, and people who are not eligible for social 
security because their earnings and/or working-time are too low. 10 To avoid 
problems of selectivity bias arising from the dependence of labor force participa-
tion of women on wages, only data for males were considered. Pan-time workers 
were also excluded. Even with these restrictions, a 1 percent random sample of the 
existing huge data set still contains well above 100,000 cases for each year 
investigated. 
In addition to the sectoral classification, our data set includes information on 
schooling, age, and industry switching. The employees are classified into six 
qualification groups. On the basis of this information, the standardized duration of 
the education and vocational training for an individual can be calculated. A 
...:orresponding variable SCHOOL was constructed as follows: 11 
1 For persons with a lower schooling level and no occupational qualifications the 
variable SCHOOL takes the value 10 (years). This group covers about 19.7 
percent of our sample in 1984 and includes lower secondary school (Haupt-
schule) and intermediate secondary school (Realschule) graduates who did not 
complete an apprenticeship or graduate from a full-time vocational school. 
2 For persons at this schooling level with an occupation qualification, which might 
be either a completed apprenticeship or graduation from a vocational school, the 
variable SCHOOL is 12.125; this group is by far the largest (about 71.9 percent 
in 1984). 
3 For persons holding a secondary school leaving certificate (Abitur) without any 
other qualification (0.59 percent in 1984) the variable SCHOOL is 13. 
4 For persons with nonuniversity higher education (Fachhochschule, 3.11 percent 
in 1984) we have SCHOOL= 15; 
5 For persons as under category 2 but additionally holding a secondary school 
leaving certificate the value for SCHOOL is 15.125 (1.44 percent in 1984). 
6 Finally, for persons with university-type education (Hochschule, 3.24 percent in 
1984), the value for SCHOOL is 18. 
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On this basis, the potential experience (EX) can be measured as AGE-SCHOOL-6 
(years). 
To assess the effect of schooling on earnings two different approaches were 
adopted. First, the schooling variable was used as a cardinal measure of education 
and directly taken as an explanatory variable.With the implicit assumption that the 
coefficient of schooling is invariant for all types of education, it can be interpreted 
as the (constant) rate of return of education. This assumption can be criticized as 
being too restrictive. Therefore, the information on education was introduced in a 
qualitative way in the second approach, taking group 1 as a reference level and 
introducing five different dummy variables for the others. Since the left-hand 
variable are log-wages, the corresponding coefficient of these dummy variables can 
be interpreted as (approximate) percentage remuneration gains of education and 
vocational training of a specified type. 
A further variable (MOV) takes the value 1 if the corresponding person switches the 
industry where he was employed in the current year and O otherwise. The percentage of 
industry switchers captured in our sample was 10.75 percent in 1984 and somewhat 
higher in 1979 and 1989 (about 13 percent and 12.7 percent, respectively). We have no 
information about the causes of industry switching, specifically, we do not know 
whether a person was laid off or voluntarily quit the previous job. In the most general 
model, MOY was introduced as an additional explanatory dummy variable. In other 
versions of earnings functions estimates we excluded this variable or considered the wage 
differentials of industry switchers separately. 
Inevitably, some differences between the specifications of Krueger and Summers 
(1988) and our approach remain. The CPS data set contains additional variables, 
e.g. to control for working conditions, region, occupation type and union 
membership. There are data sets for the Federal Republic of Germany including 
comparable variables but they do not cover enough cases to assess the effect of 
industry dummies on earnings with the same sectoral disaggregation as adopted by 
Krueger and Summers (1988). On the one hand, it could be suspected that the 
exclusion of the mentioned control variables would result in upwardly biased 
estimates of interindustry wage differentials, since possibly important sources of 
wage differentials are neglected. On the other hand, it can be argued the set of 
variables which previous studies have shown to be the most important (human 
capital and experience variables) are included in our study (in a way that perhaps 
allow for a more refined consideration of these effects). Furthermore, there is no 
need to control for demographic variables as Krueger and Summers did, since our 
sample is more homogeneous (including full-time salaried males only). Some 
control variables used for the U.S. specifications are either found as not significant 
or "wrong-signed" for Germany in previous studies using survey data. 12 Other 
factors can be expected to be less important in the German context, such as union 
membership (since the scope of collective regulation is not closely related to union 
membership, and hence bargaining results normally also apply to nonmembers). 
Therefore, it is unlikely that our estimates of interindustry wage differentials do 
exhibit a substantial upward bias. 13 
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:Estimation Method 
A special characteristic of the data set under consideration is that it is truncated to 
the left (because of the exclusion of minor employment) and censored to the right 
(because of the contribution assessment ceiling in the social security system). 14 The 
former should cause no troubles because we are considering full-time employed 
males only, a group for which social insurance is compulsory. 15 On the other hand, 
censoring on the right side of the earning scale is a severe problem which-if not 
considered explicitly-could lead to heavily biased estimates of the earnings 
functions. 16 Hence it was necessary to use the TOBIT estimation method instead 
of Ordinary Least Squares. 17 
Following Krueger and Summers, the estimated industry wage differentials are 
normalized as deviations from the (weighted) mean. The resulting coefficients are 
the expected proportionate difference in wages between an employee in a given 
industry and the average employee. 18 To summarize the overall variability in 
industry wages we focus on the weighted adjusted standard deviation of the 
industry wage differentials. 19 
RESULTS 
Human Capital Effects on Earnings 
The following versions of model specifications with log wages on the left hand side 
were considered: 
model 1: the specification includes experience and schooling variables, 
information about industry switch and industry dummies; 
model 2: like model 1, but excluding the industry dummies; 
model 3: the specification includes industry dummies only; since all relevant 
microdata information is excluded, this model corresponds to an estimation 
with aggregate data; 
model 4: like model 1, but excluding information about industry switch 
(mover dummy); and 
model 5: like model 1, but excluding industry and mover dummies. 
The most general approach {model 1) was used to compare the two different versions 
of modelling the influence of schooling and vocational training on earnings as described 
in pages 134-136. The results are presented in Table 6.1. All coefficients exhibit the 
expected sign and order of magnitude (as was the case in all versions that were 
calculated). Experience has a positive influence on earnings but with declining marginal 
rates, and wages rise with education and fall in the case of an industry switch. The 
returns from education (cardinal measure) are estimated to be between 7 and 8 percent, 
which is roughly in line with the results of previous studies. 20 According to our estimates 
there is no dear movement for education differentials over time: From 1979 to 1984 
these differentials rose, and from 1984 to 1989 they declined slightly again. 
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Table 6. 1 Two Versions of the General Model• 
1979 1984 
Coef SE Coef SE 
Model 1, cardinal measure of education (k = 44) 
const 3.5513 0.0109 3.6670 0.0124 
EX 2.3550 0.0353 2.4847 0.0424 
EX2 -0.0729 0.0008 -0.0665 0.0008 







MOV -8.7537 0.3068 -11.8122 0.3573 -11.4041 0.3337 
a 0.2727 
lnL -18762.958 
Model 1, education dummies (k = 48) 
const 4.2650 0.0072 
EX 2.3460 0.0353 
EX2 -0.0726 0.0008 
SCHOOL2 14.0035 0.2441 
SCHOOL3 13.1811 1.2824 
SCHOOL4 47.8500 0.6830 
SCHOOLS 29.1725 0.9813 
SCHOOL6 53.0655 0.7380 




L-R [:x;2(4)] 647.9b 
Notes: 
Coefficients and standard errors x 100; 
• Sectoral effects not reported here; 
0.2962 0.3040 
-29269.683 -34044.646 
4.4413 0.0088 4.5450 0.0104 
2.4715 0.0424 2.5449 0.0505 
-0.0661 0.0008 -0.0581 0.0008 
15.4375 0.2747 15.2033 0.2876 
11.6774 1.4320 12.6459 1.3537 
54.3314 0.7014 54.3068 0.6736 
27.8035 0.9444 25.2642 0.8096 
58.8379 0.7305 56.9475 0.6615 





N: Number of observations; k: Number of explanatory variables; a: Standard error of the regression; In 
L: Value of the log likelihood function; LR: Likelihood-Ratio test of the model in the upper part of the 
table versus the model in the lower part. 
b indicates significance at the I percent level; SCHOOL2-SCHOOL6 are dummies for the 
corresponding types of education described in the text. 
A comparison of the lower to the upper part of Table 6.1 reveals, however, that 
a cardinal measure of education is too crude. The Likelihood-Ratio test clearly 
rejects the restrictions implicitly imposed by using the cardinal measure. According 
to this statistical evidence, it seems inadequate to neglect the quality of different 
types of education. Thus the following results are based on the more general 
modeling of education effects. 
The mean differential of education type 2 with respect to the lowest group 
(about 15 percent) is slightly higher than for type 3 (about 12.5 percent). 
Therefore, on average, a secondary school leaving certificate in terms of earnings is 
worth less than a completed apprenticeship for a person with a low or medium level 
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of schooling (although the former takes longer). Persons holding that certificate 
and having additionally completed an apprenticeship (type 5) are paid significantly 
higher differentials although there is some evidence that these differentials are 
declining over time (from about 29 percent in 1979 to about 25 percent in 1989). 
The top groups of earners are those with nonuniversity or university-type higher 
education (type 4 and type 6). The results show that the education differentials for 
these groups widened between 1979 and 1984 but stagnated or slightly declined 
since then. It also seems that the gap between nonuniversity type graduates 
(Fachhochschule) and university-type graduates has been reduced (from about 5.2 
percent in 1979 to 2.6 percent in 1989). 
The experience differential is highly significant and slightly growing over time. 
The return for additional years of experience declined less in 1989 than it did in 
1979, implying that the typical earning profile has become less concave. Finally, 
our findings suggest that industry switchers have to expect significant wage losses 
(8.8 percent in 1979, 9.4 percent in 1984, and 7.6 percent in 1989). 
In Table 6.2 we compare the versions of the estimation model with the results of 
the most general model presented in the lower part of Table 6.1. Exclusion of the 
mover dummy leads to a slightly higher standard error of the regression (between 
0.16 and 0.26 percentage points), but the coefficient estimates of the human 
capital variables are not substantially affected. Due to the large sample, the 
reduction of the standard error of the regression is highly significant as shown by 
the Likelihood-Ratio test. Hence it can be concluded that the mover dummy 
should enter the regression. 
If human capital variables are excluded from the general model, the standard 
error of the regressions increases by between 6.53 (1979) to 7 .20 percentage points 
(1984). A test for the joint significance of these variables exceeds by far the critical 
value at the 1 percent level. These results indicate that education, vocational 
training and experience explain a substantial part of the observed wage differentials. 
Interindustrial Wage Differentials 
The removal of industry dummies from the general model raises the standard error 
by between 0.89 (1979) and 1.85 (1989) percentage points.22 Also in this case the 
Likelihood-Ratio test statistic rejects the exclusion of these variables at any 
conventional level of significance. Evidently, industry effects on wages are 
important even if (observable) differences in human capital are controlled for. 
We now turn to the estimated interindustry wage differentials. Table 6.3 gives 
the estimates for the general model as (approximate) percentage deviations from 
the weighted mean differential and the corresponding t-statistics. Most of the 
interindustry differentials are significant at least at the 5 percent level, in 1989 all 
industry effects are statistically significant different from zero (9 exceptions in 
1979, 5 exceptions in 1984). The magnitude of interindustry differentials is 
considerable, ranging in 1989 from -45 percent in Eating&Drinking to +35.8 
percent in the petroleum industry. The differentials are rather stable over time and 
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Table 6.2 Different Versions of the Estimated Model Compared to the General Model 
1979 1984 1989 
Variable Coef SE Cotf SE Cotf SE 
Mover Effects Excluded• (k = 47) 
const 4.2581 0.0073 4.4465 0.0089 4.5511 0.0105 
EX 2.3459 0.0355 2.5009 0.0427 2.5708 0.0509 
EX2 -0.0738 0.0008 -0.0678 0.0008 -0.0596 0.0008 
SCHOOL2 14.4610 0.2451 15.7775 0.2768 15.6752 0.2899 
SCHOOL3 13.6228 1.2903 11.9741 1.4442 12.9932 1.3653 
SCHOOL4 48.2337 0.6866 54.3793 0.7063 54.1140 0.6784 
SCHOOLS 29.3896 0.9871 27.7783 0.9523 25.4056 0.8159 
SCHOOL6 53.4428 0.7424 58.6018 0.7351 56.6816 0.6666 
0 0.2737 0.2973 0.3050 
In L -18988.991 -29476.593 -34143.104 
LR [X2 (1)] 1100.0b 1464.8b 1589.Sb 
Industry Effects Excluded (k = 9) 
const 4.2712 0.0041 4.4553 0.0058 4.5431 0.0080 
EX 2.3586 0.0363 2.5270 0.0441 2.6637 0.0533 
EX2 -0.0736 0.0007 -0.0678 0.0008 -0.0602 0.0008 
SCHOOL2 13.7810 0.2473 15.3583 0.2820 1S.6181 0.3004 
SCHOOL3 13.8599 1.3191 13.1170 1.4901 14.0010 1.4304 
SCHOOL4 49.2258 0.6955 56.2450 0.7209 57.1093 0.7008 
SCHOOLS 30.6776 1.0027 30.1136 0.9752 29.4665 0.8445 
SCHOOL6 53.3611 0.7243 59.7837 0.7245 58.4089 0.6647 
MOY -10.1502 0.3136 -13.7283 0.3695 -13.8396 0.3490 
0 0.2810 0.3083 0.3209 
lnL -21546.395 -33038.451 -39354.845 
LR [X2(39)] 6214.8b 8588.Sb 12012.9b 
Experience and Schooling Effects Excluded• (k = 40) 
0 0.3374 0.3670 0.3710 
In L -40084.765 -50847.298 -55177.906 
L-R [X2(8)] 43291.Sb 44206.2b 43659.1 b 
Notes-. L-R: Likelihood-Ratio test versus the general model; for number of observations and other notes 
see Table 6.1. 
a "significant" sign change of the differential between 1979 and 1989 occurs in 
only two industries (Furniture, Stone, Clay&Glass). Four of the five best-paying 
industries in 1979 are also among the five best-paying industries in 1989 and the 
same is true for the five lowest-paying industries. 23 Service industries are found 
among the latter (Eating&Drinking, Private Households, Medical Services, 
Personal Services) as well as among the former (Banking, Insurance}. Employees in 
some capital intensive branches (Petroleum, Tobacco, Transport Equipment) also 
earn top wages. 
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Table 6.3 Interindustry Wage Differentials and Corresponding t-statistics (Controls for 
Schooling, Experience, and Industry Switching) 
1979 1984 1989 
Sector Coe/ t-stat Coe/ t-stat Coe/ t-stat 
MIN 2.5548 2.6605 11.6583 10.9170 12.0525 10.1918 
CON -4.7556 -6.9829 -2.7866 -3.6087 -4.6283 -5.7320 
LUM -11.2452 -8.2938 -4.4422 -2.9533 -6.1879 -4.0263 
FUR -4.8648 -5.3829 2.5265 2.6293 3.9740 4.0182 
STO 2.4508 2.9716 -4.0718 -4.0460 -4.1963 -4.0242 
PRIM 4.3954 5.4135 5.8075 6.1669 8.6692 8.7683 
FAB 1.5665 1.9501 1.6113 1.8002 1.6012 1.7536 
MAC 5.2914 7.2927 7.4954 9.1251 10.1989 12.1191 
ELE 5.4455 7.2077 8.0049 9.4456 10.7428 12.3615 
CAR 11.9106 15.7092 15.0173 17.7328 18.7919 21.6440 
INST 1.1555 1.3804 1.9913 2.1339 2.3178 2.4555 
FOO -4.8262 -5.8620 -4.5162 -4.8993 -5.1781 -5.3939 
TOB 6.5108 2.1349 13.5845 3.7935 16.8226 4.3983 
TEX -7.5157 -7.0600 -6.2091 -5.1278 -4.0977 -3.2224 
APP -7.0262 -4.3940 -7.8299 -4.3121 -7.5307 -3.8558 
PAP 2.6213 2.1988 4.1949 3.1455 6.1497 4.6679 
PRIN 7.0646 6.5954 7.3769 6.2308 8.4985 6.9900 
CHE 8.9257 11.6078 13.3465 15.5330 15.3256 17.4078 
PET 19.7058 9.8485 30.8634 13.3930 35.8096 13.0136 
RUB 2.2651 1.6208 4.6377 3.0537 6.9065 4.5331 
LEA -12.6815 -4.6992 -14.0726 -4.6261 -7.8913 -2.2934 
RAI 1.0282 0.9788 -1.4485 -1.1963 -5.4295 -4.0449 
TRA 0.6651 0.8798 -0.8397 -0.9890 -4.0334 -4.6737 
COM 8.5348 5.6470 10.3513 6.5186 11.4830 7.0009 
PUB -6.2448 -8.4434 -7.8875 -9.5604 -10.1501 -11.8454 
WHO -0.9438 -1.2661 1.0419 1.2385 1.7651 2.0297 
EAT -32.0549 -23.7407 -39.1068 -28.8250 -45.0045 -33.5130 
RET -8.4832 -11.2814 -8.2567 -9.7993 -7.8010 -9.0227 
BAN 9.9801 10.8797 17.7908 17.8060 19.1561 18.8304 
INSU 13.8759 12.1383 18.8168 15.1302 22.4619 17.6567 
PRIV -29.6029 -4.8268 -43.6908 -7.1733 -31.7818 -4.0018 
BUS 1.5845 1.0254 3.5878 2.2253 8.4198 5.6010 
REP -8.8020 -8.8913 -8.3903 -7.7661 -7.6570 -6.9940 
PER -18.7475 -16.4223 -20.9283 -17.6872 -21.4169 -18.6709 
ENT 9.6603 5.4109 11.5356 6.1395 9.8879 5.4967 
MED -14.8484 -1.1448 -34.1326 -2.9466 -29.5808 -3.2543 
HOS -1.0441 -0.9672 -1.4281 -1.2774 -2.7361 -2.4640 
WEL -2.7522 -2.6084 -2.2110 -1.9684 -6.0820 -5.4844 
EDU -6.3300 -6.1989 -7.4885 -6.7548 -9.9879 -8.9780 
PRO -0.7720 -0.9458 -1.1624 -1.2966 -4.0013 -4.4885 
SDl 0.1038 0.1462 0.1503 
SD2 0.0647 0.0919 0.1083 
Notes: Model with schooling dummies; SDI: Adjusted standard deviation of diJFerentials; SD2: 
Weighted adjusted standard deviation of differentials (employment weights); reported coefficients give 
approximate percentage differentials from the mean wage; for a list of industries see Appendix. 
147 
LUTZ BELLMANN, JOACHIM MOLLER 
At the bottom of Table 6.3 we report the unweighted and the employment-
weighted adjusted standard deviation of interindustry wage differentials (SDI and 
SD2). According to these statistics, the amount of wage dispersion among 
industries being not explained by (observed) human capital variables has been 
growing considerably over time. Specifically, the time period between 1979 and 
1984 witnessed a strong extension of interindustry wage differentials in the Federal 
Republic Germany. 24 Since these results are calculated from an extraordinary large 
sample of wage data, they provide hard statistical evidence for the phenomenon 
that the "flexibility" of German wage schemes has been remarkably increasing 
during the time span under consideration. 
The rise of interindustrial wage differentials can also be shown in Figure 6.1, 
which plots the interindustry wage differentials for the year 1979 (horizontal axis) 
against those obtained for 1989. A simple (unweighted) regression yields a constant 
term of 2.09, a slope coefficient of 1.36, and an R2 of 0.90. 25 The increase of wage 
dispersion for observationally similar workers is reflected in the slope coefficient 
which is greater than one. For example, the relative earning situation in the low-
paying service industries (Eating&Drinking, Private Households, Medical Services, 
Personal Services) has even deteriorated, while the advantage of high-paying 
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Figure 6.1 Interindustrial Wage Differentials (Germany 1979 and 1989) 
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findings strongly support the hypothesis of a rising wage inequality in the Federal 
Republic of Germany during the 1980' s. 
Human Capital Variables Excluded 
Interindustty wage differentials were also calculated on the basis of model 3 (human 
capital variables excluded). Since in this case microdata information is not utilized, the 
corresponding calculations should reproduce the results of aggregate studies of wage 
dispersion. As outlined above, we would expect an overestimation of industty effects in 
this version. In accordance with these considerations, the weighted adjusted standard 
deviations of interindustry differentials neglecting microdata information on human 
capital [see Table 6.8 in the Appendix] exceed those of Table 6.3. Although important 
differences show up in some industries (see, for instance, Education Services, Medical 
Services, Furniture), the correlation coefficients between the differentials in Table 6.3 
and Table 6.8 exceed 0.9 for all three years included in our study. Moreover, the rising 
trend of interindustry wage dispersion is also present in the 'quasi-aggregate' estimations. 
Figure 6.2 plots the wage differentials with and without control variables for the 
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Figure 6.2 lnterindustrial Wage Differentials with and without Controls for Human 
Capital (Germany 1989) 
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wage differentials of some human-capital intensive sectors such as Medical Services 
or Education Services would be heavily underestimated if only aggregate data were 
used. On the other hand, an upward bias occurs in industries such as Furniture that 
do not require a high level of education of their work force. A simple regression 
gives -0.63 for the constant term, 0.71 for the slope coefficient, and an ff of 0.75. 
According to this, differences in the average human capital utilization among 
industries account for almost 30 percent of the wage dispersion calculated from 
aggregate data. Similar results are obtained for 1979 and 1989. To summarize: 
Interindustry wage differentials are upwardly biased to a considerable extent if 
microdata information is neglected. 26 
Results for Industry Switchers 
One possibility to find further evidence on the process of wage formation is to 
study the wage changes experienced by industry switchers separately. The 
subsample of industry switchers consists of more than 10,000 cases for every year 
under consideration. The results of TOBIT estimates for this group are docu-
mented in the appendix. The coefficient estimates of human capital variables are 
roughly in line with that obtained for the full sample. The same is true for the 
relative importance of human capital variables (see Table 6.4). Industry effects are 
weaker for switchers but also present. As for the full sample, a corresponding 
Likelihood-Ratio test strongly supports the joint significance of the industrial 
effects. The weighted adjusted standard deviation of wage differentials for the 
subsample is below that obtained for all workers. 
Although interindustry differentials are less significant for industry switchers in 
general, the differentials for switchers are highly correlated with the overall 
Table 6.4 Comparison of All Workers and Industry Switchers Only 
All Switchers Only 
1979 1984 1989 1979 1984 1989 
Standard Deviations of lnterindustrial Wage Differentials 
Without Controls 0.089 0.115 0.130 0.044 0.067 0.078 
With Controls 0.067 0.088 0.107 0.041 0.060 0.067 
Relative Importance of Human Capital Controls 
#1 6.47 7.08 6.70 5.88 6.28 7.53 
#2 6.53 7.20 6.86 5.96 6.51 7.66 
Relative Importance of Industry Effects 
#1 0.89 1.33 2.15 0.58 1.17 1.24 
#2 0.89 1.33 1.85 0.59 1.15 1.21 
Notes: Relative imponance measured as the increase of the standard error of the regression ( times 100) 
obtained by excluding the corresponding variables from the general model; # 1: cardinal measure of 
schooling; #2: schooling dummies. 
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Figure 6.3 lnterindustrial Wage Differentials for the Full Sample and for Industry 
Switchers only (Germany 1989) 
differentials (the correlation coefficients being 0.79, 0.87 and 0.82 for 1979, 1984, 
and 1989). Figure 6.3 plots wage differentials for the full sample (horizontal axis) 
against the differentials of industry switchers (venical axis). As is evident from this 
plot, the slope of the regression line (see the solid line in Figure 6.3) is smaller than 
one (the estimated intercept is 0.09, the slope coefficient 0.67 and the R 2 is 0.70). 
Hence there is evidence that wage differentials for industry switchers are only about 
two-thirds of those of the total labor force. 
DISCUSSION AND INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON 
Comparison of General Results 
The microdata evidence presented here can be compared to those reported by 
Krueger and Summers (I 988) for the United States, Edin and Zetterberg 
(1992) for Sweden, and (to some extent) with Winter-Ehmer (1992) for 
Austria. 
One important point which casts some light on the differences of institutional 
settings in these countries is the absolute and relative imponance of human capital 
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variables and industry effects for explaining the observed wage differentials. An 
overview of the respective results is given in Tables 6.5 and 6.6. 
Taking 1984 for a comparison, the following can be concluded: 
1 The standard deviation of interindustry wage differentials as a measure of wage 
flexibility is by far highest in the United States and lowest in Sweden. The 
Federal Republic of Germany can be seen as an intermediate case with higher 
wage flexibility than in the Swedish labor market. 27 Although the results are not 
strictly comparable, wage flexibility in the Federal Republic of Germany seems 
to exceed that of Austria, too. 
2 Human capital variables reduce the weighted adjusted standard deviation of 
industry wage differentials more in the United States and Sweden than in the 
Federal Republic of Germany (cf. Table 6.5). 
3 If the reduction of the standard error of the earnings function regression is taken 
as an indicator, human capital variables have the strongest effect on wage 
differentials in the Federal Republic of Germany. For Sweden the influence of 
Table 6.5 Weighted Adjusted Standard Deviation of Interindustry Wage Differentials, 
U.S., Sweden, Germany, and Austria 
Without Controls With Controls 
1979 1984 1989 1974 1979 1984· 1989 
U.S. 0.240 0.132 0.108 0.140 
Sweden 0.083 0.013 
Germany 0.089 0.115 0.130 0.067 0.088 0.107 
Austria 0.055 
Sources: Edin and Zetterberg (1992: 1344, Table 3) for Sweden; Kruger and Summers {1988: 26, Table 
II) for the U.S.; Tables 6.3 and 6.8 of this chapter for Germany; Winter-Ehmer (1992: 12) for Austria 
Notes: • for Austria 1983; 
Dash in column indicates data are not available. 
Table 6.6 Relative lmponance of Human Capital Variables and Interindustry Wage 
Differentials for Explaining Earnings in the U.S., Sweden, and Germany 
(1984) 
Human Capital Variables Industry Effects 
All Switchers Only All Switchers Only 
United States 5.1 4.3 
Sweden 2.2 0.2 
Germany 7.2 6.5 1.3 1.2 
Sources: Edin and Zetterberg (1992: 1346) for Sweden; Krueger and Summers {1988: 264f) for the 
United States; Tables 6.2 and 6.9 of this chapter for Germany 
Notes: Sec Table 6.5 
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human capital variables on earnings is only moderate, while the United States 
ranks in-between (cf. Table 6.6). 
4 Industry effects are very important in the United States where they are of the 
same order of magnitude as the influence of human capital variables; although 
highly significant, the effect of industry variables is less distinct in the Federal 
Republic of Germany and even lower in Sweden. 
5 Roughly comparing the relative importance of human capital to industry 
variables for the determination of wage differentials, yields a relation of about 1 
to 1 in the United States, 5 to 1 in the Federal Republic of Germany, and 10 to 
1 in Sweden. 
From this evidence it cannot be doubted that the Swedish system is the most 
egalitarian, an effect of the so-called solidarity wage policy according to the Rehn-
Meidner doctrine with its postulate "equal pay for equal work" (see Edin and 
Zetterberg 1992 for details). The United States labor market is the opposite end of 
the scale offering the greatest extent of flexibility or the largest industry effects. 
With respect to wage flexibility, the Federal Republic of Germany represents an 
intermediate case. According to our findings, the German system is closer to that in 
the United States than to the Swedish system. Furthermore, one of the most 
striking results of our estimations is the increasing flexibility of the German wage 
structure. It thus seems that the German system in the 1980's was on the way to 
adopting the flexibility of the American system. 
One special characteristic of German wage patterns is that formal proofs of 
education and vocational training are very important for the explanation of wage 
differentials. Formal qualification seems to play a more prominent role for the 
determination of earnings in Germany than in the United States or Sweden. 
Comparison of Interindustry Differentials 
Our results for interindustrial wage differentials can be compared to those obtained 
by Krueger and Summers (1988) for the United States. In Table 6.7 we have listed 
the five highest- and lowest-paying industries for Germany and the United States. 
For both countries interindustry differentials are substantial and there are some 
striking similarities at the very top and at the very bottom of the scale. In both 
countries the capital-intensive petroleum industry pays the highest differential in all 
years, and wages in Private Households Services are lowest or almost lowest after 
having controlled for education and experience. Transport Equipment and 
Tobacco also tend to pay high differentials in both countries, while the leather 
industry pays below the average. In Germany and the United States service 
industries dominate the lower end of the wage scales. But apparently there are also 
some differences in the wage structure between the two countries. Insurance and 
Banking are among the best-paying industries in the Federal Republic of Germany, 
whereas they are only in the midfield in the United States. Wage differentials for 
workers in Mining are considerably higher in the United States (where they are 
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Table 6.7 Wage Differentials for the Five Highest- and Lowest-Paying Industries in 
Germany and the U.S. 
Germany United States 
1979 1984 1989 1979 1984 
Rank Ind. Diff. Ind. Diff. Ind. Diff. Ind. Diff. Ind. Diff. 
1 PET 19.7 PET 30.9 PET 35.8 PET 27.8 PET 37.1 
2 INSU 13.9 INSU 18.8 INSU 22.5 MIN 26.3 TOB 34.0 
3 CAR 11.9 BAN 17.8 BAN 19.2 CAR 15.6 PUB 25.9 
4 BAN 10.0 CAR 15.0 CAR 18.8 CHE 14.8 MIN 24.1 
5 ENT 9.7 TOB 13.6 TOB 16.8 CON 13.7 CAR 19.1 
36 LEA -12.7 LEA -14.1 EDU -10.0 APP -13.2 RET -15.5 
37 MEO -14.9 PER -20.9 PER -21.4 EDU -18.5 EAT -18.9 
38 PER -18.9 MEO -34.1 MEO -29.6 WEL -19.0 EDU -19.4 
39 PRIV -29.6 EAT -39.1 PRIV -31.8 LEA -23.3 WEL -24.6 
40 EAT -32.1 PRIV -43.7 EAT -45.0 PRIV -25.9 PRIV -36.6 
Sources: Krueger and Summers (1988: 265£) for the U.S. (excluding sectors ORD and MISC); Table 
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among the top group) than in Germany. Construction workers earn below the 
average in Germany but have a positive differential in the United States. 
In Figure 6.4 the United States differentials are plotted against the German 
differentials for 1979 showing a weak positive relationship between the differentials 
in the two countries. A simple regression gives an intercept of -1.82, a slope 
coefficient of 0.54, and an If of 0.40 (again, the solid line in Figure 6.4 represents 
the corresponding regression line). Although the hypothesis of a similar wage 
pattern between Germany and the United States cannot be rejected, the correlation 
(0.63) is lower than in previous aggregate studies and corroborates the findings of 
Helwege and Wagner (1991). This also suppons the results of Edin and Zetterberg 
(1992) stating in their comparison between Sweden and the United States that the 
magnitude of correlations across countries has probably been overstated in studies 
based on aggregate data. 
CONCLUSIONS 
According to a recent international study by Davis (1992: 289), there have been 
"several prominent cross-country patterns of change in key aspects of the relative 
wage structure" operating on a global scale over the last two decades. Among the 
advanced economies, the global trends at work during the 1980's were the rising 
overall wage inequality, rising inequality among observationally similar workers, 
rising or flat education differentials, and rising experience differentials. The 
empirical evidence for the Federal Republic of Germany (not included in Davis' 
study) fits these findings almost perfectly. Davis also mentions differences in the 
extent and the structure of wage inequalities across countries "pointing to wage-
setting institutions and goverm.nent labor market interventions as potentially 
powerful influences on earnings inequality" (241). Our study comparing the 
evidence for Germany, the United States and Sweden corroborates this view. From 
the study of Edin and Zetterberg ( 1992) it is obvious that egalitarian pay policy has 
coined the Swedish system, whereas the U.S. system exhibits high wage dispersion. 
Estimations of interindustry wage differentials suggest that Germany is something 
of an intermediate case between Sweden and the United States with respect to 
overall wage inequality and wage dispersion among observationally similar workers 
in different industries.On the one hand, the extent of wage dispersion thus roughly 
corresponds to the corporatism index proposed by Calmfors and Driffill (1988) 
with Austria and Sweden in the top group, Germany in the middlefield and the 
U.S. system at the bottom end of the scale. In contrast to Rowthorn (1992: 508) 
who has objected that "centralised wage bargaining is not synonymous with 
egalitarianism," our empirical evidence seems to support the view that corporatism 
(defined as in Calmfors and Driffill 1988) favors something like "solidarity wage 
policy. "28 On the other hand, the criteria used as a measure of corporatism 
("coordination level within central organizations," "existence of parallel central 
organizations and their cooperation") are too crude as to cover all important aspects 
of reality. In the light of the Calmfors and Driffill criteria, wage patterns of the 
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German and the Swedish labor market system should be much more similar than 
actually appears to be the case. This points to the crucial role of the objectives 
followed by the central organizations. It is not the centralized negotiation system 
alone, but "centralised wage bargaining (which) has been accompanied by a policy 
of deliberately squeezing differentials" (Rowthorn 1992: 508) that explains the 
Swedish evidence. In Germany, it seems that the negotiating parties either did not 
regard egalitarian pay policies as a true priority during the 1980' s, or they were not 
successful in stemming against the global trends. 
A further piece of evidence for the role of policy objectives (which also might 
reflect social norms prevailing in the society) can be taken from the absolute and 
relative importance of schooling and experience for remuneration schemes. In 
pages 127-129 we discussed that in Germany (as in Sweden) sectoral wage 
agreements inter alia contain regulations about specific wage categories associated 
with skill grades, age or seniority, while there are no comparable regulations in the 
United States. Hence in the United States it could be possible that employees with 
given formal qualifications and experience are treated rather differently within the 
same industry. With regard to the empirical evidence one has to differentiate 
between two aspects: 
1 To what extent are wage differentials explained by formal qualification? 
2 How sensitive do interindustry wage differentials react to the inclusion of human 
capital variables? 
As shown in pages 145-149, the absolute importance of formal qualification 
(certificates) as a determinant for earnings is highest in Germany and lowest in 
Sweden. Taking the U.S. case as a reference that comes closest to the market 
valuation, it can be argued that formal qualifications are overvaluated in Germany 
and undervaluated in Sweden. It is interesting to see that the sensitivity of 
interindustrial wage differentials with respect to human capital variables (and other 
control variables) is even higher in the United States (and Sweden) than in the 
Federal Republic of Germany. Hence aggregate interindustry wage differentials in 
the United States and Sweden are relatively strongly affected by human capital 
variables as compared to Germany. This would suggest either a more uneven 
distribution of qualifications across industries in the former countries, or a more 
uneven treatment of the same qualification levels across industries in Germany. The 
latter is in line with the importance of sectoral regulations in the German system. 
But, of course, this question requires further investigation. 
A major limitation in our empirical analysis is the fact that our data set did not 
include a job tenure variable (only the differentiation between mover and stayer was 
taken into account). We plan to investigate this problem in more detail. In the 
United States employers are allowed to pursue a hire-and-fire or employment-at-
will policy. Nevertheless, the United States employers have to cope with several 
restrictions regarding the selection of the workers they wish to fire. At the firm level 
there contracts exist with unions which insist on regulations specifying an inverse 
seniority order of layoffs or dismissals (Dohse et al. 1982). By contrast, in Germany 
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employers seek to stabilize employment during the business cycle. This behavior 
can be explained by employment regulations imposed by the Protection Against 
Dismissal Act, the Works Constitution Act, and the Employment Promotion 
Act.29 These regulations will exert some influence on earnings, if the incumbent 
work force ("insiders") disposes of some bargaining power with respect to wages, 
because they change the threat points of the bargaining parties (Lindbeck and 
Snower 1988). Thus insider power in Germany is more related to age, whereas in 
the United States it is more related to tenure. Therefore, we would expect tenure to 
be more important in the United States compared to Germany in explaining 
individual earnings. This would be further evidence for the influence of institu-
tional settings over wage patterns. 
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS 
Versions of this chapter were presented and discussed at the Ninth Annual 
Congress of the European Economic Association, Maastricht, September 3-5, 
1994, at the Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam, and at the Annual Meeting of the 
Verein fur Socialpolitik, Jena, September 28-30, 1994. For the preparation of the 
data files we ate grateful to Karl John and Wolfgang Majer at the computer 
department of the Institute for Employment Research, Nuremberg. We would also 
like to thank Linda Bell, Michael Burda, Bernd Fitzenberger and Wolfgang Meyer 
for valuable comments. The usual disclaimer applies. 
NOTES 
1 Beschiiftigtenstatistik der Bundesanstalt for Arbeit. 
2 For a wider discussion of corporation concepts see Soskice (I 990). 
3 For institutional details of the German wage-setting system refer to Jacobi et al (1992). 
4 Survey data from the study Qualifikation und Berufiverlauf of the Federal Institute for 
Vocational Training (BIBB) and the Institute for Employment Research (IAB). 
5 See Mincer (1974). 
6 Hypotheses about differences in the institutional conditions for wage bargaining have 
explicitly been tested for comparisons of the United States and Sweden (Edin and 
Zetterberg (1992) and Zanchi (1992) as well as for Norway and Austria (Barth and 
Zweimiiller 1992). Bellmann (I 992) presents evidence that the results obtained for 
industry wage differentials from the Socioeconomic Panel (Schmidt 1992) and the study 
Qualifikation und Berufiverlauf of the Federal Institute for Vocational Training (BIBB) 
and the Institute for Employment Research (IAB) (Wagner 1991) with calculations 
from the Beschiifiigtenstatistik are similar. 
7 Some problems remain in less important industries. For example, Miscellaneous 
Manufacturing can not be adapted to the German classification scheme. The sector 
Ordnance seems to be so small in Germany that it had to be excluded from the analysis. 
8 Employers report gross earnings and the corresponding employment periods. For 
comparison reasons we used daily earnings in our estimation. 
9 The methodological problems arising from classification errors of interviewed persons, 
discussed at length by Krueger and Summers (1988}, can thus be disregarded in our 
context. 
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10 Civil servants and self-employed are concentrated in agriculture, postal service, railroads, 
territorial authorities as well as in social security agencies. 
11 See Bellmann et al (I 992: 35f.). 
12 For example, Wagner (1991) repons evidence that bad working conditions, on average, 
are related to lowerwages. 
I 3 It can also be argued that the absence of serious measurement errors in our data set leads 
to lower differentials as, for example, in studies using survey data. 
14 For persons whose earnings exceed this ceiling the actual amount of earnings is 
unknown. Members of this group appear with the contribution assessment ceiling 
(Beitragsbemessungsgrenze) in our data set. 
15 The limits of so-called "minor employment" are so low that a full-time employee almost 
surely exceeds this limit. But, of course, our study does not cover earnings in the shadow 
economy. 
16 More than 10 percent of the cases are censored. 
17 We adopted the Newton-Raphson method to calculate the Maximum Likelihood 
estimator taking OLS estimates as staning values. In most cases, convergence was 
achieved after 3-4 iterations. Estimates of the covariance matrix of the coefficients are 
calculated as described by Amemiya (1985: 373). The calculations were done on a 486-
DX50. The computer programs are written in GAUSS. 
18 Throughout the following the approximation between logpoints and percentage points 
will be used. 
19 Although for each industry i= (I, ... , K) the estimated wage differential A is 
an unbiased estimate of the true wage differential /J;, the standard deviation of A is an 
uywardly biased estimate of the "true" standard deviation of {J. This bias occurs because 
/J; equals /J; + e7, where e7 is the least squares sampling error. According to Krueger and 
Summers (1988: 267, footnote 6) the standard deviation of /J is adjusted by using the 
formula: 
K K K 
SD({J) "" var(/J) - '''f/i.2/ K + L L Uij/ K2, (1) 
i= I ;,,,. I j• I 
where O; is the standard error of /J; and O;j stands for the covariance of O'; and ai. 
20 Using survey data, Wagner (1991) finds corresponding coefficients of 5.7 percent for 
1979 and 7.0 percent for 1985. 
21 The corresponding coefficients reponed by Wagner (1991) are somewhat higher (2.6 for 
1979 and 3.0 for 1985). 
22 If the cardinal measure of schooling is used, the corresponding figures are 0.89 (1979) 
and 2.15 (1989). 
23 The correlation coefficients of interindustry wage differentials in 1979, 1984 and 1989 
are between 0.95 and 0.98. 
24 These results cannot be explained by a level effect since we are considering relative 
deviations from the mean here. 
25 The regression line (solid) and the 45°-line (dashed) are also shown in Figure 6.1. 
26 This result has been noted by several authors. See, for instance, Edin and Zetterberg 
(1992) or Zanchi (1992). 
27 It should be noted that the standard deviation of wage differentials for Germany with 
controls for human capital exceeds the corresponding value for Sweden without controls. 
28 Rowthorn (1992) takes Austria as a counter-example, arguing on the basis of aggregate 
information according to which Austria seems to exhibit high wage dispersion. 
29 Bellmann et al (1993) have studied the effect of current tenure and age on eventual 
tenure. Their results reveal the postulated relationship for the United States and 
Germany. 
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APPENDIX: CALCULATION OF NORMALIZED INDUSTRY 
EFFECTS 
Let the true model be 
(2) 
where J;i is the observation of the dependent variable for individual j in industry i, xij is a 
vector of explanatory variables, a the corresponding vector of coefficients, c0 the constant 
term and d; a shift variable for industry i. Without loss of generality the first industry is 
taken as a reference. Hence the estimated model is 
Jij= f0 + a'x;i+ a;+ error, for i> 1, 
where 
From equation (5) and (6) we have 










~ n; d, = - L...J;.-. 
i=i n 
(8) 
Substitution of equation (9) in equation (7) yields the unknown industry dummies d; for 
i> I. 
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Table 6.8 Interindustry Wage Dilferentials and Corresponding t-statistics (No Control 
Variables) 
1979 1984 1989 
Sector Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat 
MIN 2.9864 2.5328 8.8669 6.7669 6.6315 4.6225 
CON -8.1221 -9.7148 -8.8849 -9.3371 -10.8908 -11.0656 
LUM -16.9641 -10.1418 -14.7411 -7.9368 -16.5071 -8.7956 
FUR -9.1887 -8.2695 -11.5670 -9.3091 -12.7375 -10.0212 
STO 0.6240 0.6157 -0.4439 -0.3902 -0.6937 -0.6014 
PRIM 3.7013 3.7087 3.8065 3.2735 4.8749 4.0386 
FAB -1.4520 -1.4690 -3.6090 -3.2654 -4.6944 -4.2125 
MAC 6.9409 7.7961 8.2701 8.1688 9.5183 9.2851 
ELE 9.7765 10.5497 11.4805 11.0141 14.1360 13.3744 
CAR 12.9865 13.9579 14.1307 13.5463 17.5473 16.6057 
INST -1.0193 -0.9886 -1.9083 -1.6540 -1.9824 -1.7194 
FOO -7.6189 -7.5203 -10.1219 -8.8770 -11.7299 -9.9921 
TOB 12.5708 3.3338 18.8585 4.2472 23.5061 5.0454 
TEX -8.6928 -6.6203 -10.5832 -7.0544 -9.7757 -6.2785 
APP -7.4176 -3.7583 -8.5444 -3.8048 -10.0800 -4.2100 
PAP -2.2625 -1.5381 -0.4933 -0.2993 0.1466 0.0911 
PRIN 6.6146 5.0142 7.6601 5.2329 8.3853 5.6395 
CHE 10.7887 11.4152 13.6993 12.9222 14.9385 13.9228 
PET 26.4631 10.8211 38.0671 13.5874 42.8831 13.1068 
RUB -0.2776 -0.1613 -1.4583 -0.7779 2.5183 1.3553 
LEA -18.1921 -5.4511 -18.2744 -4.8539 -13.7853 -3.2660 
RAI 1.3230 1.0223 -1.5156 -1.0115 -4.8607 -2.9638 
TRA -4.1756 -4.4936 -5.8084 -5.5397 -9.4630 -8.9785 
COM 13.1792 7.0773 15.7702 8.0554 20.1757 10.1330 
PUB -2.0001 -2.1990 -5.3462 -5.2436 -6.4925 -6.2068 
WHO -1.8221 -1.9888 -0.5001 -0.4813 -0.2834 -0.2669 
EAT -39.9725 -24.1192 -54.0354 -32.2964 -58.7102 -35.8437 
RET -12.0499 -13.0582 -12.7531 -12.2722 -12.4685 -11.8251 
BAN 14.2706 12.6558 22.2792 18.1296 24.7235 20.0459 
INSU 20.0822 14.2904 25.5238 16.6781 30.2344 19.6293 
PRIV -36.1759 -4.8263 -46.7758 -6.1491 -37.1121 -3.8717 
BUS 12.5793 6.6726 16.6327 8.4525 20.9464 11.6217 
REP -15.8062 -12.9508 -15.6231 -11.6892 -14.2116 -10.6195 
PER -23.7784 -16.8914 -29.2218 -19.9128 -28.7219 -20.4590 
ENT 19.1126 8.7334 21.6492 9.3794 18.4843 8.5128 
MED -3.2142 -0.1985 1.1129 0.0779 -12.5501 -1.1367 
HOS 10.9125 8.2769 11.2638 8.2365 10.9129 8.1175 
WEL 5.3514 4.1214 5.1727 3.7366 2.1774 1.6120 
EDU 11.9910 9.6635 10.2027 7.5298 9.0622 6.7412 
PRO 2.3122 2.3057 1.5639 1.4143 -2.7908 -2.5691 
SDl 0.1397 0.1783 0.1877 
SD2 0.0893 0.1148 0.1302 
Noter. See Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.9 Effect of Experience and Schooling for Industry Switchers Only 
1979 1984 1989 
Variable Coef SE Coef SE Coef SE 
General Model• 
const 4.0836 0.0258 4.3228 0.0379 4.3895 0.0402 
EX 2.4949 0.1430 2.3330 0.1961 2.5703 0.1992 
EX2 -0.0692 0.0027 -0.0613 0.0032 -0.0571 0.0029 
SCHOOL2 14.1609 0.7038 13.1985 0.8890 15.9618 0.8390 
SCHOOL3 4.6202 3.5339 9.4592 4.3378 10.0877 3.7391 
SCHOOL4 47.0192 2.2329 46.7147 2.3620 53.3751 1.8923 
SCHOOLS 28.6965 3.0223 17.4537 3.0479 35.1622 2.3840 
SCHOOL6 58.4607 2.4295 51.1489 2.3075 60.8878 1.8708 
0 0.3021 0.3320 0.3352 
lnL -3278.8479 -3905.9221 -5162.5470 
k 47 47 47 
Industry Effects Excluded 
const 4.0764 0.0183 4.3196 0.0291 4.3621 0.0339 
EX 2.5356 0.1455 2.2604 0.2019 2.5963 0.2056 
EX2 -0.0695 0.0027 -0.0597 0.0033 -0.0567 0.0030 
SCHOOL2 13.8984 0.7038 14.2033 0.9053 17.4358 0.8562 
SCHOOL3 4.1941 3.5888 9.0745 4.4691 10.4620 3.8511 
SCHOOL4 46.7891 2.2534 48.5044 2.4080 55.7603 1.9323 
SCHOOLS 28.7907 3.0721 17.7814 3.1355 36.7223 2.4496 
SCHOOL6 57.2324 2.3977 52.1873 2.2956 60.7176 1.8544 
0 0.3080 0.3435 0.3473 
lnL -3528.9923 -4268.9788 -5636.6402 
k 8 8 8 
Experience and Schooling Effects Excluded• 
const 4.3032 0.0225 4.5163 0.0307 4.6527 0.02810 
0 0.3671 0.3971 0.4118 
lnL -5686.7841 -5906.2897 -8001.0002 
k 39 39 39 
N 13,168 11,041 13,666 
Notes: See Table 6.2. 
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Tablt6.10 Interindustry Wage Differentials and Corresponding t-statistics, Industry 
Switchers Only (With Controls for Schooling and Experience) 
1979 1984 1989 
Sector Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat 
MIN 10.4189 2.7458 17.4691 2.8141 15.1240 1.8237 
CON 1.8003 0.8852 3.1758 1.1604 -0.3037 -0.1217 
LUM -6.5093 -1.6159 2.5997 0.5651 -2.8203 -0.6308 
FUR -1.0584 -0.3734 3.4500 0.9545 0.0634 0.0196 
STO 8.6968 3.4890 9.2323 2.8509 8.1547 2.7993 
PRIM 7.1234 2.4495 10.8539 2.9185 8.5588 2.5090 
FAB 3.1255 1.3336 3.8336 1.2395 3.1893 1.1586 
MAC 5.7637 2.4853 8.7420 2.9012 7.9371 2.9914 
ELE -0.8039 -0.3288 7.9599 2.5954 12.2844 4.5075 
CAR 9.0635 3.5630 12.5549 3.8539 13.4977 4.5888 
INST 1.8575 0.7174 1.1513 0.3503 6.2154 2.1184 
FOO 0.5236 0.2098 -3.0697 -0.9278 -2.7157 -0.9065 
TOB 1.3872 0.1243 -7.1783 -0.4597 26.0944 2.2953 
TEX -7.3966 -2.0157 -0.5531 -0.1281 -1.9003 -0.4297 
APP -0.1207 -0.0235 -13.4691 -2.2545 -3.0836 -0.5051 
PAP 1.7253 0.4807 4.4523 0.9088 6.0418 1.4321 
PRIN 1.7399 0.4701 2.4828 0.5421 7.8745 1.7591 
CHE 6.7136 2.7253 8.5473 2.7189 10.8411 3.7911 
PET 9.4994 1.2415 30.1395 2.7982 10.7038 0.7703 
RUB 8.5229 1.9508 8.9337 1.7692 9.8631 2.0109 
LEA 1.9654 0.2708 -11.3859 -0.9357 -3.6144 -0.3438 
RAI 0.7218 0.1217 7.5460 0.3529 -8.0778 -1.0217 
TRA 1.0934 0.5029 -3.9745 -1.3449 -3.0715 -1.1794 
COM 4.3959 1.1403 7.0004 1.6071 -0.4067 -0.0947 
PUB -6.6031 -2.8198 -10.8961 -3.5907 -11.0601 -3.9558 
WHO 1.2145 0.5564 4.8324 1.6381 4.6802 1.7885 
EAT -28.3502 -8.4790 -33.2416 -8.8913 -34.8901 -9.8381 
RET -6.1046 -2.8031 -6.0079 -2.0840 -2.7126 -1.0557 
BAN -1.0727 -0.2540 -0.9100 -0.1618 11.8623 2.1499 
INSU 6.1753 1.5370 3.7088 0.7425 9.5402 2.1059 
PRIV -11.0634 -1.0025 -48.0179 -3.6053 -3.2826 -0.1859 
BUS 14.9611 3.0723 -1.0602 -0.1957 14.6633 3.7349 
REP -7.9079 -2.3196 -4.9887 -1.1284 -2.5740 -0.6625 
PER -13.2242 -4.4838 -19.4218 -5.4933 -18.9231 -5.9118 
ENT 1.5090 0.2898 7.2891 1.1613 -0.3299 -0.0658 
MED -31.2159 -1.6622 
HOS -5.0396 -1.5602 0.3901 0.0972 -10.2552 -2.8094 
WEL -5.4628 -1.5735 -8.9744 -2.3976 -14.7726 -4.3177 
EDU -5.7955 -1.8385 -8.2114 -2.1058 -16.5189 -4.8694 
PRO -4.8640 -2.1784 -7.4104 -2.5442 -7.4611 -2.9379 
SDI 0.0639 0.1153 0.1047 
SD2 0.0405 0.0584 0.0645 
NottT. See Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.11 Interindustry Wage Differentials and Corresponding t-statistics, Industry 
Switchers (No Control Variables) 
1979 1984 1989 
Sector Coef t-stat Coef t-stat Coef t-stat 
MIN 1.8272 0.4031 18.4894 2.4693 9.1078 0.8924 
CON -0.3705 -0.1528 0.5333 0.1633 -4.1718 -1.3650 
LUM -11.7796 -2.4594 -6.0605 -1.1065 -13.3229 -2.4327 
FUR -4.5027 -1.3294 -2.2510 -0.5216 -7.9212 -2.0102 
STO 5.2712 1.7735 6.7636 1.7495 2.2271 0.6246 
PRIM -0.5070 -0.1456 6.3089 1.4195 3.9453 0.9426 
FAB 1.9994 0.7160 2.7078 0.7335 0.0309 0.0092 
MAC 9.3647 3.3940 10.7484 2.9903 8.6478 2.6659 
ELE 2.8537 0.9799 12.7770 3.4936 17.3252 5.1962 
CAR 7.3408 2.4233 6.2180 1.6039 10.5906 2.9438 
INST -0.0282 -0.0091 -0.6530 -0.1661 4.5637 1.2683 
FOO -2.3445 -0.7883 -6.9999 -1.7710 -11.7714 -3.2059 
TOB 4.1356 0.3084 -19.1091 -0.9971 31.9711 2.2724 
TEX -13.3047 -3.0289 -8.1769 -1.5851 -10.3146 -1.8993 
APP -4.1650 -0.6762 -15.0259 -2.0976 -3.2878 -0.4370 
PAP -7.6734 -1.7824 -3.1843 -0.5420 -3.9641 -0.7660 
PRIN -2.3276 -0.5273 5.8554 1.0678 2.0673 0.3760 
CHE 5.2816 1.7968 5.3335 1.4194 11.8300 3.3767 
PET 16.1310 1.7482 30.7834 2.4045 16.9077 0.9913 
RUB -0.3006 -0.0574 -2.2375 -0.3700 6.9236 1.1507 
LEA -8.3535 -0.9496 -4.7390 -0.3276 -8.7502 -0.6812 
RAI -3.1217 -0.4422 6.7998 0.2647 -17.6690 -1.8084 
TRA -1.7963 -0.6936 -6.4261 -1.8218 -8.1757 -2.5634 
COM 10.7097 2.3230 16.7456 3.2111 12.2081 2.3233 
PUB -2.1036 -0.7531 -8.0718 -2.2265 -5.9908 -1.7470 
WHO 2.0314 0.7808 5.7587 1.6322 4.1580 1.2963 
EAT -31.2776 -7.8582 -42.6254 -9.5905 -41.7294 -9.6357 
RET -5.8441 -2.2550 -5.5137 -1.6027 -2.8789 -0.9153 
BAN 3.4071 0.6738 14.9668 2.2363 22.9508 3.4037 
INSU 12.1781 2.5415 16.5853 2.8075 17.1435 3.1022 
PRIV -11.8668 -0.9112 -49.8513 -3.1137 -10.6888 -0.4977 
BUS 31.4189 5.4605 15.8226 2.4768 35.8777 7.5761 
REP -9.1224 -2.2381 -6.4358 -1.2146 -8.2746 -1.7376 
PER -13.8687 -3.9432 -23.5567 -5.5819 -23.4919 -5.9908 
ENT 9.2047 1.4834 19.5793 2.5929 10.1248 1.6549 
MED 13.7750 0.5942 
HOS 9.0820 2.3557 14.8144 3.0980 12.6695 2.8388 
WEL 3.3362 0.8062 -1.8762 -0.4194 -5.4406 -1.2972 
EDU 11.2399 3.0031 11.0659 2.3902 7.7413 1.8741 
PRO -1.5872 -0.5966 -4.1484 -1.1933 -4.1807 -1.3449 
SDI 0.0888 0.1375 0.1243 
SD2 0.0441 0.0666 0.0775 
Notes-. See Table 6.3. 
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Table 6.12 Classification of the Industries 
U.S. Classification German Classification Includes Excludes 
MIN Mining Bergbau 05-08 
CON Construction Baugewerbe 59-61 
ORD Ordnance Herstellung von Handelswalfen 373 
und deren Munition 
LUM Lumber Holzbe- und -verarbeitung 40,42 
FUR Furniture Herstellung und Reparatur von Mobeln 41 
STO Stone, Clay, Glass Gewinnung und Verarbeitung von 14-16 
Steinen und Erden, Feinkeramik, Glas 
PRIM Primary Metals Eisen- und Stahlerzeugnisse 17-20 
FAB Fabricated Metals Stahl- u. Leichtmetallbau, Schlosserei 21-25 
MAC Machinery, excl. elec. Maschinenbau 26-27 
ELE Electrical Machinery Elektrotechnik 34 
CAR Transportation Equipment Herstellung von Kraftwagen, -riidern, 28-32 300 
Schiff- und Luftfahrzeugbau 
INST Instruments Feinmechanik, Herstellung und Reparatur 35-39 373 
von Uhren, Herstellungvon EBM-Waren 
MIS Misc. Manufacturing sonstige verarbeitende Gewerbe 
FOO Food Herstellung Nahrungsmittel/Getranke 54-57 
TOB Tobacco Tabakverarbeitung 58 
TEX Textiles Verarbeitungvon Grundstoffen 46-51 
APP Apparel Bekleidungsgewerbe, Polsterei 52,53 
PAP Paper Papiererzeugung und -verarbeitung 43 
PRIN Printing Druckerei und Verviclfaltigung 44 
CHE Chemical Chemische lndustrie 09,10,12 
PET Petroleum Verarbeicung von Mineralol 11 
RUB Rubber Gummi- und Asbestverarbeitung 13 
LEA Leather Ledererzeugung und -verarbeitung 45 
RAI Railroad Eisenbahnen 63 
TRA Other Transportation Verkehr und Post 64-68 
COM Communications Verlags-, Llteratur- und Pressewesen 77 
PUB Public Utilities Gebietskorperschaften 91,92,94 
WHO Wholesale Trade GroBhandel 620 
EAT Eating & Drinking Gast- und Speisewirtschaften 703 
RET Other Retails Einzel- und Versandhandel 621-625 
BAN Banking Kredit- und sonst.Finanzierungsinst. 690 
INSU Insurance Versicherungsgewerbe 691 
PRIV Private Household Private Haushalte 90 
BUS Business Services Rechtsberacung 79 
sowie Wirtschaftsberatung und -priifung 
REP Repair Services Reparatur von Kraftfahrzeugen 300 
PER Personal Services Personenbezogene Diensdeistungen 70-73,84 703 
ENT Entertainment Kunst, Theater, Film, Rundfunk, Fernsehen 76 
MEO Medical Services Freiberulliches Gesundheicswesen 780,785 
HOS Hospitals Gesundheitswcsen 78 780,785 
WEL Welfare Services Organisationen ohne Erwerbscharakter, 88,89,93 
Sozialversicherung 
EDU Education Services Wisscnsschafcliche Hochschulen, sonst. 74,75 
Unterrichtsanstalten, Erziehung u.Sport 
PRO Professional Services sonstige Dienstleistungen 80-86 
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Institutional Framework, Participation, 
Microeconomic Effects, and Comparisons with the 
United States 
Vivian Carstensen, Knut Gerlach, Olaf Hubler 
INTRODUCTION 
While the idea of profit sharing has existed for more than a hundred years in the 
United States (Gilman 1891) and in Germany (v. Thiinen 1850) and generally 
advantages outweigh the disadvantages from a theoretical viewpoint, this form of 
payment is not widespread. Nevertheless, the debate surrounding this topic is 
rekindled from time to time. 
Recently research on profit sharing (PS) has been stimulated in Europe by the 
PEPPER-Report (Uvalic 1991), which contains a detailed description and analysis 
of profit and revenue sharing in the member states of the EU and in the United 
States by the publication of "Paying for Productivity" (Blinder 1990), a collection 
of papers presenting a survey of the literature on the effects of pay schemes, 
including PS and worker participation in decision making, on labor productivity. 
In both Germany and the United States, the productivity effects of PS and, 
especially in the U.S., the slowdown of productivity constitute significant themes 
of the ongoing research (Kruse 1993). Due to various publications of Weitzman 
(1983, 1984, 1985, 1987) the impact of PS on employment and inflation has been 
at the core of the debate in the United States, while in the European tradition the 
consideration of microeconomic productivity effects is coupled with investigations 
of the impact of PS on investment, absenteeism, separation, and the identification 
of workers with the firm. Additionally, in Germany PS is recommended as an 
instrument for the New Lander to reduce labor costs, to extend employment, and 
to increase or maintain the competitiveness of German firms in the more integrated 
Europe. 
Furthermore, it is asked why so few firms introduce PS, whether PS is merely 
another form of payment compared with wages, whether these two and other 
instruments are used complementarily or substitutively. The limited diffusion of PS 
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leads to the question of whether tax incentives can help to adopt PS, whether 
additional conditions like nonpecuniary participation of workers are necessary for 
the success of PS, and whether the decision to opt for PS depends on the structure 
of markets. Disagreement exists in all these fields-from both the theoretical 
position and the empirical evidence. 
The chapter is organized as follows. The next (second) section gives an overview 
of the institutional and legal framework of PS in Germany, describes typical PS 
schemes, and contains the principal legal issues of PS and some remarks on the 
growth and distribution of PS in the United States. Contradictory hypotheses 
concerning PS are formulated in pages 173-177. Subsequent pages describe our 
German firm data set. Pages 177 -196 present the empirical analysis, i.e. descriptive 
statistics and first results of the econometric analysis concerning participation of 
firms in PS schemes and microeconomic effects of PS, where pure PS productivity 
effects and joint effects with workers' nonpecuniary participation are investigated. 
Comparisons with results of U.S. studies are included. Pages 196-201 conclude 
the chapter. 
INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK AND TYPICAL PS 
SCHEMES 
Legal Basis in Germany 
Savings schemes offering incentives in the form of tax concessions and cash 
premiums to workers and firms were first enacted in 1961. The goal of these 
schemes was to foster asset accumulation of employees with moderate annual 
incomes in order to redress the unequal distribution of wealth which resulted from 
the economic reconstruction after the second world war. With the enactment of 
the Property Development Act (Asset Participation Act, effective January 1, 1984) 
and its subsequent amendments-the most recent of January 1, 1994-the 
participation of employees in the assets of firms was specifically stimulated. Before 
1984, property development via building societies (savings and loan associations) 
enjoyed the highest priority. After 1984 this ordering of priorities was reversed. 
The catalog of forms of participation fostered by tax concessions and cash 
premiums primarily comprises: loans and debentures by employees, rights of 
usufruct, silent partnerships, cooperative associations, and equities. The financial 
participation of employees in firms employing them are subsidized with a cash 
premium of 20 percent of a maximum annual amount of DM936 per employee. 
This subsidy, however, is paid only to single (married) employees with annual 
gross incomes not exceeding DM27,000 (DM54,000). According to section 19a 
of the Income Tax Law, shares or other forms of financial participation of 
employees are exempt from tax and social security payments. These exemptions are 
valid for firms and employees under certain conditions, i.e. they must not exceed 
DM500 per employee and year, the firm can subsidize the acquisition of the share 
or the financial participation up to 50 percent of its value, and for a period of six 
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years the employee cannot dispose of his/her financial panicipation. It is of 
special significance that the propeny promotion possibilities of the Income Tax 
and the Propeny Development Act can be combined. Apparently, this can 
explain the finding that in company sharing schemes a combination of gain or 
profit sharing and participation in the firm's assets is chosen by firms and workers. 
The gains accruing to both panics, the employee and employer, by this com-
bination are illustrated by an example (valid for 1989, the year of our firm data 
sample): 
An unmarried employee with an annual income less than DM27,000 opts 
for a capital participation of DM936 in the enterprise for a period of six 
years. A cash premium of 20 percent paid out of tax revenues reduces his 
expenditures to DM749. The employee's capital participation is supple-
mented by an amount of DM500 exempt from tax and social security 
payments. The firm makes this contribution on the basis of a gain or 
profit sharing scheme, where gain sharing refers to a participation of 
employees in the firm's revenue in case of reduced delivery times, for 
example. Consequently, the employee acquires a capital participation of 
DMl,436 with expenditures of DM749. The firm's contribution (DM500}, 
evidently, leads to a reduction in profits and taxes. With a marginal tax rate 
of 60 to 75 percent, the firm is capable of attracting additional financial 
resources of DMl,436 by giving up profits of DM125 to 200. A long-
term analysis, however, has to take into account that after a period of six 
years the worker's capital participation as well as his invested gain or profit 
shares can be terminated. Schneider and Zander (1990: 117) point out that 
in recent years cash benefits as gain or profit shares have petered out in favor 
of investments financed from this source. Evidently, this result favorable 
both for the employee and the firm is attained by reduced taxes and by a 
subsidy. 
This example helps to explain why in recent years elements of gain or profit sharing 
and of capital participation often are interrelated. Gain or profit sharing can be 
based on economic performance of the firm (e.g., production performance), 
returns (e.g., revenue) or profits according to the balance sheet. In most participa-
tion schemes profit sharing is preferred to sharing on the basis of revenue or 
production performance (Schneider and Zander 1990: 79). Problems to be solved 
in profit sharing schemes concern the definition of profits (interest on equity 
capital, earnings of owner-managers, risk premiums}, the distribution of profits 
between capital and labor, and the individual distribution of profit shares between 
employees. Numerous procedures and guidelines have been developed by firms to 
resolve these issues (Schanz and Riekhof 1983: 44). 
Evidently, profit shares do not have to be invested in the firm since they can be 
part of the normal remuneration as quasi-rents which are shared between capital 
and labor. In that case, however, the monetary and fiscal advantages of the official 
property promotion are no longer available, and the consequences of genuine profit 
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sharing and profit sharing disguised as quasi-rents might differ with respect to 
taxation. 
Legally, profit sharing in firms can be based on individual contracts (firm and 
worker) or on contracts between the works council and the firm. Due to legal 
aspects and psychological points of view (motivational considerations) the 
literature usually is in favor of contracts between the works council and the firm. 
The capital participation of employees can be independent of the legal constitution 
of the firm (rights of usufruct, loans of employees), or it may be tied to the legal 
constitution of the firm, if, for example, employee stocks are offered. Additionally, 
capital participation of workers can take the form of equity capital or long-term 
liabilities. The choice between equity capital and long-term liabilities is determined 
by the following considerations: the firm's capital structure (i.e., its mix between 
equity capital and liabilities), employees' participation in profits and losses, and the 
stronger motivational effects due to the status of co-ownership. Furthermore, 
employees can participate directly or via an intermediary association in the firm's 
capital. 
Investigations of gain sharing and capital participation (Uvalic 1991; Guski and 
Schneider 1983, 1986; Schanz and Riekhoff 1983) demonstrate that these 
participations are distributed unequally according to sectors of economic activity, 
firm size classes, age of firms, legal constitution of firms, and regions. The 
determinants of the unequal distribution, however, have not been analyzed 
theoretically and empirically. The number of firms with gain sharing and/or capital 
participation schemes has increased substantially since the enactment of the 
Property Development Act in 1984, and, apparently, employees tend to make 
larger contributions to the capital of firms via gain or profit sharing than in the 
antecedent period (Guski and Schneider 1986). A recent study by the Ministry of 
Labor in Baden-Wilrttemberg (Ministerium fur Arbeit, Gesundheit, Familie und 
Sozialordnung des Landes Baden-Wilrttemberg 1990), however, draws attention to 
the fact that in general employees are poorly informed about cash benefits and tax 
subsidies offered in connection with gain sharing and capital participation. 
PS schemes 
From April 1991 to June 1992 we collected data from 33 PS firms in Lower 
Saxony and Baden-Wilrttemberg (interview and questionnaire). In the interviews 
we encountered a variety of PS schemes, which are the basis of the empirical 
investigation (for a description of the data set and the empirical results see pages 
177-196). In the sequel six typical PS schemes are presented: sharing of revenue or 
value-added, employee stock (on privileged terms), PS with a silent partnership, 
asset participation on the basis of loans, firm performance bonus, and sharing of 
profits per sales. Each scheme is described within the context of the firms which 
introduced it (see Table 7.1). In many firms mixed schemes exist and two or more 
of the pure schemes coexist in some firms, respectively. 
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Table 7.1 Profit Sharing Schemes in Germany 
Empl,,ym' Sharr E/igi.bilily Altnn,ztiw lncmtiw Sy,tmu 
Nof 
Schane Mode of P,,,-nt DefiniluJn of Distriln,t,,l,/e Profits Durtllitm ofContrlln PartidplllUJn in Decision Milking Oun• 
Revenue Sharing Wage: cub/monthly Percentage of sales or v:alue added or rheir Optional: tenure (1 year), restrictions for Flexible working time, dliciency wages, 3 
variation respecrivdy (2-30%) part-time workers and apprentices, and fringe benefits, private pension system, 
for high absenrccism bonus for presence at work 
Monthly revenue, v:alue added and Dependent on single-plant's bargaining, Investments, tceruiting of employees 
respective v:alues of rhe past year basically unlimited, no legal 
requirement 
Employee Stock F.quity-capital DM500 per employee (legally based), Tenure (1 year), part-time/fixed duration Efficiency wages, private pension system, s 
Ownenhip price advantage (10-50%), which may workers and apprentices may be PS-scheme (profits per sales), 
dilfer from year to year, dividend per c:xduded; number of stocks accessible additional group incentives 
stock is proportional to tenure 
Stock, ash/,-/y or Executive board [ISSue of stock contracted Retention: 6 years (legal requirement); Investments, working conditions, wage 
,u flaible intnfltlls wirh works council) firm-level agreement: 1 year determination, tceruiting 
Profit Sharing wirh Wage, capital 25-50% of profits (losses may be Optional c:xdusion of: part-time workers, Efficiency wages, private pension system, 17 
a Silent Partnership/ included), rhereof25-50% as cuh, apprentices, high absenteeism; renure kindcrgarden 
Asset Participation 
wirhl..oans 
rest as capital stock or loan wirh interest 
rate proportional to profits 
(3 months-I year), number of shares 
dependent on renure 
Cash, capital stock, loans/ yearly Firm's management (discussion wirh work Retention: 6 years (legal requirement); Long-run decisions, investments, 
force) according to rhe balance sheet access: firm-specific agreement, working condition wage determination 
termination of contract in case of new 
single-plant agreement 
Finn Performance Wage 10-40% of performance bonus (revenue- Tenure: 6 to 9 monrhs, absenteeism may E8iciency wages, pension funds, piece s 
Bonus expenditure-dcducrion) preclude eligibility rates 
Cash/ monthly, y,arly Firm's management (optional discussion 
wirh d«tcd members of rhe work 
3-5 years or termination of single-plant 
bargaining 
Working conditions, wage determination 
force) 
Distribution of Wage 8-10% of profits per sales or 10-50% of Tenure: 6 to 9 monrhs, absenteeism may E8iciency wages, rank order 6 
Profits per Sales profits per sales that exceed a defined preclude eligibility; reduction for part- tournaments, furrher training, pension 
levd (f.e. 6%) time workers fund, time management, reduction of 
hicrachical lcvds, job rotation 
Cash/monthly, y,arly Finn's management (optional discussion Indefinitely Working conditions, investment, wage 
wirh d«tcd members of the work determination 
force) according to rhe balance sheet 
N.,.,, • Some fimu had more than one dicme. therefore tbc ,um of the N of ca,es exc=ls 33, the nwnbcr of fimu intcrviewal 
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Revenue or Value-added Sharing 
This is a simple and straightforward form of a sharing scheme. Employees might 
receive 2-10 percent of monthly revenue or value-added (excluding sales tax) with 
a time lag of one month or they get 10-30 percent of the deviation between the 
actual and past years value of revenue or value added, respectively. The individual 
distribution of this sum is uncomplicated. It is divided by the number of 
employees or distributed according to the individual annual income without bonus 
payments. On average, employees' revenue sharing amounts to 10-15 percent of 
total annual payroll (excluding fixed labor costs). It is frequently combined with 
alternative incentives like flexible working time, a variety of fringe benefits and 
with workers' panicipation in decision making in the production process. 
Employee Stock Ownership on Privileged Terms 
The 1984 Income Tax Law (section 19a), in conjunction with the Property 
Development Act, usually provides the legal basis for the issue of employee stock. 
This issue does not have to follow a fixed schedule, however; it depends on actual 
annual profits and is negotiated between the executive board and the corporation's 
works council. The following details typically characterize the employee stock 
ownership schemes: Tenure of a minimum of one year is required for panicipa-
tion, and a positive correlation is stipulated between individual tenure and the 
amount of stock offered for purchase. The price of preference stock normally does 
not exceed two thirds of the market rate at the time· of the contract, and the price 
advantage offered by the firm is exempted from income tax and social security 
contributions up to DM500 (Income Tax Law, section 19a). In addition, the 
acquisition of employee stock is subsidized with a premium of 20 percent up to 
DM936 (Property Development Act). To obtain this premium employees must 
retain the shares for six years. The corporations sometimes request a commitment 
of less than three years for offering the price advantage. 
PS with a Silent Partnership 
Frequently, this kind of sharing is established in medium-sized or small firms, 
especially in corporations with limited liability. At first sight it seems to be the 
typical German type of profit sharing, but uniform and firmly established 
procedures cannot be observed. The conditions of participation differ between 
firms, and are usually established by single-plant bargaining. The observed sharing 
arrangements differ in requirements for joining the program (in/excluding part-
time workers, apprentices, or retired workers). A gain sharing pan and a cash 
component may be included. This variation is not surprising as profit sharing is 
absolutely voluntary, often introduced by entrepreneurs who feel morally 
responsible and tend to collaborate with their employees as partners. 
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Usually, all employees-with the possible exception of part-time workers and 
apprentices-have the option to become silent partners. Sometimes, workers with 
high rates of absenteeism are precluded. Up to a maximum of 25 percent of total 
profits according to the financial statement is distributed to employees as silent 
partners. Silent partners participate in the losses of the firm. This participation is, 
however, limited to the amount of their equity capital. The firm's management 
determines and defines the amount of the annual distributable profits according to 
the financial statement (Handelsbilanz), which allows a more extensive inclusion of 
expenditures than the legally required balance sheet (Steuerbilanz). A group of elected 
representatives of employees, however, is informed by the firm about the financial 
statement and is called upon to discuss issues concerning the determination of 
distributable profits and the firm's policy. The intention is to obtain consensus 
regarding the magnitude of distributable profits. Profits are distributed individually 
per capita, according to individual wages and to the capital stock held by each 
employee. The mix of these possibilities within a firm's scheme varies between firms. 
New silent partners are granted a rather small amount as a first share. 
This PS scheme can be supplemented by additional components. All employees 
might receive payments on the basis of the attainment of specific goals as, for 
example, increased productivity or output. These bonus payments (gain sharing) 
amount to approximately 25 percent of the profits accruing to employees as the 
already mentioned capital stock. The rate of interest paid to the silent partners 
exceeds the current discount rate by at least two percentage points, and may be 
restricted to a maximum. The interest rate can also be dependent on the ratio of 
profits to sales, with higher ratios providing higher interest rates. 
Normally, the silent partnership contract remains valid until the employee 
retires. When the capital stock of an employee exceeds a certain amount, 
DMl0,000 for example, he/she can require a payment in cash. A cash payment 
may be stipulated, too, if more than 25 percent of the assets of the firm are sold, if 
the worker dies, quits, or is dismissed. In case of a quit or dismissal the cash 
payment of a silent partner might be reduced by 1 percent for each year between 
the expected year of retirement and the year of separation. However, a silent 
partner is not allowed to sell his/her capital stock to other persons. 
Asset Participation on the Basis of Loans 
The institutional framework of this kind of asset participation is almost identical to 
that for PS with a silent partnership. The legal status of capital differs since an 
employee's share is not equity capital. The firm is in the position of a debtor. The 
two systems differ slightly in the number of additional sharing systems, which are 
established in the firm, too (see also Figure 7.1), and in the formal access for 
employees to information concerning the firm's business transactions and accounts 
(due to German commercial code). The de facto access (especially the right to 
control the balance sheet), however, does not vary between these forms: usually it 
is restricted by firm level agreements. 
174 



















f::::;:;:!::t:!:'.j Percentage of firms with nonpecuniary 
participation in job-design 









■ Average duration of 
the system in 1989 
• • • • • • • • • Average number of 
share systems 
per firm 
Figure 7.1 Participation, Duration, and Number of Share Systems 
VIVIAN CARSTENSEN, KNUT GERLACH, OLAF HUBLER 
Firm Performance Bonus 
Often PS or bonus payments are interpreted as a group incentive or group bonus 
which are used as substitutes for or complements to individual incentives as, e.g., 
piece rates. Their goals are to motivate employees to work more efficiently, to 
reduce labor turnover and absenteeism. Normally, employees with tenure of at least 
six months participate in profits, but they do not share in losses. 
To determine the profits to be shared (firm performance bonus) first the 
difference is calculated between revenue and expenditures (variable/fixed labor 
costs, capital costs, depreciation, investments, energy costs, marketing costs, etc.). 
Usually, this is computed on a monthly basis. Second, a certain portion of this 
difference (increasing with its size) is deducted as a reserve for contingencies. The 
goal is to secure sufficient means for avoiding firm's losses through price or demand 
shocks, and to elicit high efforts from employees in each month. Otherwise 
employees could work very hard one month to obtain the full bonus, and shirk the 
next month, since they do not participate in losses. Therefore, this reserve can be 
interpreted as a bond, deferred until December of the current year. 
The residual profit (revenue minus expenditures minus deduction) is the 
monthly bonus to be shared. Employees will obtain 10-40 percent, while 20 
percent are set aside for reactions to changes in market conditions (e.g., necessary 
investments). If severe contingencies have not occurred, and the work force's mean 
effort was high, the deferred bond is shared in December. Frequently, the 
individual distribution of the performance bonus is based on individual income. If 
an employee's absenteeism exceeds a certain level-for whatever reason-she/he is 
excluded from bonus payments during the relevant period. All calculations are 
performed by the firm's management. It gets advice, however, in regular 
discussions with several elected members of the work force or members of the 
works council. 
Distribution of Profits per Sales 
The work force receives up to 10 percent of profits per sales or obtains between 10 
and 50 percent of the excess, if the profits per sales exceed an a priori defined level. 
The individual distribution is in accordance with monthly or yearly income. It may 
be supplemented by a distribution per capita. Apparently, the duration of the 
direct profits-per-sales schemes is unlimited. This may be interpreted as an 
intention to strengthen confidence between workers and management. 
Evidently, on a microeconomic level a variery of compensation schemes exists 
which includes elements of profit and revenue sharing. Many of them can be 
interpreted as components of personnel management trying to improve employees' 
motivation and productiviry. The motivational effect of sharing schemes is often 
considered in combination with (voluntary) employee involvement in decision-
making. 
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Schemes, Legal Issues, Growth, and Prevalence of PS in the United States 
Three types of PS plans can be distinguished. In cash or current distribution plans a 
profit-related bonus is paid directly to employees at regular intervals. These profit 
shares are tax-deductible for the employee. The employer, however, has to pay 
regular income taxes for the bonus (Kruse 1991). In deferred plans, a bonus is paid 
to employee accounts of a pension or profit sharing trust. The employees receive 
the accumulated values of the accounts at retirement or separation from the firm. 
The accounts are subject to vesting requirements. The payments are taxable upon 
withdrawal at the time of retirement. In combination plans a current or deferred 
payment of the profit-related bonus is feasible. 
Since 96 percent of profit sharing plans in the United States are deferred profit 
sharing trusts (Blasi 1988) and since they are similar to ESOPs, a brief discussion 
of the major forms of defined-contribution plans (profit sharing plans, ESOPs, 
401 (k) plans) is warranted. Contributions to deferred profit sharing plans are 
exempt from taxation (Blasi and Kruse 1991). These plans must be permanent 
and established for the exclusive benefit of employees. The law states eligibility 
requirements for participation in plans and requires that the plan has a definite 
formula for the allocation of benefits to individual employees and a definite 
schedule for the vesting of the accounts of employees. Discretionary formulas for 
calculating the contribution of the employer to the plan are permissible. The 
profits shared with employees can to a certain degree be invested in the company's 
stock. 
An ESOP may borrow money in order to purchase employer stock (Conte and 
Svejnar 1990; Blasi and Kruse 1991). The loan is paid back as annual contributions 
are made to the Employee Stock Ownership Trust. The firms get a tax deduction 
for the repayment of the principal and the payments of the interest of the loan. As 
the loan is repaid, the shares of the stock are allocated to the individual investment 
accounts of employees. Employees can sell the shares at retirement or when 
separating from the company. Since the allocation of stock to individual employees 
can be based on profits it is difficult to distinguish between an ESOP and a deferred 
profit sharing plan. Blasi (I 990: 174) argues: "More systematic data will probably 
conclude that the distinction between 'profit sharing' and 'employer ownership' is 
largely bogus, the result of a massive disguising bias." 
In 401 (k) and other thrift plans employees purchase company stocks by 
savings, which are deducted from their salaries (Blasi and Kruse 1991). As an 
incentive for encouraging employees to participate, employers typically make a 
contribution to these plans; such contributions are tax-deductible up to 15 
percent of the income of the participating employees. Since the matching 
contributions of employees may be based on profits, these plans can be considered 
as deferred profit sharing plans. 
According to Kruse (1991) the number of participants in deferred profit sharing 
plans was 9.9 (15.4) million in 1980 (1986) representing 13.3 (18.4) percent of 
the private work force. ESOPs covered 6.2 (I I.I) percent of the private work force 
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in 1980 (1986). Separate data for 401 (k) plans are not available. Interestingly, only 
3.0 percent of the approximately half-million profit sharing plans were a 
combination of a deferred trust and cash profit sharing in 1983 (Blasi 1990). The 
distribution of deferred profit sharing and ESOPs varies substantially across 
economic sectors (Kruse 1991). The prevalence is high in manufacturing and 
finance, insurance, and real estate and low in construction and services. Kruse 
estimates that profit sharing plans are adopted by 20-28 percent of U.S. companies 
and that the percentage is higher in nonunion firms. 
Cash profit sharing, apparently, plays a smaller role in the United States than in 
Germany compared to all PS schemes. This finding can be interpreted in the sense 
that American PS schemes tend to favor either long run incentives for greater effort 
and/or make use of the offered tax exemptions. The 401 (k) plans have a roughly 
similar legal basis as PS in Germany, i.e. the Property Development Act in 
conjunction with property promotion possibilities of the Income Tax Act. While a 
majority of German PS schemes use the tax and social security exemptions offered 
by these laws, the 401 (k) plans, evidently, are not widely spread in the U.S. One 
explanation could be that alternative PS plans in the U.S. are more attractive 
concerning the policies and tax exemptions the government has devised. 
Both deferred profit sharing plans and ESOPs provide incentives to employees 
after a long duration of employment. This form of PS could strengthen employees' 
loyalty to the firm and help to establish a long-term relationship between worker 
and firm. Alternative explanations of this observed pattern of PS may be suggested. 
One hypothesis is that deferred plans and ESOPs are a substitute for privately 
provided pension plans since they are subject to less restrictive government 
regulations. If this interpretation is valid it could explain, too, why there is no 
German counterpart to deferred plans and ESOPs. Pension plans in the German 
social security system are (still) fairly generous and additional pensions provided by 
firms are rare compared to the U.S. Thus, German firms, interested in PS, do not 
consider the trade-off between expensive and heavily regulated private pension 
plans and deferred PS schemes, they focus primarily on the incentive effects of PS 
plans. After a possible future retrenchment of old-age benefits in Germany an 
increase in deferred PS plans could be expected. 
A second hypothesis for the prevalence of deferred plans and ESOPs in the U.S. 
is that they tend to make compensation more flexible. "The two pillars of the 
American compensation system are collapsing: the pure fixed wage system and the 
pure fixed retirement system" (Blasi and Kruse 1991: 131). This movement toward 
a more flexible compensation could represent a response to severe demand shocks 
during the last decade. An analogous reaction on the part of German firms should 
be expected. However, due to the smaller importance of privately funded pensions 
(compared to the U.S.) this strategy is not very attractive. German firms react to 
demand shocks first by reducing other fringe benefits and second by reducing work 
time and thirdly by dismissing workers. 
Unions in both countries traditionally exhibited a negative attitude toward PS. 
Company-based unions, which predominate in the U.S., however, might be more 
178 
PROFIT SHARING IN GERMAN FIRMS 
inclined to cooperate with management on PS than the national unions in 
Germany organizing labor mainly in firms without PS. Deferred profit sharing may 
offer employees an additional voice option to unions as the traditional collective 
voice of workers. A coexistence of deferred PS and unions may lead to a mutual 
reinforcement of the two voice options and consequently to a positive impact on 
firm's performance. Consequently, it could be expected that unions will change 
their stance with respect to PS more rapidly than their German counterparts. 
PROFIT SHARING OF EMPLOYEES: HYPOTHESES 
The theoretical analysis of profit sharing must first investigate the reasons why 
some firms adopt profit sharing and why the majority of firms is opposed to this 
form of compensation. Second, the economic effects of profit sharing have to be 
scrutinized. It is evident that economic effects of profit sharing have an impact on 
the decision to implement this form of compensation. In a first step an isolated 
investigation of determinants and effects might be admissible, in a second step the 
interdependence between determinants and effects has to be fully considered. 
Concerning the characteristics that differ between PS and non-PS firms and the 
effects of profit sharing, the theoretical analysis is characterized by a high degree of 
uncertainty: each hypothesis (H) can be answered by an alternative hypothesis (A). 
In the sequel, this is illustrated by a juxtaposition of some selected hypotheses 
which focus on institutional aspects and are formulated from the perspective of the 
firms' management and the work force. 
Mode of Payment 
HI Profit sharing plans might include a monthly or annual cash payment 
calculated according to an ex ante stipulated formula. Observers frequently assume 
that these schemes provide incentives for greater effort than sharing plans without a 
cash component and distribution formula. An annual payment of a bonus makes it 
easy to understand that remuneration and firm performance are tied. The profit 
share of the work force is predictable due to the ex ante negotiated and rigid 
formula of distribution. In addition, a cash payment compared to a participation 
via employee stock ownership is not subject to both uncertainties, i.e. fluctuations 
of the size of the bonus and of the stock price. 
Al Employee stock ownership as a form of profit sharing facilitates a long-term 
relationship between worker and firm which increases loyalty to the firm. A sense of 
co-ownership will emerge strengthening the identification with the objectives of 
management and reducing conflicts and dissension. 
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Alternative Incentives 
H2 Profit sharing will be selected as an incentive in conditions precluding piece 
rates, efficiency wages, and group incentive plans. These conditions prevail if a 
majority of workers produces a nonstandardized output and is involved in the 
development of new products and the improvement of products. An introduction 
of profit sharing can be expected when workers exert a substantial impact on the 
overall performance of the firm. 
A2 Workers differ with respect to their reactions to incentives. A complex system 
of incentives including profit sharing as one component might be more expensive 
and efficient than a pure profit sharing scheme. If the firm's revenue permits a 
combination of incentives this combination could be advantageous in the long run. 
Firm Size 
H3 If profit sharing generates an incentive effect it should prevail in small and 
medium-sized firms, since the incentives will be barely diluted. Additionally, if 
competition is higher for small and medium-sized firms than for large firms and 
the former are confronted with a widely fluctuating product demand, profit 
sharing could in those circumstances increase the flexibility of human resource 
management. 
A3 In large firms workers tend to be heterogeneous. As a consequence, it proves 
difficult to satisfy the diverse interests with a single incentive plan. Due to the 
division of labor and team production large firms frequently are rather profitable 
and dispose of the financial resources required for a combined scheme of 
incentives, including profit sharing. 
Unions 
H4 Unions might consider profit sharing as an opportunity to gain influence and 
to have access to a broad spectrum of entrepreneurial decisions. The reason is that 
groups participating in profits should have an impact on the major determinants of 
profits. An increasing strength of unions in a firm could consequently raise the 
probability of introducing a profit sharing scheme. 
A4 For two reasons a negative correlation is predicted between profit sharing and 
unionization. Traditionally, unions have opposed profit sharing, although this 
negative attitude has been modified recently. Profit sharing can be adopted 
explicitly to deter unionization and to undermine the relationship between workers 
and unions. 
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Works Councils 
H5 A works council as an institution is legally independent from unions, de 
facto however, close relationships exist. If A4 is valid and works councils support 
the goals of unions, they will oppose the adoption of profit sharing. Furthermore, 
in firms with profit sharing, works councils could be coerced to accept an uneasy 
mediating position between capital and labor entailing a loss of confidence of the 
work force. 
A5 Individual contracts between management and workers or collective contracts 
between management and the works council can constitute the legal basis for the 
adoption of profit sharing. A collective contract is frequently recommended due to 
legal arguments and for reasons of motivation. The works council can gather the 
information to monitor and supervise the adoption and execution of a profit 
sharing scheme, disseminate complete and reliable information to the work force, 
thus supporting the goals the firm wishes to attain with profit sharing. 
Regions 
H6 In rapidly growing regions many firms will be exceptionally profitable. For 
these firms it is easier than for their counterparts in stagnant or declining regions to 
adopt profit sharing. Regional competition in the labor market might coerce them 
to pursue this strategy. 
A16 In stagnant or declining regions, e.g. the New German Lander, profit sharing 
and a low base wage instead of a higher fixed wage might be an advisable strategy to 
strengthen future competitiveness. 
A26 Worker preferences for a fixed compensation or for a compensation package 
including profit sharing might vary between regions. In some regions workers with 
a potential owner psychology might predominate. 
A36 The regional impact on the frequency of profit sharing plans should be 
limited after controlling for labor market conditions, sectors, firm size, 
qualification of workers, and degree of unionization, since firms face basically 
similar problems of motivation and flexibility regardless of location. 
Productivity 
H7 A firm's productivity can be enhanced by adopting profit sharing. In firms 
with financial participation workers' effort exceeds the intensity in firms paying 
fixed wages, since, with a remuneration that is entirely independent of individual 
performance, a utility- or income-maximizing worker will not have incentives for 
181 
VIVIAN CARSTENSEN, KNUT GERLACH, OLAF HOBLER 
effort. In addition, profit sharing tends to generate a mutual control and supervi-
sion as workers would participate both in gains from higher effort and losses from 
shirking of their colleagues. 
A7 Individual effort has only a negligible impact on the firm's overall perfor-
mance. Profit sharing will not elicit higher effort, since each worker selects a free-
rider strategy and expects that the improved performance of co-workers has a 
positive impact on profits. 
Nonpecuniary Participation 
HS Positive productivity effects of PS according to H7 can be augmented by a 
combination of PS with employee involvement in decision making (nonpecuniary 
participation, codetermination). Many dimensions of effort, such as working 
harder and more precisely, accepting flexible time schedules and a variety of jobs, 
taking initiative, and being responsible for material and maintenance, are difficult 
to observe or unobservable. Additionally, it may be impossible to allocate output to 
individual levels of effort. Therefore, due to free-riding the incentive effects of PS 
may be not sufficient to compensate for the costs. Furthermore, possible compensa-
tion of employees for risk taking via profit sharing may reduce net profits in the 
firm. 
Nonpecuniary participation is needed as a complement to improve the 
emergence of a company spirit, to strengthen responsibility and flexibility, to 
improve the flow of information, and the acceptance of decisions. The effects 
could be a reduction of turnover costs ·md absenteeism, of costs of on-the-job 
training, and a decreased willingness to withhold information from management. 
In firms where PS and participation are combined, the attitude toward new 
technologies is more positive than without participation, and the horizontal control 
of peers is strengthened. This indirect control decreases costs compared with 
traditional hierarchical control of supervisors. 
A8 The combination of PS with participation is dominated by pure PS schemes 
and by the traditional fixed wage system, respectively. If workers participate not 
only in profits, but also in decision making, management and capital are not so 
careful as usual; they feel restricted in their property rights. Employees tend to 
prefer short-run decisions maximizing the contracted profit share and reducing 
investment. The combination of PS and nonpecuniary participation increases the 
costs and time of attaining agreements because additional decision makers besides 
management are involved. 
In the following empirical part of this chapter the conflicting hypotheses about 
PS will be investigated. 
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DATA 
The data of our investigation, which were obtained from firms, are based on two 
sources. First, the population is composed of firms in the manufacturing sector of 
Lower Saxony and Baden-Wiimemberg with five or more employees. A random 
sample stratified according to four firm size classes was drawn in the two federal 
states (n = 206). The interviews were conducted by Infratest Sozialforschung 
(Munich) using our questionnaire in the period October 1990 to January 1991. For 
1989, data on 103 firms are available. The data include information on a broad 
spectrum of issues such as production, marketing, personnel, costs, revenue, and 
profits. The majority of the firms (91) had no profit sharing scheme. These 91 firms 
constitute our control group. For the 12 profit sharing firms additional information 
was gathered about the year of adoption, the proportion of eligible and partici-
pating employees and the amount of profits distributed to the participants. 
Second, the Institute for Quantitative Economic Research (IQW, University of 
Hannover) interviewed 33 firms in Lower-Saxony and Baden-Wiirttemberg, which had 
adopted profit sharing schemes. The interviews were conducted in the period April 1991 
to June 1992. We used the questionnaire that forms the basis of our first data source. 
However, additional questions concerning details of the sharing system and employees' 
participation in decision making were included. The data also refer to 1989. 
EMPIRICAL ANALYSIS 
Descriptive Statistics 
PS Firms Versus Non-PS Firms and Comparison of PS Firms 
As Table 7.2 demonstrates PS firms are on average larger than their non-PS-
counterparts. More than 70 percent of them has a work force of at least 200 
employees. The proportion of firms of that size (~200 employees) in the subsample 
of non-PS firms is less than 20 percent. This finding contradicts H3, which 
emphazises the perceptibility of bonus payments as a necessary condition for the 
intended incentive effects of PS. Sharing firms tend co export more than non-PS 
firms (30 vs. 20 percent of sales), and they are more successful in the introduction 
of new or recently improved products (86 vs. 48 percent of the relevant firms). In 
addition, they are more likely to hold patents. 
The skill composition of the labor force within the two subsamples differs 
systematically. The proportions of white collar and highly qualified workers (with a 
university degree) in firms with PS exceed those ratios in non-PS firms by 40 
percent and 45 percent, respectively. The probability of the existence of a works 
council is higher in sharing firms, the degree of unionization is almost identical. 
The preceding arguments could have the implication that the accumulation of 
specific human capital facilitates the production process and that information 
sharing between employees and management is improved. 
183 
VIVIAN CARSTENSEN, KNUT GERLACH, OLAF HOBLER 
Table 7.2 Descriptive Statistics of PS and Non-PS Firms and Regional Comparisons of PS 
Firms: Number of Observations (N), Means, Standard Deviations, and Tests 
of Differences Between Means (t-statistics) 
Firms with Firms without 
Profit Sharing Profit Sharing 
Standard Standard 
N" Mean Deviation N Mean Deviation tb 
FSIZEC 41 2.54 0.78 87 1.67 0.80 5.85' 
INNOV 43 0.86 0.35 86 0.48 0.50 5.04' 
EXPORT 38 31.31 26.43 84 21.19 24.52 2.00· 
PPE 31 57.52 99.83 62 49.19 52.80 0.41 
PROD 37 149.42 145.63 77 103.98 61.56 0.76 
CAPINT 36 64.96 86.46 69 36.26 46.78 1.38 
WOCOUN 44 0.84 0.37 86 0.45 0.50 4.99' 
PWU 35 31.55 27.68 46 30.58 36.12 0.14 
SKILLED 38 0.09 0.10 77 0.05 0.07 2.30' 
WCOL 41 0.40 0.23 86 0.28 0.17 3.20' 
WPT 38 0.07 0.05 80 0.07 0.10 0.03 
APPR 40 0.06 0.07 78 0.06 0.08 0.02 
DPPS 43 0.77 0.37 84 0.48 0.50 3.42' 
DTREX 40 0.95 0.22 86 0.53 0.50 6.45' 
WPE 32 58.64 14.15 69 50.21 17.84 1.81 
DEFFWAGE 43 0.93 0.26 71 0.80 0.40 2.07' 
DSEN 42 0.67 0.47 71 0.52 0.50 1.54 
MCUST 43 1.14 0.94 86 1.86 0.46 4.71' 
SHARE 36 34.75 24.92 73 41.84 31.08 1.29 
APC 44 2.88 1.66 86 3.64 1.58 2.49' 
FEXP 44 4.11 0.75 83 4.45 0.70 2.42' 
IPROM 43 1.76 0.57 81 2.30 0.83 4.26' 
IPS 43 2.07 0.70 80 2.53 1.02 2.91' 
IPART 43 1.63 0.69 83 2.19 0.85 4.02· 
(continued on p. 179) 
Firms opting for profit sharing incur higher training expenditures than their 
nonsharing counterparts: financial support is guaranteed by almost all PS firms, and 
by only half of the non-PS firms. Additionally, the existence of a company pension 
system is more likely. Encouragement of further training supplemented by deferred 
compensations, i.e. pensions and long-term contracts, can be interpreted as the 
workers' participation in the costs and returns of firm specific human capital. This 
directly supports the rent-sharing hypothesis of long-term employment (Hashi-
moto 1979). The goal is to reduce quits and to attract or to tie qualified employees 
to the firm. PS firms pay bonuses in addition to regular wages and seem to use 
bonus payments and efficiency wages as a compensation package (10 percent level). 
The following variables depict subjective assessments of the management of 
firms and, therefore, may be biased. PS firms tend to be relatively independent of 
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Table 7.2 ( Continued) 
PS Firms in PS Firms in 
Lower Saxony Baden-Wurttemberg tb 
Firm-Related Variables 
PWU 20 39.87 28.29 15 20.47 23.35 2.22· 
WPT 24 0.05 0.04 14 0.09 0.06 2.49' 
APPR 24 0.08 0.08 16 0.04 0.03 2.19' 
PS-Related Variables 
PSYEARS 24 12.88 9.62 15 14.07 11.11 0.34 
ELIG 24 77.50 33.84 19 88.63 22.25 1.30 
INVOL 25 60.20 38.34 19 75.63 29.49 1.51 
CAPE 19 5.42 10.51 12 8.14 16.77 0.50 
HIER 19 4.89 1.19 14 4.00 1.11 2.21 • 
PSPW 22 0.04 0.04 12 0.08 0.09 1.51 
PSPE 22 1.75 2.18 12 2.84 3.15 1.07 
PSPP 20 0.04 0.05 9 0.06 0.06 0.96 
PSPIN 22 1.94 2.25 12 3.19 3.02 1.25 
FPART 18 2.00 0.97 14 1.79 0.89 0.65 
DOPE 19 0.74 0.45 14 0.64 0.49 0.56 
DDPWC 16 0.93 0.25 13 0.61 0.51 2.10· 
DPROD 19 0.63 0.49 14 0.29 0.47 2.04' 
DSOLID 19 0.53 0.51 14 0.86 0.36 2.17' 
DFLUCT 19 0.37 0.49 14 0.57 0.51 1.14 
DABSENT 19 0.26 0.45 14 0.43 0.51 0.96 
DLEGAL 19 0.21 0.42 14 0.36 0.49 0.89 
DFAIR 19 0.84 0.38 14 0.85 0.36 0.12 
WATTID 17 0.53 0.51 13 0.46 0.52 0.36 
EPROD 19 0.42 0.51 14 0.14 0.37 1.84 
ESOLID 19 0.42 0.51 14 0.71 0.47 1.71 
EFLUCT 19 0.16 0.38 14 0.29 0.47 0.84 
Noter. 
• Several questions were not answered by all firms. Therefore, for each variable the number of 
observations is documented. 
b Significant differences between the tw0 subgroups (a=0.05, normal distribution) are marked by an 
major customers compared to their nonsharing counterparts, and the reported 
assessment of actual profits (per sales) in comparison with profits of competitors is 
more favorable. 
Firms that opt for profit sharing do not consider the work experience of 
applicants as such a strong signal for ability as their nonsharing counterparts. The 
assessment of the long-run effects of important incentives differs systematically. 
While firms with PS rely, first, on the opportunity of promotion, second, on the 
introduction or improvement of sharing schemes, and, third, on a high degree of 
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employee participation in decision making as adequate means to motivate workers, 
non-PS firms are rather pessimistic concerning these factors. 
A regional split of the sample of PS firms (1 = Lower Saxony, 0 = Baden-
Wiirttemberg) does not produce strong differences (Table 7.2). 1 There is some 
evidence that relatively more part-time workers and apprentices are employed in PS 
firms of Baden-Wiirttemberg compared to Lower Saxony. PS firms in the latter 
federal state face a higher degree of unionization. Expected productivity gains are 
mentioned more frequently as a reason for introducing PS by firms in Lower 
Saxony, while the improvement of solidarity between management and workers as 
well as among employees is an important cause of introduction of PS in firms of 
Baden-Wiirttemberg. In addition, Lower Saxonian PS firms are organized more 
hierarchically than their counterparts in Baden-Wiirttemberg. 
In Table 7.3 the sample of PS firms is split into the two subgroups of 
(a) firms that have introduced the sharing scheme prior to the Property Develop-
ment Act in 1984 (D84 = O) and 
(b) firms that opted for profit sharing after the enactment (D84 = 1). 
No differences are detected according to the firm-related variables (not all presented 
in the table). The industry-specific variable MARKUP, which represents the inverse 
ranking of the industry-specific ratio of value added minus labor costs to sales, is 
larger in the second group. Gross profits in industries where PS became popular 
after the enactment in 1984 seem to exceed those in traditional sharing industries. 
The PS-related variables in the two subsamples are almost identical with the 
exception of the proportion of participating employees (INVOL), the amount of 
PS per (employed) worker (PSPE), and the ratio of PS to wages (PSPW). 
Participation of employees (INVOL) is stronger in firms belonging to subsample 
(a). There is, however, no evidence for a higher eligibility in firms which adopted 
PS before 1984. The difference of PSPE and PSPW between the two groups 
diminishes if the amount of PS per participating employee (PSPIN) is considered. 
These results in conjunction with insignificant differences in the remaining PS-
related variables in Table 7 .3 favor the hypotheses that possible determinants and 
effects of PS are independent of tax subsidies. 
Simple Correlations of PS 
In Table 7.4 correlations are documented between 
1 worker's share in profits (PSPP), 
2 ratio of profit sharing to wages (PSPW), and 
3 level of profit sharing per employee (PSPE) 
on the one hand and 
(a) profits per employee (PPE), 
(b) firm size (FSIZE), and 
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Table 7.3 Comparisons of PS Firms with Introduction of the Scheme prior to the 
Property Development Act in 1984 (D84 = O) and after the Enactment 
(D84 = 1). Number of Observations (N), Means, Standard Deviations, 
and Tests of Differences between Means (t-statistics) 
PS Introduction PS Introduction 
before 1984 after 1984 
Standard Standard 
N• Mean Deviation N Mean Deviation tb 
Firm-related Variables 
FSIZE 25 848.64 1,016.32 19 3,855.52 14,988.27 0.87 
EXPORT 23 34.39 27.08 18 29.28 24.92 0.63 
MARKUP 25 5.72 3.12 20 7.35 3.03 1.76 
PWU 23 34.00 28.51 13 31.00 29.45 0.30 
WPT 25 0.07 0.05 17 0.08 0.07 0.44 
APPR 25 0.05 0.04 18 0.09 0.09 1.57 
PS-related Variables 
ELIG 25 83.00 42.38 20 69.00 38.39 1.16 
INVOL 25 76.72 31.19 20 52.95 38.39 2.29" 
CAPE 19 7.83 15.29 13 4.87 8.50 0.70 
HIER 19 4.63 1.30 14 4.36 1.15 0.63 
PSPW 23 0.09 0.13 16 0.03 0.05 2.27· 
PSPE 24 4.52 7.71 17 0.96 1.21 2.22· 
PSPP 17 0.05 0.05 15 0.03 0.05 1.56 
PSPIN 24 5.65 8.50 17 4.37 6.74 0.52 
FPART 18 1.93 0.67 14 1.74 0.77 0.73 
DOPE 19 0.74 0.45 14 0.86 0.36 0.82 
DDPWC 17 0.82 0.39 12 0.92 0.29 0.70 
DPROD 19 0.47 0.51 14 0.50 0.52 0.14 
DSOLID 19 0.74 0.45 14 0.57 0.51 0.98 
DFLUCT 19 0.42 0.51 14 0.50 0.52 0.44 
DABSENT 19 0.32 0.48 14 0.36 0.49 0.24 
DLEGAL 19 0.26 0.45 14 0.29 0.47 0.14 
DFAIR 19 0.74 0.45 14 1.00 0.00 
WATTID 18 0.56 0.51 12 0.42 0.52 0.73 
EPROD 19 1.53 0.51 14 1.71 0.47 1.08 
ESOLID 19 1.16 0.38 14 1.21 0.43 0.40 
EFLUCT 19 1.58 0.51 14 1.71 0.47 0.78 
Noter. 
• Several questions were not answered by all firms. Therefore, for each variable the number of 
observations is documented. 
b Significant differences between the two subgroups (a= 0.05, normal distribution) are marked by an 
asterix. 
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Table 7.4 Simple Correlations between Profit Sharing Variables and Firm-related Variables: 
Coefficients, Level of Significance (One-Tailed in Parentheses), Number of 
Cases 
PSPP PSPE PSPW PSYEARS 
PPE -0.189 0.523 0.291 0.112 
(0.135) (0.001) (0.038) (0.252) 
29 36 38 38 
FSIZE 0.218 0.183 0.177 0.297 
(0.128) (0.148) (0.151) (0.033) 
29 36 36 39 
PSYEARS 0.313 0.499 0.529 1 
(0.050) (0.001) (0.000) (O) 
29 36 36 39 
D84 -0.278 -0.316 -0.313 -0.735 
(0.072) (0.036) (0.032) (0.000) 
29 36 36 39 
PROD -0.186 0.488 0.375 0.087 
(0.168) (0.002) (0.014) (0.303) 
29 34 34 37 
ABSENT -0.326 -0.332 -0.306 -0.233 
(0.042) (0.024) (0.035) (0.077) 
29 36 36 39 
FPART 0.276 0.269 0.237 0.075 
(0.213) (0.087) (0.118) (0.539) 
21 27 27 28 
DOPE 0.099 0.242 0.239 0.053 
(0.331) (0.107) (0.110) (0.394) 
22 28 28 28 
DDPWC 0.236 0.266 -0.177 0.062 
(0.173) (0.105) (0.180) (0.385) 
18 24 29 25 
DMAINT 0.621 0.246 0.410 0.249 
(0.001) (0.103) (0.015) (0.096) 
22 28 28 29 
DFLUCT 0.657 0.440 0.569 0.298 
(0.000) (0.010) (0.001) (0.058) 
22 28 28 29 
DABSENT 0.288 0.336 0.474 0.346 
(0.097) (0.040) (0.005) (0.033) 
22 28 28 29 
DQUAL 0.167 0.415 0.370 0.313 
(0.230) (0.014) (0.026) (0.050) 
22 28 28 29 
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(c) years since the adoption of the actual sharing system (PSYEARS) on the other 
hand. 
In addition, correlations of these variables and important indicators of firm 
performance are reported. Finally, the relationship of various variables with 
employees' participation in decision making is considered (for a definition of the 
generated participation variables see Appendix). 
The incumbents' share of profits (PSPP) as well as labor productivity (PROD) 
tend to decline with rising profits (10 percent level). Labor costs (excluding PS-
outlay) are positively related to PSPP. No relationship exists between PSPP and firm 
size, despite the fact that the largest profit shares are found only in firms which 
employ at least 200 workers. The correlation between PSYEARS and PSPP is positive. 
Large shares, however, are not correlated with high levels of participation. Two of the 
reported determinants of PS (namely maintenance of machinery and reduction of 
fluctuation) are positively related to PSPP. Absenteeism decreases with PSPP. 
Profit sharing per wages (PSPW) increases with higher labor productivity. Profits 
exceeding one monthly salary are distributed only in enterprises with high annual 
profits per employee (>DMl0,000/worker), i.e. mainly in large firms. No support 
is found for the hypothesis that especially large firms with nonstandardized 
production have to pay perceptible (and therefore higher) bonuses in order to 
avoid the dilution of potential incentive effects of PS. Absenteeism, often regarded 
as an indicator of firm performance, declines with increased PS per wages. The 
number of years since the introduction (PSYEARS), and the fact of introducing 
the scheme prior to the enactment of the Property Development Act in 1984 are 
positively correlated with the amount of PSPW. This can be interpreted in the 
sense that voluntarily adopted schemes provide larger shares for employees {see also 
Table 7.3). 
Profit sharing per employee (PSPE) is correlated with higher labor productivity 
and lower absenteeism. No relationship can be detected between firm size and 
PSPE; a long duration of the installed scheme, however, increases PSPE. 
Considering all PS firms, a proportion of 40 percent distributes DM500 per capita 
or less, which is exactly the legally subsidized amount. In the subsample of firms 
introducing PS after 1984, this proportion increases to 70 percent. In firms that 
introduced PS before 1984, PSPE exceeds DM500 with a proportion of 85 
percent. These results suggest that firms and employees learn to improve PS as a 
system of mutual incentives for high effort and fairness. Furthermore, the duration 
of PS in the firm is negatively related to absenteeism and positively to firm size. 
In a next step employee involvement in decision making is taken into considera-
tion. On the whole, formal participation (for example, Quality Circles) is relatively 
widespread, especially in large enterprises. However, some firms that introduced PS 
after 1984 completely lack formal nonpecuniary participation. Correlation is found 
between the formal decision making of employees (FPART) and PSYEARS on the 
one hand and between the degree of the de facto nonpecuniary participation 
(DOPE, DDPWC) and PSYEARS on the other hand. 
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Subsequently, intended effects of PS are considered. First, we look at the 
proponion of firms declaring that the specific variable had been a determinant for 
the introduction of PS. Second, these intended effects are compared with the real 
effect on those variables. The responses concerning the variables are subjective 
assessments by management and these may differ from the objective facts. About 
50 percent reported productivity improvement as one reason for the introduction 
of PS. The goal of improving solidarity is reponed by 67 percent, and 85 percent 
of the firms are interested in fairness. About 55 percent mentioned the recruitment 
of highly qualified applicants as a reason for introducing PS schemes. Legal 
subsidies did not play an imponant role (27 percent). For the firms mentioning 
these specific variables as determinants, it was analyzed whether the envisioned 
improvements had materialized. For 55 percent solidarity is improved, 30 percent 
report higher productivity, and 21 percent reduced fluctuation. These determinants 
and effects are correlated with PSYEARS. With a longer duration of the system the 
goals of decreasing absenteeism and of attraction of qualified applicants are 
reponed more frequently. Firms with longer PSYEARS report lower degrees of 
absenteeism. 
Nonpecuniary Participation in Different PS Schemes 
A first impression of the conjunction of profit sharing and nonpecuniary 
participation on the basis of the institutional framework of the schemes is given in 
Figure 7.1. For each of the six typical schemes the duration of PS, the degree of 
workers' panicipation, i.e. de facto involvement of employees in substantial 
decisions like work- and job-organization (DPART4 = 3), and the total number of 
sharing schemes within the firm are considered. The basis for the calculation of the 
number of schemes within a firm is not the number of firms, but the total number 
of schemes established in all firms. It is known how many firms have established a 
particular scheme of the six categories. However, additional pecuniary schemes 
might exist in the firm. The average number of these additional schemes constitutes 
the total number of sharing schemes. The duration of the system and the n~mber 
of schemes installed can be interpreted as a proxy for the seriousness of entre-
preneurs and management to participate workers in profits and decision making. 
The proportion of firms with de facto substantial participation in work organiz-
ation and job related decisions indicates the degree of participation in the different 
PS schemes. 
On average, the duration of participation in the firm's assets (I 1.6 years) is less 
than that of cash-based sharing systems (14.4 years), with the exception of 
employee stock ownerships, which last for almost 18 years. Apparently, the 
impact of the Property Development Act (1984) concerning the introduction of 
PS is negligible. The reduction of tax liabilities is particularly important in only 
two forms (PS with silent partnership and asset participation with loans). On 
average, these two systems were established more than three years prior to the 
enactment. The most obvious form of sharing-direct revenue or value-added 
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sharing-has the longest tradition. The average duration of existence amounts to 
22 years. As explained in the interviews, the paternalistically run companies often 
installed PS schemes because the entrepreneurs feel morally responsible for the 
work force. 
In addition to the described pure systems a combination of different PS schemes 
is found in many firms. The most prevalent form is the link of asset participation 
with a cash-based system, where access to the cash component is based on the 
participation in the asset component. The high degree of participation in decision 
making (DPART4 = 3) is most often found in the scheme "firm performance 
bonus," where all digible employees are obliged to participate. About 75 percent of 
these companies have substantial participation. More than 70 percent with asset 
participation and almost 70 percent of firms with employee stock ownership 
provide a substantial involvement of their workers in those decisions 
(DPART4 = 3). 
Summarizing the descriptive results from Figure 7.1 it can be seen that 
combined systems of PS and nonpecuniary participation are typical in 
1 large companies with employee stock ownership, with the risk of a potential 
dilution of incentive effects, 
2 firms with schemes of asset participation taking the form of loans, and 
3 enterprises, which base the calculation of distributable profit shares on a relative 
complex formula. 
A first tentative investigation of PS may rely on comparisons of means, simple 
correlations, and descriptions. A more extended analysis, however, should not be 
based on these elementary statistics since they do not consider multicollinearity, 
interactions of job related variables, unobserved or omitted variables and the 
industrial relations context. In the subsequent econometric analysis the multi-
variate character of participation in PS and effects of PS is explicitly taken into 
account. 
Econometric Analysis-Preliminary Results 
PS Participation Functions 
The concept "determinants of PS" is explicitly avoided in favor of the term "PS 
participation functions." This is due to a limitation of our data set. The data refer 
to one period (1989) whereas a possible introduction of PS might have occurred in 
years prior to 1989. Therefore, it cannot be distinguished conclusively whether 
present characteristics of a firm had an impact on the past decision of introducing 
PS (since they remained stable for a number of years) or whether these character-
istics have changed drastically in the time elapsed due to the adoption of PS or as a 
response to other factors affecting the firm. In that sense, PS participation or 
assignment functions point out the variables which differ between PS and non-PS 
firms. 
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In the following, estimates of PS participation functions are presented. Different 
PS indicators are distinguished. First, a dummy variable 
DPS = { 1 if/ ~ 0 
0 otherwise 
(1) 
is employed as the unobserved endogenous variable y ·, which is an unobserved 
decision or objective variable of the firm introducing PS or continuing with the 
participation of employees in profits. A linear model is assumed to determine y • 
• '{3 y =z +u (2) 
where y • might be the change of productivity or profits due to PS and the 
components of vector z are firms' characteristics that affect y •. Three basic models 
are formulated (ML-estimates are presented in Table 7.5, columns 1-3). The first 
model is dominated by factors which describe the relative market position of the 
firms. The second model may be called "labor endowment model" and the third 
model is a pure sector dummy model. At a first glance the second model seems to 
be preferred due to pseudo-R2, LRT, and t-ratios. However, a mixed model with 
elements from the other ones improves the approach. Statistical criteria favor 
specification (7). Except for the regional dummy and the metal sector dummy the 
signs of the coefficients are stable over the seven models. 
Now we may confront our results with the preceding hypotheses. We start with 
some comments concerning influences that are not incorporated in the final model. 
Former studies (FitzRoy and Kraft 1985, 1986, 1987) have shown that the 
existence of a works council and a high degree of unionization have opposite effects 
on the probability of PS in a firm. The positive effect of the former variable also 
results in our investigation but the significance strongly depends on the model 
specification. We cannot find significant effects of unionization. Therefore, this 
variable is neglected in the following, but in all tested versions this coefficient 
remains positive. This is in accord with Palokangas's (1992) result that small 
unions prefer the ordinary wage system, while large unions are theoretically willing 
to make an agreement on PS. This means we cannot confirm the often mentioned 
negative effects of unions on PS schemes with our data. Neither hypothesis H4 nor 
the alternative A4 is unambiguously preferred. 
Furthermore, we cannot reject the hypothesis that there does not exist a 
difference in the profit sharing behavior between the two considered German 
Lander Lower Saxony and Baden-Wiirttemberg. The effect of the variable 
REGION (1 = Lower Saxony) is insignificant. This speaks in favor of A36. 
It should be emphasized that in PS firms the percentage of white collar workers 
and skilled workers is higher than in non-PS firms. Perhaps, in part the 
insignificance of the variable SKILLED stems from the high degree of multicol-
linearity with TREX. However, in specification (6) of Table 7.5, TREX is 
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Table 7.5 Profit Sharing Participation Function 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) 
INVEST 0.4192 (0.23) - - - - 2.0530 (0.98) 3.6412 (1.62) 
EFFWAGE 0.0387 (2.30) - - - - 0.0372 c2.on 0.0353 (1.75) 
SHARE -0.0091 (1.71) - - - - -0.0096 (1.68) -0.0132 (1.94) 
COMPET -0.4406 (1.71) - - - - -0.5051 (1.8n -0.8082 c2.6n 
WOCOUN 1.0219 (2.94) - - - - 1.0922 c2.9n 
SKILLED 1.4803 (0.79) 0.8163 (0.43) - 0.1061 (0.05) 0.0168 (0.01) 1.5157 (0.73) 
TREX - 0.7487 (2.16) - 0.7548 (2.10) 0.8832 (2.25) - 0.6983 (1.72) 
ABSENT - -0.0692 (1.10) - -0.0802 (1.23) -0.9880 (1.39) 
FSIZE - 0.0020 (2.41) - 0.0021 (2.32) 0.0024 (2.50) - 0.0036 (3.13) 
REGION - 0.1561 (0.49) - 0.1410 (0.43) -0.2159 (0.54) 
OPTICS - - 0.6646 (1.11) 0.7026 (0.93) 0.3556 (0.46) 0.4621 (0.72) 
CHEM - - 0.7600 c1.7n 0.5630 (1.13) 0.3740 (0.71) 0.4837 (1.01) o.6321 c1.on 
METAL - - 0.1580 (0.26) - -0.1387 (0.21) -0.1156 co.in 
STONE - - -o.2632 co.3n - -0.2140 (0.25) -0.5845 (0.72) 
ENGIN - - -0.4303 (1.16) - -0.9909 (1.88) -0.8144 (1.86) -1.1692 (2.29) 
CONST -0.2065 (0.27) -o.6115 O.2n -0.4113 (2.18) -0.6062 (1.24) -0.1088 (0.18) -0.0709 (0.09) o.1356 co.8n 
LRT 20.64 31.92 7.41 33.94 38.03 28.14 51.87 
DF 6 5 5 7 10 11 8 
Pseudo-R2 0.1719 0.2658 0.0617 0.2826 0.3167 0.2344 0.4319 
PROB (DMT) 62.51 86.20 - 83.46 87.98 61.65 95.04 
PROB (BJLT) 41.61 92.93 - 95.87 86.24 60.13 83.16 
PROB (IMT) 65.20 97.75 - 84.93 92.67 44.04 94.96 
Notn: 
Dependent Variable: OPS 
Method: Probit-ML-Estimates (absolute t-Ratios in Parentheses) 
N = 89 (N1 • 32 Firms with Profit Sharing) 
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suppressed and the SKILLED effect remains insignificant, but multicollinearities 
with other variables are possible. The negative correlation between absenteeism and 
PS should be mentioned, although the causality is not unambiguous. Are workers 
participating in profits because they have a low degree of absenteeism, or does PS 
induce a reduction of absenteeism? 
The importance of industries for PS is not obvious. In Hubler (1993) it is 
argued that high-wage sectors are more predestinated to introduce PS, because the 
free-rider problem does not seem to be so important. High sectoral wages-an 
indicator of efficiency wages-attract qualified and productive workers who are 
usually more satisfied with their jobs than other workers. This means there is a 
higher percentage of employees willing to work harder due to PS instead of 
improving the individual economic conditions by free-riding. But also historical 
aspects may explain sectoral differences. 
In none of the seven models are the tested null hypotheses (H0) rejected 
(homoscedasticity-DMT [Davidson and MacKinnon 1984]; normal 
distribution-BJLT [Bera et al 1984); correct specification-lMT [information 
matrix test in Orme's (1990) version]) as can be seen from the bottom of Table 
7.5 (PROB = 100 P(T~ T,mp I H0) is the empirical significance level where T,mp is 
the empirical test statistic). The prob values of the tests (PROB) are much higher 
than the usual 100a level. The pseudo-R2 speaks in favor of model (7). And if we 
compare the LRT statistic of the saturated model (all mentioned variables in Table 
7.5 are included in the estimation; the estimates are not presented in the tables; the 
LRT of this model is 54.69) with that of the seven models in Table 7.5 all other 
models except model (7) have to be rejected. With the exception of the two sectoral 
dummies and works council-see above-we can interpret the results in model 
(7) as follows: 
1 With larger investments the probability that a firm shares the profits with its 
workers increases. The combination of high investments and PS indicates good 
economic conditions of the firm. 
2 A high wage drift and the existence of PS are positively correlated. Hypothesis 
A2 is preferred to H2. But we cannot say much about the causality. Do high 
wages induce high productivity and therefore the profit situation allows PS or 
does the argument run in the opposite direction or is the truth somewhere in 
between or do unobserved determinants exist which explain high wages and PS 
jointly? In Hubler (1993) unobserved abilities are mentioned as one possibility. 
Especially, we may expect this, if these abilities improve productivity due to the 
team work. 
3 Firms with a high degree of competition avoid the introduction of PS. They fear 
that their cost situation deteriorates. 
4 If firms have a high market share of their most important product, they are 
reluctant concerning PS. This seems to contradict (3). However, a high market 
share is not identical with a low degree of competition. Perhaps, there exist two 
firms' strategies, an output oriented strategy with the objective of high market 
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shares and a labor input strategy in accordance with PS, which are not 
complementary. 
5 Large training expenditures per employee are more often observed in PS than in 
non-PS firms. With an increasing qualification of the employees positive 
productivity effects due to PS are expected. 
6 Large firms are more interested in PS than smaller ones. A3 is preferred to H3. 
This result is not in accordance with findings of FitzRoy and Kraft (1987). One 
explanation might be that the FitzRoy-Kraft sample contains only firms of 
medium size. 
If we summarize the effects in model (7), apparently PS is more common in 
well-situated firms than in firms facing difficult economic conditions. We believe 
that PS is not an instrument to improve a firm's position. Firms with above-average 
profitability that do not share their rents with employees thus run the risk of 
demotivating workers and eroding the very basis of continuing success (FitzRoy 
1990: 19). Our investigation does not support FiczRoy's and Kraft's conjecture that 
some firms start from a crisis situation to introduce team work and group 
incentives (FitzRoy and Kraft 1992; 219). 
Effects of PS 
Most empirical studies of profit sharing concentrate on productivity. FitzRoy and 
Kraft (1992) emphasize that a rare consensus has emerged: almost all empirical 
studies find a positive association between PS and productivity. However, the 
authors warn that the positive correlation might be an artifact. Unobserved factors 
such as quality of the management (Cable and Wilson 1989) or job conditions can 
induce the relationship. Moreover, insufficient attention has been paid to the 
measurement of PS. 
In Table 7.6 estimates of different productivity functions with some PS 
indicators are presented. Incorporated as control variables are the percentage of 
skilled employees (SKILLED), wages per employee (WPE), training expenditures 
per employee (TREX), capital intensity (CAPINT), a regional dummy 
(REGION), and sectoral dummies. Except for the regional variable, the signs of 
the coefficients are as expected. But the differences of the PS indicators should be 
stressed. If all firms are considered (upper pan of Table 7.6) the following 
relationship results: 
(a) If PS is measured by a dummy, positive significant productivity effects cannot 
be observed. 
(b) Both the level of PS (LPS) and PS per employee (PSPE) induce positive and 
significant effects. 
(c) The ratio of level of PS to total profits (PSPP) is negatively significantly 
correlated with productivity. 
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It might be argued that the neglect of firm size (FSIZE) induces the last 
result-in large firms incentives have to be stronger to induce the same productiv-
ity effects, and productivity decreases with firm size. Therefore, the negative 
coefficient results in equations with PSPP. However, empirical investigations (not 
presented in Table 7.6) show that FSIZE has no productivity effects. But the 
question remains: why is productivity negatively correlated with PSPP and 
positively with the other PS-ratio (PSPE)? This is also confirmed with our data by 
simple correlation coefficients in Table 7.4 (r(PROD,PSPP) = -0.19; 
r(PROD,PSPE) = 0.49). The negative correlation seems to be an artifact, namely, 
PROD represents a relevant part in the denominator of PSPP (profits). Maximiz-
ation of PROD is possibly not the major objective of the firms, they rather tend to 
maximize available (net)profits or net profits per employee (PPE) and per capital 
(PPC), respectively. 
The upper part of Table 7.6 shows that PS neither significantly increases PPE 
nor PPC whereas a tendency of positive effects of LPS and PSPE on PPE and of 
negative effects on PPC can be found. Obviously, the positive PROD effects are 
compensated by the difference between gross and net profits. This outcome appears 
to be sensible. Otherwise, if PPE or PPC were significantly enlarged by PS, we 
would have to expect the introduction of a sharing system in all firms. 
In the lower part of Table 7.6 the estimates are restricted to firms with PS. In 
these approaches the estimates are corrected for a potential sample selection bias by 
Heckman's (1979) suggestions of an additional artificial regressor (estimated 
hazard rate). However, the effects are not significant. The lower part of Table 7.6 
also shows that within the subsample of PS firms the PPE and PPC effects of PS are 
more pronounced than within the total sample. 
PS and Nonpecuniary Participation 
As emphazised in the hypotheses, additional positive effects of PS on productivity 
may be expected by combining it with nonpecuniary participation (codetermina-
tion}, and as Steinherr (1977) has demonstrated that whatever the objective 
function of the firm it requires fairly mild assumptions to render some profit 
sharing and participation in decision making always optimal. The expected 
advantages of employees' participation are improved channels of information, 
better conflict resolution, greater possibilities for acquiring on-the-job human 
capital from other workers, a more positive attitude toward the introduction of 
new technology. PS without participation of the employees can mean that the 
entrepreneur manipulates the calculation of profits so that employees feel 
distrustful and therefore PS has no real impact on productivity. 
Participation can take many forms, and involves a multiplicity of institutional 
arrangements. Levine and Tyson (1990: 189) distinguish between consultative 
participation in work and workplace decisions, substantive participation in work 
and workplace decisions, and representative participation. In our investigation we 
separate between the degree of participation (DPART.) on the one hand, and 
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formal panicipation (FPART) on the other hand. The former encompasses 
participation of works council in investment and rationalization (DPARTl), in 
personnel decisions (DPART2), in pay issues (DPART3), and in job design 
(DPART4) with four different levels (0: no participation; 1: information; 2: 
consultation; 3: coresponsibility for the taking of decisions). FPART comprises the 
following items: quality control circles (QCC), teamwork (1W), joint labor-
management consultation committees OLMC) measured as dummies. It is an open 
question how effective the different forms of participation are and the measurement 
problem is unsolved. The simplest way is using different binaty variables with unit 
value if the firm is classified at the j'th participation level. Supposing that 
combined productivity effects between PS and panicipation exist, interaction 
variables should be constructed, and if the overall effect of participation is 
somehow to be gauged, a composite measure of the degree of participation in a 
given firm is also required. In the literature a weighted sum of the different 
dummies (Cable and FitzRoy 1980) or Guttman Scales (Cable 1988) are used. 
However, quantitative evaluations are extremely difficult because panicipation is 
usually associated with several other important changes in the workplace, the 
motivation to work and the reward structure. Therefore, we propose to construct a 
complete index using the instrument of principle component analysis where 
different variables are incorporated expressing the framework of the panicipation 
field. On the left hand part of Table 7.7 the results of the principal component 
analysis are presented where two factors are extracted. As can be seen from the 
factor loadings of the PS-participation framework variables on the two factors, the 
first factor can be interpreted as panicipation while the second factor describes PS. 
As firms' characteristics are usually highly multicollinear it seems sensible also to 
summarize the characteristics, using a factor analysis, although an interpretation of 
the factors is difficult as can be seen from the right hand pan of Table 7.7. 
A possible interpretation of the two extracted factors is the following. Factor 21 
(F21) discriminates between new and old technology. The former is characterized 
by capital intensive firms with large expenditures for R&D and further training, 
with highly skilled workers producing a large value added per capita and obtaining 
high wages. These determinants have positive factor loadings on F21. Factor 22 
(F22) separates between firms' scale of production-mass production vs. small 
series or single-piece production. The former can be described by large firms with 
numerous but unskilled workers, a high degree of unionization, a considerable 
amount of overtime work and strong export activities. This means F22 is positively 
loaded by mature industry production characteristics. 
In Table 7.8 some estimates are presented where profit sharing and participation 
effects on productivity are jointly considered. The specifications differ in measure-
ment of PS and participation and in the controlled variables. The major results are 
the following: First, formal participation is only of minor relevance. Second, a high 
degree of participation generally does not exert positive effects on productivity. On 
the one hand, participation of employees is not effective while participation via 
works council is important in some fields. On the other hand, panicipation in job 
198 
Table 7.7 Principle Component Analysis with Varimax Rotation 
Variable Communality Factor 11 Factor 12 Variable Communality Factor21 Factor22 
LPS 0.3129 0.0012 0.5594 SALES 0.9307 0.9573 0.1193 
FPART 0.3652 0.4504 0.4030 R&D 0.7956 0.8861 -0.1021 
DPARTl 0.8375 0.9152 0.0033 SKILLED 0.5890 0.7032 -0.3075 
DPART2 0.6944 0.8317 -0.0508 TREX 0.8556 0.9221 -0.0732 
DPART3 0.6451 0.7975 -0.0956 WPE 0.4352 0.6592 -0.0243 
DPART4 0.7567 0.8679 0.0581 CAPINT 0.7345 0.8553 -0.0550 
PSYEARS 0.2411 0.0727 -0.4856 PWU 0.3214 -0.2660 0.5006 
PEWPS 0.5116 0.0539 0.7133 OVERTIME 0.4924 -0.1258 0.6904 
CASH 0.4205 -0.0142 0.6483 FRINGE 0.1770 0.2638 -0.3278 
ALTINC 0.0510 0.2249 0.0194 EXPORT 0.8739 0.4566 0.8157 
PIECEWO 0.0063 -0.0085 0.0790 FSIZE 0.8080 0.5932 0.6854 
MOTIVE 0.2814 0.1226 0.5161 
ATTITUDE 0.0384 -0.0038 0.1960 
DPROD 0.5052 0.0751 -0.4856 
DMAINT 0.3573 0.0815 0.5921 
DSOLID 0.3216 0.3549 0.4423 
EIGENVALUE 3.6373 2.7088 4.9360 2.0772 
CUM. PERCENTAGE 22.7 39.7 44.9 63.8 
Note: N = 27 (only PS Firms). 
Table 1.8 Effects of Profit Sharing and Nonpecuniary Participation on Productivity 
Model (I) Model (2) Moekl (3) Model (4) Model (5) Motk/(6) Model (7) Model (B) 
LPS 0.0352 (3.12) -0.0209 (0.35) 0.0360 (4.20) 0.0034 (0.19) LPS 0.0409 (4.94) 0.0412 (5.90) 
FPART 24.6897 (0.73) 7.6450 (0.20) - - WOCOUN 34.1265 (0.39) 
DDPWC -0.4345 (0.07) 0.9273 (0.1 I) - - PWU 3.0488 (2.75) 3.0099 (3.33) 
PS°FP - 0.0317 (0.85) - - PSYEARS 1.2433 (0.44) 
PS0 DP - -0.0040 (0.50) - - PEWPS 0.5535 (0.58) 
DPARTI - - 32.3648 (0.76) 45.7222 (1.31) CASH 2.3039 (0.04) 
DPART2 - - 25.6883 (0.81) -13.6006 (0.48) ALTINC 133.2 I 49 (2.83) 127.2097 (3.18) - 189.2255 (5.69) 
DPART3 - - -98.9685 (3.99) -0.5783 (0.02) DPART3 -88.6004 (3.64) -96.5359 (5.04) 
DPART4 - - 59.9094 (1.82) -11.9446 (0.43) DPART4 78.1823 (2.22) 95.0909 (4.59) 
PS0 DP3 - - - -0.0280 (2.74) 
PS0 DP4 - - - 0.0268 (3.12) 
PS0 DPI - - - -0.0378 (0.85) PIECEWO -150.6643 (2.66) -155.4871 (3.21) - -15.9157 (0.78) 
PS0 DP2 - - - 0.0235 (0.55) FI I - - 119.2597 (4.03) 
PS0 DP3 - - - -0.0616 (5.24) Fl2 - - 51.8655 (3.08) 
PS0 DP4 - - - 0.0655 (4.03) F21 - - 189.8769 (12.55) 34.9551 (3.51) 
F22 - - -48.1908 (2.72) 55.9964 (4.81) 
REGION - - -30.9146 (0.74) - 60.4762 (2.40) 
OPTICS - - 97.0315 (2.88) -46.2592 (1.89) 
CHEM - - 58.3687 (1.19) 65.0159 (1.77) 
ENGIN - - 320.6633 (3.31) -214.3995 (4.56) 
CONST 52.1196 (0.80) 87.0342 (1.08) 51.6785 (1.25) 81.2078 (2.48) CONST -227.8422 (0.84) -74.4235 (1.44) 147.5799 (3.89) 65.8726 (2.05) 
R.2 0.3014 0.2678 0.5766 0.8195 Rz 0.6799 0.7349 0.9616 0.9891 
Nous-. Dependent Variable: PROD 
Method: OLS (absolute t-Ratios in Parentheses) 
N = 27 (only PS Firms). 
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design increases and that in pay issues decreases productivity. Third, it is not 
unambiguous whether interaction effects predominate over direct PS and 
nonmonetary participation effects. Considering column 4 of Table 7.8, the results 
speak in favor of interaction effects. But factor analysis-see Table ?.?-obviously 
separates PS and participation effects. However, we do not know in which way 
factor 11 (FI 1) and factor 12 (Fl2) in Table 7.7 express different dimensions. It 
might be possible that independent from a specific reason FI 1 and Fl2 have to be 
separated but from the productivity view there is reciprocal reinforcement. The 
comparison of columns 7 and 8 in Table 7 .8 supports this idea. In column 7 more 
information is incorporated than in column 8, with the exception of the 
interaction between PS and nonpecuniary participation but the adjusted determina-
tion coefficient in 8 is higher than in 7. Therefore, we favor specification 8 with 
interaction effects. This means hypothesis H8 is preferred to AS. 
Comparison with U.S. Results 
Mitchell et al (1990: 55) emphasize that statistical research by academics on profit 
sharing in the United States has been extremely limited. Weitzman and Kruse 
(1990) and Kruse (1993) summarize the results of econometric U.S. studies on 
productivity effects of profit sharing and present new evidence, respectively. 
Generally, the productivity effects of PS are consistently positive and in most 
investigations significant. However, biases might exist that lead to the preponder-
ance of positive coefficients even if the true coefficient is zero. The publication 
process favors the dissemination of significantly positive results in the literature. 
The size of the effect varies almost certainly with the specification and the 
circumstances in which profit sharing is implemented. The mean estimated effect is 
calculated as 7.4 percent and the median estimate is 4.4 percent. The more recent 
study of Kruse (1992), who uses panel data from 1971 to 1985 obtains the 
following results: 
1 The coefficient of the profit sharing dummy that represents the increase in 
productivity in the year in which PS was adopted is positive and statistically 
significant. The increase amounts to 3.4 percent. 
2 The coefficient of the variable that measures the yearly change in productivity 
after adopting the profit sharing plan is positive, small, and insignificant. 
3 Using the proportion of employees within the firm covered by PS instead of 
dummy variables, the estimated coefficient is three times larger; the other results, 
however, tend to remain unchanged. 
4 Important differences between manufacturing and nonmanufacturing firms are 
not detected. 
In comparison with our investigation it should be stressed that we do not dispose 
of panel data and the sample is much smaller. However, more information is 
incorporated. The explained variance of the productivity variable is definitely 
higher than in the U.S. study. From our empirical evidence we cannot conclude 
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that PS really improves labor productivity independently of firms' characteristics, 
the level of PS and employees' degree of participation. 
U.S. investigations jointly analyzing PS and nonpecuniary participation are 
scarce. Levine and Tyson (1990: 205), for example, mention a case study of 
Hewlett-Packard where Quality Circles, self-directed work teams, and a cash profit 
sharing plan exist. Although econometric results are not presented their 
conclusion-not only on the basis of the Hewlett-Packard case study-is that 
growing evidence exists concerning the positive interaction between PS and 
participation which is more than the sum of its parts. This is in accord with our 
findings. Employers evaluate the productivity effects and improved labor-
management relations in a slightly more positive way than employees. The only 
U.S. study in which the two factors, PS and participation, are analyzed by 
regressions is published by Mitchell et al. (1990). They demonstrate in contrast to 
our results the existence of direct PS and participation effects on productivity and 
no effects on interaction. Furthermore, if participation is split in substantive 
participation and information sharing, the latter variable does not have an impact 
on productivity. Our results support this evidence. 
CONCLUSIONS 
The major results of our investigation are the following: 
1 There exists a wide range of voluntarily agreed PS schemes in Germany. Six 
main schemes have to be distinguished. The degree of diffusion differs between 
the schemes. This is partially determined by the legal framework. In our sample 
PS with a silent partnership predominates. 
2 We found that the probability of the existence of a PS scheme is higher in firms 
with a large number of employees, a low degree of competition, low market 
shares, and favorable economic conditions than in other firms. 
3 The positive productivity effects of PS are not so obvious as could be expected 
from the theoretical viewpoint. Alternative organizational structures and labor 
compensation systems often affect the economic performance of firms. Effects of 
nonpecuniary participation and of participatory arrangements which vary across 
institutional settings are more relevant in interaction with PS than as pure 
effects, a somewhat divergent result from that of a U.S. study. 
The observed results which differ compared to other studies might be due to 
varying sample selection and to the measurement of PS, participation and 
economic performance. 
Our results are preliminary in the sense that they are based on a small data set. 
We are in the process of extending the sample by incorporating profit sharing firms 
from North Rhine-Westfalia and of collecting information for a control group 
from the same federal state. Furthermore, we are involved in a second round of 
interviews in the PS firms. The control group of firms was already interviewed a 
second time. This procedure should be helpful to analyze time effects and to reduce 
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the impact of unobserved variables. Furthermore, as Pendleton et al (1991) 
emphasize, PS is an extremely complex phenomenon which can operate through a 
variety of processes, through the medium of attitudinal change. Therefore, it seems 
necessary to investigate further potential reactions of firms and workers to PS. 
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NOTES 
To identify a potential bias in the data source which might stem from the fact that PS 
firms were interviewed by lnfratest and the Institute for Quantitative Economic 
Research we performed the t-tests of the first part of Table 7.2 for these two subsamples 
of PS firms. With the exception of two additional variables (market policy concerning 
the most important product and the proportion of PS-eligible and actually participating 
employees) no significant differences were detected. 
REFERENCES 
Bera, A. K., Jarque, C. and Lee, L.-F. (1984) "Testing the Normality Assumption in 
Limited Dependent Variable Models," International Economic Review 25: 563-578. 
Blasi, J. R. (1988) Employee Ownership: Revolution or Ripojf?, Cambridge, MA. 
-- (1990) "Comment" in A. S. Blinder (ed.), Paying for Productivity, Washington. 
Blasi, J. R. and Kruse, D. L. (1991) The New Owners, New York. 
Blinder, A. S. (1990) (ed.), Paying/or Productivity, Washington. 
Cable, J. (1988) "A Model and Measure of Employee Participation: Guttman Scale Tests of 
the Espinosa-Zimbalist Hypothesis," in D. C. Jones and J. Svejnar (eds), Advances in the 
Economics of Labour-Managed and Participatory Firms, 3, Greenwich. 
Cable, J. and FitzRoy, F. (1980) "Productive Efficiency, Incentives and Employee 
Participation: Some Preliminary Results for West Germany," Kyklos 33: 100-121. 
Cable, J. and Wilson, N. (1989) "Profit-sharing and Productivity: An Analysis of UK 
Engineering Firms," Economic Journal 99: 366-375. 
Conte, M. A. and Svejnar, J. (1990) "The Performance Effects of Employee Ownership 
Plans," in A. S. Blinder (ed.), Paying/or Productivity, Washington. 
Davidson, R. and MacKinnon, J. G. (1984) "Convenient Tests for Logic and Probit 
Models," Journal of Econometrics 25: 241-262. 
FitzRoy, F. (1990) "Profit Sharing Arguments-Macro- and Micro-economic Effects," 
University of St. Andrews, mimeo. 
FitzRoy, F. and Kraft, K. (1985) "Mitarbeiterbeteiligung und Produktivitat: Eine 
okonometrische Untersuchung," Zeitschrift for Betriebswirtschaft 55: 21-36. 
-- (1986) "Profitability and Profit Sharing," Journal of Industrial Economics 35: 
113-130. 
-- (1987) "Cooperation, Productivity and Profit Sharing," Quarterly Journal of 
Economics 102: 23-37. 
(1992) "Forms of Profit Sharing and Firm Performance: Theoretical Foundations and 
203 
VIVIAN CARSTENSEN, KNUT GERLACH, OLAF HOBLER 
Empirical Problems," Kyklos45: 209-225. 
Gilman, N. P. (1891) Proftt-sharingbe~enEmployerandEmployee, New York. 
Guski, H. G. and Schneider H. J. (1983) Betrieb/iche Vermogensbeteiligung in der 
Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and, Part II, Cologne. 
-- (1986) "Betriebliche Vermogensbeteiligung, Bestandsaufnahme," Beitriige zur 
Wirtschafis- und Sozialpolitik 145, lnstitut der deutschen Wirtschaft, Cologne. 
Hashimoto, M. (1979) "Bonus Payments, On-the-Job Training, and Lifetime Employment 
in Japan," journal of Political Economy 87: 1251-1271. 
Heckman, J. J. (1979) "Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error," Econometrica 47: 
153-161. 
Hubler, 0. (1993) "Productivity, Earnings, and Profit Sharing-An Econometric Analysis 
of Alternative Models," Empirical Economics 18: 357-380. 
Kruse, D. L. (1991) "Profit Sharing in the 1980s: Disguised Wages or a Fundamentially 
Different Form of Compensation?," in R. W. Eberts and E. L. Groshen (eds), Structural 
Changes in U.S. Labor Markets, Armonk, NY /London. 
-- (1992) "Profit Sharing and Productivity: Microeconomic Evidence from the United 
States," Economic journal 102: 24-36. 
-- (1993) "Profit Sharing-Does it make a Difference?," Kalamazoo, Mich. 
Levine, D. and Tyson, L. (1990) "Participation, Productivity, and the Firm's Environ-
ment," in A. S. Blinder (ed.), Payingfor Productivity, Washington. 
McFadden, D. (1973) "Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior," in P. 
Zarembka (ed.), Frontiers in Econometrics, New York. 
Ministerium fur Arbeit, Gesundheit, Familie und Sozialordnung des Landes Baden-
Wurttemberg (1990) (ed.), Beteiligung am Produktivkapital Stuttgart. 
Mitchell, D. J., Lewin, D. and Lawler, E. E. (1990) "Alternative Pay Systems, Firm 
Performance, and Productivity," in A. S. Blinder (ed.), Paying for Productivity, 
Washington. 
Orme, C. (1990) "The Small Sample Performance of the Information Matrix Test," Journal 
of Econometrics 46: 309-331. 
Palokangas, T. (1992) "Binding Contracts, Profit-sharing and the Degree of Centraliz-
ation," journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics 148: 260-273. 
Pendleton, A., Wilson, N. and Walley, K (1991) "Profit Sharing and Employee Share 
Ownership: A Survey of Recent Developments in the UK," University of Bradford, mimeo. 
Schanz, G. and Riekhof, H.-C. (1983) Mitarbeiterkapitalbeteiligung in der Wirtschaft 
Niedersachsens, Hannover. 
Schneider, H.J. and Zander, E. (1990) Erfolg.r- und Kapitalbeteiligung der Mitarbeiter in 
Klein- und Mittelbetrieben, Freiburg. 
Steinherr, A. (1977) "On the Efficiency of Profit Sharing and Labor Participation in 
Management," Bel/Journal of Economics 8: 545-555. 
Thunen, J. H. von (1850) Der isolierte Staat in Beziehung auf Landwirtschaft und 
Nationa/okonomie, zweiter Tei! (second part) Der naturgemiijfe Arbeitslohn und dessen 
Verhiiltnis zu Zinsfujf und zur Landrente, Rostock. 
Uvalic, M. (1991) "The Pepper Report. Promotion of Employee Participation in Profits and 
Enterprise Results in the Member States of the European Community," Florence/ 
Brussels: Commission of the European Communities. 
Weitzman, M. L. (1983) "Some Macroeconomic Implications of Alternative Compensation 
Systems," Economic journal 93: 763-783. 
-- (1984) The Share Economy, Cambridge. 
-- (1985) "The Simple Macroeconomics of Profit Sharing," American Economic Review 
75: 937-953. 
-- (1987) "Steady State Unemployment under Profit Sharing," Economic journal 97: 
86-105. 
204 
PROFIT SHARING IN GERMAN FIRMS 
Weitzman, M. and Kruse, D. L. (1990) "Profit Sharing and Productivity," in A. S. Blinder 
(ed.), Payingfor Productivity, Washington. 

































degree of absenteeism 
suggestions of alternative incentives to PS (I = yes) 
has the employees' attitude to work positively changed after the adoption of 
PS (I= yes) 
assessment of profits (per sales) compared ro competitors (I = much better 
... 5 = extremely worse) 
proportion of apprentices 
test for normality (Bera et al 1984) 
proportion of capital held by employees 
capital intensity 
cash PS payment (I = yes) 
(I = chemical sector) 
degree of competition (I = low, 2 = average, 3 = high) 
squared correlation between observed and expected values 
dummy for reason to adopt PS (1 = decline of absenteeism was an objective 
of the introduction) 
degree of participation of the employees in decision making: dummy (I if 
DPARTE>6) 
degree of participation of the works council in decision making: dummy (I 
ifDPARTWC>6) 
To determine DPARTWC (DPARTE) the degree of involvement in 
decision making (beyond codified German codetermination) i~ considered 
for the four fields: (a) investment and rationalization; (b) wage determina-
tion; (c) personnel; (d) workplace and then scored: no (0 points), access to 
information (I point), discussion (2 points), worker initiated changes (3 
points). The sum of scores constitutes DPARTWC (DPARTE). 
dummy (1 if actual wage level exceeds bargained wage level) 
degree of freedom 
dummy for reason to adopt PS (1 =fairness ... ) 
dummy for reason to adopt PS (I = reduction of fluctuation ... ) 
dummy for introduction of PS relative to the Property Development Act in 
1984 (1 = introduction after 1984) 
dummy for reason to adopt PS (I = legal subsidies ... ) 
dummy for reason to adopt PS (I= improved maintenance of material. .. ) 
test for homoscedasticity of all exogenous variables (Davidson and 
MacKinnon 1984) 
participation of works council in investment and rationalization (0, 1,2,3) 
participation of employees in investment and rationalization (0,l,2,3) 
participation of works council in personnel decisions (0, 1,2,3) 
participation of employees in personnel decisions (0, 1,2,3) 
participation of works council in pay issues (0, 1,2,3) 
participation of employees in pay issues (0, 1,2,3) 
participation of works council in job design (0, 1,2,3) 
participation of employees in job design (0, 1,2,3) 
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=DPARTI 1 + DPART21 + DPART31 + DPART41 
=DPARTl + DPART2 + DPART3 + DPART4 
dummy (1 = private pension system exists) 
dummy for reason co adopt PS (1 = co increase productivity ... ) 
dummy (1 = profit sharing exists) 
dummy for reason co adopt PS (1 = accraccion of highly qualified 
workers ... ) 
dummy (1 = seniority wages are paid) 
dummy for reason co adopt PS (1 = to improve pannership and solidarity 
between management and workers ... ) 
dummy (1 = financial suppon of che firm for further training of the 
employees) 
ratio of actual co bargained wage 
dummy for effect of PS (1 = PS reduced fluctuation) 
proponion of eligible employees (for PS firms only) 
dummy (1 = engineering sector) 
dummy for effect of PS (1 = PS increased productivity) 
dummy for effect of PS (1 = PS improved solidarity) 
expons per sales 
assessment of former experience (1 = extremely negative ... 5 = extremely 
positive) 
formal (representative) panicipacion in decision making: 
FPART = QCC + TW + JLMC (aggregate of formal institutions: quality 
circle (QCC), team work (TW), regular joint tabor-management consulta-
tion committees 0LMC) measured as dummies) 
firm specific fringe benefits (nonwage labor costs) 
firm size (number of employees) 
classes of firm size (1 = 5-49 employees, 2 = 50-199 employees, 3 = >200 
employees) 
factor scores of factor 1 from principal component analysis co PS-
panicipacion variables 
factor scores of factor 2 from ... co PS-participation variables 
factor scores of factor 1 from ... co firms' characteristics 
factor scores of factor 2 from ... co firms' characteristics 
number of hierarchical levels 
information matrix cesc for correct specification (Orme 1990) 
dummy (1 = firm introduced new or substantially improved products) 
investment per sales 
proportion of PS participating employees (for PS firms only) 
panicipation as incentive co increase effort (I = vety suitable 
... 5 = unsuitable) 
promotion as incentive ... 
profit sharing as incentive ... 
log-likelihood function 
level of profit sharing 
likelihood ratio test statistic 
number of major customers (0 = none, 1 = 1, 2 = 2-10) 
ranking score across the external proxy for the gross profit situation of a 
sector: (value added-labor costs) per sales. Eleven sectors are considered 
(1 = sector with worst situation ... 11 = sector with/ best situation). 
dummy (1 = metal products sector) 
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number of observations 
dummy (1 = optics products sector) 
overtime work per employee and year 
proportion of employees with PS 
piecework (1 = yes) 
profits per capital 
profits per employee 
prob value (100 times empirical level of significance) of a statistical test(.) 
labor productivity (value added per employee) 
McFadden-R2 (McFadden 1973) 
level of profit sharing per employee 
level of profit sharing per participating employee 
level of profit sharing per profit 
level of profit sharing per wages 
number of years employees have participated in profits 
=LPS times DPARTl 
=LPS times DPART2 
=LPS times DPART3 
=LPS times DPART4 
=LPS times DPARTWC 
=LPS times FPART 
percentage of work force unionized 
expenditures for research and development 
dummy (1 = Lower Saxony, 0 = Baden-Wiirttemberg) 
sales 
market share of the most important product 
proportion of skilled workers with a university degree 
dummy (1 = stone, sand, and clay industty) 
training expenditure per employee 
dummy (1 = workers' attidude to the firm has changed through PS) 
proportion of white-collar workers 
dummy (1 = works council exists) 
wages per employee 





Wolfgang Franz and David Soskice 
INTRODUCTION 
The German apprenticeship system holds fascination for labor economists, since it 
is an example of a system in which many companies make substantial net 
investments in marketable skills. Moreover, although German companies are 
exhorted from time to time to provide more apprenticeship places, such exhorta-
tion is not the rule; and there is no system of sanctions or penalties for companies 
that do not have an apprenticeship program: a large proportion of companies in 
fact do not. Nor do companies cut corners with their apprentices: unions and 
employer associations, with input from the public authorities, bargain out the 
content of the company part of apprenticeship programs, with the result that the 
skills are genuinely marketable; the operation of the programs are monitored by 
both local chambers and by works councils within companies; and successful 
completion of the apprenticeship requires the passing of serious external 
examinations. 
It is true that companies bear by no means all the costs of the apprenticeship: 
The apprentice accepts a very low wage for the three-year duration of the training. 
Expertise is available at low or no cost to the company on setting up a program and 
on incorporating new ideas from employer associations and the chambers, as well 
as from the unions. Above all, part of the training, usually a day a week, takes place 
in a public training school. The whole cost of this part of the training-the two 
parts together lead the apprenticeship system to be described as the 'dual 
system' -is borne out of the public purse. 
Nonetheless it remains the case that the contribution of companies is significant. 
It ranges from rather low net investments per apprentice by small handwerk 
companies to sizable net contributions by large companies. We try in this chapter 
to give some tentative explanations for this behavior: Why should profit-maximiz-
ing companies make net investments in marketable skills? Pages 203-212 of the 
chapter sets the scene by describing the operation of the system, including the 
statistical picture in terms of supply and demand and costs; the relationship 
between the vocational training and the educational systems; the complex of 
regulations that companies engaging in apprenticeship training have to respect; and 
208 
THE GERMAN APPRENTICESHIP SYSTEM 
the relevant institutions. Pages 212-235 develop two simple ideas as at least partial 
and complementary explanations of company behavior. The first is that it is 
significantly more expensive to teach company-specific skills to externally hired 
workers with marketable skills. The second tries to capture the belief that 
companies have that the apprenticeship system is some sort of competition that 
they must go in for if they are to get the best young employees fresh from school. 
INSTITUTIONAL REGULATIONS AND A QUANTITATIVE 
OVERVIEW 
Apprenticeship training in Germany is referred to as a dual system of vocational 
training. Trainees receive both school education at special vocational schools and 
on-the-job training at firms. Therefore, in what follows both components of the 
dual system are explained in some detail. 1 
To begin with vocational school education, each person leaving elementary 
school (mostly at the age of 15 years) has to attend either a pan-time compulsory 
vocational training school for three years or otherwise undergo a higher general or 
vocational school education. Teaching at a vocational training school (Berufsschule) 
takes place either once a week for eight hours or in forming blocks of six or seven 
weeks twice a school year or as one 12-week bloc. The latter organization enables 
vocational schools to offer a broader variety of special courses. While this part-time 
attendance at the Berufsschule is the most common type of education, there exists a 
variety of other forms. Among them the so-called "basic vocational training year" 
(Berufsgrundbildungjahr) is worthwhile to mention because in West Germany in 
1991-1992 some 8 percent of all pupils at the Berufsschule were undergoing such a 
training year. The highest attention is given by the young people to a full-time 
school-based basic vocational training year. That means these young people are 
pupils at the Berufsschule for the whole week and not, as is otherwise typical for the 
dual system, simultaneously part-time pupils and trainees in the firm. In contrast to 
the part-time Berufsschule, young people embarking on such a full-time school 
bases course must have completed the compulsory period of education, i.e., the 
lower secondary school (Hauptschule). 
The body responsible for vocational schools is local authorities but they are 
supervised by the regional Land ministries of education. The organization of 
vocational schools depends mostly on the size of the local community. For villages 
or small towns there exists a district vocational school with departments for trade 
and industry, commercial business, and domestic science. For towns of greater size 
there are separate vocational training schools according to the divisions mentioned 
before. 
With respect to quantitative magnitudes, Table 8.1 provides information on the 
distribution of school population and school leavers, respectively, among several 
types of education. The figures on school population should be viewed with care, 
however, since in the thirty years under consideration the number of young people 
changed substantially. In 1960 some 17 million people were under the age of 21, 
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Table 8.1 School Population and School Leavers in West Germany 1960-1990 (% )' 
1960 1970 1980 1990 
School Populationb 8.6 11.0 11.8 9.1 
Primary School 36.0 36.1 23.5 27.9 
( Gruntlschule) 
Lower Secondary 24.7 21.5 19.3 14.0 
School (Hauptschule) 
Upper Secondary School 14.9 20.4 29.4 26.6 
(Realschule/ Gymnasium) 
Vocational Training 22.6 18.8 22.6 10.6 
System< 
School Leaversb 0.6 1.3 1.8 1.4 
Lower Secondary School 
Leaving Certificate 
Yes 55.2 26.8 22.2 14.6 
No 17.7 10.8 6.2 3.9 
Higher Education 8.8 7.0 12.6 20.1 
Certificate (Abitur)d 
Vocational School Completed 40.1 34.9 40.7 
Source: Institut der Deutschen Wirtschaft, Zahlen zur wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland 1992, table 125; calculations by the authors 
Notes-. • see text for details. 
b millions of persons. 
' figures include various types of vocational schools. 
d including certificate for attending 'Fachhochschulen'. 
i.e., 30 percent of the whole population. The 1960's experienced the baby boom 
resulting in 19 million people of the aforementioned age group in 1970, i.e., 32 
percent of the population. After this a considerable decline of births took place, so 
that in 1990 the figures are 14 million persons and 22 percent, respectively. Hence, 
the age structure of the school population changed toward the disadvantage of 
youngsters. Therefore, the figures on those leaving school constitute the more 
reliable numbers. From them a dramatic increase of school leavers with higher 
education certificates can be observed while the percentages of young people who 
complete vocational training schools of various types do not differ between 1970 
and 1990. 
It has been mentioned that the category "vocational training system" in Table 8.1 
includes several types, with the Berufischule described before as the most important 
school. Other schools are, for example, the Berufifachschulen and the Fachschulen. 
By and large, both are vocational prep schools. The Berufifachschulen are one-year 
schools with a full week teaching and aim to prepare for working life with or 
without previous practical experience in a profession. Attendance of a Berufifach-
schule is voluntary and may replace vocational training schools. This holds also for 
the Fachschule, with the major difference that this school is attended by young 
people after vocational training and experience thus offering more intensive 
210 
THE GERMAN APPRENTICESHIP SYSTEM 
training in certain professions in a time period between 6 months and 3 years. 
Taken together, young people entering apprenticeships are not only the 15-year-
old graduates from the lower secondary school, but also persons who graduate from 
intermediate secondary schools, upper secondary schools, and those who have 
already completed the vocational preschools described above. Moreover, many 
young men deliberately complete military service before starting an apprenticeship 
training. These aspects together explain why the average age for young Germans to 
enroll in apprenticeship training exceeds 15 years and may be as high as 19 years as 
is found in a study by Biichtemann et aL (1993) which is based on seven waves of 
the German socio-economic panel (1978-1990). 
Whatever the age of a person trying to receive an apprenticeship training 
position, Table 8.2 is devoted to a comparison between demand for and supply of 
apprenticeship training within private firms and the public sector. "Demand" and 
"supply" are rather ambitious words because parts of them are only known if 
registered at the labor offices. This concerns unfilled apprenticeship positions and 
applicants not yet provided with an apprenticeship training positions (rows 2 and 
4, respectively). Given this caveat, rows 3 and 5 denote the annually observed 
supply of and demand for, respectively, apprenticeship training positions (as 
opposed to the existing stock of positions in row 6). Taken at face value the second 
half of the 1970's indicates an equilibrium situation on the market for apprentice-
ships. However, the average figures conceal imbalances, especially in 1975-1976, 
to the disadvantage of young people searching for apprenticeships. These years 
were characterized by an increased demand for apprenticeship training positions 
stemming from the entrance of the baby boom cohort of the 1960' s into the labor 
Table 8.2 Apprenticeship Training Positions in West Germany 1975-1991 (00s)• 
1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1991 
1. Newly filled apprenticeship 552 654 643 543 
training positions 
2. Unfilled apprenticeship 24 29 49 122 
training positions 
3. Supply of apprenticeship 576 683 692 665 
training positions 
(rows 1 + 2) 
4. Applicants not yet provided 25 36 36 13 
5. Demand for apprenticeship 577 690 679 556 
training positions 
(rows 1 + 4) 
6. Total apprentices 1,441 1,718 1,717 1,477b 
Sources: Sachverstandigenrat zur Begutachcung der gesamcwirtschaftlichen Encwicklung, Annual Report 
1989/90, table 12; Institut der Deucschen Wirtschafc, Zahlm zur wirtschaftlichen Entwicklung der 
Bundesrepublik DeutschlAnd, table 132 
Notes: • Averages per year reported September 30th. 
b 1990. 
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market. On the other side, the supply of apprenticeship positions declined after 
1972 due to the recession and regained the 1972 level of about 640,000 positions 
in 1978-1979 only. Similar observations hold for the first half of the 1980's. 
While on average the market can be characterized as being in a slight excess 
demand situation, this is only due to the excess supply in 1980-1981. The 
consecutive years experience a considerable excess demand which peaks in 
1984-1985 with a lack of 37,000 positions, i.e., about 5 percent of the demand 
for apprenticeships. In the second half of the 1980's the situation on the market 
began to change dramatically. The baby boom cohort of the 1960's passed through 
the dual system and, in addition, the demand for higher education at universities 
increased substantially. Hence, demand was falling and this process strengthened in 
the beginning of the 1990's with an excess supply of 43,000 positions in 1992 and 
is expected to continue in the foreseeable future. 2 
The coexistence between unfilled positions and unprovided applicants indicates a 
mismatch on this market due to regional imbalances and/or because the positions 
supplied do not meet the preferences for certain professions by the applicants. 
Moreover, unprovided applicants sometimes accept training in a profession not 
really desired. Therefore, not all filled apprenticeship positions are perfect matches 
between professions supplied and demanded. 
Regional imbalances are most obviously observed between West and East 
Germany. (For purposes of comparison, this chapter retains the preunification 
terms 'West' and 'East' Germany.) While in the first half of 1993 in West 
Germany each applicant could choose between two positions supplied, in April 
1993 two thirds of all East German applicants had not yet found a training 
position.3 As of November 1993, some 146,000 applicants in East Germany had 
been offered 84,000 apprenticeship positions in the private sector in 1993. About 
50,000 had found a position in West Germany and more than 5,000 youths 
received training in public training centers. 
Table 8.3 is an attempt to obtain some insight as to whether a qualifications 
mismatch governs the market for apprenticeships. The major drawback of these 
figures is that they only refer to positions and applicants registered at the labor 
offices. Under this proviso it can be seen that supply and demand are sometimes 
perfectly matched at a greater scale such as for marketing and sales. On the other 
hand, there is a considerable excess demand for apprenticeships in administrative 
professions and an excess supply of positions for metal manufacturers. It goes 
without saying that even fairly balanced markets for certain professions may be 
subject to a regional mismatch and vice versa. 
Due to general imbalances and/or mismatch on the market for apprenticeships 
there are young people without training contracts. They have to attend the 
vocational training school nevertheless and may be employed or unemployed 
otherwise. Table 8.4 displays the evidence about the characteristics of young people 
without training contracts in West Germany. For example, in 1990, some 1.4 
percent of all young people attending the Berufichule on a part-time basis had no 
training contract and 1.8 percent were unemployed. Due to the recession the latter 
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Table 8.3 Professions Mismatch on the Market for Apprenticeships in West 
Germany 1991-19921 
Profession 







Marketing and sales 
Administration 





























Source: Amtliche Nachrichtm der Bundaanstalt for Arbeit (ANBA) (1993), 5: 916 
Notes: • percentages of all registered positions and applicants, respectively; not all possible 
professions are listed, hence column sums do not add to 100; see text for explanations. 
Table 8.4 Young People at Vocational Schools by Employment Status in 
West Germany (%)1 
Total number of pupils (000) 
Male (000) 
Female (000) 
Employed with apprenticeship contract 
Male 
Female 



















Source: Statistisches Bundesamt, Fachserie 11, Row 2 ( 1983: 83; 1990: 46) 














figures were higher in 1983. Moreover, young females suffer more from not having 
a contract and/or being unemployed. Most of the young people without training 
contracts do not have a Hauptschule leaving certificate and exhibit a comparatively 
poor performance including disturbed or retarded social behavior. It has been 
shown elsewhere that both the risk of becoming unemployed and the duration of 
unemployment are positively influenced by these deficits.4 
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The next relevant question is which firms offer apprenticeship training positions. 
Supply of such a training is voluntary although firms have been urged to offer these 
positions by the public and their chambers in times of an excess demand for 
apprenticeship training positions in the 1970's. In addition, a law to promote the 
supply of apprenticeship training positions enacted in 1976 authorized the federal 
government to levy a tax on firms not offering these positions if there is not an 
excess supply of at least 12.5 percent of demand. In fact, this tax has never been 
introduced although its requirements were met in the 1970's. By the end of 1980, 
however, the aforementioned law was ruled out in general by the federal supreme 
court on formal legal grounds and the new law enacted afterwards did not contain 
such a tax. 
A very important distinction is to be made between "Handwerk" and "Industrie," 
where the first expression refers to the small artisan and crafts sector while Industrie 
corresponds with large-scale manufacturing and service sector activities. Not only is 
the Handwerk sector the origin of the apprenticeship system which can be traced 
back at least until the nineteenth century but in addition the motives to supply 
apprenticeship training positions may differ from that in the industry and trade 
sector. In what follows this distinction should be kept in mind. 
While no firm can be forced to offer training, not every firm is entitled to do so. 
Both the instructors and the training programs have to fulfill several requirements 
which are fixed in a law concerning vocational education (Berufsbildungrgesetz of 
1969) and are supervised mostly by the chambers of crafts and of industry/trade, 
respectively. The qualifications of the instructors are also laid down in a decree 
(Ausbildn-Eignungrverordnung). Qualifications for an instructor can be obtained 
during an education as master craftsmen. These are successful apprentices who 
undergo a more advanced qualification and embark on courses at master crafts-
men's colleges. They have to pass exams at the chamber of crafts or industry/trade 
and receive the title "Meister." The training program of the apprentices is subject to 
several regulations, too. There are about 400 recognized trades and occupations the 
contents of which are laid down in official training regulations. They specify the 
type, organization, and duration of training including the attendance at the part-
time vocational school described before. Moreover, a detailed set of guidelines 
concerning the curriculum and the level of education are laid down with a 
tendency in the past decade to upgrade these requirements. 
How training is actually managed within the firm depends, among other factors, 
on the size of the firm. In small firms or craft businesses training takes place on the 
job directly, whereas large industries have established training centers exclusively 
designed for training and not for producing goods to be sold on the market. In 
addition, smaller firms sometimes can send trainees to centers that are jointly 
funded by the local chambers of commerce and the Federal Ministry of Education 
and Science. 
The overwhelming part of all apprentices, 84 percent in 1990, for example, is 
trained either in the industry and trade sector or in the crafts sector. Although the 
industry and trade sector is training considerably more young people than the crafts 
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sector, this ranking is reversed if the apprentices are compared with all employees 
in the respective sector. 
Table 8.5 highlights the evidence. As of 1990, the percentages differ roughly by 
a factor of three. The contribution of the crafts sector is even more distinct in 
1980. Although both sectors increased their supply of apprenticeship training 
positions as a reaction to several appeals by the public, government, and their 
chambers to meet the excess demand for these positions, the crafts sector, 
compared with its employees, undertook higher efforts so that the relation 
apprentices to employees amounted to one to five this year. After 1980, however, 
the crafts sector reduced training to mid-1970's levels whereas the decline in the 
industry and trade sector was less marked. 
Put differently, the above figures suggest that the crafts sector educates young 
people in excess who are then employed in the industry and trade sector. Indeed, a 
study by Hofbauer (I 977) reveals that in 1970 out of all male employees with a 
completed apprenticeship training roughly two thirds received their education in 
the crafts sector, but only one quarter were employed there. 
Table 8.6 breaks down employees and apprentices by major sectors in West 
Germany 1992. Apparently, male apprentices are concentrated in the manufactur-
ing sector which includes crafts while the major share of females receives their 
training in the service sector. 
Table 8.6 also displays monthly earnings figures for apprentices in West 
Germany 1992. Although these numbers represent already aggregates over 
subsectors and training years (see pages 210-212), they display a high variability 
ranging from DM889 for females in the agricultural sector to DMl, 175 for males 
Table 8.5 Apprentices Trained in Crafts and Industry{frade in West Germany 
1960-1990" 
Crafts Industry and Trade 
Apprentices Employees Apprentices Employees 
(000} (mill/ %' (000) (mill/ %' 
1960 447 3.5 12.8 743 12.6 5.9 
1970 420 3.4 12.4 725 14.2 5.1 
1980 702 3.4 20.6 787 14.4 5.5 
1990 487 3.4 14.1 756 15.5 4.9 
Sources: Statistisches Jahrbuch for die Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and, various volumes; Statistisches 
Bundesamt, Fachserie 11, Reihe 3 (1990: 17). Institut der Deutschen Wircschaft, Z'.ahlen zur 
wirtschafilichm Entwicklung der Bundesrepublik Deutsch/and 1992, cable 66; Sachverstiindigcnrat zur 
Begutachtung der gcsamtwirtschaftlichen Entwicklung, Annual Report 1992/93, cable 23'; 
Bundcsministerium fur Wircschaft, Wirtschafi in Zahlen 92, table 4.6, calculations by the authors 
Notes: • Sec text for details; 
h excluding apprentices; 
' apprentices as a percentage of figures in previous column. 
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Table 8.6 Employees, Apprentices, and Earnings by Sector in West Germany I 9921 
Apprentices Monthly Earnings (DM) 
% ofa/1 %of 
1,000 persons Employeel Apprentices Earnings' 
Selected Sectors Mak Female Male Female Mak Female Male Female 
Agriculture 18 9 14 13 907 889 23 28 
Manufacturing (incl. 360 107 7 5 1,058 1,040 18 27 
crafts business) 
Construction 135 13 9 7 1,160 1,103 24 27 
Trade and 127 125 5 5 955 896 19 26 
Transportation 
Public Sector 40 69 2 4 1,175 1,155 20 23 
Services 138 370 7 11 1,034 961 22 32 
Total< 842 696 6 7 1,070 984 20 27 
Source. Deutsches lnstitut fur Wircschaftsforschung (DIW) (1993), Wochmbmcht, 15, April 15: 191; 
calculations by the authors 
Notes: • Fourth quarter; see text for explanations. 
h Excluding apprentices, 
' Percentage of earnings of blue- and white-collar workers (weighted average). 
J Includes all sectors of the economy. 
in the public sector. The earnings differential between males and females does not 
mean, however, that females are paid less in the same training program. The main 
reason why earnings differ is that compensation is distinct in levels within those 
sectors by the type of the training. Females are more than proportionally trained in 
occupations which are paid less. One reason for these differences is that the 
compensations paid to the apprentices are, to a large extent, the result of 
negotiations between unions and employers' confederations in context with the 
wage bargaining process which in Germany is organized by industries and regions. 
The negotiated compensation is distinguished by year of training. For example, 
compensations paid in 1993 for trainees in banking are DMl,034, 1,129, and 
1,234 in the first, second, and third training year, respectively. 
The aforementioned figures on compensation paid to the apprentices represent 
only parts of the costs of such a training the firm has to meet. Two aspects deserve 
attention in order to calculate these costs. First, additional costs have to be taken 
into account such as employers' contributions to social security, work clothes and 
the like. Equally important are costs of the training process itself such as establish-
ing and operating training centers and classes for theoretical instructions. Clearly 
these costs arise in larger firms mainly, and to a lesser amount, if any, in the crafts 
sector. Second, these gross costs have to be balanced against the revenues stemming 
from contributions by apprentices to value added. These profits increase with 
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training duration and occur in firms or crafts businesses where apprentices directly 
work in the production process rather than in training centers. Especially, but not 
exclusively, the crafts sector gains from apprentices not only because in the course 
of their training they produce marketable goods and services but also due to the 
fact that the craft business saves costs of carrying out inferior work which would 
occur were there no apprentices. 
Table 8.7 attempts to give some information on gross and net training costs, 
respectively. These figures display estimates for 1985 based on a 1980 survey taken 
by the Bundesinstitut for Berufsbildung (Federal Institute for Vocational Edu-
cation). The gross costs include (a) the compensation paid to the trainees including 
employers' contributions to social securiry, (b) wage costs of the staff training the 
apprentices, and (c) administrative and material costs. The first two types of costs 
represent about 50 and 40 percent, respectively, of total costs. It has to be noted 
that these costs can be deducted from taxable revenues. The difference between 
gross and net costs are revenues produced by the apprentices. It goes without saying 
that especially the estimates about revenues are subject to imprecision because firms 
typically underestimate these revenues. 
As can be seen gross costs are considerably higher in the industry and trade sector 
compared with the crafts sector. On the other hand, the revenues do not differ so 
much; they amount to DM8,4000 and DM7,9000 on average in each sector. 
Moreover, there is a tendency of gross costs to increase by firm size while a decline 
can be observed for revenues. As has been mentioned one reason for this development 
Table R.7 Annual Training Costs per Apprentice by Sector and Firm Size in 
West Germany 1985 (DMl,000)" 
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of gross costs are training centers in large firms. Their costs are, however, subject to 
diminishing average costs below a given firm size (500 persons, for example). 
In other words, due to a possible underestimation of the revenues in the 
Handwerk sector there is reason to argue that the net costs of training may be small 
if not negative. This makes it clear that firms may take on apprentices for 
fundamentally different reasons. In addition to possible net benefits in the 
Handwerk sector there is anecdotal evidence that especially in small towns and 
villages the small craft or artisan employers and the parents of applicants for an 
apprenticeship training know each other for some time for reasons such as 
belonging to the same social circles. Hence, in addition to a possible pressure from 
the chamber there might exist some personal network motivating training in the 
Handwerk sector more or less absent in the industry and trade sector. 
On average of all sectors net training costs amounted to DM12,348 in 1985. 
One way to give an impression of the order of magnitude is to compare this figure 
with the wage costs of a worker who has successfully completed such a training. In 
1985 such a male worker (Facharbeiter) in the industry had a monthly income of 
about DM3,000. That means that gross wage costs relevant for the employer's 
decision amount to some DM5,300 per month. Given annual training costs per 
employee of DM15,000 and a training period of three years, an apprentice costs 
approximately 8 to 9 months of a Facharbeiters income. 
ANALYSIS OF THE APPRENTICESHIP SYSTEM: WHY DO 
COMPANIES TRAIN APPRENTICES? 
The discussion of the German apprenticeship system in the first section of this 
..::hapter poses for the economist the classic question raised most clearly by Becker: 
"Why should a company pay for the training of a young person in marketable 
skills?" As is well known, Becker's argument was that a company would make no 
contribution to training in marketable skills because, once the person had acquired 
the skills, he or she would have to be paid the market wage; in which case it would 
be more profitable for the company to hire in someone who had been trained 
elsewhere, since the company would pay the same wage and avoid the costs of 
training. 
In spite of Becker's argument, we pointed out in pages 208-210, first that many 
German companies train apprentices (Table 8.6); second, that companies appear to 
pay substantial net amounts to cover the cost of the training (Table 8.7); third, 
that the successful completion of an apprenticeship leads to a marketable certificate 
of skills in the relevant occupation; fourth, there is no financial or other contractual 
bonding and the young person is at liberty, on completion of the apprenticeship, 
to leave the company in which they were apprenticed and seek employment 
elsewhere; indeed, this is common for those trained in the craft sector; and finally, 
while institutional pressure on companies to take apprentices has not been 
unknown, nor is it the rule-as is attested by the excess supply of apprenticeship 
places in West Germany in recent years (Table 8.2, row 2). 
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There is no accepted explanation of why German companies appear prepared to 
pay to train apprentices in marketable skills. In what follows, we make two 
assumptions: that German companies are behaving rationally to maximize profits; 
and that they are not subjected to any direct form of institutional, social, or 
political pressure in their choices. Clearly, these assumptions should not be taken as 
literally true in all cases; but they provide for a sharper analysis and one which is 
more useful in an internationally comparative context. 
We focus in this theoretical section on the facts that most clearly challenge 
Becker's argument that companies do not invest in training their employees in 
general skills, by looking at large and medium-large companies the great majority 
of whom train apprentices. The arguments suggested here probably apply less well 
to smaller companies. Indeed there is a case in analyzing the German apprentice-
ship system for distinguishing at least broadly between larger and smaller 
companies. A case can be made that the method of training cost calculation greatly 
exaggerates the net cost to small companies (Soskice (1993)). In looking at larger 
companies in this chapter, however, the net cost of training to the company is 
taken at its face value. Why then do larger companies train? The following pages 
are devoted to two complementary explanations of why it may be profitable for 
larger companies to invest in apprentices. 
Large Companies: Specific Skills and the Apprenticeship Calculation 
Company-specific skills cannot be easily measured, but there are several reasons for 
believing that they are of considerable importance in German companies. First, a 
large body of case study evidence shows that work organization in German 
companies involves skilled employees (who are not necessarily the majority of the 
work force) in jobs with considerable responsibility both individually and in 
groups, with knowledge of the company's products and technology, reorganization 
of production processes, as well as skills in working with company engineers; this is 
not confined to manufacturing and appears also to be true of banks. Second, as 
indirect evidence of company-specific skills, German tenure lengths are exception-
ally long on average. 
Company specific skills, on the usual assumptions, do not affect the Becker 
argument. The intuition is straightforward: since the company bears the costs of 
investing in company-specific skills and gains the return from them (net of a wage 
premium to discourage quitting), the company should be indifferent between 
investing in skilled workers hired from the external market and investing in skilled 
workers rrained as apprentices in the company. But the assumptions necessary for 
this argument to work are sharper than often realized. In particular, if 
1 the costs to the company of investing in specific costs by training apprentices are 
significantly lower than the costs of training externally hired skilled workers, and 
if 
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2 specific skills are necessary for using maketable skills; it may pay the company to 
train apprentices rather than hire skilled workers externally. 
Both the usual Becker argument and the reasons why it does not hold under these 
conditions will be demonstrated in a slightly more formal way in a: moment. Before 
that, we suggest why these conditions may hold in larger German companies and 
why intuitively this makes it profitable for companies to train apprentices. 
There are good reasons to believe that both conditions may hold in many larger 
German companies today. The first condition is that it is less costly to train 
company-specific skills to apprentices than to train them to externally hired skilled 
workers. There are two reasons why this is so: 
(a) Most obviously, the wage cost of an apprentice is lower than that of a skilled 
worker. As we showed in pages 211-212, an apprentice is paid about one 
quarter of the pay of a skilled worker. 
(b) Although the apprenticeship program that a company runs must meet a 
number of externally imposed requirements (see page 208), these relate to 
minimum standards. Larger companies (and advanced companies generally) 
train their apprentices well beyond minimum standards, in order for them to 
have the general skills needed in the company. They can develop programs that 
embed the general training within company requirements, practices, machines, 
and so on. Thus the specific skills can be taught at very low (or zero) marginal 
cost within the apprenticeship. By contrast, the cost of training an externally 
hired worker, such as the training time taken by a supervisor, is an additional 
cost. 
The second condition relates to the relative importance of specific skills, and more 
specifically the need to acquire them before marketable skills can be effectively used 
in a particular company. With the type of modern patterns of work organization 
which seem increasingly widespread in Germany, the requirements of a skilled 
worker have changed radically. By contrast to the traditional craftsman or to a 
tradesman in a Fordist company who had a set of standardized skills which they 
could use in many different environments, the modern skilled employee plays a 
complex interactive role in the production, maintenance, organization of new 
processes, and so on. Our contention is that, with modern work processes, a newly 
hired skilled employee will need to acquire company-specific skills before he can 
effectively utilize his marketable skills. Marketable skills and company-specific skills 
are in fact complementary. 
Thus, oversimplified, if a given quantity of company-specific skills can be taught 
more cheaply at the apprenticeship stage than subsequently, and if some company-
specific skills are necessary for the use of marketable skills, then for some 
combination of low relative costs and high company-specific skill requirement it 
may be profitable to train apprentices rather than hire externally. In the simple 
example that follows, the conditions are derived for this to be true. 
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Assume a one-period model, in which the output of a skilled worker, y, is given 
by Model I: 
(1) 
where s, is company-specific skills, with O S s, S 1; sm is marketable skills, with 
s,. = 0 or 1; a measures the importance of company-specific skills, with OS a S 1: 
a = 0 implies company specific skills have no effect on the productivity of 
marketable skills. Total output is the sum of the output of individual workers, all 
of whom in the example have to have marketable skills, i.e. sm = 1, for their 
output to be positive. So we only consider workers with marketable skills, either 
(just) ex-apprentices or those hired externally at the start of the period. All 
workers are paid the same wage, w,., irrespective of their company-specific skills; 
(marginal premia for company-specific skills change the conclusions marginally). 
The model abstracts from a multi-period analysis by assuming that the 
company's previous expenditures on training an apprentice is equivalent to paying a 
lump sum, c,, at the start of the period. It is assumed that the cost of training in 
company-specific skills to the full, that is to s, = 1, is included in c,. It is also 
assumed that apprentices who are offered employment at the company will accept 
the offer; this can be justified if necessary by marginal premia above w,.. 
It is assumed that the "cost" of company-specific training for employees hired 
externally is not financial, but is reflected in the length of time taken before they 
acquire any given level of company-specific skills. In particular it is assumed that in 
order to acquire specific skills s,, they must work unproductively for some 
proportion of the period, µ • s,. Thus being fully trained in company-specific skills, 
and so having a productivity of 1, would require that in the first µ percent of the 
period the externally hired skilled worker was occupied unproductively in training; 
to acquire skills of s, < 1 implies they have zero productivity for the first µ • s, 
percent of the period. Thus the net profit to the company from an externally hired 
worker is 
(2) 
Now consider the company's optimization problem: If the company hires skilled 
workers externally, it will choose to train them in company-specific skills to the 
cost-minimizing level, say s;; and it will then choose between training apprentices 
(i.e. paying c,) to have workers with s, = s,. = 1, and external hires with the optimal 
training in company-specific skills, s;. 
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subject to s,S 1. This implies an interior solution, whenµ > a/(1 + a), 
• a • s.=--- s,<I 
r µ(1 + a) 
or s; = 1 a µS--
1 + a 
(4) 
(5) 
when it is optimal to train the hired worker fully in company-specific skills. The 
intuition here is that a/ s, is proportional to the marginal benefit to the company 
from extra company specific skills and µ(I + a) is proportional to the marginal cost 
of training external hires in specific skills. Roughly, a can be thought of as the 
relative importance of specific skills {relative to marketable skills), and µ as the 
relative cost of training external hires in specific skills {relative to the zero cost of 
training apprentices in them). As a rises relative to µ, it pays the company to 
increase investment in specific skills; for high enough a relative to µ, the company 
will invest fully in specific skills; (note a/{l + a) increases in a). 
To decide on apprentices versus external hires, the company compares the net 
profit per apprentice and per external hire. The simplest case is where 
µ S a/(1 + a), so that external hires are fully trained in specific skills: then the 
condition for training apprentices is: 
(6) 
where the LHS is the net profit per apprentice and the RHS the net profit per 
external hire, with in both cases s, = sm = I. The simple condition here is that the 
net cost of the apprenticeship be less thanµ, which can be interpreted as the value 
added lost in specific training {since the value added of an ex-apprentice is 1, and µ 
is the percentage of the period required to train the external hire fully in specific 
skills). We come back to this condition below. 
In the general case, define the maximum profit function per external hire as 
;r ;(a,µ), given by substituting Equation (3) into Equation (4); and call the 
constant profit per apprentice, ;r ;. The condition for training apprentices is then: 
Totally differentiating ;r ; = ;r : gives: 
a 
da µ - = _ __._ _ < 0 
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which is negative since a/(µ• [1 +a])< 1 along the interior solution. These 
results can now be put together to show precisely (Figure 8.1), under what 
conditions on a and µ it will pay to train apprentices rather than hire. Above 
µ = a/(1 + a), external hires will be fully trained in specific skills if hired; above 
this line, apprentices will be trained in the region to the right ofµ= c., this being 
the condition in Equation (6) above. It clearly pays to train apprentices in the 
region to the right µ = c., since a is constant and µ is increasing. :rr : = :rr ; is 
defined for the area to the right of the µ = a/(1 + a) line, where there is an 
internal solution to the specific training of external hires (if they are hired). It starts 
from the intersection of c. and µ = a/(1 + a), where therefore a= c./(1- c.); 
Equation (8) shows that it is downward sloping; it cuts µ = 1 at some positive value 
of a, since at a = 0 it pays to hire externally and do no training in specific skills 
independent of the value of µ. Thus what we have shown is that if the cost of 
training, measured by µ is large enough and the significance of company-specific 
skills is important enough for the effective use of marketable skill, measured by a, 
it will pay to train apprentices rather than hire already trained employees from the 
external market. The argument, it is true, relies on the apprentices accepting offers 
to stay in the company, but the company can pay them a small premium making it 
worth their while to do so, without the argument being affected. 
What are the empirical supports of this approach? We made it clear at the start 
of this section that there is a genuine puzzle about why the larger German 
companies make the net investments they do in apprenticeships, and that this 
argument {and the next) are experimental. It is very difficult to imagine getting the 






















Figurt 8.1 Costs and Benefits of Company-Specific Skills 
223 
WOLFGANG FRANZ, DAVID SOSKICE 
by giving some idea about the relative magnitudes of a and µ in relation to 'a· In 
its absence, we rely on case studies and broad orders of magnitude. 
The case studies of German industrial sociologists are not of course directly 
concerned with the value of a. But there is some agreement that work organiz-
ation in German industry in the 1980's requires that skilled workers have both 
general skills and have complex teamwork, organization, and technology/ 
product skills specific to a particular company. General skills by themselves are 
not of much value, until these complementary skills have been acquired. If 
these studies are taken literally, then the sort of crude model used here is not 
too far off the mark, and the associated value of a is high. Let it be assumed at any 
rate that a is at a level (the metric will be discussed shortly) above the c,/(1 - c,) 
level. 
Now consider µ in relation to c,. We know of no case studies in which large 
companies have been asked how long is required for an externally hired skilled 
worker to become reasonably effective as a skilled worker in the company. This may 
be in part because, as was pointed out in the first section, larger companies tend to 
hire in workers who have done an apprenticeship in the handwork sector as semi-
skilled and not as skilled workers. An experienced researcher in the area of training 
and productivity case studies suggested that somewhere between one and two years 
might be an appropriate period in machinery building companies. 
How is this to be converted into a measure ofµ, and how is c, to be measured? 
The variable µ purports to measure the cost of training in specific skills when 
s; = 1; it measures the proportion of the period the new worker is unproductive 
multiplied by average productivity (1 in the model). So an appropriate measure of 
µ is the number of unproductive months times the value added per worker; and 
that then needs to be compared with the net cost to the company of training an 
apprentice. We showed in pages 211-212 that the net cost of an apprentice to a 
company in 1985 was of the order of magnitude of DM50,000 (DM15,000 p.a. 
for just above 3 years). 
How very roughly does this compare to the cost of training an external hire in 
specific skills? If on average a newly hired skilled worker takes one and a half years 
to become effective, and if it assumed the worker improves productivity on a 
straight-line basis, then the worker is on average unproductive for 9 months. As we 
have pointed out in pages 211-212, 9 months labor costs to a company of a skilled 
worker at DM5,300 per month in 1985, roughly DM50,000, comes to the same 
order of magnitude as the net cost of an apprentice. There are, in addition two 
reasons for thinking that average labor costs may underestimate relevant average 
value added: First, the new hire may need machinery to train on, so that capital 
costs per worker (or some percentage of them) should be included. Second, the 
company is likely to face a nonperfectly elastic demand curve, given that it is likely 
to be producing a differentiated product. The calculation also takes no account of 
the amount of time taken by other skilled employees to train a new worker, nor of 
a supervisor's time. 
224 
THE GERMAN APPRENTICESHIP SYSTEM 
It seems to us therefore that, at least in principle, the interplay of general and 
company-specific skills and the relative cheapness of teaching specific skills 
simultaneously with general skills to apprentices may alter the balance of 
calculations away from Becker's conclusion. The numbers which we have put 
forward are only informed guesswork. But even if they are considerably awry, they 
suggest that this is an imponant argument which needs funher empirical work. 
Large Companies: Competing to get the Best School Leavers via 
Apprenticeships 
The previous argument, on the role of company-specific skills, suggests at least that 
the apprenticeship versus external hire calculation may be quite finely balanced. In 
these pages, we put forward a complementary argument, which reinforces the case 
for training apprentices. Our staning point is a belief that seems widely held by 
companies in justifying their involvement in the apprenticeship system. This sees it 
as a son of competition among companies to get the "best" school leavers as 
apprentices and hence subsequently as skilled workers. If a company does not take 
apprentices, they will end up with a less effective skilled work force than they could 
have done with apprentices. 
In a world of full information, this proposition is incorrect: Assume that skilled 
workers (those who have successfully completed an apprenticeship) have different levels 
of effectiveness, and that a worker of any given level can identify their effectiveness to 
companies, then there will be market wages for different levels of effectiveness. In that 
case the Becker result will hold, since it will pay companies to hire the desired work 
force from the external labor market and thus avoid the cost of apprenticeships. 
A necessary condition for an argument along these lines to hold is therefore that there 
is asymmetric information. We set out here a simple model of how the acquisition of 
private information by the training company about capacities of apprentices during the 
apprenticeship produces results similar to the justification sketched out above. That is to 
say, that panicipation in the apprenticeship system enables companies to get effective 
skilled workers, which they would not be able to do otherwise. 
We hope to justify in a very simple model the behavior of large German 
companies and apprentices as an equilibrium, and one which complements the 
argument of the last section on specific skills. In the simple model here, use is made 
of the inside information which companies get during the three and a half year 
apprenticeship of the quality (reliability, responsibility, effectiveness etc.) of the 
apprentices they are training, information which apprentices cannot communicate 
to other companies: Specifically it is assumed that apprentices come in two "types" 
of effectiveness, "good" ones and "lemons." We show there is an equilibrium in 
which all companies train apprentices and offer contracts at the end of the 
apprenticeship to "good" apprentices, but not to "lemons;" these contracts are 
accepted by the "good" apprentices. If a company tried to hire an apprentice 
trained elsewhere, there would be a high probability that the hire would be a 
"lemon:" Therefore companies train their own apprentices; and "good" apprentices 
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(even if they would prefer to work elsewhere) accept the contracts offered by their 
own companies, because other companies have no vacancies. 
The decisions of German companies to "make or buy" their skilled work forces 
are of course far more complex in reality than the model presented here. But even 
in this simple model, the high training equilibrium result relies on key institutional 
rules and understandings which govern apprenticeships, wage-setting and 
employment security in Germany. It is not just, therefore, the asymmetric 
information condition outlined in the last paragraph which leads Becker's results 
not to hold: it is the combination of that condition and the restrictive wage-setting 
and employment security rules. Without these rules, in fact, asymmetric 
information does not prevent Becker's result from holding; and without asymme-
tric information, the wage-setting and employment security rules are insufficient. 
This seems an interesting case therefore in which two problematic conditions 
produce a good result: Inside information and restrictive labor market rules 
produce a better outcome than full information and deregulated labor markets. 
What are the important restrictive rules and understandings? 
1 Apprenticeships cannot be terminated by the employer after a brief probationary 
period. The probationary period is either 1 or 3 months, and the apprenticeship 
is normally 3.5 years. (Termination can only take place for grossly improper 
conduct or for force majeure, e.g. company closure). Apprentices are however in 
practice allowed to leave. 
2 It is extremely costly for a company to dismiss a skilled worker if the works 
council is opposed to the dismissal. 
3 Roughly speaking, companies cannot pay less to a newly hired skilled worker for 
a particular category of jol, than to its existing employees in that category. 
4 Companies are quite at liberty to hire skilled workers from other companies. But 
again roughly speaking, companies cannot use pay and conditions as a means of 
attracting workers from a similar "level" of company. This is a consequence of 
several factors: First, basic wages are regulated by industry agreements; second, 
although actual wage rates are (depending on the size and skilled labor 
composition of a company) above the basic rates, both employer associations 
and industry unions are concerned about preventing significant wage drift; 
finally works councils (representing existing skilled employees and with a strong 
interest in their retraining) would make it difficult for companies to pay newly 
hired workers above the odds. 
Model 2 With these rules in mind, a simple model can be constructed. 
Companies are identical, and they produce output according to constant returns 
using skilled labor as the only input. Again the fiction of a one-period model is 
adopted, and the same assumptions apply except that there are no specific skills, 
(they are brought in at the end to reinforce the conclusions of the model). The 
model can be thought of as a game between a large number of companies and a 
larger number of apprentices. Although it is constructed in one period, the timing 
form of the game is as follows: 
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Cl Companies move first and choose the number of apprentices they will take; 
they know the proportion of lemons among any given number of apprentices 
but any individual company only discovers the identity of the lemons among its 
apprentices after the apprentices have been taken on and trained by the 
company. (Training takes no time in the model, but requires the company to 
pay c.). At the same time companies choose the number of external hires they 
will make, and the number and identity of apprentices who will get offered jobs. 
All companies make these moves simultaneously, so no company knows what 
another company has done. If companies choose not to take on apprentices, the 
game ends with zero training and zero output (since skilled workers are needed 
to produce output}; so this can be taken as a low-skill outcome. 
A2 The second move is made by apprentices again before any production has 
taken place. Each apprentice knows at this move whether or not he or she has 
been offered "post-apprenticeship" employment in the company that trained 
them; they also know what the common probability of an external job offer is 
(but not whether they individually have a better or worse chance to get one, 
since other companies cannot distinguish lemons from good apprentices). 
The alternatives facing the company in CJ are set out first; but its optimal decision 
depends on the contingent choices which post-apprentices make in the second 
move A2. Thus having discussed the parameters of the company's decision, the 
move of the apprentice is brought in in order to see the equilibria in the model. 
Companies can either use their own ex-apprentices (of number A) or hire in 
skilled workers from the external market (H), to produce output. The new hires 
may be lemons, H" or effective workers, H"" The productivity of an effective 
worker is sm = I, and the productivity of a lemon is p. The proportion of lemons in 
the population is y, and they are assumed to be distributed evenly over training 
companies. Of a company's A apprentices, it does not offer employment to those 
who are lemons. This is because the productivity P of a lemon is assumed to be 
below the market wage, wm. The company offers employment to all nonlemon 
apprentices; but some percentage of nonlemon apprentices, q, will choose to quit 
at the end of the apprenticeship: The quit rate q is an endogenous variable to be 
chosen by the apprentices in a Nash equilibrium. The output of a company is thus: 
y= (I - q). (1-y). A+ HNL + PHL (9) 
The company maximizes profits, subject to some output constraint (i.e. it is demand 
constrained}, with unit output being sold at price of 1. The company's choice variables 
are (A, H}: It has to choose the number of apprentices and the number of external hires 
of skilled workers, the choice of apprentices being made before it knows which ones are 
lemons. Given the constant returns nature of the model, the relevant choice is simply 
whether it will use apprentices or whether it will hire in skilled workers or whether it is 
indifferent. Which of those three choices depends on the unit profitability of 
apprenticeships, :rr 4 , and on the unit profitability of new hires, :rr h· 
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If (i): ;n. > :n h• then the company only uses apprentices. 
If (ii): :n. < :nh, then the company only uses external hires. 
If (iii): :n • = :n h• then the company is indifferent between external hires and 
apprentices. 
We define :n • and :n h in turn: 
(10) 
(11) 
The unit profit from training an apprentice is the profit (1 - wm) from an 
apprentice who is employed by the company, reduced by the probability of lemons 
multiplied by the probability of quits, and less the cost of the apprenticeship c,. 
The unit profit from an external hire is the profit (1 - wm) from the hire of a 
nonlemon, multiplied by the probability of a nonlemon (1 - h) less the loss from 
a lemon multiplied by the probability of a lemon h· 
The probability of hiring a lemon is not exogenously given, since it depends on 
the percentage of nonlemons who quit after an apprenticeship and seek work in 
other companies: 
PL=--~--
y+ q• (l - y) 
(12) 
Thus before the company can make a choice between apprenticeships and external 
hiring, it must forecast the strategy which apprentices will adopt (assuming it has 
apprentices) toward quitting. 
Turn therefore to the apprentice's decision. The "good" apprentice, on receiving 
an employment offer by the company which trained him or her, has to choose 
either to accept the offer or to take a chance on getting a job offer externally, i.e. to 
quit; (the "lemon" gets no offer and is forced to seek employment elsewhere). It is 
simplest to assume the apprentice chooses a mixed strategy, where the choice of q 
means that the apprentice seeks offers elsewhere with probability q and accepts the 
training company's offer with probability 1 - q. 
Apprentice preferences-; It is assumed that there is on average some desire by 
apprentices to quit and look for employment elsewhere even if they have been 
offered employment where they have been trained. But it is also assumed that they 
are highly risk averse and they will only quit if they are sure of getting employment 
elsewhere. This is expressed by assuming that if the probability (p~) of an external 
job offer is unity (p~ = 1) then good apprentices will prefer the highest q < q ·, 
consistent with p~ = 1. Thus q · represents this desire to quit: q · is in practice likely 
to be quite small, but here it will be assumed that q • = 1. This latter is not meant as 
a realistic assumption, but merely to show that even if apprentices are potentially 
footloose they will not in fact necessarily choose to leave. 
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There are two equilibria in this model, both of which involve companies training 
apprentices. In the first equilibrium, companies meet all their employment needs 
by apprenticeships; in the second some are also met by external hiring. The first 
equilibrium is the one sketched out earlier in providing the intuition behind the 
argument: Companies meet all their employment requirements by training, so they 
make no external hires; apprentices do not quit since they see the probability of a 
job offer outside is zero. 
The first equilibrium corresponds to the following conditions: 
(a) Companies choose only to train: This requires :re a> :re h· The latter condition is 
satisfied so long as q = 0, as can be seen by comparing the RHS of Equations 
(10) and (11). The RHS of :rch is negative, since q= 0 implies PL = l; the RHS 
of :TC 4 is assumed positive with q= 0. 
(b) Given that companies have hired enough apprentices to need no external hires, 
and that this is known to apprentices, they will choose not to quit since p~ = 0. 
It may be useful to represent this equilibrium graphically, see Figure 8.2 (page 
224). The perceived probability of hiring a lemon, PL• is shown on the vertical axis; 
and the quit rate of qualified apprentices, q, is on the horiwntal. The graph is 
divided into two areas by the line :re a= :re h; the equation of this line in terms of h 
and q is given by: 
(13) 
Above this line apprentices are more profitable than external hires, and below the 
reverse. Along the upwards sloping line, companies are indifferent between keeping 
apprentices and external hires: the "indifference" line slopes up because an increase 
in h• the probability of a lemon, makes it less attractive to hire external workers, 
and therefore must be balanced by an increased quit rate which reduces the 
attraction of apprentices. 
The downward-sloping line shows how the probability of a lemon declines as ex-
apprentices become more inclined to quit. If no ex-apprentices choose to quit, the 
probability of hiring a lemon is unity; if on the other hand there is a 100 percent 
chance that an ex-apprentice will quit the probability that an external hire will turn 
out to be a lemon is y, the percentage of lemons in the population. 
The first equilibrium is at El. Here companies offer employment to all good 
apprentices, and apprentices know that the probability of employment elsewhere is 
zero. Hence they accept the offers, even if they would pref er to leave. The second 
equilibrium is at E2. In this equilibrium, employers are indifferent between offering 
apprentices employment and hiring externally. Therefore the strategy of announc-
ing that they will offer external hires corresponding to filling quits of qE2 is at least 
as good as any other strategy. However, this second equilibrium is a weak one, 
since any other percentage would be equally good. For this reason the first 
equilibrium can be taken as the equilibrium of interest. 
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Figure 8.2 Lemons Equilibria 
c8 +(1-wml 
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Models 1 and 2 These two models can be put together usefully as follows. In 
Model 2, the preferences of apprentices can be made more plausible by assuming 
that there is some percentage of apprentices who will always quit at the end of the 
apprenticeship (for demographic reasons, etc.). Call that percentage q ... Clearly El 
is no longer an equilibrium if apprentices choose a mixed strategy quit rate of at 
least q .. , and no equilibrium exist with q< q ... Is there an equilibrium analogous 
to E 1 but with q = q .. rather than q = 0? The answer co this is positive if q .. < qH2. 
If q .. < qE2, then it pays companies to fill as much of their needs as possible by 
offering employment to their own apprentices, and by hiring externally to fill chose 
who have quit. It does not pay companies to train apprentices if a larger percentage 
than qE2 quit, since then n • < n h· Moreover it does not pay apprentices to adopt a 
mixed strategy greater than q ·•, since they will be unable to get employment with 
probability 1. 
The critical question then is whether or not q .. < qE2. Model 1 can now be brought 
into play. In Model 1, the cost of the acquisition of specific skills by externally hired 
workers with marketable skills makes external hiring, ceteris paribus, less attractive 
than employing one's own ex-apprentices. If the cost of acquisition of company-
specific skills is imported into Model 2, Equation (11) requires modification since the 
productivity of external hires is zero for a fraction µ of the period. This in turn 
changes the upward-sloping "indifference" Equation (13), which becomes: 
Ca+ (1 - U/,,) • q• (1 - )') - µ 
PL = (1-µ) (14) 
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This inclusion of specific skills does not alter the downward-sloping PI, schedule, so 
a change in µ has the effect of moving the indifference line up or down the lemon 
probability curve. As it does so, qEL is reduced or increased. Partially differentiating 




(1 - PL) 
(1- µ) 
(15) 
Thus it can be seen that the inclusion of the company specific skills argument 
pushes the indifference line down and hence increases qEL. This in turn implies chat 
the room for q ·• is that much greater. 
Hence the two arguments which have been made in this section reinforce each 
other. Our claim is that both arguments capture important elements of the current 
German scene and both modify Becker's assumptions in such ways as to reverse his 
conclusions in these cases. Where first it is both the case that specific skills are 
complementary to general skills and that specific skills can be taught more cheaply 
at the apprenticeship stage than later; and second that the apprenticeship stage 
enables training companies to screen out lemons: then (depending on the 
parameters) companies may have incentives to make investments in training 
apprentices in marketable skills. Unfortunately current data make it difficult to test 
these hypotheses econometrically: It is difficult to measure specific skills and the 
cost of teaching them. And it is equally difficult to measure the efficiency of 
externally hired skilled employees. 
CONCLUSION 
This chapter has focussed on the apprenticeship system in what might very loosely 
be called the advanced sector of the German economy, namely medium to large 
companies in the industrial and commercial sector. Leaving aside the liberal 
professions, agriculture, and public services, roughly 60 percent of apprenticeships 
are now in this area. The remaining 40 percent are in the craft or handwerk sector 
(see Table 8.5). Although the formal structure of apprenticeships in the two sectors 
is (more or less) the same, we noted in the second section that there are major 
differences in the actual patterns of operation. Having suggested in the last section 
two complementary models to explain why profit-maximizing industrial and 
commercial companies make significant net investments in apprenticeships, let us 
briefly recall the main differences between this and the craft sector. First, the 
retention rate of post-apprentices in craft sector companies is relatively low: Those 
who do not stay move in large numbers to semi-skilled work in large industrial 
companies, where semi-skilled workers often earn more than skilled workers in the 
craft sector; large companies appear to value the organizational skills they acquired 
during their craft apprenticeship and often they do not use the technical skills they 
learnt, e.g. as a baker. Second, the existing studies of the net costs of training 
apprentices in the crafts sector suggest they are low (Table 8.7), and it seems likely 
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that a proper shadow price procedure would establish that they were insignificant or 
negative. In addition to these differences, the conditions which drove the two 
models of the last section-namely, substantial company-specific skills and 
considerable asymmetric information about the quality of apprentices-are much 
less likely to be of relevance in the craft sector. Thus a full model of the German 
apprenticeship system would distinguish between the two sectors, with the craft 
sector acting as a training school for future semi-skilled workers in the other sector 
in addition to its own skill requirements. 
In focusing on why companies in the industrial and commercial sectors make 
significant net investments in apprenticeship training, our goal is to try and 
understand which assumptions of Becker's argument are inapplicable in the 
German context. Our maintained assumption throughout is that these companies 
are profit-maximizing and that their investment choices do not reflect political or 
social pressures. A more complete approach than that in this chapter might want to 
explore this assumption more fully. It may be appropriate in the conclusion to 
suggest in what direction such an exploration could most fruitfully go. Let us start 
by reiterating that there is no strong set of institutional sanctions against companies 
which do not train apprentices; moreover there is an active tabor market in skilled 
workers, and there is nothing to prevent a company which does not train using that 
market. There may from time to time be political pressures on companies to 
increase the number of apprenticeship places, but this typically relates to 
exceptional circumstances and does not supply the general motivation to train. 
The more interesting direction to go in, as briefly referred to in page 212, is that 
of personal, family and social networks. In small communities, an employer 
depends in many ways on the goodwill of the local community for the smooth 
running of the business. Thus taking local apprentices may be an important way of 
maintaining local goodwill; and the community, and its political representatives, 
may see the giving of goodwill, for instance in the form of political cooperation in 
a whole range of activities, as a worthwhile means of ensuring that young people in 
the community have local apprenticeships available. Certainly, both small and 
medium-sized companies have long-term attachments to particular small towns in 
Germany. In general, the reasoning may be less conscious: it may approximate the 
anthropological model of "gift-exchange," which of course can be seen in game 
theory terms as an example of the Folk theorem. 
The main thrust of the chapter, however, is to show that (leaving all political, 
social, and institutional pressures aside) it can pay profit-maximizing companies to 
engage in net investments in training in marketable skills under certain assump-
tions. The alternative but complementary sets of assumptions are: 
1 That the cost of training apprentices in company-specific skills is much lower 
than the cost of training externally hired workers in the same company-specific 
skills; and that company-specific skills are needed to make transferable skills 
productive. 
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2 That the company gains considerable information about the quality of an 
apprentice during the apprenticeship, which the apprentice cannot signal to 
other companies. 
In both cases, it seems likely that the German labor market institutional 
environment explains why these conditions are important in encouraging costly 
apprenticeship training. The type of autonomous work organization of skilled 
manual employees which generates the need for combined specific and general 
skills (as implied in (1)) is clearly helped by a highly cooperative trade union 
system and an effective system of internal employee representation via works 
councils. And the wage-setting system and the rules governing apprenticeship 
security play a key role in the argument relating to (2). Thus, there is a contrast 
between the German and American systems, which explains why some degree of 
greater institutionalization in the former is important in getting companies to 
invest in apprenticeship training. 
NOTES 
See Kempf (1985), Lehne (1991), and Steedman (1993) for descriptions of the 
German apprenticeship system. 
2 Source: Amtliche Nachrichtm der Bundtsanstalt for Arbtit (ANBA), No. 5 (1993), 
p. 914. The figure refers to West Germany. 
3 Source: IWD-lnformationsdienst des lnstituts der deutschm Wirtschaft, No. 21 of May 
27, 1993, p. 7. 
4 See Franz (I 982) for a detailed study on youth unemployment in West Germany. 
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LABOR MARKET POLICY, 
INFORMATION, AND HIRING 
BEHAVIOR 
Robert J Flanagan 
The importance of incomplete information in labor markets has been appreciated 
at least since George Stigler' s pathbreaking articles in the early 1960' s. In analyzing 
the benefits and costs of acquiring information, Stigler's formulation provided a 
firm theoretical foundation for frictional unemployment and the important 
implication that labor market policies that altered search costs would alter 
unemployment durations. These insights inspired little interest in the parallel 
phenomenon of frictional job vacancies, however, or in the role of the hiring 
process in generating unemployment. Employer search and hiring behavior became 
a black box in the face of increasingly sophisticated formulations of how workers 
identified and accepted job offers. 
With the passage of time, both the focus on worker behavior and the original 
formulation of imperfect information seem to provide an inadequate understand-
ing of the role of institutional interventions in labor markets. The search cost 
paradigm proved too limited to explain the upward drift in noncyclical unemploy-
ment in many European countries; to a large extent, declining flows out of 
unemployment appear to reflect changes in employer hiring behavior. At the same 
time, predictions of policy effects based on the neoclassical model of labor demand 
with (implicitly) full information-the closest approximation to a model of hiring 
in traditional microeconomics-have been startlingly inaccurate in some instances. 
The treatment of information in the analysis of institutional interventions remains 
a problem, but recent work suggests that the problem is not so much that 
information is incomplete but that it is unevenly distributed. 
This chapter provides a review and interpretation of the recent literature on how 
the structure of information in labor markets can influence the effect of institutional 
interventions into those markets. The focus is on the relationship between informa-
tional structure, hiring behavior, and employment outcomes. Much of the chapter 
explores how asymmetries in information in labor markets give rise to signaling and 
screening behavior that alters both the interpretation of some labor market variables 
and the policy conclusions of standard labor demand theory. Several varieties of 
policy intervention are considered, including targeted wage subsidies, advance notice 
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of layoff, restrictions on dismissals and pay compression. Evidence on the importance 
of labor market analyses based on asymmetric information is presented from research 
in the United States and several European countries. The final section considers the 
implications for labor market research and policy. 
PRELIMINARIES 
Traditional labor demand theory inhabits an environment of perfect information. 
Workers know all relevant details of alternative employment contracts available to 
them in the market. Employers know all relevant aspects of worker ability and 
performance. The structure of labor costs then determines the overall level of labor 
input, the division of the input between employees and hours per employee, and 
the adjustment path of employment and hours in response to shifts in demand 
(Hamermesh 1988; Nickell 1986). 
In the simplest textbook labor market model, hiring occurs when the wage is less 
than the marginal product and firing occurs when the wage exceeds the marginal 
product. The theory is mute on hiring and firing in equilibrium-i.e., in the 
absence of some net change in employment. It also only rationalizes the existence 
of job vacancies when wages are held below their equilibrium rate, although job 
vacancies, like unemployment, are a ubiquitous feature of labor markets. 
Recognizing distinctive features of the structure of labor costs extends the range 
of predictions offered by the standard model. Fixed employment costs-per 
worker employment costs incurred in each pay period irrespective of the number of 
hours worked-tend to reduce total labor input by increasing the average cost of 
labor. By raising the cost per employee relative to the cost per hour worked, such 
costs also provide an incentive to use fewer workers for longer hours, and by 
increasing the cost of low-wage labor relative to high-wage labor, such costs create 
an incentive for employers to substitute skilled for unskilled labor. 
Costs of changing employment are one-time costs associated with gross changes 
in employment. Unlike fixed costs, they do not recur in each pay period. If the 
average adjustment cost per period increases with the size of the adjustment (e.g., 
the number of workers hired or fired), employers have an incentive to spread the 
employment adjustment over several periods. Even so, the existence of adjustment 
costs leads to a lower average labor input. If adjustment costs vary across groups, 
firms will substitute toward those groups with the lowest adjustment costs, ceteris 
paribus. 
Compensating wage differentials provide the key idea on the supply side of the 
standard theory. The broad notion of compensation used since the writings of 
Adam Smith includes both monetary and nonmonetary benefits and costs. Since 
nonmonetary aspects of work are generally believed to be less flexible than 
monetary aspects, most adjustment occurs via wage changes. With full knowledge 
of their options, workers effectively pay for superior work conditions via lower 
wages and must be bribed by higher wages to accept inferior conditions. Such 
bribes provide an incentive for employers to improve working conditions. 
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The policy domain supported by the competitive labor market model with 
complete information is quite limited. The strong assumptions regarding 
information in the standard labor market model have long troubled many 
economists. Historically, doubts about the completeness of information in labor 
markets have provided a rationale for policy interventions into labor markets. (For 
example, workers' compensation arrangements exist in part because of doubts 
about the ability of workers to assess the risks of personal injury on alternative 
jobs.) The point of departure for the policy assessments in this chapter, however, is 
the fact that important information on both sides of the labor market is often 
unevenly distributed. In particular, workers may lack full information on many 
aspects of a job, such as the future viability of the firm, while employers may be 
imperfectly informed about a worker's productive potential or actual job 
performance. 
Invoking imperfect information to rationalize policy assumes that all parties in 
the market continue to behave in a regime of imperfect information as they would 
in a regime of perfect information. Yet, this is surely irrational. When information 
is unevenly distributed, workers with superior abilities and employers with superior 
employment conditions have an interest in making their superiority known in a 
credible manner. Signaling models of labor market behavior capture the efforts of 
self-interested workers and employers to communicate privately held information 
credibly. In signaling models, the party with superior information would like to 
choose an action that signals their high quality to the party with inferior informa-
tion. The trick is to find a signal that low-quality parties cannot imitate. In general, 
this requires an inverse relationship between the cost of the signal and the quality 
of the party sending the signal. The next section of the chapter reconsiders the 
effects of several labor market policies in an environment of labor market signaling. 
When the inverse correlation between signal cost and quality weakens, it 
becomes easier for low-quality parties to imitate high-quality parties and hence 
more difficult for the receiver of the signal to deduce the quality of the sender. A 
particular signal indicates a high quality sender only with some probability. The 
concluding pages {237-239) of the chapter consider the impact of such "pooling 
equilibria" on hiring policies. 
LABOR MARKET POLICIES IN A SIGNALING 
ENVIRONMENT 
We now reconsider several labor market policies, contrasting the policy effects 
predicted by the standard tabor market model with theory and/or evidence on the 
role of the policy in markets where information asymmetries are important. In each 
of these policy examples, the structure of information in tabor markets has a crucial 
effect on hiring behavior and the interpretation of specific policy interventions. In 
some cases, asymmetric information provides a case for policies that are con-
demned in the setting of the standard model. In others, policies that are supported 
in this setting can have perverse effects with asymmetric information. 
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Wage Subsidy Programs 
Reasoning from the standard, full-information model of labor market equilibrium, 
economists have long argued the advantages of wage subsidies for employment 
creation. When the main barrier to employment is that employer wage offers fall 
below workers' reservation wages, government wage subsidies can increase 
employment by lowering the employer's cost per worker employed while raising the 
worker's wage. A key assumption in the analysis is that employers are well informed 
about workers' abilities. 
By the late 1970' s, wage subsidy programs targeted on particular disadvantaged 
groups began to emerge as a part of labor market policy in the United States. 
Contrary to the predictions of the standard labor market model, employer 
participation in these programs was disappointingly low. In the words of one 
observer, "The number of workers whose wages are subsidized by the programs is 
far below the number of workers who are technically eligible to be covered .... 
Employers appear to be passing up opportunities to collect tax credits for 
employment decisions they are making anyway" (Burtless 1984). 
In a revealing 1981 experiment, the clients of an urban manpower agency were 
randomly divided into three groups of job seekers: Participants in one group 
received vouchers informing employers that they were eligible for a tax credit; the 
second group of job seekers received vouchers informing employers that the 
applicants were covered by a cash subsidy (equal in value to the tax credit); 
members of the third group received no voucher and were not subsidized. 1 The 
standard analysis of wage subsidies predicts that the first two groups should have 
received more job offers. Instead, the third group was more successful in finding 
jobs than either of the vouchered groups (Burtless 1985). Moreover, few of the 
firms that hired vouchered workers bothered to apply for the subsidy. Indeed, some 
members of the first two groups may have obtained jobs because they did not 
inform employers that they qualified for some form of subsidy. 
Contrary to the standard analysis of wage subsidies, hiring in the U.S. 
experiments proceeded as if membership in a group targeted by labor market policy 
was interpreted as a signal of low productivity by employers. The difference 
between predicted and actual outcomes stems from the fact that worker productiv-
ity reflects a mixture of observable and unobservable characteristics, but standard 
formulations of the role of wage subsidies on employment ignore the influence of 
the latter on hiring behavior. In fact, employers try to devise methods for selecting 
workers with desirable unobservable characteristics, conditional on what is 
observable. 
Hiring under U.S. wage subsidy programs is consistent with the view that 
employers associate public labor market programs with an adverse selection of 
unobservable characteristics. That is, those with the most desirable characteristics 
succeed in the market without government assistance. Targeting appears to signal 
productivity deficits that exceed the subsidies available in targeted programs, rather 
than profitable opportunities for employers. Members of a targeted group 
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effectively signal their quality by remaining outside a wage subsidy program (even if 
unemployed). This meets the (Spence) condition for effective signaling, because it 
is cheaper for individuals with high (but unobserved) ability to succeed without the 
subsidy. If hired, they are likely to be retained once performance is observed. It is 
costly for individuals with low (but unobserved) ability to mimic this behavior in 
an effort to fool employers, for once performance is observed, they will be fired. 
They need help (such as a subsidy) to hold a permanent job. 
Joining (or revealing participation in) a government program is a poor way for 
high-ability workers to find a job. With no differential cost to differentiate between 
high- and low-ability workers, government programs provide in effect a kind of 
pooling equilibrium, in which employers assume that the productivity of all 
members of a targeted group is heavily weighted by the low productivity of those 
who fail to make a market connection without assistance. The resulting stigma 
tends to undermine the objectives of such programs independently of their design. 
A notable feature of the U.S. wage subsidy programs is that they did not include 
training or other activities designed to increase the productivity of the unemployed. 
I am unaware of any U.S. evidence on whether the stigma of program participation 
extends to training programs, for example. However, survey responses from 
Swedish manufacturing firms indicate that when considering two job applicants 
who are observationally equivalent except for participation in a "labor market 
program," many employers consider the applicant enrolled in the program to be 
potentially less productive (Agell and Lundborg 1993: 31-32). In general, Swedish 
labor market programs are heavily weighted toward training, but the term, "labor 
market program," is not defined more fully in the survey. 
Labor Market Information Programs 
A similar analysis can apply to public labor market information services. Within the 
setting of the standard model, there is a case for public institutions that facilitate 
the matching of workers to jobs. But a rarely explored feature of labor market 
information programs is that the matching can only occur on the basis of personal 
and job characteristics observable by the employment agency. Qualities that are 
unobserved by employers are generally unobservable to employment agencies. This 
is another case in which more able job seekers may be able to signal their quality by 
using methods other than the employment service to find a job. 
In fact, the public employment service (PES) has never been a major source of 
job matches in most countries. In 1991, only 26 percent of unemployed job seekers 
in the United States used the Employment Service as a job search method. The vast 
majority contacted employers directly and placed or answered employment ads. Of 
the various job search methods, use of the PES was least likely to result in 
employment one month later (Bortnik and Ports 1992). Similar patterns can be 
observed in other industrial nations (OECD 1992: Table 3.3). Even in countries in 
which the public employment service is granted a monopoly in job matching 
services, many employers simply do not list job vacancies with the service. Direct 
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evidence of adverse signaling appears in a mid-1989 survey of almost 400 German 
firms. Responses indicate that "firms were considerably more sceptical about the 
applicant's willingness to work if the interview was arranged by the labor office" 
(Franz and Smolny 1993: 6). Respondents also perceived applicants provided by 
the labor office as less trustworthy than other applicants. More generally, an OECD 
study concludes that "in all countries the main complaint of employers about the 
PES is that it does not supply suitable candidates, and their main reason for not 
using the PES is the belief or hope that other recruitment methods will prove more 
effective in this respect" (OECD 1992: 127). 
In the United States, the potential for adverse signaling was reinforced in the 
early days of the Employment Service by the requirement that unemployment 
insurance applicants had to register with the employment service before receiving 
insurance payments. Employers came to associate the Employment Service with the 
least able workers-an impression that persists to this day-and used alternative 
methods of identifying acceptable workers. In many other industrialized countries, 
the public employment service plays a more central role in the administration of 
unemployment insurance benefits (OECD 1992: 122).2 
An important, if discouraging, policy implication of the analysis of wage subsidy 
and labor market information programs in an environment of unevenly distributed 
information is that the sorting facilitated by targeted labor market programs may 
inadvertently initiate signaling processes that undermine the original objective of 
the policy. Not for the first time, new institutions can have unintended effects. 
Public policies are by no means the only source of signaling criteria, however. 
There is evidence in the United States, for example, that employers infer that 
workers who are laid off have less ability than workers who lose their jobs in a plant 
closing. The former group has longer post-displacement unemployment and lower 
wages in subsequent employment than the latter group (Gibbons and Katz). Many 
Swedish employers indicate that they consider unemployed job applicants less 
productive than employed applicant with otherwise identical qualifications (Agell 
and Lundborg 1993: 31-32). What is clear from the preceding discussion is that 
many labor market policies fail to reverse such presumptions in an environment of 
asymmetric information. 
Advance Notice of PJant Oosing or LayofF 
With perfect information in labor markets, firms offering less stable employment 
would have to pay a higher wage to compensate workers for the risks of less stable 
employment than they might find at other firms. The differential would in turn 
provide incentives for employers to stabilize their employment. In this world, 
prenotification policy is redundant, because employment changes have been 
anticipated and their expected costs are embedded in the wage. 
The more common formulation, within the context of the standard labor 
market model, assumes at least implicitly that workers are not fully informed about 
the future viability of their firm. Prenotification provides time for a more measured 
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adjustment to labor market change. To the extent that this imposes costs on 
employers (because some workers quit while their services are still needed, for 
example), the effect of the policy is to raise the adjustment costs of the firm. 
(Notice that these costs only exist because workers are initially less well informed 
than in the first case.) Like other adjustment costs, prenotification requirements 
therefore influence the speed with which adjustments take place, but also will 
reduce the willingness of firms and workers to invest in training. 
The basic uncertainty at issue arises because employers know more about the 
future viability of their firms (and hence future layoffs) than do workers, and 
employers with poor economic prospects do not wish to stimulate quitting by early 
disclosure of this information. Suppose now that employers with favorable 
economic prospects wish to signal their future financial viability to workers. 
Workers may rationally interpret employer statements of robust economic health as 
self-serving and hence not credible. On the other hand, employers could try to 
signal their economic health through their wage policy. Firms with stronger 
economic prospects can credibly signal their ability to provide future job security 
by adopting a high wage policy. Such a policy would be too costly for firms in a 
weaker economic position, and they would offer low wages (Kuhn 1992). Each 
firm signals its economic prospects to workers via its wage policy. In contrast to the 
full information model with compensating differentials, the more job secure 
companies now pay the higher wage to signal their strength. Low-wage firms retain 
workers to the extent that specific human capital investments are present. 
Alternatives to signaling through the wage structure also exist. Contractual 
commitments to provide payments in the event of a plant closing or to provide 
advance notice meet the criteria for effective signaling. The commitments are 
cheapest for the most viable firms. 
Despite the informational advantage of employers, a mandatory advance notice 
requirement is not needed, because viable employers have a self-interest in signaling 
their strength. Lower quit costs compensate for the higher wages. If such a law is 
passed, viable employers will no longer have to pay higher wages to signal their 
strength, so profits increase and worker utility declines. In contrast to the wage 
subsidy and employment service examples, this institutional intervention truncates 
a signaling process. In the prior examples, a policy intervention reduced worker 
welfare by establishing an adverse signaling process. Here, the policy intervention 
truncates a favored signaling process. 
This conclusion rests heavily on labor market institutions, however, for signaling 
requires wage flexibility at the employer level, as in nonunion systems or systems 
where the potential leveling effect of negotiated wage is undone by wage drift. 
When institutional rules prevent adjusting wages for signaling purposes, workers 
cannot clearly distinguish strong from weak firms on the basis of their wage policy, 
and advance notice will raise both the expected utility of workers (who can use the 




Most industrialized countries now regulate dismissals via statute or collective 
bargaining. Even in the United States, where there is no comprehensive national 
job security legislation and where collective bargaining covers a very small fraction 
of private employment, state courts increasingly found exceptions to the Common 
Law "employment at will" doctrine during the 1980's. This growth of legal 
restrictions on dismissals in the United States during a period when U.S. 
unemployment fell is an awkward point for those who argue that European 
dismissal policies were an important source of higher European unemployment. In 
fact, there is little persuasive evidence on the effects of such policies, and the 
potential effects may depend on the structure of information in labor markets. 
Under perfect information, employers would provide levels of job security that 
paid for themselves either directly or via compensating wage differentials. (In the 
present context, "job security" can mean either a higher objective probability of job 
stability or higher legal standards for dismissal from the job [e.g., just cause].) To 
the extent that job security is a "good" or positive nonpecuniary aspect of 
consumption, workers could "buy" more job security by accepting lower wages, 
which effectively would compensate the employer for the higher costs of providing 
greater job security. Conversely, employers would have to offer relatively high 
wages to induce workers to accept jobs offering little job security. 
Introducing a dismissal policy in this environment reduces layoffs, but creates 
incentives for employers to substitute capital for labor and uncovered workers (e.g., 
on fixed-term contracts) for covered workers. Moreover, dismissal costs that reduce 
the flow out of employment also induce employers to be more careful in their 
hiring decisions, thereby reducing the flow into employment. 
This picture changes when employers are uncertain of a worker's true ability, 
and continuous monitoring of performance is not possible. Employers may then 
perceive job seekers offering to work at a lower wage in exchange for greater job 
security as "talented shirkers" -individuals who raise their on-the-job utility 
through surreptitious reductions in effort (Levine 1991). The limited evidence 
available offers some support for this proposition. A survey of Swedish manufactur-
ing firms found that 93 percent of the firms rejected offers to work at a lower wage 
by blue-collar workers and 84 percent rejected such offers from white-collar 
workers. In about a third of the cases, employers assumed that the underbidders 
had inferior skills (Agell and Lundborg 1993). (Another third was motivated by 
concerns over creating internal inequities.) Individual employers who voluntarily 
instituted greater dismissal protection (and accordingly paid lower wages) could 
find the potential benefits dissipated by adverse selection. The combination of 
adverse selection and competition among firms would discourage individual firms 
from adopting greater dismissal protection on their own. 
In this world, a statutory dismissal or job security standard applicable to all firms 
would correct the adverse selection, and shirkers would be more evenly distributed 
among firms. If employers would have offered more dismissal protection, absent 
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adverse selection, the public policy raises well-being. In an area where there is so 
little reliable evidence, however, one must also consider the possibility that more 
lenient standards will produce more shirking. 
The foregoing analysis assumes that firms did not use wage policy to overcome 
their informational disadvantage. Suppose now that firms establish wages above 
market-clearing rates in order to provide performance incentives to workers whose 
work cannot be continually monitored. This efficiency wage policy creates positive 
performance incentives, because if workers are dismissed for poor performance 
they would receive a significantly lower wage in another job-as long as all firms 
are not following an efficiency wage policy. Firms would be unwilling to hire 
workers who would accept a lower wage, because the lower wage would erode 
performance incentives. By holding wages above the market-clearing level, the 
policy produces unemployment. Job security legislation would seem to undermine 
the credibility of an efficiency wage strategy, which rests on the employer's ability 
to dismiss malingering employees. To the extent that job protection legislation 
makes dismissals costly, there would be nothing gained from paying efficiency 
wages. Thus, job protection legislation could in principle reduce unemployment in 
economies in which many employers follow an efficiency wage policy. 
HIRING BEHAVIOR WITH IMPERFECT SIGNALING 
In the standard labor demand model, the employer's search and hiring process is 
something of a black box. Employers simply hire and retain workers as long as their 
(known) marginal product is at least as great as the market wage. Many real world 
personnel policies are irrelevant in this world. 
We have seen in the earlier discussion that when job applicants have superior 
knowledge about their performance abilities, they also have incentives to utilize 
credible signals of their ability. Many real world personnel policies would also be 
irrelevant in a world of clear signals, but real world conditions do not always 
permit clear signaling of abilities to employers. Clear signaling requires an inverse 
relationship between ability and the cost of the signal. As this condition weakens, it 
becomes easier for low-ability workers to acquire the signal in an effort to fool 
employers. When faced with a "pooling" of high- and low-ability workers, 
employers must develop personnel strategies to reduce their uncertainty over the 
productivity of job applicants. Their choice among strategies is not independent of 
the institutional structure of the labor market. 
Employer Screening 
The simplest strategy, and the one that is closest in spirit to the traditional labor 
demand model, is the "trial and error method," in which unsatisfactoty employees 
are fired after an initial period of observation on the job. This approach is 
obviously constrained by restrictions on dismissals established by legislation or 
collective bargaining. As many have observed, an effect of such restrictions is to 
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make employers more careful about who they hire. Increasing the cost of 
dismissing employees induces employers to consider personnel strategies that raise 
the odds that the employees they hire will be productive. Broadly speaking, 
employers can move from trial and error to one of two alternative strategies. 
The first is a "self-selection" strategy in which the employer establishes a 
compensation structure that would only appeal to individuals who planned to 
perform well during a career relationship with the company. Workers accept wages 
that are lower than their marginal product early in their career in exchange for 
wages that exceed their marginal product late in their career, so long as their 
performance merits retaining them. The initial low wages are a kind of perfor-
mance bond posted in the expectation that good performance will lead to 
continued employment, wage increases, and high relative wages late in the career 
(Salop and Salop 1976; Lazear 1981). Workers who are unlikely to perform well or 
remain at the job long would not rationally accept employment at a firm offering 
such a compensation plan, and self-selection would substitute for costly employer 
screening. Those who accept employment under such compensation schemes 
effectively signal that they have the desired but unobservable job performance 
characteristics. Because such incentive schemes require steep job tenure-earnings 
profiles, however, the self-selection strategy is constrained by institutionally-driven 
pay compression. Collective bargaining and indexation schemes produced such 
compression in some European countries during the 1970's. 
The second strategy for raising the quality of new hires is intensive pre-
employment screening. In effect, this strategy raises the fixed costs of hiring a 
worker, thus producing a reduction in the number of employees, increased hours 
per employee, and a substitution toward skills for which productivity can be 
discovered without extensive pre-employment screening. It is important to note 
that this cost would not be at issue (a) if employers were as well informed as 
applicants about the latter's ability, and (b) if the institutional structure of the 
labor market did not prevent the use of less expensive alternative strategies for 
reducing that uncertainty (Flanagan 1987).3 
How important is the pre-employment screening strategy and to what extent is 
its use related to institutional constraints on alternative personnel strategies? At the 
heart of these questions is the nature of the employer search process, and evidence 
on the nature of employer search processes should illuminate the favored personnel 
strategies. For example, an employer following a trial and error strategy would 
presumably adopt a sequential search strategy. That is, the employer would 
establish a threshold level of productivity based on observable characteristics, accept 
the first applicant over the threshold, observe the performance of the applicant 
during a probationary period, and dismiss the worker if the performance is 
unsatisfactory. If the vacancy remains unfilled, the employer could reduce the 
threshold. In the context of workers' job search, this is searching at the extensive 
margin. In common with the trial and error strategy, the self-selection strategy is 
consistent with a sequential search strategy by employers, since employees would 
pre-screen themselves in the face of long-term compensation incentives. 
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In contrast, the pre-employment screening strategy involves search at the 
intensive margin-acquiring detailed information on several job applicants before 
choosing the apparent best person for the job. Empirically, what is at issue is the 
determinants of the duration of job vacancies. If unemployment durations can be 
interpreted in part as the outcome of worker search strategies, vacancy durations 
can be interpreted as the outcome of employer search strategies. In fact, it appears 
that employer hiring decisions are the dominant factor controlling job search 
durations by workers, since empirical studies of the job search process indicate that 
the probability that a job seeker accepts a job offer is very close to one. 
What kind of a search process seems to describe employer behavior best? 
Research into behavior by employers in the Netherlands and the United States 
rejects the model of sequential search behavior by employers that would be 
consistent with the trial and error and self-selection strategies. Instead, employer 
search for qualified workers is dominated by pre-employment screening. The work 
of van Ours and Ridder (1992) describes a hiring process in which most applicants 
apply during the first two weeks following the announcement of a job vacancy. 
Then there is a screening and selection period of one to two months. Virtually all 
vacancies are filled after five months. Thus, most vacancies exist not because there 
are no applicants, but because it takes time to select a suitable employee from the 
pool of available applicants.4 Moreover, employers do not appear to lower job 
requirements if vacancies remain unfilled, contrary to the predictions of the 
sequential search model (van Ours and Ridder 1991). Instead, employers behave as 
if they observe the wage set by market forces or bargaining, set applicant 
requirements so that the expected marginal revenue product of an acceptable 
applicant is at least as high as the wage, and screen until they find the applicant 
with the largest margin over the threshold. 
To what extent does the research into the determinants of vacancy durations 
confirm the influence of institutional constraints on an employer's choice among 
alternative personnel strategies? Vacancy (screening) durations are longer in union 
than in nonunion firms and longer where there is considerable regulation of the 
dismissal process (van Ours and Ridder 1992). Studies of U.S. data also find that 
employer search is longer in unionized firms and where it is difficult to fire a worker 
(Barron and Bishop 1985). Employer screening appears to be more intensive where 
institutional constraints are most likely to prevent the main alternatives to pre-
employment screening. 
CONCLUDING COMMENTS 
This chapter addresses the question of whether and under what circumstances labor 
market policy interventions can produce positive hiring outcomes. The central 
theme of the chapter is that the answer depends on the structure of information in 
the labor markets in which the interventions occur. Predicting the effects of labor 
market policy on hiring behavior often requires a more complicated pre-assessment 
than occurs in applications of the standard labor demand model. 
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Some of the examples reviewed in the chapter provide evidence that some 
institutional interventions inadvenently establish signaling criteria that reverse 
policy outcomes predicted by the standard labor market model. Others indicate the 
theoretical possibility of such effects. Still others provide evidence that institutional 
interventions influence personnel policies and employer search strategies in ways 
that can influence the character of unemployment. 
It is no accident that the chapter is built on examples. Game theory is notorious 
for its multiple equilibria, and general predictions are harder to come by in a world 
of asymmetric information than in standard labor market theory. Applied 
economists can view this as a frustration or an opponunity for research. The 
emphasis on the connections between the structure of information and structure of 
institutions provides many opportunities for situation-specific analyses-
sophisticated case studies, if you will. For some problems, the standard tools will 
remain adequate. But for others, as the examples demonstrate, they will not. 
The research challenge is not made easier by the fact that consideration of 
worker and employer strategies in response to asymmetric information complicates 
further the interpretation of observed wage structures. This is the mirror image of 
the reversal of textbook predictions of policy effects. In one setting, economists 
(and job seekers) may interpret relatively low wages as an indication of relatively 
favorable nonmonetary working conditions, while in another setting they may 
conclude that the firm is in a weak financial condition. Other juxtapositions are 
possible. How does the analyst know which setting is appropriate? What is the 
domain of particular theories (information structures)? These and related questions 
imply a large research agenda. 
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NOTES 
1 The original purpose of the experiment was to determine whether the form in which a 
subsidy was given influenced the employment success of the target groups. At the time, 
this issue was hotly debated in Congress. 
2 In some circumstances there is potential for use of the employment service to provide 
a positive quality signal. The OECD repons that in Spain "a significant proponion 
of the job seekers register [with the service] largely in order to gain later access to 
training courses, which carry a grant." On the other hand, "listings of job-seekers 
suitable for a panicular vacancy . . . stan with the longest duration unemployed" 
(OECD 1992: 126). 
3 If institutional changes during the 1970's and 1980's had increased employers' 
reluctance to hire, then the duration of job vacancies (net of cyclical influence) should 
have increased. There is evidence of just such increases in Germany (Franz 1989). 
Consistent with the argument and evidence reviewed below, Franz and Smolny interpret 
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lengthening job vacancies as "higher choosiness of employers in selecting applicants for 
available jobs" (Franz and Smolny 1993: 5). 
4 The authors also report that "at the higher education level, employers need more time co 
select an employee from a larger pool of applicants. Fewer employees are hired from this 
pool" (van Ours and Ridder 1992: 152). 
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ARRANGEMENTS FOR JOB 
PLACEMENT 
Friedrich Buttler and Ulrich Walwei 
INTRODUCTION 
In several European countries (e.g. Belgium, France, and Norway) public employ-
ment services still have a monopoly position. In contrast to this, in other countries 
(e.g. the United States, the United Kingdom, and Switzerland) public employment 
services (PES) and private employment services (PRES) have now been coexisting 
for quite some time. Recently a tendency toward liberalization in the area of job 
placement has been observed. In Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands, and 
Sweden public employment services have lost their monopoly position. Different 
institutional arrangements for job placement in Europe have also given rise to to 
changes within the framework of the Single European Market. It is questionable 
whether the prohibition of market entry for private employment services is 
reconcilable with the freedom to provide services guaranteed in the EEC treaties. 
During the 1970's and 1980's private employment services that intervene in the 
functioning of labor markets exerted a growing influence. Such agencies cover a 
wide range of activities, for example, fee-charging employment agencies, 
management consultants, outplacement agencies, temporary work agencies, and 
self-help associations (ILO 1994). There are several reasons of the sector's growth 
and employers' motives for delegating to others the tasks of selecting or recruiting 
the staff they need (Caire 1991). The growth of the business is linked to the 
employers' discovery of the importance of human resources, as well as to the policy 
of externalizing a certain number of functions, so that the firm can concentrate on 
its own speciality. 
The main purpose of this chapter is to assess the effects of different regulatory 
regimes (placement monopoly versus coexistence) on the functioning of the labor 
market by using a transnational analysis. In particular we will comment on two 
interesting findings of a recent OECD review report on PES. Their data on hirings 
suggest on the one hand that the monopoly status of the PES may not necessarily 
improve its market share (OECD 1992: 122). On the other hand, the report states 
that the existence of PRES does not preclude a comparatively high market share of 
the PES (1992: 141). These findings require an explanation. The chapter starts 
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with theoretical considerations on the role of employment services as brokers in the 
labor market. Subsequently, different institutional arrangements for job placement 
are discussed by comparing regulations and appropriate empirical findings 
internationally. Finally, the chapter examines the need for institutional changes and 
innovations in the area of job placement. 
FUNCTIONS AND IMPACT OF JOB PLACEMENT 
Inaeasing Transparency 
Markets are generally speaking not transparent. It is uncertain where one can obtain 
something, or offer something, what price must be paid or what price can be 
obtained, and what kind of quality the exchanged object has. This lack of 
transparency can be reduced by gathering information. Information, however, is 
not given free of charge. Gathering information costs time and money, and 
information will usually cost more the more quickly it is required. The fact that 
information costs money makes it necessary to have certain mechanisms or 
institutions to be able to carry out an efficient exchange (Akerlof 1970: 488). 
Examples of this are newspaper advertisements, informal contacts, or agents. 
Agents can be brought in if it is possible for them to increase the net return of 
information for the exchange partners by increasing the gross return or reducing 
the cost of the transaction (compared with the cost and gross returns of using 
alternative channels of information). 
These theoretical considerations are especially relevant to the labor market. Labor 
markets are not at all homogeneous. Jobs and skills differ greatly. In addition, 
personal attitudes on both sides play an important role. Therefore matching vacant 
jobs and persons looking for employment is a difficult, complex and cost-intensive 
task. Employers and workers will be ready to use job placement agencies if the 
expected net return of using them is higher as compared with other search channels. 
An optimum filling of vacancies demands extensive knowledge of companies' skill 
needs on the one hand, together with the suitability of the employees on the other 
hand. Only where job agents have expert knowledge of specific pans of the labor 
market can they expect to be brought into the search process. 
But due to certain peculiarities of the labor market it is difficult to judge the 
usefulness of using external placement agents. The quality of jobs and the 
performance of workers are experience goods (Spence 1973: 355). This well-
known fact leads to the conclusion that the actual benefit of using job placement 
agents could not be determined on completion of the contract. Therefore, job 
placement services themselves are an experience good. For this reason the 
reputation of a placement agency will be of significant importance for its success in 
the future, i.e. the possibility of being brought into the search process is mainly 
dependent on the quality of that service in the past. 
It must also be mentioned that hiring expenditure includes the cost of search and 
selection. The cost of search and the cost of selection could be interdependent. 
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Search activities based on specified and well-defined criteria entail the higher cost of 
finding suitable candidates but the lower cost of selection and vice versa. In both 
cases placement agencies could have a certain task. In one case they support 
predominantly search activities by finding suitable candidates, in the other mainly 
the effectiveness of selection decisions. Job brokers can therefore either be search 
and/or selection agents (which is the case e.g. as PRES activities show). 
Employment Effects 
PES or PRES will in general only be used if they are cost-effective. This statement 
can be illustrated by a simple hypothetical example. Suppose a firm has to fill a 
vacancy and can use either PES or PRES instead of or in addition to its own search 
activities. Relevant for the decision whether or whether not to use a placement 
service are: 
the benefit (B) of searching which is the expected productivity of the selected 
worker; 
the cost ( C) of searching which includes the cost of using external agencies 
( C,...,), of handling the job filling internally ( ½n,) and of not filling or 
unsatisfactorily filling the vacancy ( C,.,,.) 
An efficient firm will only commission any kind of employment service if the 
resulting additional benefits are higher than the additional cost of hiring: 
(B) > ( C,...,_ + ½n, + C,,.,.) 
This means, the use of an employment service will be more likely 
if, ceteris paribus, the recruited worker is expected to be more productive { + B), 
and/or 
if, ceteris paribus, the cost of handling the job filling internally can be reduced 
by contracting this task out to outside agencies (- ½n,), and/or 
if, ceteris paribus, the vacancy can be filled more quickly and adequately 
(- c,,.,). 
Due to the fact that a fee is charged for the use of a PRES, whereas a PES is free of 
charge, it would only make sense for the firm to commission the PRES if its use 
results in additional benefits or additional cost savings. Therefore, these theoretical 
reflections suggest that the market potential for PES is in general the more difficult 
job fillings in terms of qualification requirements. The advantages of a PRES can 
either be its deeper knowledge of certain segments of the labor market or better 
knowhow and more resources to select suitable candidates. Similar theoretical 
considerations with quite similar suggestions are possible from the viewpoint of the 
job seeker. In general, public job placement officers as well as private job placement 
agents could make the matching of labor and vacancies easier and improve the 
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functioning of the labor market. In addition those services potentially increase 
employment and consequently reduce unemployment. These hypotheses can be 
clarified by some funher theoretical reflections. 
The level of unemployment or more precisely the unemployment rate is the 
result of two different effects: On the one hand, the inflow of the labor force to 
unemployed status (i.e. the risk of becoming unemployed) and on the other hand, 
the average duration of unemployment between the date of registration and the 
date of being taken off the unemployment register (i.e. the risk of staying in the 
unemployed status). The UR-curve in Figure 10.1 represents combinations of 
inflow rate and duration figures which lead to the same unemployment level. It 
shows that the level of unemployment could be reduced either by a decrease of the 
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Figure 10.1 Decomposition of Unemployment 
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In both cases a downward shift of the curve will be the result. The UR-curve also 
shows that a movement leftwards along the curve would mean an improvement in 
the unemployment composition. With respect to labor market policy considera-
tions it would be better to have a certain unemployment rate with a low duration 
value and a comparatively high inflow rate instead of a low inflow rate but a high 
duration value (as it is unfortunately the case in many OECD countries). Job 
placement influences the inflow rate, the duration value and the unemployment 
composition. 
By supporting the matching process, efficient job placement contributes to a 
longer average duration of employment periods. They help to place workers in the 
job where they can be used most productively. In consequence, mismatch will be 
less likely and the risk of becoming unemployed (due to a mismatch) will be 
reduced. An improvement in the job matching process through placement agents 
can also be illustrated by the Beveridge Curve. It displays the theoretical relation-
ship between the stock of unfilled vacancies and the stock of unemployed. The 
further "outside" the curve is situated the more acute are mismatch problems. A 
shift of the curve to the left implies an easier matching of labor supply and demand 
due e.g. to more transparency and better information on the labor market. One 
reason for a leftward shift of the Beveridge Curve could be-other things being 
equal-more efficient employment services. 
An improvement of the matching process would not only mean better matching 
but also quicker matching. Efficient employment services would reduce the 
duration of vacancies to a certain unavoidable minimum. A shorter duration of 
vacancies would tend to increase the number of employed and reduce the average 
duration of unemployment (especially frictional unemployment). But this effect 
should not be overestimated. A shorter duration of vacancies (e.g. due to efficiently 
working employment services) must not necessarily lead to the corresponding 
increase in employment. The effect could be smaller because firms are in competi-
tion with one another. The expansion in one firm due to a (quicker) filling of 
vacancies could result in job losses and in the cancelling of vacancies in other firms 
(Reyher et al 1990). In addition the possible effect on the duration of vacancies 
might be comparatively small because speedy and tailor-made filling of a vacancy is 
difficult to achieve at the same time and could thus be contradictory. Tailor-made 
filling takes time because the company's skill needs and the applicants' 
qualifications must be harmonised with one another as far as possible. 
Efficiency of employment services means optimum matching of vacancies with 
persons looking for employment. Although their effects on the quality of the 
matching process and the level of unemployment are clear-cut and positive, the 
effects on the unemployment composition need further consideration. Because 
efficiently operating services concentrate on the most promising job seeker when 
acquiring applicants, this could lead to an even greater segmentation of the labor 
market. Special and more intensive help and advice would then be necessary and 
could enable (long-term) unemployed to move into employment. Especially in 
order to combat and prevent long-term unemployment (L TU) and its negative 
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long-term consequences (such as the devaluation of human capital) active labor 
market policies play an important role. Therefore, the combination of those 
policies (e.g. wage cost subsidies for target and problem groups of the labor 
market) with effective placement could be a powerful instrument to foster the 
reintegration of (long-term) unemployed people in the labor market. Help to the 
L TU and other disadvantaged unemployed people produces greater benefits to the 
economy in terms of lower benefit payments and higher tax flowbacks. But 
attention must be paid to the fact that there are increasing marginal costs of 
reintegrating long-term unemployed. That is caused by diminishing marginal 
returns of reintegration policies. The more long-term unemployed are covered by 
reintegration policies, the more we are confronted with the hard core of this group. 
The more we are confronted with the hard-to-place people, the more we need 
assisted matching and support by social workers. 
INTERNATIONAL COMPARISON OF JOB PLACEMENT 
Legal Framework 
Looking to the situation in different countries as far as the role of public 
employment services and the admittance of their private counterparts is concerned, 
we can see varying conditions from one country to another (cf. Table 10.1). The 
following international comparison includes the United States, Japan and several 
European countries (Walwei 1991). There are public employment services in all 
the countries in the survey which carry out job placement free of charge and which 
are financed by public funds. Apart from the two extreme forms of a more or less 
strict PES monopoly and the coexistence of public and private institutions, varying 
situations can also be found between the two extremes. 
There is a relatively strict PES monopoly in Greece, Italy, and Spain. In these 
countries fee-charging private employment services are not allowed at all and there 
is an obligation for firms to notify the PES of any vacancies. However, the illegal 
(placement) activities of management consultants and other agents (such as 
temporary work agencies) are often tolerated to a great extent. 
In contrast to this there is a coexistence between public employment services and 
fee-charging private services in Denmark (since July 1990), Germany (since August 
1994), the United Kingdom, Ireland, Portugal, the Netherlands (since January 
1991), the United States, Sweden (since July 1993), and Switzerland. In Denmark, 
Sweden, and the United States PRES can carry on business without a special 
license. Just like any other company, such agencies acquire their legitimacy by 
being entered on the commercial register and by declaring themselves to the tax 
authorities. In the United States there is no federal law that specifies what a PRES 
is allowed to do. Instead, prohibited actions are defined; e.g. according to the Civil 
Rights Act of 1964 private (as well as public) placement agencies have to provide 
services without regard to race, color, sex, or national origin. In addition to that, 
nearly all states have enacted their own laws regulating PRES activities. For some 
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B L D~ F D' GR IR I NL' p E GB s- CH N USA J 
Permissibility of 
Fee-charging employment - - + - - - + - + + - + - + - + 
agencies 
Nonprofit agencies + + + + + - + - + + + + + + + + + 
Temporary employment + + + + + - + - + + - + + + + + _, 
agencies 
Executive search agencies + + + + + - + - + + - + - + + + + 
Obligation to notify + + - + - + - + - - + - + - + - + 
vacancies 
Notts-. 
+ =yes - =no 
• New regulation since July 1990. 
b New regulation since August 1994. 
'New regulation since January 1991. 
d New regulation since July 1993. 
' Such services arc allowed for entertainers. 
r Such services arc allowed for 29 occupations. 
1 Only trade unions can run manpower supply services. 
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states, only registration is required. In other states, regulatory laws are applicable 
and contain some prohibited practices (e.g. false advertisement or referring 
candidates to establishments where a strike or lockout is in force). But in general, 
in the United States regulation of PRES can be judged as quite liberal (Stevens 
1989: 10). 
In contrast, private employment services in the other coexistence countries 
mentioned only have the legal right to run an agency if a supervisory authority 
(generally the employment service) judges that the applicant meets certain criteria. 
For example, in the United Kingdom a PRES needs a current license from the 
Secretary of State for Employment. A license may be refused or revoked on the 
grounds that: The applicant is under twenty-one years of age; the applicant is 
unsuitable because of misconduct; the premises are unsuitable. In addition certain 
regulations set the standards of service to be provided (e.g. with regard to 
advertisements, fees, young people under eighteen or employment abroad). 
According to the new Swiss Placement Code (July 1991) every PRES (including 
executive search) has to apply for a license. This PRES regulation is intended to 
protect jobseekers from abusive methods and also constitute a uniform federal basis 
throughout the Swiss Federation. 
Many coexistence countries regulate the charging of fees. In the United 
Kingdom, Ireland, the Netherlands, Germany, and Sweden, placement fees 
may be demanded from the employers only (except the finding of jobs for 
workers in the entertainment field). In contrast to that, in Switzerland the 
registration fee payable by the clients to the licensed placement firms is limited 
to a very low sum. The Swiss Employment Code provides that the fee must not 
exceed 12 percent of the first month's salary, the employees may pay only up to 
6 percent of their first salary. Expenses are usually not included in the fee 
payable and can be charged separately. A peculiarity of the Swiss and German 
systems is that a PRES must publish statistics concerning the number of 
jobseekers registered or placed, vacancies received or filled, and placements 
made. A special feature of the Swedish placement system is that-although 
PRES are not forbidden anymore-companies are obliged to notify all 
vacancies to the PES. 
In the other countries, the placement systems lie between the two extremes. In 
Belgium the PES is the sole body responsible for job placement. Only in 
exceptional cases does the PES entrust a commercial PRES with job placement for 
individual occupations or for groups of persons (especially in the case of 
entertainers and executives). In addition, job placement may be carried out free of 
charge by various private agencies (e.g. educational institutions) to complement the 
state placement service. In Luxembourg a commercial PRES must restrict itself to 
recruiting workers abroad. In Japan PRES are in principle prohibited. However, 
such services may be operated in 29 occupations requiring special technical skills in 
which the PES alone may not fully meet supply and demand (e.g. engineers, 
dentists). In France, apart from the PES, only institutions (e.g. chambers of 
commerce, universities)-whether private or public-which work free of charge 
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may place workers in employment. In addition, a restricted number of commercial 
private employment services are allowed under certain circumstances. In Norway 
(as in Sweden) companies are obliged to notify the PES of all vacancies. Since 
1993 there have been no restrictions on commercial placement of executives and 
entertainers. 
The commercial supply of workers by temporary employment agencies can be 
regarded partly as a substitute for commercial job placement (cf. Konle-Seidl et aL 
1990). The main difference between a contract to supply workers on a temporary 
basis and the regular placement service is that the legal relationship between the 
agency and the temporary worker outlasts the individual temporary job, but that 
the individual job is not aimed at establishing a new employment contract. 
However, the hired temporary workers can be candidates for the firms employing 
them in their search for employees on a permanent basis. Temporary work agencies 
are not permitted at all in Greece, Italy, and Spain. There are no substantial 
restrictions (with the exception of the duty to obtain a license) on the supply of 
temporary employment in Denmark, Great Britain, Ireland, Luxembourg, 
Portugal, and the United States. Fee-charging employment agencies in Great 
Britain, Denmark, Ireland, and the United States may also supply temporary 
workers. In Belgium, the Netherlands, France, Germany, and Japan a limited 
permissibility can be spoken of (e.g. a limit on the length of time for temporary 
work or the exclusion of certain sectors of industry). 
Public Employment Services 
The OECD report on public employment services already quoted gives an interesting 
and illustrating picture of the tasks assigned to them, their resources and market 
importance. The main findings of this report (which includes Norway, Spain, the 
United Kingdom, and Japan) with special respect to job placement will be 
summarized in this chapter and be supplemented by information and data on the 
situation in the Netherlands, Germany, and the United States (OECD 1993; 
Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit 1992; National Commission for Employment Policy 1991). 
In all the countries under review, the PES is responsible for, besides the 
provision of job placement services, most aspects of the administration of 
unemployment insurance benefits. In addition they are, to varying degrees, 
responsible for the implementation of certain labor market measures (e.g. job-
search help, guidance on places on training and job-creation schemes). Not 
surprisingly the bulk of PES staff is located in local offices. In all countries under 
review, a substantial proportion of PES staff is still devoted to benefit administra-
tion, as opposed to active labor market policies (including placement). In the 
United Kingdom, benefit administration occupies over 60 percent of staff 
resources. In western Germany, only about 25 percent of staff resources in local 
offices is devoted to job placement and counseling. 
To facilitate the matching process the PES in the countries under review codify a 
range of variables (e.g. occupation, salary offered or sought, and age). In practice, 
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much job placement occurs in local labor markets that have a limited range of 
vacancies which are in general notified by telephone. Most commonly, vacancy 
information is shown either on cards or on a display screen in local offices. Matching 
is still mainly done by PES placement officers who propose a candidate after receiving 
a job offer. To complement this many PES have recently established self-service 
systems. In the British "semi-open" self-service system, card displays show only basic 
information (occupation, salary, and working hours). For further details the job-
seeker must approach a placement officer, especially in order to get the address and 
telephone number. Quite similar to the British system is the American "Interstate Job 
Bank" (IJB). Job openings are usually available on microfiche, but may also be 
available on computer terminal screen. But the IJB is, like the British card system, a 
semi-open self-service system because a referral to a job listed on the IJB can only be 
made by PES staff. In the "fully open" system, or open-file system, in Norway and 
Japan all the relevant information is available on screen without the need for a 
placement officer to be contacted. In Germany, a similar computer system has 
recently been established in nearly all local PES. 
There are two main indicators of the market share of PES activities with respect 
to placement: The proportion of registered vacancies and the proportion of all 
hirings that are made with PES support. Table 10.2 shows the relevant figures for 
the review countries. The relatively low percentage of placements as a percentage of 
vacancy notifications and of all hirings in Norway and Japan is to some extent due 
to the "fully-open" systems in both countries. It is difficult to count self-service 
transactions. Therefore, in those countries the proportion of registered vacancies 
(as a measure of the intended use of the PES) is getting more important. The PES 
in the U.S. obviously has the lowest market share of all countries in the survey. But 
attention must be paid to the fact that the placement ratio varies considerably from 
one state to another (see Table 10.3). The placement ratios listed in both tables are 
comparable to a limited extent only because of the different methods used to record 
the statistics in each country. In addition the number of placements in a given 
period reflects neither the effort made by the PES nor the value of each placement 
(see OECD 1984 and page 260). 
In spite of these difficulties the comparison does allow careful conclusions to be 
drawn. As the figures show, most vacancies are filled without the intervention of 
the PES. In countries in which PES and PRES coexist one can find a controversial 
picture. Whereas the market share of the PES (as a percentage of all hirings) in the 
United States is much lower than in those countries with a placement monopoly 
(e.g. Spain and Germany, where PES were forbidden until 1994), the British PES 
has been able to defend its position much better. Therefore, looking to the 
situation in the UK one can argue (as the OECD report does) that the coexistence 
of public and private placement services does not necessarily lead to a compara-
tively low market importance of the PES. But looking to other "monopoly" 
countries (e.g. such as France, with a market share for the PES of 12 percent) it 
can also be stated that a placement monopoly does not necessarily lead to a 
comparatively high market share. 
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Table 10.2 Registered Vacancies and Placements in 1990-1991 (Indicators Based on Aggregate Statistics) 
United West United 
Japan Norway Spain Kingdom Netherlands Germany States 
(1990) (1990) (1990) (1990) (1991) (1991) (1991) 
PES administrative data: 
Annual vacancy registration (000s) 7,980 237 684 2,413 343 2,307 6,792 
Annual placements (000s) 1,356 84 506 1,764 129 1,569 3,214 
Labor market data: 
Dependent employment (0OOs) 47,726 1,761 9,073 22,824 5,799 26,195 117,914 
Monthly new hires as % of 
dependent employment (approx.) 1.9 2.3 2.2 2.1 1.7 2.3 5.4 
Derived indicators: 
Placements as % of vacancy 17 35 74 73 53 68 47 
notifications 
Monthly vacancy registrations as % 1.39 1.12 0.63 0.88 0.37 0.73 0.48 
of dependent employment 
Monthly placements as % of 0.24 0.40 0.46 0.64 0.19 0.50 0.23 
dependent employment 
Vacancy registrations as % of all 70 50 30 40 20 35 10 
hirings (approx.) 
Placements as % of all hirings 12 10 20 30 10 24 5 
(approx.) 
Sourtes: Alexander (1992); Bundcsaustalt fiir Arbcit (German Federal Employment Service); U.S. Deparuncnt of Labor 
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Table 10.3 Market Share of the U.S. 
Employment Setvice 
(1990) -Selected States 
with Comparatively High 
or Low Market Shares 
State Market Share (%) 
South Dakota 28.1 




U.S. Total 4.8 
Rhode Island 1.8 
Connecticut 1.8 
Massachusetts 1. 7 
Delaware 1.2 
New Jersey 1.0 
Source: U.S. Department of Labor 
In addition to the total share of PES placements and registered vacancies it is 
important what kind of jobs and workers they are dealing with. A tentative answer 
can be given by data from the United Kingdom as a "coexistence country" and 
Germany (as a "former monopoly country"). Table 10.4 illustrates the market 
importance of the British PES subdivided into different segments. Employers were 
more likely to contact job centers when recruiting skilled manual or unskilled staff. 
On the other hand job seekers who use job centers tend to be unemployed, are 
more likely to work in a manual profession, to live in rural regions, and to have 
comparatively low skills (Harrison 1991). This statement is in general also true for 
Germany. A company survey shows that the proportion of registered vacancies 
(related to total vacancies) is the lower the higher the skill requirements are (Reyher 
etal. 1990). 
The PES are in general more concerned with the supply side of the labor market 
because their main objective is, of course, to place unemployed people. In 
particular they need to help those unemployed who are less attractive to employers 
(e.g. the long-term unemployed). By doing this their reputation with employers 
may suffer. Consequently, in many countries, the main complaint of employers 
about the PES is that it does not supply suitable candidates. That is not• only 
because of an-as often criticized-insufficient preselection of candidates, but 
also due to a considerable lack of qualified candidates. That means the stigma of 
PES candidates can stigmatize PES itself. This signaling argument suggests that 
PES might not concentrate its placement activities only on hard-to-place people. If 
they lose their middle-class constituency they will be in danger of being driven out 
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Job Word of Notice Private Careers 
Center Ads Mouth Board Agmcy Service Other Total 
Company Size 
1-9 employees 30 14 39 4 2 1 10 100 
10-49 employees 28 23 34 1 5 3 6 100 
50+ employees 27 24 26 2 10 1 11 101 
Business Activity 
Manufacturing 27 24 27 1 8 1 13 101 
Disuibution 43 16 28 1 5 0 8 101 
Retail and Catering Services 27 16 41 5 2 2 8 101 
Financial and Business Services 21 31 26 0 14 2 7 101 
Regions 
London and South East 26 21 32 2 11 2 5 99 
Midlands, East Anglia, South West, Wales 26 21 38 4 3 1 8 101 
North, Scotland 35 17 30 1 2 1 14 100 
Grade 
Management/Professional 12 45 26 1 9 2 6 101 
Skilled Nonmanual 19 37 22 1 14 2 7 102 
Skilled Manual 34 20 32 1 3 1 9 100 
Unskilled 36 16 29 2 4 3 11 101 
Total Share of Search Channel 28 23 32 3 5 2 7 100 
Sourr:e: IFF-Rcsearch Ltd. (1988) 
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of the market, as experience in the United States clearly shows. Employer 
disillusionment was particularly damaging. Due to this loss of reputation the PES 
in the United States even began to lose its ability to serve the disadvantaged 
(Bishop 1992: 14). 
Private Employment Services 
Empirical knowledge for a careful assessment of the activities of private employ-
ment services and their possible effects on the labor market is still inadequate. The 
existing information makes it possible only to give a rough picture about the 
quantitative importance and structural characteristics of such agencies. This part of 
the chapter is mainly based on experience with commercial PRES in the United 
Kingdom but also additional information is given for the Netherlands and the 
United States (Clark et al. 1989; Smith 1988; FRES 1990; OECD 1993; ILO 
1994; Harrison 1992; Stevens 1989). 
The number of PRES in the United Kingdom increased greatly in the 1980's. 
Statistics of the Employment Department show a significant growth of 322 percent 
in the number of licensed agencies and employment businesses between March 
1977 (5,336 license holders) and March 1990 (I 7,193 license holders). Due to the 
recession in the United Kingdom it has fallen slightly since then. This recent 
decline shows that demand for such agencies partly depends on cyclical compo-
nents. The total number of license holders in 1993 was 14,493-9,506 were 
licensed as both employment and temporary work agencies, 4,172 were licensed as 
employment agencies only and 728 were licensed as temporary work agencies only. 
The market share of PRES is at present assessed at about 5 percent and seems to be 
clearly below that of the PES {Walwei 1991). 
The regional, occupational, and industrial distribution of the employers' use of 
PRES is illustrated in Table 10.4. Employers were more likely to contact a PRES 
when recruiting clerical staff or managerial and professional employees. Private-
sector employers and those employers with more than 20 employees also contact a 
private agency more often when recruiting staff. 
The number of job seekers who use PRES as their main method of searching for 
a job also increased from 77,000 in 1984 to 167,000 (4 percent of all job seekers) 
in 1991, according to the Labour Force Survey. Job seekers using PRES are more 
likely to 
- live in London and the Southeast, 
- be without health problems or disabilities, 
- be aged between 25 and 50 years, 
have no children, 
be highly qualified, 
be employed, 
have been employed previously, 
- have been looking for work for only a short period of time, 
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be employed in managerial and professional or clerical occupations, 
be employed in banking and finance industries, 
have full-time jobs and be seeking full-time employment (Harrison 1992). 
About 80 percent of current license holders are small businesses, small being 
defined as sole trader or single license holder. The majority of PRES do not seem to 
belong to any representative body. Over 60 percent of license holders are situated 
in London and the Southeast. However, there being no geographical restrictions on 
the activities of agencies, there is no part of the United Kingdom without license 
holders (including, for example, the remote islands of Scotland). 
Placement agencies now cover most types of employment, from unskilled work 
to senior managerial posts. But they specialize in concrete occupational categories. 
Recruitment to office jobs continues to be one of their major activities. The main 
growth areas are the upper and lower ends of the labor market. About half the total 
number of license holders deal in specialist, managerial, and executive jobs; and 
nearly one third of them supply domestic and home care workers and au pairs. 
Demographic change is causing many license holders to draw on groups of 
potential workers that are currently underused (e.g. older people, women returning 
to working life). 
The placement fee is determined by the market and payable only by the 
employer. At the moment it is around 12-30 percent of the annual 
salary-depending on the qualification requirements for the particular position. In 
return, commercial agencies take pains to find the most suitable applicant. Their 
activities are therefore aimed at active acquisition of positions, the careful 
preparation of requirement profiles, and the conscientious preliminary screening of 
applicants. 
In the Netherlands, the 1990 Employment Service Act permits PRES as 
intermediaries between jobseekers and recruiting employers. So far, only a limited 
number of licenses (approximately 800) have been issued. Fee-charging employ-
ment services normally operate only in segments where highly skilled labor is 
required. Such agencies account for only 1 percent of all hires into permanent jobs. 
Of special importance in this context is the role played by the frequently used 
temporary work agencies. In the Netherlands they can in fact be seen as a substitute 
for fee-charging employment services. An employer survey shows that transitions 
from temporary work into a permanent job account for 7 percent of all appoint-
ments to permanent jobs (which is not much lower than the 10 percent market 
share of the PES). Obviously employers in the Netherlands not only use temporary 
workers to adjust the numerical size of their staff but also to test prospective 
workers. 
Just as in the United Kingdom, in the United States a remarkable growth of the 
PRES industry has occurred. The increasing importance of private agencies also 
reflects a prevailing philosophy of the US government that assigns a limited federal 
role while recognising the predominance of private activities. The number of PRES 
grew between 1959 and 1993 from 2,500 to 14,000 companies (with a network of 
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20,000 offices or branches). Their market share is assessed at about 10 percent, 
which seems to be significantly higher than that of the PES. According to a survey 
by the National Association of Personnel Consultants they deal mainly with highly 
skilled labor. The most commonly covered areas of activity were in 1991, 
according to the NAPC survey: Clerical (23.1 percent of the total cash in), data 
processing (15.0 percent), engineering/scientific (14.2 percent), and 
sales/marketing (13.6 percent). The respondents report that 96 percent of their 
placements involve a fee paid by the hiring employer which ranges on average 
between $10,324 (insurance) and $2,902 (clerical). Other characteristics such as 
regional distribution, firm size etc. are very similar to European coexistence 
countries (NAPC 1992). 
There are not many studies dealing with the efficiency of job search or recruiting 
methods. Two American studies should be mentioned because their results are of 
special interest in the context of this paper. Bonnick and Harrison-Ports (1992: 
29) found that "checking with employers directly" was the search method most 
often used by unemployed job seekers (approximately 72 percent of the total), but 
it did not necessarily prove to be the most successful method. Job seekers using a 
PRES (9 percent of all unemployed job seekers) had the highest likelihood of 
finding employment in 1991. Almost one fourth of them found jobs. However, 
the results do not suggest that the PRES is the most efficient search method because 
the authors did not check for certain variables such as qualifications. 
Bishop (1992: 12-13) tries to find an answer to the question of why firms pay 
substantial fees to use a PRES, but he did not find a convincing empirical answer. 
First, because his data, based on an employer survey, suggest that referrals from 
PRES were not significantly better than new hires recruited through other channels. 
Second, because of the fact that the decision process after a referral from a PRES 
took significantly more hours of staff time than for other informal recruitment 
sources. One can comment on that result in two ways. On the one hand, employers 
might be unaware of how poorly they fare with PRES referrals. But on the other 
hand they might be forced to use them by an absence of other applicants for a 
hard-to-fill job. 
MONOPOLY OR COEXISTENCE: A RELEVANT QUESTION 
The ongoing debate on the liberalization of employment services (especially in 
European countries) shows several controversies. Proponents of a removal of the 
monopoly state that the admittance of PRES would have positive effects on the 
allocation in the labor market and would tend to increase employment and reduce 
unemployment. They argue that the matching process on the labor market could be 
made easier by the possibility of using a further search channel. Besides that, 
private competition is seen as an incentive for public services to improve their own 
services. The efforts of public employment services toward stabilizing or extending 
their market share (with the precondition that their existing financial scope is 
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retained) would then in turn affect the private competition, and vice versa. Such 
competition will then reveal and satisfy the various needs of employers and job 
seekers. On the whole, better placement services from private and public 
intermediaries would reduce search costs (as argued on page 244) and contribute to 
placing workers in the job where they can work most productively. 
The main counterargument is that PES need a significant share of the placement 
market to carry out certain public tasks efficiently. A comparatively low market 
share (due to strong private competition) would 
impede monitoring of the labor market thus enabling the knowledge gained to 
be turned into necessary measures for individual and general measures in the 
labor market; 
impede the prevention of abuse of the benefit system. Benefits are generally 
payable only to those unemployed who are able and willing to take up a 
reasonable job offer; 
reduce the possibilities for the integration of problem groups through various 
company contacts and vacancies to be filled. That is because candidates 
proposed by the PES could be more segmented and stigmatised and 
filtered-due to the inferior role of the PES and to statistical discrimination. 
What could be a possible answer to this controversy regarding the experience 
from an international comparison in pages 247-257? First of all it has to be said 
that the existing experience and data in international comparisons are not sufficient. 
In general, they do not allow a careful assessment of all arguments in the debate. In 
spite of these serious restrictions the chapter does allow some tentative conclusions 
to be drawn regarding institutional arrangements for job placement. 
First, most vacancies in the economies are filled without the intervention of any 
kind of employment service. The potential market for job placement is extremely 
difficult to define. On the one hand, that is because a great deal of recruitment 
obviously does not require any kind of intermediary. Employer and employee can 
find each other by chance (informal contact) or perhaps they know each other 
from previous employment relationships (cf. Deeke 1991). Therefore, the quality 
and speed of the remaining vacancy fillings are quite independent from the 
institutional arrangements for job placement. On the other hand, it is difficult to 
define an optimum economic share of the PES in contrast to the PRES market 
share that will by and large emerge from market forces. The problem is not only 
that an optimum economic share is most unlikely to be constant versus time or 
could be different regarding skills or regions. In addition this is also because of the 
fact that social costs (in terms of efforts) and benefits (in terms of benefits) of PES 
activities must not necessarily equal market costs and benefits. Therefore, there is a 
strong need to evaluate PES placement activities (see below). 
Second, there seems to be only little competition between the PES and PRES. In 
all coexistence countries in the survey, private services can be seen more or less as a 
complement to the PES. The public sector is still more concerned with the supply 
side of the labor market; providing placement and guidance to everybody, but 
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giving priority to the placing of the unemployed. On the other hand, the private 
sector mainly targets the demand side, employed job seekers, and the upper end of 
the labor market. Thus mainly people with relatively low skills and those requiring 
further training are entrusted to the PES. As the international comparison suggests, 
this latter observation is also independent of institutional arrangements governing 
private employment agencies. But further research has to answer the question as to 
whether such PES/PRES complementarity exists per se or only as a result of 
coexistence. Longitudinal analyses dealing with market shares in certain labor 
market segments in countries where recently liberalization took place (e.g. 
Denmark, Sweden, and Germany) could provide answers. 
The finding of PES/PRES complementarity also provides an explanation for the 
findings in the OECD review report. The market share of the public employment 
services within their market potential (defined by the complementarity argument) 
does not as a rule depend on its monopoly status but first of all on its own 
attractiveness (i.e. the quality of the service). The size of the job placement market 
is not a fixed quantity. As experience in the United Kingdom shows, the number of 
placements at the overall economic level might be increased through the possibility 
of bringing in (more) PRES. Table 10.5 indicates an increase of the market share 
of public and private employment services together in the UK from 27 percent in 
1982 to 33 percent in 1987. During that period the number of private services 
increased significantly. But as the recent figures for 1992 (joint PES-PRES market 
share approximately 29 percent) show, the increase was also attributable to the 
increased difficulties, during a period of economic growth and in a tightening labor 
market, in filling vacancies through informal methods. 
Third, during the second half of the 1980's in many OECD countries, skill 
shortages were accompanied by considerably high unemployment (mismatch 
unemployment). It became much more difficult to place unemployed persons in 
vacant positions compared with the beginning of the 1980's. Indicators were the 
rightward shift of the Beveridge Curve, the increased duration of vacancies and the 
growing standard deviation from the average length of a period of unemployment. 
However, mismatch in the labor market could have a number of reasons-not 
only the effectiveness of employment services, but also regional, industrial and 
occupational disparities as well as employers' and job seekers' own efforts in 
adapting to changing circumstances. 
A multiple regression analysis explaining the duration of vacancies and the 
length of unemployment in western Germany shows that profile discrepancies 
between unemployed persons and job vacancies hence become more obvious 
(Buttler and Cramer 1991). The imbalances in the labor market produced a 
selection process which is typical of a market economy based on competition. The 
individual firm's decision must always be to recruit the workers that appear the 
most appropriate for a vacancy. Therefore it is no surprise that the length of 
unemployment is mainly influenced by factors such as age or health limitations, 
which may indicate lower individual productive capacity. On the other hand 
workers are also selective. They are attracted by well-paid jobs that appear to be 
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Table 10.5 Market Shares of Different Search Channels 
in the United Kingdom (1982 and 1987, in 
o/o of total hirings) 
1982 1981 
Job Center 24 28 
Advenisement 19 23 
Word of Mouth 43 32 
Public Notice Board 1 3 
Private Agency 3 5 
Careers Service 3 2 
Other 7 7 
Total 100 100 
Sources: Hedges (1983); !FF-Research Ltd. (1988) 
secure. The main problem of-private or public-employment services 1s 
therefore to match the workers and the jobs that have filtered out of the market. 
Assuming another period of economic growth in the near future and then again 
the appearance of skill shonages, the resulting difficulties will, however, not be 
solved only by giving more room to the highly specialized private employment 
services. The efficiency of the public services still plays the key role, because they 
are mainly responsible for matching those workers and jobs which have filtered out 
of the market. Because they have all the relevant services for labor market 
promotion in one organization they are able to give additional aid for integrating 
unemployed people. In order to support such a policy orientation the following 
measures to improve the effectiveness of the public employment services are of 
great importance: 
1 PES placement activities have to be evaluated in terms of cost and benefits. The 
PES market share will not emerge from the market process alone. Because the 
simple number of placements (e.g. in a given period) reflects neither the effort 
(in terms of resources) made nor the benefit of each placement. The benefits of 
PES placements refer to the matching process as such (e.g. with respect to 
occupational or regional mobility) as well as to the individual needs of employers 
and employees. PES placement activities affect both sides of the market. From 
the viewpoint of the individual employer the benefits of placement (compared 
with other recruitment methods) reflects, for example, e.g. candidates' 
productivity, required skills or expected turnover. For the individual job seeker, 
the benefits of placement (compared with other search methods) consist, for 
example, of the expected job tenure (and the corresponding likelihood of 
becoming unemployed) and the career. In order to determine the benefits of 
PES placements, longitudinal analyses (including comparisons with control 
groups) are required. 
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2 Contacts between the PES and small and medium-sized firms should be 
expanded. Company surveys in western Germany show that the proportion of 
registered vacancies (related to total vacancies) increases with company size (see 
Reyher et al. 1990). It has to be mentioned that approximately 86 percent of all 
vacancies are accounted for by small and medium-sized firms (under 200 
employees). Another company survey in western Germany shows that dispropor-
tionately large numbers of job vacancies with an outstanding duration came 
from small and medium-sized firms in the hotel and catering sector from trading 
firms and from construction firms with currently unfavourable sales and 
employment trends (Cramer 1990). It is reported that a significant proportion of 
these vacancies were also hard to fill because of disadvantageous locations and 
working hours. Therefore, it would be important to support the matching of 
workers and available jobs which have been filtered out of the market by 
expanding company contacts. This would facilitate a more job-oriented and not 
predominantly job seeker-oriented placement; 
3 The PES could make more use of the matching potential in the labor market. A 
comprehensive flow of information about vacancies and job seekers between 
offices is made possible by the use of electronic aids and the implementation of 
effective self-service systems. With this information on hand the PES could 
explore more intensively the possibilities for flexibility on the part of the 
employees and for substitution on the part of the employers. Workers could be 
encouraged to apply for jobs outside their regular occupational range and 
employers urged to appoint workers whose qualifications do not exactly fit their 
requirements but which are more or less equivalent. 
4 If a job seeker's own search in the labor market is made easier by the use of more 
electronic aids as is now the case in many countries, the personnel capacities of 
the PES could be better concentrated on important tasks and can thus be used 
more effectively, e.g. for a more active acquisition of vacancies for their mainly 
unemployed clients by increasing and intensifying contacts with companies 
(especially small and medium-sized), a more proficient selection of applicants 
and by putting more emphasis on the beneficial reintegration of the long-term 
unemployed into the labor market; 
5 If private employment agencies are a successful search method even for 
unemployed job seekers but are not used very frequently (see Bortnick and 
Harrison-Ports 1992) one can think about establishing cooperation between the 
PES and private employment agencies. The U.S. is the only country where a 
concrete cooperative arrangement already exists. The U.S. employment service is 
permitted to refer applicants to private agencies as long as they are not charged a 
fee (i.e. a fee borne by an employer can be charged). In practice this possibility is 
not used very often. One reason might be the resistance of PES managers to 
contracting out their original work because this could finally lead to considerable 
staff cuts. But more important seems to be the PES/PRES complementarity, 
which limits the scope of cooperation. That means, as Bishop (1992: 12) has 
stated in a general way, "that problems of the employment service cannot be 
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solved by contracting out the (placement) function to private employment 
agencies." Of course, this does not exclude limited areas for cooperation, e.g. 
bilateral recommendations in order to increase the transparency of the labor 
market and the matching possibilities. But however, in order to foster the 
reemployment opportunities for the unemployed it seems to be of special 
imponance to improve the effectiveness of the PES. 
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FIRM GROWTH, AND NEW 
FIRM FORMATION 
Evidence From Panel Studies for Germany and 
Comparative Findings From the U.S. 
Knut Gerlach and Joachim Wagner 
INTRODUCTION 
In his comprehensive anide on labor demand in the Handbook of Labor Economics, 
Hamermesh (1986: 455) states: "It is true that in contrast to the myriad studies oflabor 
supply based on households, there is a shocking absence of research on the microecon-
omics of labor demand." Most explanations of the mobility of workers between 
different states of the employment system, and sectors, regions, and occupations are 
traditionally linked to choices of workers and the traits of workers affecting their 
decisions. With the still rare availability of longitudinal employment data of individual 
firms empirical investigations have started recently to focus on labor demand. In this 
chapter we intend to make a contribution to this literature by analyzing three issues: 
1 Dynamics of employment in manufacturing firms. 
2 The relationship between firm size and employment growth. 
3 The employment effects of newly founded firms. 
For each issue, we report results from our own investigations based on a unique 
longitudinal data set covering all manufacturing establishments that were active in 
at least one year between 1978 and 1992 in Lower Saxony, a northern Federal 
State. Some comparisons are drawn to studies based on other longitudinal data sets 
from Germany and the United States to elaborate on similarities, dissimilarities, 
and stylized facts. The chapter ends with some reflections on the role of firm panels 
as an instrument for dynamic labor market analyses. 
DYNAMICS OF EMPLOYMENT: JOB TURNOVER 
A number of recent empirical studies on labor demand use longitudinal data at the 
firm level to decompose employment variations over time, and to measure the 
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heterogeneity of establishment-level employment changes. This heterogeneity is 
measured in terms of gross creation and gross destruction of jobs-rates of 
employment increase in growing firms (plant expansions), rates of employment 
decrease in shrinking firms (plant contraction), rates of employment increase in 
new firms (plant births), rates of employment decrease in closing firms (plant 
closings). 
Our empirical investigation is based on longitudinal data measuring the average 
annual level of employment for each year between 1978 and 1992 in 11,272 
establishments which constitute the manufacturing sector of the federal state of 
Lower Saxony. Data were collected in official surveys of firms by the Lower 
Saxonian Statistical Office. Usually, all establishments from manufacturing 
industries have to reply to the monthly survey, provided that at least 20 persons are 
working in either the local production unit or in the company that owns the unit. 
This data source is supplemented by the annual survey of small firms in manufac-
turing comprising all manufacturing firms with 1 to 19 working persons. The panel 
data set includes the number of persons working in a local production unit in each 
year from 1978 to 1992, i.e. firms that did not yet or no longer exist in a year are 
coded to have zero persons working in them. 
One peculiarity of the data has to be mentioned. Relocations of establishments 
from (or to) Lower Saxony to (or from) another region or country are recorded as 
plant closings (or plant births). In the same vein, establishments changing their 
center of activity from manufacturing to services or vice versa are inadequately 
depicted as exits or entries. Though the data are from one of the federal states, the 
results should be valid for the "old" part of Germany as a whole, since we have no 
evidence for any systematic differences with respect to employment variations, firm 
size and employment, and the employment effects of newly founded firms. 
Results for the manufacturing sector between 1978 and 1992 are given in Table 
11.1. A summation of the four components (expansions, contractions, births, 
closings) yields the rate of net employment change (row 3), while a summation of 
the absolute values and a division by the rate of net employment change results in 
an indicator of turbulence (row 9), which can be considered a measure of 
heterogeneity of the development of firms. 
Important results are: 
1 Gross flows substantially exceed net flows; absolute values of the indicator of 
turbulence are in the range of 2 (1981-1982, 1982-1983) and 36.5 
(1978-1979). 
2 The sum of the absolute gross flows [8] varies less than the net changes of 
employment [3]. The minimum of gross flows is 7.9 (1980-1981), the 
maximum is 11.3 (1986-1987), while the minimum of net changes is -4.38, 
and the maximum is +3.15. 
3 Even in periods of small net changes of employment substantial gross flows can 
be observed. For example, in 1978-1979 the growth rate of employment [3] 
was approximately zero ( +0.26), however, employment increased by almost 
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Table 11.1 Component of Job Turnover in the Manufacturing Sector of Lower Saxony, 1978-1992 
1978/79 1979/80 1980/81 1981/82 1982/83 1983/84 1984/85 1985/86 1986/87 1987/88 1988/89 1989/90 1990/91 1991/92 
(1] Number of Employees in tO 733,206 735,126 740,391 727,751 700,141 669,503 655,988 658,681 674,584 669,713 662,294 676,584 697,929 710,208 
[2] Number of Employees in tl 735,126 740,391 727,751 700,141 669,503 655,988 658,681 674,584 669,713 662,924 676,584 697,929 710,208 696,971 
[3] Rate of Change of Employment +0.26 +0.72 -1.71 -3.79 -4.38 -2.02 +0.41 +2.41 -0.72 -1.01 +2.06 +3.15 +I.76 -1.86 
between t0 and t1 (in % ) 
[4] Increase of Employment in +0.96 +0.75 +1.14 +0.56 +0.85 +1.19 +1.11 +1.53 +0.86 +0.70 +I.66 +0.84 +I.04 +1.23 
New Finns (m % of (1]) 
[5] Increase of Employment in +3.95 +3.71 +1.95 +1.99 +1.58 +2.52 +4.01 +4.73 +4.45 +3.15 +4.24 +5.38 +4.65 +2.56 
Growing Finns (in % of [1 ]) 
[6] Decrease of Employment in -3.17 -2.84 -3.n -5.14 -5.39 -4.34 -2.82 -2.50 -4.32 -3.82 -2.67 -2.12 -2.80 -4.64 
Shrinking Firms (in % of [1 ]) 
[7] Decrease of Employment in -1.47 -0.90 -1.02 -1.21 -1.41 -1.39 -1.90 -1.35 -1.71 -1.05 -1.17 -0.96 -1.13 -1.01 
Closing Finns (in% of [1]) 
[8] S~ of Absolute Gross Flows: 9.55 8.20 7.88 8.90 9.24 9.44 9.84 10.11 11.33 8.73 9.74 9.30 9.61 9.44 
[4] + [5) - [6) - [7) 
[9] Indicator of Turbulence: +36.46 +11.45 -4.62 -2.35 -2.11 -4.68 +23.97 +4.19 -15.69 -8.61 +4.73 +2.95 +5.46 -5.07 
[8]/[3) 
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1 percent via new firms [4], and 3.95 percent via expanding firms [5], while job 
losses in the magnitude of 3.17 [6] caused by contracting firms and, finally, job 
losses of 1.47 percent caused by plant closings [7] were recorded simultaneously. 
4 Even in periods of strong employment losses we observe sizeable positive gross 
flows. For example, in 1982-1983, total employment decreased by 4.38 percent 
[3], but the growth rate of employment amounts to 2.5 percent in newly 
founded firms and expanding firms [4 and 5]. 
5 The reverse can be observed in periods with a strong tendency of employment 
growth, i.e. strong negative gross flows happened simultaneously (e.g., 
1989-1990). 
6 Gross flows apparently are not associated with net changes of employment. For 
example, gross flows of ea. 9.5 percent occurred in 1978-1979 and in 
1983-1984 with net changes of employment of +0.26 percent and -2.02 
percent, respectively. 
7 On average 4.9 percent of all jobs are lost annually which implies that under the 
assumption of a steady state a job lasts about 20 years. 
Basically, these results do not change when the analysis is performed for 
establishments from sectors of economic activity, industries, or regions, or for 
firms from different size classes (cf. Gerlach and Wagner 1992, 1993a, 1993b). 
Job turnover has been investigated for West Germany in different sectors, firm 
size classes, and periods using the data from the Employment Statistics register of 
the Federal Labor Office (Cramer 1987, 1989; Cramer and Koller 1988; Boeri and 
Cramer 1991, 1992; Konig 1993). The register includes all employees in the 
private sector of the economy, i.e. about 80 percent of the total work force. Since 
individual plants are assigned separate identification numbers it is possible to 
reconstruct the development of about 2.7 million establishments from 1977 to 
1990 (Boeri and Cramer 1992). For this period Boeri and Cramer calculate an 
average annual net growth of employment of 0.9 percent which is composed of 
+6.2 percent (-5.8 percent) in growing (contracting) and +2.3 percent (-1.7 
percent) in new (dosing) establishments. Similar to our investigation, gross flows 
are dominated by expanding and contracting firms, and gross flows exceed net 
flows substantially. However, gross flows differ between broad economic sectors 
with investment goods and banking and insurance exhibiting small values. This is 
contrary to our findings that within manufacturing for different sectors, distinc-
tions between gross and net flows cannot be detected. Cramer and Koller (I 998) 
obtain the result that gross flows decrease with firm size across all firms. Again, this 
is not in accordance with our results. 
U.S. studies on gross employment changes and their components are 
summarized by Hamermesh (1993: 152-153). Apparently, the main difference 
between the U.S. and Germany concerning job losses in shrinking and dosing 
manufacturing plants is the finding that, on average, these jobs last longer in 
Germany than in the United States. In a comparative investigation, Leonard and 
Schettkat (1991) demonstrate that on average manufacturing jobs last 11.1 (14.5) 
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years in the U.S. (Germany). 1 In an attempt to explain the greater stability of 
German manufacturing jobs the authors discard four explanations-differences 
in size distributions of establishments, in legal restrictions on job destructions, in 
wage rigidity, and in subsidies to ailing firms. The hypothesis they favor is that 
product market pressure is less severe in Germany and that the banking system in 
Germany is more involved in industrial coordination than in the United States. 
Interestingly, the hierarchy of job stability across broad economic sectors (as well 
as the wage structure) is very similar with the most stable jobs in finance and the 
least stable in construction. 
This kind of decomposition of employment variations is of interest for two 
reasons: 
1 It contributes to a clearer image of the dynamics of employment and the puzzles 
raised for the theory of labor demand. It will be hard to sustain the tradition in 
labor and industrial economics, which views plants within industries, regions, 
and size classes as relatively homogeneous or theories of vintage effects in terms 
of which plants within age groups are relatively homogeneous. Consequently, 
new challenges for the theory of labor demand and economic theories of the 
growth of the firm arise. "The main point of all this is that labor demand is a 
more complex issue than is reflected by consideration of the neoclassical theory 
of production, as useful as that theory has been" (Hamermesh 1993: 162). 
2 High rates of reshuffling of employment opportunities across plants (job 
turnover) are one of the reasons why workers change firms or transit between the 
states of employment, unemployment, and nonparticipation in the labor 
market. Numerous studies and theories try to explain the mobility of labor. 
What we urgently need is insight into the process of worker reallocation and 
mobility connected with or caused by job turnover and job reallocation. 
Labor turnover and job turnover are related aspects of labor market dynamics, 
and both indicators of labor market dynamics are linked. Changes in the level of 
employment cause some job turnover, and even without any job turnover, there 
will still be labor turnover. 
A relationship exists between changes in the level of employment, job turnover, 
and labor turnover: Net change of employment is smaller than or equal to job 
turnover, and job turnover is smaller than or equal to labor turnover. Due to 
sectoral and firm-specific gross job creation and destruction, job turnover will 
exceed net changes of employment. Additionally, workers are mobile between 
firms, sectors, unemployment, and nonparticipation. Therefore, labor turnover 
tends to exceed job turnover (Schettkat 1992: 62ff.). 
FIRM SIZE AND FIRM GROWTH 
The distribution of companies by size is approximately log-normal. This regularity 
was termed a stylized fact recently by Richard Schmalensee (1989: 994). This form 
arises if each firm faces the same distribution of growth possibilities, and if each 
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firm's actual growth is determined by random sampling from that distribution, i.e. 
if Gibrat's Law of Proportionate Growth holds (cf. Wagner 1992). 
Why is it imponant to know whether the growth paths of firms are governed by 
Gibrat's Law or not? 
One answer to this question is related to issues of industrial and regional policy: 
If Gibrat's Law does not hold, and if the results of an investigation indicate that 
small firms grow at a faster rate than medium sized and large firms, and if small 
firms play an important role in the regions as employers, and if unemployment is 
a serious regional problem (many ifs), then a regional development strategy 
should promote the births and growths of small firms. If, on the other hand, 
Gibrat's Law holds, and growth is independent of firm size, this indicates that 
size should not be a prerequisite for the promotion of firms. 
2 Another reason to care for the validity of Gibrat's Law is given in a recent paper 
by Herbert Simon (1991: 29): "Without the introduction of very panicular ad 
hoe assumptions, unbuttressed by empirical evidence, neoclassical theory 
provides no explanation for the repeated appearance of Pareto distributions of 
business firm sizes in virtually all situations where size distributions have been 
studied. . . . These observed distributions are difficult to reconcile with any 
notions that have been proposed for optimal firm size, but are easily explained 
by a simple plausible probabilistic mechanism that makes no appeal to 
optimality." This is why the role played by chance in the process of firm growth 
needs to be identified: The answer might influence the way economists look at 
the reasons for success or failure of firms. 
Applying the method developed in Chesher's (1979) seminal paper we tested for 
the validity of Gibrat's Law using the establishment level longitudinal data base of 
the manufacturing sector in Lower Saxony described on page 265 above. The test 
proceeds as follows: 
One takes the deviation of the logarithm of the size of firm i at time t from the 
mean of the logarithm of the sizes of companies at time t, Z,,; (Z,_ 1,; and Z,_2_; are 
defined analogously), with i= 1,2, .. . ,N and tas a time index. 
The equation 
Z,.;= b*Z,_ 1,;+ e,.; (1) 
with e as a disturbance term could be estimated by OLS and it could be tested if b 
is significantly different from 1. For b= 1 Gibrat's Law is valid. In the case that a 
positive or negative stochastic influence prevails over several periods (i.e., if the 
disturbances are autocorrelated), however, the exogenous variable and the 
disturbance term are not uncorrelated, and the OLS-estimate of bis inconsistent. 
Therefore, the test of the validity of Gibrat's Law is based on an OLS-estimation 
of equation (2) 
(2) 
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with u as a disturbance term, g1 = b+ r, gi_ = -b *r, and r as a coefficient of 
autocorrelation. 
It is tested whether g1 = 1 and gi_ = 0 is valid which implies b= 1 and r= 0. 
Estimated values for band r can be computed from (2) using the formula 
(3) 
The empirical investigation uses overlapping periods of 3 years (1978 to 1980, 
1979 to 1981, ... ,1988 to 1990) and comprises all firms that reported at least one 
employed person in each year of the respective period. Results are given in Table 
11.2. 
As Table 11.2 indicates, the validity of Gibrat's Law is rejected for 10 out of 11 
periods at a usual level of significance of 5 percent. It is noteworthy that the 
estimated values for bare approximately 1 (they vary between 0.991 and 1.001), 
which means that no relationship between firm size and employment growth can be 
detected. Small firms do not grow faster or slower than larger firms. The rejection 
of Gibrat's Law stems from the fact that the estimated values of the coefficient of 
autocorrelation differ from zero. This coefficient is negative in periods in which 
Gibrat's Law is rejected. Firms which experience between t and t+ 1 a high rate of 
growth (which is independent from their size in t and thus stochastic), tend to 
experience a lower rate of growth between t+ 1 and t+ 2. 
It should be noted that in an earlier study based solely on data from firms 
reporting to the Monatsbericht (i.e., firms that have as a rule at least 20 employees, 
cf. page 265 above) it was found that Gibrat's Law was rejected, too: Small 
firms grew neither faster nor slower than smaller ones, but growth rates for a given 
firm from year to year were positively correlated, i.e. "persistence of chance" was 
Table 11.2 Test ofGibtat's Law for Manufacturing Firms, Lower Saxony, 
1978-1990 
Number 
Period of Firms b r Test 
1978-1980 6,870 0.992 -0.108 #" 
1979-1981 6,777 1.000 -0.082 # 
1980-1982 6,725 0.992 -0.071 # 
1981-1983 6,635 0.991 -0.132 # 
1982-1984 6,458 0.996 +0.002 
1983-1985 6,340 1.001 -0.103 # 
1984-1986 6,225 0.998 -0.092 # 
1985-1987 6,193 0.996 -0.073 # 
1986-1988 6,171 0.995 -0.041 # 
1987-1989 6,127 1.000 -0.026 # 
1988-1990 6,092 0.997 -0.226 # 
Note. 
•#indicates that Gibrat's Law is not valid. 
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found (cf. Wagner 1992). Results presented here indicate that this positive 
correlation over time follows from a sample selection bias caused by the exclusion 
of firms that had fewer than 20 employees in at least one of the years covered in the 
estimation. 
Our findings are in accordance with the probalistic interpretation of growth of 
firms stated by Herbert Simon. However, further research is needed to find out 
what makes a successful growing firm. Unfortunately, this research cannot be based 
on data from our official surveys, since important informations on, e.g., innovative 
activities, strategic planning, and attitudes and expectations of managers are not 
available. 
Recently, the relationship between firm size and growth has been investigated by 
several authors in Germany. FitzRoy and Kraft (1991) find on the basis of a small 
sample of 51 firms from the metalworking sector with data for the years 1977 and 
1979 that large firms exhibit a significantly slower growth rate of sales than smaller 
and younger firms, thus rejecting Gibrat's Law. Konig (1993) estimates equation 
(2) with the data from the Employment Statistics register of the Federal Labor 
Office for overlapping periods of 3 years between 1985 to 1990. Exclusively 
surviving establishments are included in the sample, and equation (2) is estimated 
for all establishments (N = 863,458), establishments founded prior to 1980 
(N=653,219), and establishments set up before 1980 and having at least 50 
employees in 1985. For the first two categories of firms Konig (1983: 74) obtains 
for all four triannual periods a coefficient of b with a value of slightly less than 1 
and a negative value for r, which indicates that employment growth depends 
negatively on the development of the past year. Gibrat's Law is thus not confirmed 
for these two types of firms. For the third category of establishments comprising 
about 39,000 firms with 9.4 million employees, bis estimated as being very close 
to 1 and the values of r are small and change sign. Hence, the author confirms 
Gibrat's Law for older firms with a minimum size of 50 employees. 
A correlation analysis of the relationship of growth rates between five consecu-
tive years (1985 to 1990) leads to the result that the coefficients of correlation 
computed for the sample of all establishments have a negative sign. This again 
confirms the finding that establishment with an above average growth rate tend to 
have a below average growth rate in the following year and vice versa (Konig 1993; 
Boeri and Cramer 1992). For large establishments (500 and more employees) the 
correlation analysis, however, computes stable and positive correlation coefficients 
for growth rates one, two, three, and four years apart (Konig 1993: 81). Evidently 
large establishments exhibit more stable processes of growth and contraction than 
smaller firms. An explanation could be that longer periods of planning and 
implementation are required in larger establishments. 
Recent studies of Gibrat's Law with data of U.S. firms are summarized and 
reviewed by Wagner (1992). Interestingly, these investigations (Evans 1987a, 
1987b; Hall 1987; Dunne et al 1989b) conclude that Gibrat's Law generally is not 
valid, although the rejection is usually stronger for smaller than for larger firm size 
classes. Hall (1987) finds that Gibrat's Law is accepted for larger firms. 
277 
KNUT GERLACH, JOACHIM WAGNER 
The American and German studies differ strongly with respect to the sectors 
analyzed, the samples, and the methods used. Although one should be cautious 
when comparing the results, the main finding is a rejection of Gibrat's Law. This 
rejection is usually stronger for small than for larger firms and is apparently 
compatible with the finding that growth rates of employment tend to decline with 
firm size (Scherer and Ross 1990: 144; Cramer and Koller 1988; Cramer 1987). 
EMPLOYMENT EFFECTS OF NEWLY FOUNDED FIRMS 
Employment effects of new firms are at the center of the job turnover/job creation 
debate. The discussion following the seminal studies by Birch (1981, 1987) on the 
number of jobs created by small firms in the U.S. made clear that the focus here 
should not be on the short run employment impact of newly founded firms, 
because small new firms that create a large number of jobs do have relatively high 
chances of failure during their first years, too (cf., e.g., Brown et al. 1990: 88). 
Evidence on the long-run employment effect of new firms can only be gained by 
looking at a cohort of new firms, i.e. the group made of all firms founded in year t, 
and their development over time: How many firms survive, and what is the total 
and average number of jobs in the surviving firms after, say, 10 years? 
This section presents findings from studies of the long-run employment effects 
of new firms in Germany and the U.S. based on longitudinal cohort analyses. 
Using the establishment-level longitudinal data base of the manufacturing sector 
in Lower Saxony described on page 265 above we identified the groups of new 
firms that entered in 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982, considering only firms with 
fewer than 50 employees on average in the first year (for a discussion of data issues 
related to the identification of entries see Wagner 1994). A look at these four 
cohorts of new firms and their development over time until 1992 revealed the 
following insights: 
Cohorts of new firms differ in size. In 1979 and 1980 about 230 new firms were 
founded, while in 1981 and 1982 the foundation activity declined to about 150 
firms. 
2 The mortality rates of new firms is very high (liability of newness). Table 11.3 
reports the number of surviving members of the cohorts and the rates of survival 
for each year until 1992. Patterns of survival are similar for the four cohorts; 
until 1992, more than half of the firms founded in 1979 failed. 
3 Growth of employment in the surviving firms is rather strong on average. The 
average size of the firms of cohort 1979 increased from 15.7 employees (1979) 
to 36.4 employees in 1992, and similar patterns are found for the cohorts 1980 
(11.5 and 26.8 persons, respectively), 1981 (11.7 and 24.9 persons), and 1982 
(11.8 and 25.4 persons). 
4 High mortality risks and growth of surviving firms lead to an approximately 
constant contribution to employment of a cohort. The cohort of 1979 started 
with 3,500 employees, and had 3,746 employees in 1992; figures for the 1980 
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Table 11.3 Survival of New Small Manufacturing Firms• in Lower Saxony (Cohorts 1979, 1980, 1981, 1982) 
1979 1980 1981 1982 1983 1984 1985 1986 1987 1988 1989 1990 1991 1992 
[1] Number of Survivors: 
Cohort 1979 223 206 185 168 157 140 137 128 121 118 113 112 107 103 
1980 - 240 219 193 169 157 141 133 129 123 118 116 111 106 
1981 - - 159 143 121 110 101 91 86 83 78 72 71 69 
1982 - - - 149 128 114 101 96 90 84 81 79 78 74 
[2] Survival Rate (%) 
Cohort 1979 - 92.4 83.0 75.3 70.4 62.8 61.4 57.4 54.3 52.9 50.7 50.2 48.0 46.2 
1980 - - 91.3 80.4 70.4 65.4 58.8 55.4 53.8 51.3 49.2 48.3 46.3 44.2 
1981 - - - 89.9 76.1 69.2 63.5 57.2 54.1 52.2 49.1 45.3 44.7 43.4 
1982 - - - - 85.9 76.5 67.8 64.4 60.4 56.4 54.4 53.0 52.3 49.7 
Note: 
• Firms with less than 50 employees at startup time. 
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cohon are 2,758 and 2,839 persons, for the 1981 cohort 1,858 and 1,718 
persons, and for the 1982 cohort 1,752 and 1,877 persons. This means that in 
1992 some 10,180-or about 1.5 percent of all persons in manufacturing-are 
employed in firms founded between 1979 and 1982. 
5 More detailed analyses of the post-entry performance of the firms from these 
cohorts (discussed in Wagner 1994) showed that about one third of all surviving 
firms shrunk during the period under consideration, and that no clear-cut nexus 
between startup size and probabiliry of survival or between firm size and firm 
growth shows up. 
Although our analysis of cohorts of newly founded manufacturing firms revealed 
some interesting insights, investigations into the causes of survival or death must be 
postponed, because important information related to the founders and to the 
circumstances of the initiation of the business are lacking from official statistics. 
German studies on the basis of the data from the Employment Statistics register 
of the Federal Labor Office (Konig 1993; Boeri and Cramer 1991, 1992) support 
and extend our findings. Konig (1993: 53) reports for all private sectors that in 
1990, some 2.311 million employees (12.3 percent of the work force covered by 
the statistic) had found jobs in firms founded in the period 1985 to 1990. For 
manufacturing the comparable figure amounts to 7.4 percent. With the exception 
of the consumer goods industry, the number of newly founded firms exceeds the 
number of plant closings in the period 1978 to 1987 in eight sectors of the 
economy. This finding, however, is reversed for the sectors construction and 
transportation in the recession 1981 and 1982 and for construction in the years 
after 1984 (Boeri and Cramer 1991). An analysis of the post-entry performance of 
these cohorts (1978, 1979, 1980) of all newly founded firms reveals a broadly 
similar pattern. Employment peaks one year after the founding years and 
subsequently decreases and stabilizes at a level of 90 to 100 percent of the initial 
employment of the cohort. This is the result of two countervailing forces, i.e. 
newly founded plants exit and the survivors grow. In about two years after 
foundation the average number of employees of surviving firms is twice as high as 
at the outset (Boeri and Cramer 1992). In the period 1977 to 1987 the average 
annual net change of employment of 0.5 percent is equal to the difference between 
the average employment gains of 2.2 percent in newly founded firms and the 
average employment losses of 1.7 percent in closing plants (Cramer and Koller 
1988). 
In a retrospective study of business founders in Munich and Upper Bavaria 
Brilderl et aL (1992) analyze the determinants of business survival. The multi-
variate analyses indicate that schooling, work experience, and industry-specific 
work experience of the founder increase the probability of survival. Additionally, 
the number of employees, the amount of capital invested at the Startup and a 
business strategy aimed at national markets are of importance for the success of 
newly founded firms. This study contains some clues about the determinants of 
survival of newly founded firms which are not available in the German official 
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statistics used in the other mentioned investigations. However, as Hamermesh 
(1993: 158) points out, an ideal study of the determinants of newly founded firms 
would have to consider the potential population of founders and investigate how 
the fraction of that population which has established plants in an industry is 
affected by economic variables like input costs, especially wages. 
U.S. studies on the employment effects of new firms use data from the Censuses 
of Manufactures for the years 1963 to 1982 (Dunne et al. 1988, 1989a, 1989b) 
and from the 1976-1986 United States Establishment Longitudinal Microdata 
(USELM) files of U.S. Small Business Administration (Phillips and Kirchhoff 
1989). Dunne et al. (1989a) find that cohorts of new manufacturing plants attain 
the maximum of their employment in the period in which they enter. Their 
employment decreases in the subsequent census periods indicating that the 
employment growth of surviving plants does not compensate the employment 
losses of contracting or closing plant of the same cohort. This American pattern is 
very similar to the German findings, the employment reductions, however, of a 
typical cohort of newly founded American plants apparently exceed the employ-
ment losses in Germany. Is this again the impact of stronger competition in the 
American economy? Phillips and Kirchhoff (1989) investigate new single 
establishment firms with 500 or fewer employees. Their major findings include: A 
large variance of employment growth rates, growing firms exhibit higher survival 
rates than stagnant establishment, and differences in survival rates by industries 
with manufacturing (construction) having the highest (lowest) survival rates. 
Summarizing, it must be concluded that the analysis of the employment effects 
of new firms is still in its infancy in the two countries. It is acknowledged that new 
firms have a positive impact on employment, and in Germany they apparently 
dominate the development of employment in the long run. However, explanations 
are lacking as to why some new firms expand employment and others remain 
stagnant or fail. The patterns of employment growth of newly founded manufac-
turing plants in the two countries have rather similar characteristics. 
FIRM PANELS AS AN INSTRUMENT FOR DYNAMIC 
LABOR MARKET ANALYSES 
A central insight emerging from our own studies using establishment-level 
longitudinal data from official statistics in Lower Saxony, and from other 
investigations based on firm-level data from Germany and the United States, is that 
a better understanding of the demand side of the labor market needs data from 
firm panels. Three main conclusions can be drawn from our investigations: 
1 In accordance with other studies we find that gross employment flows are large 
and exceed net employment changes. A closer look at labor demand is, therefore, 
indispensable for an analysis of labor turnover. 
2 Small firms do not grow systematically faster or slower than large firms. Like 
Brown et al (1990: 91) we conclude: "Sentiment aside, the results of our 
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research suggest a clear message for policies affecting large and small firms: Do 
not judge employers by their size alone." 
3 The contribution of new firms to the dynamics of employment is important 
despite the fact that new firms face a high mortality risk. 
By construction, neither time series of aggregate data at the industry level nor 
cross-section data at the firm level can reveal these insights. Large gaps of 
knowledge, however, remain, because the determinants of employment growth of 
(established and newly founded) firms are not well understood. Evidently, official 
statistics lack important information needed to reduce these gaps. To mention but 
a few, nothing is known there about innovative activities, strategic planning, 
attitudes, and expectations of managers, or financial and human capital of 
founders of new firms. Therefore, panel data on firms collected in comprehensive 
longitudinal studies are strongly needed, and efforts to build these data sets for 
Germany started recently. 
However, microeconometric research in labor demand should not hesitate to use 
all information in the large sets of establishment level data collected by official 
statistics in between. As restricted as these data apparently are from the perspective 
of an investigator speculating about the ideal data set, they are, as we hope to have 
shown in the present chapter, rich enough to form a basis for investigations that 
can produce new insights into the dynamics of the German labor market. 
These insights can form a basis for cross-country comparisons of labor market 
dynamics, too, that are needed to shed light on the role played by internationally 
different institutional settings for intercountry differences in labor market 
outcomes. Obviously, this is even more the case for firm panels that are conducted 
by academic researchers. Ongoing efforts to build an interregional and international 
network of (at least, in parts) comparable longitudinal studies at the firm level, 
therefore, are extremely important. 
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NOTES 
The finding for Germany is derived from Cramer and Koller (1988). Our computations 
indicate that manufacturing jobs in Lower Saxony last 20 years. 
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LABOR ADJUSTMENT UNDER 
DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONAL 
STRUCTURES 
A Case Study of Germany and the United States 
Susan N. Houseman and Katharine G. Abraham 
INTRODUCTION 
Historically, U.S. employers have had the right to hire and fire at will. Adjustment 
to downturns has been accomplished largely through layoffs, rather than through 
reductions in average hours per worker or other alternatives to layoffs. In contrast, 
in Germany, as in most Western European countries, workers historically have 
enjoyed strong job rights, including the right to advance notice of layoff and the 
right to severance pay or to negotiations over compensation for layoff. 
In recent years, laws and practices concerning collective dismissals have been 
under scrutiny both in the United States and in many Western European countries, 
including Germany. In the United States, the massive dislocations of the l 970's 
and early 1980's pushed many workers out of their jobs and led to growing 
pressure for legislated and collectively bargained job rights. Perhaps most 
significantly, a law requiring large employers to give 60 days' notice of plant 
closings and major layoffs was passed by the U.S. Congress in 1988. Ironically, at 
the same time that the United States was moving to strengthen workers' job 
security, many European countries were weakening their job security legislation in 
an effort to promote greater labor market flexibility. 1 In Germany, the Employment 
Promotion Act of 1985 relaxed certain regulations on layoffs and permitted greater 
use of temporary and fixed-term contracts. 
Central to the debate over workers' rights to job security on both sides of the 
Atlantic has been their presumed adverse impact on labor market flexibility. Critics 
have claimed that strong job rights prevent employers from adjusting to economic 
fluctuations and secular changes in demand. It also has been alleged that, by 
inhibiting layoffs during downturns, strong job security provisions reduce 
employers' willingness to hire during upturns and thereby contribute to high levels 
of unemployment. 2 Some within the European Union have argued for a further 
weakening of European employment protection laws. 3 
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Relatively little research, however, has been done on the effects of employment 
protection laws on labor market adjustment. Although German employment 
protection laws in and of themselves would be expected to slow the adjustment of 
employment to changes in demand, the magnitude of these effects is not known. 
Moreover, it does not necessarily follow that the costs of adjusting labor are 
higher in Germany than in the United States and consequently that German 
employers adjust less quickly to changing demand conditions. To determine the 
relative costs of adjusting labor in Germany and the United States, one must 
consider other relevant labor market institutions in both countries. For example, 
because the unemployment insurance (UI) system in the United States is 
experience rated, U.S. employers generally incur higher UI taxes when they lay off 
workers; although German employers face greater regulation of layoffs than do 
American employers, they incur no tax penalties associated with layoffs. 
Moreover, German employment protection laws may inhibit the use of layoffs, 
but other German policies, such as unemployment compensation for workers on 
short time, facilitate the use of alternatives to layoffs, including work sharing. 
Elsewhere (Abraham and Houseman 1993, 1994) we present evidence to suggest 
that, although German employers adjust employment levels more slowly than do 
their U.S. counterparts in response to demand changes, they make larger short 
run adjustments to average hours per worker. Differences in total labor adju~t-
ment tend to be small. 
In this chapter we build upon our previous work examining employment and 
hours adjustment in the former West Germany and the United States. We use an 
interrelated factor demand model to jointly estimate employment and hours 
adjustment in the manufacturing sectors of the two countries. Results based on this 
model strengthen the conclusions drawn in our earlier work. 
Because the availability of UI benefits for short-time work in Germany facilitates 
the use of work sharing as an alternative to layoffs there, we also consider the 
contribution that short-time work makes to total labor adjustment. In addition, we 
review evidence on the effects of changes in employment protection laws on labor 
adjustment in Germany. Finally, we look at whether and to what extent finished 
goods inventories help to smooth fluctuations in production in Germany and the 
United States. If labor adjustment costs are greater in Germany than in the United 
States, as is usually presumed, we would expect finished goods inventories to play a 
more important buffer role in Germany, thereby mitigating the need to adjust labor 
input to demand changes there. 
THE GERMAN AND U.S. INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS 
SYSTEMS 
We interpret differences in employment and hours adjustment patterns in Germany 
and the United States in light of the two countries' labor market institutions, and 
so begin with an overview of selected features of their industrial relations systems. 
The German and U.S. industrial relations systems differ in many respects, but the 
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most relevant for our present purposes are differences in layoff policies, UI rules, 
and regulations concerning the use of overtime. 
Germany 
In Germany, as in most Western European countries, there is a long tradition of 
requiring employers to give advance notice of dismissal to individual workers. The 
first advance notice law in Germany was passed during the 1920's. Today, required 
periods of notice to individual workers vary from two weeks to six months, 
depending upon whether the worker holds a blue-collar or a white-collar job and 
upon his or her seniority and age. 4 
In addition to stipulating advance notice for individual workers, German law 
gives the works council, a legally mandated body of elected worker representatives, 
important powers in the event of a collective dismissal. Under current law, 
employers must keep both the works council and the local employment office 
advised of any developments that might lead to a collective dismissal over the next 
twelve months, and must consult the works council "as soon as possible" when 
contemplating such a layoff. The most important provision of the current law was 
introduced in 1973 and requires that, in cases of collective dismissal at an 
establishment normally employing more than 20 employees, management and the 
works council must negotiate a social plan that stipulates compensation for workers 
who lose their jobs. In the event that the two parties cannot agree on a social plan, 
the law provides for binding arbitration. The social plan requirement greatly 
enhances the works council's power to influence management decisions with 
respect to employment and hours adjustment. 
Although social plans are required only in the event of a collective dismissal, the 
number of workers who must be laid off for a layoff to fall into this category is not 
particularly high. For example, prior to 1985, for establishments with 60 to 250 
workers, a collective dismissal was defined as the layoff of 10 percent of the work 
force over a 30-day period; for establishments employing 500 or more workers, the 
threshold was just 30 dismissed workers over a 30-day period. The Employment 
Promotion Act of 1985 raised these thresholds somewhat and gave new enterprises 
a four-year exemption from the social plan requirement. 5 
Settlements in social plans vary considerably from case to case, and depend upon 
the worker's tenure and wage, as well as the company's financial condition. A 
recent study by Hemmer (1988) provides the best available data on the amounts of 
compensation paid out. In a sample of 145 social plans negotiated between 1980 
and 1985, the median settlement was between DMl0,000 and DM15,000 per 
recipient, or about 15 to 25 weeks' pay for a person with average blue-collar 
industrial earnings. The fact that a social plan is required only in situations 
involving a mass layoff creates an incentive for the firm to rely on attrition and 
perhaps on smaller layoffs spread out over time instead of on a mass layoff. 
As in the United States, German workers who are laid off are eligible to collect 
UI benefits. The payroll tax that finances these benefits, however, is not experience 
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rated so that, unlike their U.S. counterparts, German employers incur no increase 
in UI tax liability when they lay off workers. Because of the advance notice and 
other requirements associated with collective dismissals, temporary layoffs are 
virtually unknown in Germany. The German UI system does provide for short-
time benefits. With the approval of the Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit (Federal 
Employment Office), firms can reduce employees' hours of work and those 
employees can collect prorated UI benefits, which are financed in the same way as 
benefits to laid off workers. Firms applying for short-time benefits must show that 
other measures for accommodating the fall in demand, such as reducing overtime 
and rebuilding inventories, have already been taken. 6 
In contrast to U.S. law, German law contains no provision covering overtime 
premia, which instead are governed by the terms of industry-level collective 
bargaining agreements. The typical agreement provides for an overtime premium 
of about 20 percent, which is considerably lower than the 50 percent premium 
mandated by U.S. law. 
Although the availability of subsidized short-time benefits and the low overtime 
premium that is typical in German collective bargaining agreements can be 
expected to encourage reliance on hours adjustments by German employers, it 
should be noted that any change in scheduled hours at an establishment must be 
approved by the works council. Works councils, however, are generally accom-
modating in these matters. 
The United States 
The situation with respect to advance notice of layoffs and negotiation over layoffs 
historically has been quite different in the United States. Prior to 1988, advance 
notice of layoffs and plant closings was required in only three states: Maine, 
Wisconsin, and Hawaii. In the absence of any national law requiring advance 
notice, workers often received little or no warning prior to being let go. 7 In 1988 
the U.S. Congress passed the Worker Adjustment and Retraining Notification Act. 
The law, which took effect in 1989, requires employers to give workers and state 
and local government officials 60 days' advance notice before a mass layoff or plant 
closure. In general, a mass layoff is defined as a layoff of at least one third of the 
work force at a single site within a 30-day period or a reduction in the hours of 
at least one third of the work force by at least 50 percent for six months or 
longer. 8 
The U.S. advance notice law is far weaker than German collective dismissal law. 
The requirement that employers negotiate a social plan with the works council is 
widely regarded as the most important in German collective dismissal law. U.S. law 
does not require that companies consult with worker representatives or pay 
compensation to laid-off workers. Moreover, even the advance notice requirement 
in existing U.S. law appears to be having little effect. A recent survey by the General 
Accounting Office (1993) found that three quarters of all companies that had work 
force reductions of a sufficient scale to trigger notice requirements either failed to 
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file notice or gave less than 60 days' notice. These findings suggest that in most 
cases companies either slip through the law's large loopholes or simply fail to 
comply with the law. 
Although U.S. employers are not required to make severance payments to laid-
off workers, the fact that the U.S. UI system is experience rated means that layoffs 
may lead to an increase in UI tax liability. For a U.S. employer, the effective UI 
cost of laying off a worker depends upon three things: His or her weekly benefit 
amount; the duration of benefit receipt; and the share of benefits for which the 
employer ultimately pays through higher UI taxes. Weekly benefit amounts average 
roughly 35 percent of weekly wages; the average duration of benefit receipt varies 
somewhat over the business cycle, but has averaged about 14 weeks; and, at the 
margin, a typical employer bears about 60 percent of the cost of benefits paid to 
laid-off workers (though many employers are already paying the maximum UI tax 
rate and thus incur no increase in costs if they lay off additional workers).9 Thus, a 
rough estimate of the UI cost to a typical employer of laying off another worker is 
about three weeks' wages in the form of increased UI tax liability. 
Paying UI benefits to workers whose hours have been reduced is a recent 
innovation in the United States. Only 17 states have laws allowing prorated 
payment of UI benefits to workers whose hours are reduced under approved work-
sharing plans, and most of these laws were passed in 1985 or later. Current U.S. 
law specifies that nonexempt employees are entitled to a 50 percent wage premium 
for hours worked in excess of 40 hours per week. Although U.S. employers are 
typically free to alter work schedules as they choose, both the lack of provision for 
short-time benefits and the relatively high overtime premium mandated by federal 
law can be expected to discourage reliance on hours adjustments. 
Employment and Hours Adjustment 
Because of the institutional differences just described, we would expect to observe 
quite different patterns of labor adjustment in Germany and the United States. 
Employers may adjust labor input along two margins: the number of workers and 
average hours per worker. Given the higher costs of adjusting employment in 
Germany, we would expect slower adjustment of employment to changes in the 
demand for labor in Germany than in the United States. In the event of a 
downturn, layoffs may be delayed by the requirement that the firm give advance 
notice and, in the case of a mass layoff, further delayed by the negotiation of a 
social plan with the works council. Given that mass layoffs are relatively costly in 
Germany, we would expect greater reliance on attrition to achieve desired work 
force reductions there than in the United States, and might also expect layoffs to be 
more spread out over time. In addition, during both downturns and upturns, 
German employers are likely to delay employment adjustments until they are 
reasonably certain that any observed change in labor demand will persist. 
While we would expect the adjustment of employment to be slower in Germany 
than in the United States, we would expect greater adjustment of average hours for 
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workers in the short run. The fact that employment adjustment costs are typically 
higher in Germany than in the United States should increase employers' reliance on 
hours adjustments. In addition, absent works council opposition to schedule 
changes, the availability of short-time compensation and lower German overtime 
premia make it less costly for German employers to adjust average hours per 
worker. IO A priori, it is unclear whether the adjustment of total labor input is more 
or less costly in Germany than in the United States, and thus unclear whether 
German employers are, in fact, less able to adjust labor input to changes in 
demand. 
To analyze this issue empirically, we model the dynamic adjustment of 
employment and hours to fluctuations in output using the following interrelated 
factor demand model: 
where Eis production employment; his average hours per production worker; Sis 
shipments; t and t2 are time trends; and the a's, /J's and </>'s are parameters to be 
estimated. This system of equations allows for the fact that the paths of adjustment 
of employment and hours may be interdependent; not only does the adjustment of 
a particular factor depend on changes in shipments, but it also depends on the path 
of adjustment of other factors. 11 
We estimate this model using quarterly, seasonally adjusted data. 12 Each 
equation in the model was fitted independently. Based on the results of Durbin-h 
tests, we correct for first-order serial correlation in the equation error terms, where 
appropriate. Separate models were specified for aggregate manufacturing and for 
eleven disaggregated manufacturing industries in each country. We take care to 
identify comparably defined industries because we want, insofar as possible, to 
hold constant technological factors that might affect labor adjustment patterns in 
drawing cross-county comparisons. 13 Data limitations unfortunately prevent the 
inclusion of any nonmanufacturing industries in our analysis. Sources and 
additional details concerning the data are provided in the data appendix. 
We use the parameter estimates from equations (la) and (lb) to simulate the 
dynamic effects of a one-unit, permanent shock to shipments on production 
employment, average production hours, and total production hours. Implied 
responses over different horizons, along with their associated standard errors, are 
reported in Table 12.1. 14 (Selected coefficients from the models underlying these 
simulations are reported in Table 12.3 of the Appendix.) For aggregate German 
manufacturing, for example, Table 12.1 shows that a 1 percent decrease (increase) 
in shipments would result in a 0.17 percent decrease (increase) in production 
employment, a 0.40 percent decrease (increase) in average production hours, and a 
0.57 percent decrease (increase) in total production hours in the quarter contem-
poraneous to the shock. Assuming the decrease to shipments persists, four quarters 
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Table 12.1 Simulated Adjustment of Production Employment and Production Hours 
to a Permanent One-Unit Shock to Shipments in German and U.S. 
Manufacturing Industries, 1973-901 
Employment Average Hours Total Hours 
Industry/Lag Germany U.S. Germany U.S. Germany U.S. 
Manufacturing 
Current Quarter 0.17' 0.54 0.40' 0.22 0.57' 0.75 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.03) (0.06) (0.05) 
1 Quarter 0.35' 0.85 0.38 0.25 0.73' 1.11 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05) 
2 Quarters 0.49' 1.02 0.30 0.22 0.79' 1.24 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05) 
4 Quarters 0.69' 1.11 0.17 0.12 0.85' 1.24 
(0.08) (0.06) (0.07) (0.04) (0.07) (0.05) 
6 Quarters 0.81' 1.11 0.08 0.07 0.89' 1.18 
(0.10) (0.06) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) 
Textiles 
Current Quarter 0.14' 0.27 0.26 0.23 0.40 0.49 
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) 
1 Quarter 0.28 0.39 0.31 0.24 0.60 0.62 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) 
2 Quarters 0.41 0.42 0.30 0.21 0.71 0.64 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.07) 
4Quarters 0.62 0.43 0.21 0.19 0.83 0.62 
(0.08) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.10) (0.08) 
6 Quarters 0.77' 0.43 0.13 0.19 0.90 0.62 
(0.11) (0.07) (0.08) (0.06) (0.12) (0.08) 
Apparel 
Current Quarter 0.17 0.13 0.15 0.06 0.32 0.19 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.05) 
1 Quarter 0.35 0.21 0.15 0.08 0.50· 0.29 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) 
2 Quarters 0.50· 0.26 0.10 0.09 0.60' 0.35 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (0.09) (0.07) 
4 Quarters 0.72' 0.31 -0.01 0.08 0.71' 0.39 
(0.08) (0.09) (0.06) (0.04) (0.10) (0.08) 
6 Quarters 0.86' 0.33 -0.09 0.07 0.77' 0.39 
(0.10) (0.12) (0.06) (0.05) (0.12) (0.10) 
Papel 
Current Quarter 0.03' 0.25 0.30' 0.06 0.33 0.31 
(0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) (0.06) 
1 Quarter 0.11· 0.37 0.33' 0.07 0.44 0.44 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.09) (0.04) (0.11) (0.08) 
2 Quarters 0.18 0.42 0.32' 0.06 0.51 0.48 
(0.11) (0.07) (0.10) (0.05) (0.15) (0.09) 
(continued) 
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Tabk 12.1 ( Continued) 
Employment Average Hours Total Hours 
Industry/ Lag Germany U.S. Germany U.S. Germany U.S. 
4 Quaners 0.31 0.42 0.30' 0.04 0.60 0.46 
(0.17) (0.07) (0. l 1) (0.06) (0.20) (0.11) 
6 Quaners 0.40 0.41 0.27 0.03 0.68 0.44 
(0.22) (0.07) (0.11) (0.07) (0.24) (0.12) 
Printing 
Current Quaner 0.20· 0.06 0.16· 0.04 0.36. 0.10 
(0.02) (0.02) (0.04) (0.02) (0.05) (0.02) 
1 Quaner 0.38. 0.12 0.10 0.06 0.49' 0.18 
(0.04) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.03) 
2 Quaners 0.52· 0.19 0.05 0.07 0.57' 0.26 
(0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.04) 
4 Quaners o.n· 0.30 -0.03· 0.07 0.69. 0.36 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.03) (0.02) {0.05) (0.05) 
6 Quaners o.84. 0.37 -0.09· 0.06 0.76' 0.44 
(0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.02) (0.05) (0.06) 
Leather 
Current Quaner 0.19 0.21 0.28· 0.09 0.47 0.31 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05) 
1 Quaner 0.36 0.35 0.28· 0.11 0.64 0.46 
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.07) 
2 Quaners 0.49 0.43 0.21 0.10 0.70 0.53 
(0.05) (0.10) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.10) 
4 Quarters 0.65 0.51 0.07 0.06 0.73 0.57 
(0.06) (0.17) (0.06) (0.05) (0.08) (0.15) 
6 Quaners 0.74 0.53 -0.01 0.04 0.73 0.57 
(0.07) (0.22) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08) (0.18) 
Scone, Clay, and Glass 
Current Quarter 0.12· 0.32 0.19 0.13 0.31 · 0.44 
(0.01) (0.04) {0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) 
1 Quarter 0,23· 0.54 0.22 0.17 0.45' 0.71 
(0.02) (0.06) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.05) 
2 Quarters 0.32· 0.68 0.21 0.17 0,53· 0.85 
(0.03) {0.07) (0.03) (0.02) (0.04) (0.06) 
4 Quaners 0.46' 0.83 0.18 0.12 0.64' 0.95 
(0.04) {0.08) (0.03) (0.03) (0.05) (0.06) 
6 Quarters o.58. 0.87 0.14 0.08 o.n· 0.96 
(0.05) {0.08) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) 
Primary Metals 
Current Quaner 0.08· 0.37 0.43· 0.15 0.51 0.52 
(0.02) (0.04) (0.05) (0.01) (0.05) (0.04) 
(continued) 
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Table 12.1 ( Continued) 
Employment Averagt Hours Total Hours 
Industry/ Lag Gtrmany U.S. Gtrmany U.S. Gtrmany U.S. 
I Quaner 0.16' 0.53 0.34' 0.15 0.50· 0.68 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) 
2 Quaners 0.22· 0.59 0.32' 0.11 0.54' 0.70 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) 
4 Quaners 0.31' 0.61 0.28' 0.06 0.59 0.67 
(0.08) (0.05) (0.06) (0.03) (0.08) (0.05) 
6Quaners 0.36' 0.61 0.26' 0.04 0.62 0.65 
(0.10) (0.06) (0.06) (0.04) (0.10) (0.04) 
Nonelectrical Machinery 
Current Quaner 0.01' 0.52 0.13 0.16 0.14' 0.68 
(0.01) (0.07) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.08) 
1 Quaner 0.03' 0.84 0.18 0.21 0.21 • 1.05 
(0.03) (0.09) (0.06) (0.04) (0.06) (0.09) 
2 Quaners 0.05· 1.03 0.21 0.20 0.26" 1.23 
(0.04) (0.09) (0.06) (0.05) (0.07) (0.09) 
4 Quaners 0.07' 1.18 0.22 0.11 0.29' 1.29 
(0.07) (0.10) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) 
6Quaners 0.09' 1.18 0.21 0.04 0.31' 1.23 
(0.11) (0.10) (0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.08) 
Electrical Equipment 
Current Quaner 0,13· 0.37 0.52' 0.07 0.65' 0.44 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.06) 
1 Quaner 0.28' 0.63 0.59' 0.09 0.87 0.72 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.03) (0.09) (0.08) 
2 Quaners 0.40' 0.79 0.54' 0.09 0.94 0.88 
(0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.03) (0.11) (0.09) 
4Quaners 0.54 0.92 0.41' 0.05 0.95 0.97 
(0.18) (0.10) (0.11) (0.04) (0.12) (0.10) 
6Quaners 0.61 0.93 0.33 0.02 0.94 0.95 
(0.25) (0.12) (0.15) (0.05) (0.13) (0.11) 
Autos 
Current Quaner 0.13' 0.43 0.48' 0.19 0.61 0.62 
(0.01) (0.04) (0.05) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) 
1 Quaner 0.29' 0.60 0.41' 0.18 0.70 0.79 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.02) (0.07) (0.03) 
2 Quaners 0.42' 0.67 0.35' 0.16 0.77 0.82 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.02) (0.08) (0.03) 
4Quaners 0.63 0.71 0.25 0.11 0.89 0.82 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.02) (0.10) (0.04) 
6Quaners 0.78 0.72 0.19 0.10 0.97 0.82 
(0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.02) (0.13) (0.04) 
(continued) 
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Table 12.1 ( Continued) 
Employment Average Hours Tota/Hours 
Industry/ Lag Germany U.S. Germany U.S. Germany U.S. 
Instruments 
Current Quarter 0.13 0.20 0.13 0.11 0.26 0.30 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.03) (0.03) (0.04) (0.06) 
1 Quarter 0.26 0.38 0.14 0.17 0.40 0.56 
(0.05) (0.09) (0.04) (0.05) (0.06) (0.10) 
2 Quarters 0.36 0.55 0.12 0.20 0.48 0.75 
(0.06) (0.12) (0.04) (0.06) (0.06) (0.14) 
4 Quarters 0.49 0.78 0.05' 0.22 0.54' 1.00 
(0.07) (0.19) (0.04) (0.06) (0.07) (0.20) 
6 Quarters 0.55 0.91 0.01' 0.20 0.56' 1.11 
(0.09) (0.25) (0.05) (0.07) (0.08) (0.25) 
Notes: 
• Standard errors are in parentheses. An asterisk denotes that German-U.S. difference is significant at 
0.05 level, rwo-tailed test. 
b German paper industry results are for the 1973-1985 period. 
following the initial 1 percent shock, employment would have decreased an 
estimated 0.69 percent, average hours would be 0.17 percent lower, and so total 
hours would be 0.85 percent lower. 
The results for aggregate manufacturing indicate that German employers rely 
relatively more on changes in hours per worker to adjust total labor input in the 
short run, whereas even in the short run U.S. employers rely primarily on 
adjustments to the number of workers. Although employment adjustment is 
significantly greater in the United States than in Germany across all time horizons 
examined here, the adjustment of average hours is greater in Germany, significantly 
so in the contemporaneous quarter. In the quarter that a shock to shipments 
occurs, average hours adjustment accounts for about 70 percent of total hours 
adjustment in Germany, whereas in the United States employment adjustment 
accounts for about 70 percent of initial adjustment. As expected, average hours 
adjustment declines both in an absolute and in a relative sense in Germany over 
time, as employers alter employment in response to a permanent shock. Figure 12.1 
depicts these quite different patterns of employment and hours adjustment in 
Germany and the United States. 
Although the adjustment of average hours is greater in German than in U.S. 
aggregate manufacturing, this greater average hours adjustment does not fully 
compensate for the smaller adjustment of employment in the short run, and total 
hours adjustment is significantly smaller in German manufacturing up to six 
quarters after the shock. Results for aggregate manufacturing may be somewhat 
misleading, however, if the composition of the manufacturing sector is different in 
the two countries and adjustment patterns differ substantially across detailed 
industries within countries. To investigate this possibility, we estimate employment 
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Figure 12.1 Simulated Adjustment of Production Employment and Average Production 
Hours to a Permanent One-Unit Negative Shock to Shipments 
and hours adjustment models for ten manufacturing industries for which we could 
develop a clean concordance between the German and U.S. data. Because of 
economists' and policymakers' interest in the automotive sector, we also include 
that industry in our comparison. 15 
When we examine the results for the disaggregated industries a somewhat 
different picture emerges. For only two industries-stone/clay/glass and nonelectri-
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ea! machinery-is short-run total hours adjustment significantly greater in the 
United States than in Germany. In five of the eleven industries-paper, leather, 
primary metals, electrical equipment, and autos-we generally observe significantly 
greater employment adjustment in the United States and significantly greater 
average hours adjustment in Germany over short time horizons. In these industries, 
however, the greater initial adjustment of average hours in Germany appears to 
compensate for the slower adjustment of employment levels, and the adjustment of 
total labor input is not significantly different in the two countries. In another three 
industries-textiles, apparel, and instruments-adjustment patterns are quite 
similar in the two countries; the short-run adjustment of employment, average 
hours, and total hours does not differ significantly between Germany and the 
United States. Finally, in one industry, printing, the adjustment of total hours is 
actually significantly greater in Germany than in the United States, owing to the 
significantly greater short-run adjustment of employment in Germany. 
In sum, we find that, contrary to popular belief, German manufacturing 
industries generally adjust labor input as quickly as do U.S. manufacturing 
industries in response to demand shocks. In most industries short-run employment 
adjustment is smaller in Germany than in the United States, often significantly so. 
In most of these industries, however, significantly greater short-run average hours 
adjustment compensates for the slower adjustment of employment, and there is no 
significant difference in total hours adjustment. 
These results are consistent with those reported in earlier studies comparing 
employment and hours adjustment in German and U.S. manufacturing industries. 
Houseman (1988) and Kohler and Sengenberger (1983) studied adjustment in 
steel and autos, respectively. Both found that German employers adjust employ-
ment levels less, but average hours per worker more, in the short run in response to 
demand shocks. In Abraham and Houseman (1993), we found that employment 
adjustment generally was significantly slower in the German than in the U.S. 
manufacturing industries studied, but that total hours adjustment was more similar 
and often insignificantly different, implying that average hours adjustment was 
generally greater in Germany. 16 
One way of inferring the effects of German employment protection laws is to 
compare, as we have just done, employment and hours adjustment in Germany 
with that in another country, such as the United States, in which there is little 
regulation of layoffs. Another way of inferring the effects of these laws is to test for 
changes in employment adjustment that coincide with major changes in employ-
ment protection laws. If these laws have a major effect on the way German 
employers adjust employment, we would expect the speed of employment 
adjustment to slow following the imposition of more stringent regulations and, 
conversely, to increase following the relaxation of regulations. 
Recent history offers two such events in Germany. The first is the introduction 
of the requirement that employers negotiate a social plan with the works council in 
the event of a mass layoff, which was embodied in the 1972 Amendments to the 
Works Constitution Act. This social plan requirement is widely regarded as among 
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the most important provisions in German employment law. In Abraham and 
Houseman (1993), however, we report evidence to suggest that this law had, at 
most, a marginal effect on employer behavior. Even before the social plan 
requirement was enacted, employers in the German manufacturing sector relied 
primarily on the adjustment of average hours per worker, and very little on that of 
employment levels, to vary labor input in the short run. 
Some observers have suggested that German adjustment patterns were greatly 
altered by this new requirement. Legislation such as the 1972 amendments to the 
Works Constitution Act often is treated as an exogenous event that forces 
significant changes in the typical employer's behavior. It may be more realistic, 
however, to treat such legislation as a codification of what has come to be viewed as 
best practice. If this view is correct, the amendments to the Works Constitution 
Act may have forced changes in the behavior of some marginal employers whose 
previous behavior lay outside the norm, but are unlikely to have caused major 
changes in the behavior of the typical employer. 
The 1985 Employment Promotion Act, which weakened employment 
protection, was a second significant change in German law. This legislation 
exempted new employers from the requirements of negotiating a social plan, raised 
the threshold that defines a mass layoff, and relaxed restrictions on the use of 
temporary workers who are not subject to the laws' provisions. Again, at least some 
observers have characterized these as significant changes. In Abraham and 
Houseman (1994), however, we find no change in the speed of adjustment of 
employment or hours after 1985. This finding echoes that of Kraft (1990), who 
also finds no evidence of a change in the speed of employment adjustment after 
1985 in tests based on data for 21 German manufacturing industries. 
SHORT-TIME WORK IN GERMANY 
We have shown that in the German manufacturing sector employers primarily vary 
the hours that their employees work, rather than the number of employees they 
hire, to adjust labor input to demand changes in the short run. In contrast, 
American employers extensively adjust employment to changes in demand 
conditions, even in the short run. Unemployment compensation for short-time 
work is an important component of the German UI system and facilitates the use 
of hours adjustment there, whereas most states in the United States do not offer 
benefits to workers on short time. Below we assess the importance of short-time 
work to overall labor adjustment in Germany and evaluate the relative merits of 
short-time work as an alternative to layoffs. 
Figure 12.2 provides some evidence that fluctuations in short time are a 
significant factor in German adjustment. The figure depicts the percent of workers 
in German manufacturing on short-time work from 1973 to 1990 using seasonally 
adjusted monthly data. During good years few workers are on short time. The 
number rises sharply during recessions. At the trough of the recession in the mid-
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Figure I 2.2 Percent of German Manufacturing Workers on Short Time, 1973-1990 
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trough of the recession in the early 1980's, which was considerably milder than 
the earlier recession, over 12 percent of manufacturing workers were on short 
time. 
In earlier work (Abraham and Houseman 1993), we have attempted to 
characterize the contribution of variation in short-time hours to observed labor 
adjustment in a somewhat more formal fashion. Our general strategy has been to 
ask how the adjustment of total hours would have differed had no workers been 
placed on short time, assuming that employers' adjustment behavior otherwise 
remained unchanged. We have addressed this question by comparing alternative 
models of total hours adjustment fit using as our hours measure, first, actual total 
production hours and, second, the hypothetical total number of production hours 
obtained by adding hours of short-time compensation paid to the number of 
production hours actually worked. The results of this sort of exercise can be used to 
answer questions concerning the share of the total adjustment of hours in response 
to a shock to shipments accounted for by short time hours. 
In Abraham and Houseman (1993), we reported finite distributed lag models of 
hours adjustment, with and without hours changes attributable to short time, to 
changes in shipments, fit using data for each of nine disaggregated manufacturing 
industries covering the 1974 to 1984 time period. The share of current quarter 
hours adjustment attributable to variation in short time hours averaged about 45 
percent and that at lags of one to two quarters averaged in excess of 60 percent. In 
Abraham and Houseman (1994), we used Koyck models fit with data for the 1973 
to 1990 period to assess the contribution of short-time to hours adjustment in the 
manufacturing sector as a whole. Our estimates implied that, absent the hours 
changes directly associated with receipt of short time compensation, the current 
quarter adjustment of total hours to a change in production would have been 40 
percent smaller than that actually observed. 
As a check on the robustness of the conclusions drawn from our earlier work, we 
also have estimated a more complete set of hours adjustment models for the 1973 
to 1990 time period. This new estimation added models for the full set of 
disaggregated manufacturing industries for which the requisite data could be 
obtained and, for closer comparability with the work reported in the present paper, 
substituted shipments for production as the measure of output, but otherwise used 
the same approach as Abraham and Houseman (1994). Both for manufacturing as 
a whole and for each of the seven disaggregated manufacturing industries for 
which the models could be estimated, we again find that variation in short-time 
hours makes an important contribution to observed labor adjustment. 17 
Benefits for short-time work in Germany are intended primarily, though not 
exclusively, for workers affected by temporary reductions in demand. In the United 
States the structure of the UI system encourages the use of temporary layoffs rather 
than short-time work during downturns in demand. Temporary layoffs, which are 
common in the United States, are virtually unknown in Germany. From the 
employer's perspective, there is a sense in which the use of short time and the use 
of temporary layoffs are close functional substitutes. Both allow a temporary 
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reduction in labor costs during a period of slack demand. There are, however, 
important respects in which the two differ. 
First, a temporary layoff may significantly disrupt the production process. Unless 
the temporary layoff affects the entire work force, it is likely to require a substantial 
reorganization of work assignments. If senior employees enjoy bumping rights, 
laying off even a small number of workers may lead to a large number of job 
reassignments. When workers are later recalled, productivity may suffer as workers 
who have been away from the job for an extended period become reacdimated to 
the work they are doing. 
Second, there is a significant risk that employees placed on temporary layoff will 
not be available for recall. Rough calculations based on the findings reported in 
Katz and Meyer (1990) indicate that, over the duration of a temporary layoff that 
lasts thirteen weeks, 25 percent of workers on temporary layoff take a new job; over 
the duration of a 26-week temporary layoff, 40 percent of those on layoff take a 
new job. 18 If workers who had been temporarily laid off do not return, the firm 
must incur the costs of hiring and training replacement workers. The costs 
associated with hiring and training new employees largely could be avoided if 
workers were placed on short time instead of on temporary layoff. 19 
Moreover, short time and temporary layoffs are not the same from the 
employee's perspective. Workers on temporary layoff are likely to face great 
uncertainty about whether they will ever be recalled. Findings reported by Katz and 
Meyer indicate that, among laid-off workers who initially believe that they will be 
recalled, only about 70 percent end up returning to their previous employer.20 This 
low percentage in part reflects the fact that some workers choose to take new jobs, 
but also occurs because many workers never receive recall notices. Rough 
calculations based on Katz and Meyer's econometric analysis of layoff spells 
suggests that as many as 25 percent of workers who initially believe that their layoff 
spell will be temporary do not receive a recall notice within a year following the 
layoff.21 Workers on temporary layoff who are never recalled experience longer than 
average unemployment spells, in part because they are less likely to look for new 
work than workers who are certain their layoff is permanent and in part because 
potential employers are reluctant to hire someone who may quit if recalled to their 
previous job. These lengthy spells of unemployment represent a loss of income for 
the individual workers and a loss of resources to society. 
Extensive reliance on layoffs is also less equitable than work sharing, for it concen-
trates the costs of adjustment on a relatively small number of workers who suffer 
large losses of income and other job-related benefits. Short-time work arrangements 
spread the costs of adjustment more evenly across members of the work force. 
Short-time work may be used to accommodate structural as well as cyclical 
downturns. In a permanent decline in demand, the use of short-time work does 
not prevent employment reductions; rather, the temporary use of hours reduction 
measures can help an employer achieve work force reductions with minimal resort 
to layoffs. By extending the time over which these work force reductions occur, 
employers can make greater use of attrition and other alternatives to layoff. 
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The use of shon-time work in instances of structural adjustment is, however, more 
controversial. Economists typically take the position that in a permanent decline in 
demand, workers should be reallocated to other sectors as quickly as possible. To 
achieve this aim, large-scale layoffs, when necessary, have been advocated, on the 
assumption that dislocated workers will then be forced to find new employment. 
Several recent studies of displaced workers in the United States show, however, that 
workers permanently laid off from their jobs often experience long periods of 
unemployment. Among displaced workers aged 20 to 61 who lost full-time jobs 
between 1979 and 1981, for example, 31 percent of male blue-collar workers, 38 
percent of female blue-collar workers, 14 percent of male white-collar workers, and 
28 percent of female white-collar workers experienced more than a year of 
subsequent joblessness.22 Only 65 percent of prime-aged full-time workers displaced 
during 1984 held full-time jobs in January 1986; 8 percent held part-time jobs, 16 
percent were unemployed, and 11 percent had withdrawn from the labor force. 23 
By using shon-time work as an interim adjustment measure and relying on 
attrition to reduce the work force, firms can greatly reduce or even avoid layoffs. In 
this way, job reductions occur among those who have the most attractive outside 
opponunities or who are best able to relocate, and those who have poor outside 
opponunities or who are unable to relocate are not thrown out of work. 
INVENTORY ADJUSTMENT 
In the dynamic factor demand models estimated above, we allow only employment 
and average hours per worker to vary in the shon run. The theoretical literature in 
economics, however, has long speculated that companies use finished goods 
inventories to buffer production and labor against short-run fluctuations in 
demand. Under the assumption that there are significant costs to adjusting labor 
and other factor inputs, firms might be expected to build up finished goods 
inventories during a downturn and to draw down inventory stocks during an 
upturn to mitigate costly changes in production and labor. If, in fact, the cost of 
adjusting labor input is greater in Germany than in the United States, we might 
expect that finished goods inventories would play a more imponant role in 
smoothing over demand fluctuations in Germany than in the United States. 
To assess their role in the adjustment process in Germany and the United States, 
we expand the system of equations estimated above to incorporate inventories: 
where / represents finished goods inventories and all other variables are defined as 
above. In this model an equation is added to estimate the shon-run response of 
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finished goods inventories to output changes. In addition, employment and hours 
adjustment are assumed to depend upon the path of adjustment of inventories. 
This model is quite similar to that estimated in Topel (1982). 24 
Several caveats should be noted concerning the data used to estimate these 
equations. Unfortunately, inventory data for Germany, which come from a special 
survey conducted by the IFO-lnstitut fur Wirtschaftsforschung, are only available 
beginning in 1980. Therefore, we estimate equations (2a), (26), and (2c) over the 
1980-1990 period, using seasonally adjusted, quarterly data, for both Germany 
and the United States. In addition, the IFO survey reports finished goods 
inventories in terms of the equivalent number of weeks of shipments, rather than 
in terms of the value of inventories. To convert the German weeks-of-inventory 
terms to stock values, we calculated the average weekly shipments over the 
preceding twelve months and multiplied this figure by the reported number of 
weeks of inventories. 
Inventory data also are not reported for aggregate manufacturing in Germany. 
To construct an aggregate manufacturing series we summed the value of finished 
goods inventories across all of the more detailed industries for which inventory data 
were reported and for which we had shipments and labor market data. We 
aggregated shipments, employment, and hours data across the same set of 
industries to form a consistent series. This aggregate industry represents most of 
manufacturing. The primary industries excluded are food and tobacco. 
Finished goods inventory data are not available for the U.S. auto industry and, 
because of changes in industry definitions, we do not have a complete series on 
inventories for the U.S. electrical equipment and instruments industries. In 
addition, because of missing posc-1985 German shipments data, we do not report 
estimates of the expanded model for the paper industry. Data sources and 
additional details concerning the construction of the variables used in our analysis 
are given in the data appendix. 
Paralleling the analysis reported above, we use the parameter estimates from 
equations (2a), (26 ), and (2c) to simulate the response of production employ-
ment, production hours, and finished goods inventories to a one unit shock to 
shipments. The results of these simulations are summarized in Table 12.2. (We 
report selected coefficient estimates from the equations underlying these simula-
tions in Table 12.4, which appears in the Appendix). The patterns of employment 
and hours adjustment shown in Table 12.2 are similar to those shown in Table 
12.1. Shore-run employment adjustment is rypically larger in the United States 
than in Germany. Conversely, shore-run average hours adjustment is usually larger 
in Germany than in the United States. In contrast to the estimates reported in 
Table 12.1 for the 1973-1990 period, the aggregate manufacturing equations for 
the 1980-1990 period do not imply a significant difference in the adjustment of 
total hours in the two countries. Consistent with the estimates for the 1973-1990 
period, the 1980-1990 estimates for disaggregated industries generally imply that 
total hours adjustment is not significantly different in Germany and the United 
States. In sum, comparisons of employment and hours adjustment appear to be 
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Table 12.2 Simulated Adjustment of Production Employment, Production Hours and 
Finished Goods Inventories to a Permanent One-Unit Shock to Shipments 
in German and U.S. Manufacturing Industries, 1980-90• 
Employment Average Hours Tota/Hours Inventories 
Industry/ Lag Germany U.S. Germany U.S. Germany. U.S. Germany U.S. 
Manufacturing 
0.48; Current Quarter 0.16' 0.47 0.21 0.63 0.68 -0.05 -0.26 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.06) (0.03) (0.07) (0.05) (0.29) (0.23) 
1 Quarter 0.34' 0.74 0.42 0.25 0.76' 0.98 -0.06 -0.32 
(0.05) (0.05) (0.08) (0.04) (0.09) (0.06) (0.45) (0.33) 
2 Quarters 0.50· 0.88 0.36 0.22 0.86 1.10 -0.08 -0.25 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.05) (0.10) (0.07) (0.58) (0.40) 
4 Quarters 0.72 0.96 0.28 0.13 1.00 1.09 -0.16 -0.01 
(0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) (0.77) (0.55) 
6 Quarters 0.88 0.93 0.22 0.09 1.10 1.02 -0.24 0.26 
(0.12) (0.12) (0.08) (0.08) (0.13) (0.14) (0.95) (0.73) 
Textiles 
Current Quarter 0.14 0.25 0.63' 0.28 0.76 0.52 -0.34 -0.08 
(0.03) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.09) (0.09) (0.30) (0.09) 
1 Quarter 0.37 0.39 0.56' 0.31 0.93 0.70 -0.24 -0.01 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.10) (0.06) (0.12) (0.08) (0.50) (0.16) 
2 Quarters 0.57 0.47 0.52 0.27 1.09 0.74 -0.19 0.09 
(0.08) (0.06) (0.11) (0.07) (0.16) (0.08) (0.68) (0.22) 
4 Quarters 0.93' 0.53 0.45 0.17 1.37' 0.70 -0.12 0.25 
(0.15) (0.09) (0.18) (0.10) (0.26) (0.11) (0.97) (0.32) 
6 Quarters 1.22· 0.53 0.39 0.13 1.61' 0.66 -0.08 0.33 
(0.23) (0.12) (0.24) (0.14) (0.38) (0.13) (1.27) (0.42) 
Apparel 
Current Quarter 0.13 0.10 0.24' 0.06 0.36' 0.16 0.19 0.06 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.45) (0.18) 
1 Quarter 0.27 0.17 0.25 0.09 0.52 0.26 0.3i 0.22 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.11) (0.54) (0.30) 
2 Quarters 0.41 0.21 0.23 0.10 0.64 0.31 0.13 0.43 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09) (0.13) (0.14) (0.55) (0.39) 
4 Quarters 0.63' 0.22 0.18 0.08 0.80 0.31 -0.35 0.79 
(0.14) (0.13) (0.08) (0.11) (0.17) (0.18) (0.54) (0.53) 
6Quarters 0.77' 0.19 0.14 0.07 0.90' 0.26 -0.74 0.93 
(0.18) (0.15) (0.08} (0.11) (0.20) (0.20) (0.57) (0.64) 
Printing 
Current Quarter 0.15 0.08 o.n· 0.01 0.87' 0.10 -1.14 0.74 
(0.06} (0.03) (0.12) (0.02) (0.14) (0.04) (3.13) (0.21) 
1 Quarter 0.26 0.12 o.s5• 0.02 0.81' 0.14 4.68 0.93 
(0.13) (0.04} (0.15) (0.03) (0.19) (0.06} (5.16) (0.25) 
2 Quarters 0.34 0.15 0.52• 0.02 0.86' 0.16 6.18 0.99 
(0.19) (0.06) (0.14) (0.04) (0.21) (0.08) (5.77) (0.30) 
(continued) 
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Table 12.2 ( Continued) 
Employment Average Hours Tota/Hours Inventories 
Industry/ Lag Germany U.S. Germany U.S. Germany U.S. Germany U.S. 
4 Quarters 0.45 0.18 0.47' 0.01 0.92' 0.20 8.07 1.02 
(0.30) (0.10) (0.17) (0.04) (0.30) (0.13) (6.68) (0.37) 
6 Quarters 0.52 0.20 0.44' 0.01 0.97 0.21 9.20 1.04 
(0.39) (0.13) (0.20) (0.05) (0.39) (0.16) (7.75) (0.43) 
Leather 
Current Quarter 0.14 0.13 0.32· 0.04 0.46' 0.16 0.57 0.07 
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07) (0.04) (0.08) (0.06) (0.42) (0.13) 
1 Quarter 0.28 0.19 0.30' 0.04 0.58' 0.23 0.76 0.11 
(0.07) (0.08) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.65) (0.19) 
2 Quarters 0.40 0.22 0.27' 0.03 0.67' 0.25 0.70 0.15 
(0.09) (0.10) (0.08) (0.07) (0.11) (0.12) (0.81) (0.26) 
4 Quarters 0.56 0.24 0.18 0.01 0.74' 0.25 0.18 0.20 
(0.13) (0.17) (0.09) (0.10) (0.16) (0.18) (1.02) (0.46) 
6 Quarters 0.62 0.24 0.10 0.00 0.73 0.24 0.51 0.21 
(0.17) (0.29) (0.11) (0.15) (0.19) (0.29) (1.19) (0.88) 
Stone, Clay, and Glass 
Current Quarter 0.08· 0.20 0.26' 0.12 0.34 0.33 -0.15 -0.29 
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) · (0.02) (0.05) (0.05) (0.26) (0.09) 
1 Quarter 0.12· 0.43 0.29' 0.17 0.42 0.60 -0.21 -0.42 
(0.05) (0.06) (0.05) (0.03) (0.07) (0.07) (0.36) (0.13) 
2 Quarters 0.15' 0.60 0.30' 0.16 0.47' 0.76 -0.17 -0.45 
(0.07) (0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (0.09) (0.09) (0.44) (0.15) 
4 Quarters 0.19· 0.70 0.31. 0.10 0.50 0.80 -0.06 -0.38 
(0.11) (0.08) (0.07) (0.04) (0.14) (0.09) (0.55) (0.19) 
6 Quarters 0.22· 0.66 0.31' 0.07 0.53 0.73 0.01 -0.34 
(0.15) (0.09) (0.08) (0.05) (0.19) (0.10) (0.64) (0.23) 
Primary Metals 
Current Quarter 0.09° 0.38 0.37' 0.12 0.46 0.50 -0.12 0.15 
(0.02) (0.06) (0.06) (0.02) (0.07) (0.06) (0.29) (0.08) 
1 Quarter 0.19° 0.53 0.30° 0.11 0.48 0.64 -0.35 0.33 
(0.05) (0.07) (0.06) (0.03) (0.08) (0.07) (0.33) (0.13) 
2 Quarters 0.26' 0.59 0.28' 0.06 0.54 0.65 -0.43° 0.56 
(0.07) (0.09) (0.05) (0.04) (0.09) (0.08) (0.41) (0.21) 
4 Quarters 0.37 0.60 0.25° -0.01 0.62 0.60 -0.46' 1.13 
(0.14) (0.15) (0.06) (0.06) (0.15) (0.13) (0.56) (0.44) 
6 Quarters 0.44 0.61 0.23' -0.06 0.67 0.55 -0.44° 1.75 
(0.24) (0.22) (0.07) (0.11) (0.24) (0.19) (0.71) (0.81) 
Nonelectrical Machinery 
Current Quarter 0.02· 0.53 0.10 0.16 0.12· 0.69 0.36° -0.35 
(0.02) (0.10) (0.05) (0.03) (0.05) (0.10) (0.19) (0.29) 
(continued) 
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Table 12.2 ( Continued) 
Employment Average Hours Tota/Hours Inventories 
Industry/ Lag Germany U.S. Germany U.S. Germany U.S. Germany U.S. 
1 Quaner o.o4· 0.79 0.10 0.18 0.13' 0.97 0.49 -0.30 
(0.04) (0.10) (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.09) (0.35) (0.34) 
2 Quaners 0.05' 0.89 0.09 0.15 0.13' 1.04 0.61 -0.12 
(0.06) (0.09) (0.07) (0.05) (0.09) (0.08) (0.51) (0.38) 
4 Quaners 0.05' 0.89 0.06 0.06 0.11· 0.96 0.85 0.26 
(0.10) (0.11) (0.09) (0.07) (0.14) (0.09) (0.81) (0.51) 
6 Quaners 0,03· 0.84 0.05 0.01 0.08· 0.85 1.07 0.47 
(0.14) (0.13) (0.10) (0.09) (0.19) (0.11) (1.07) (0.78) 
Electrical Equipment 
Current Quaner 0.07 NA 0.49 NA 0.57 NA -0.12 NA 
(0.05) (0.09) (0.09) (0.50) 
1 Quaner 0.16 0.46 0.62 -0.13 
(0.10) (0.12) (0.13) (0.91) 
2 Quaners 0.23 0.43 0.66 -0.49 
(0.18) (0.12) (0.17) (1.55) 
4 Quaners 0.33 0.38 0.71 -0.56 
(0.46) (0.17) (0.37) (5.23) 
6 Quaners 0.39 0.35 0.74 -0.59 
(1.15) (0.31) (0.91) (22.94) 
Autos 
Current Quaner 0.10 NA 0.61 NA 0.71 NA -1.98 NA 
(0.02) (0.11) (0.11) (0.90) 
1 Quaner 0.20 0.63 0.82 -3.59 
(0.04) (0.16) (0.16) (1.58) 
2 Quaners 0.28 0.62 0.90 -4.82 
(0.06) (0.18) (0.19) (2.09) 
4 Quaners 0.42 0.60 1.02 -6.53 
(0.11) (0.20) (0.23) (2.79) 
6Quaners 0.52 0.58 1.11 -7.66 
(0.15) (0.22) (0.27) (3.29) 
Instruments 
Current Quaner 0.18 NA 0.17 NA 0.35 NA -1.21 NA 
(0.03) (0.06) (0.07) (0.35) 
1 Quaner 0.37 0.14 0.51 -1.30 
(0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.34) 
2 Quaners 0.51 0.08 0.58 -1.04 
(0.05) (0.04) (0.07) (0.34) 
4 Quaners 0.65 -0.01 0.64 -0.56 
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.36) 
6Quaners 0.70 -0.04 0.66 -0.34 
(0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.40) 
Notes: 
• Standard errors arc in parentheses. 
• An asterisk denotes that the Gcrman-U.S. difference is significant at 0.05 level, two-tailed test. 
305 
LABOR ADJUSTMENT UNDER DIFFERENT INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURES 
sensitive neither to the period of estimation nor to the inclusion of inventories in 
the model. 25 
If inventories serve as a buffer stock, one would expect inventories co fall when 
shipments rise and to rise when shipments fall. In Table 12.2, which shows the 
response of inventories co a permanent one unit, positive shock to shipments, one 
would expect initial inventory adjustment to be negative. For aggregate manufac-
turing, inventory adjustment is negative for most time horizons in both Germany 
and the United States, but is never significantly different from zero in either 
country. For the disaggregated industries reported in Table 12.2, inventory 
adjustment also tends to be very imprecisely estimated in both countries. Even 
where initial inventory adjustment has the expected negative sign, it generally is not 
significantly different from zero. 
There are, however, several exceptions. For the auto and instruments industries 
in Germany and for the stone, clay, and glass industry in the United States, 
inventory adjustment to a change in shipments is large and statistically significant 
across all or most time horizons. For example, the simulations suggest that a 1 
percent increase in shipments would result in a 1.98 percent decrease in inventories 
in the contemporaneous quarter in the German auto industry; a 1.21 percent 
decrease in inventories in the contemporaneous quarter in the German instruments 
industry; and a 0.29 percent decrease in inventories in the contemporaneous 
quarter in the U.S. stone, clay, and glass industry. These rather large inventories 
elasticities are noteworthy, of course, only if inventories represent a sizable fraction 
of shipments in these industries. Based on a separate set of simulations in which the 
shock to shipments was evaluated at the mean of the industry's shipments, only an 
estimated 6 percent share of an increase in shipments in the German auto industry 
would be abso,bed by lower inventory stocks in the quarter contemporaneous to 
the shock to shipments. In the German instruments industry and in the U.S. stone, 
clay, and glass industry inventories appear to play a more important role in 
buffering production. In the German instruments industry, an increase in 
shipments is estimated to be more than matched by a fall in inventories in the 
contemporaneous quarter and in the U.S. stone, clay, and glass industry 19 percent 
of an increase in shipments would be absorbed by a decrease in inventories in the 
contemporaneous quarter. 
These exceptions aside, the main conclusion to be drawn from Table 12.2 is that 
inventories do not appear to play a significant role in smoothing over fluctuations 
in demand in either Germany or the United States. The results concerning U.S. 
inventory adjustment presented in Table 12.2 are consistent with other research, 
which has found little evidence of a buffer role for finished goods inventories in the 
United States. 26 Even in estimates of the interrelated factor demand model that 
includes inventories run over the 1973-1990 period (not reported here) we find no 
evidence to suggest that inventories play a substantial role in smoothing over 
fluctuations in demand in the United States. 
Ideally, we would like to have estimated these inventory adjustment 
equations over a longer time horizon for Germany. German manufacturing 
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experienced little cyclical fluctuation during the l 980's, and it is possible that 
the imprecise estimates we obtain are partly due to the lack of variation in the 
data. Still, our basic finding that inventories do not appear to play a significant 
buffer role in Germany is consistent with our findings concerning employment 
and hours adjustment. We hypothesized that if the costs of labor adjustment 
were higher in Germany than in the United States so that German firms 
adjusted labor input more slowly to demand changes than did U.S. firms, 
German firms would have a greater incentive to use inventories to buffer 
fluctuations in demand. However, we find that, although German firms adjust 
employment more slowly than do U.S. firms, there is little difference in the 
adjustment of total labor input. 
CONCLUSION 
Concerns about the potential impacts of job security legislation often are based 
upon the perception that such legislation slows or prevents needed labor market 
adjustment. Taken as a whole, our results suggest that the primary difference 
between German and U.S. labor adjustment lies not in the adjustment of total 
labor input, but rather in its division between adjustments to the number of 
workers employed and adjustments to hours per worker. German companies rely 
much more on the adjustment of average hours, including the use of shore-time 
work, to reduce labor input during downturns; American companies make greater 
use of employment adjustment, and by implication layoffs. Ac lease in the German 
manufacturing sector, adjustment of hours per worker serves as a shore-run 
substitute for the adjustment of employment levels. 
Likdy reasons for the very different composition of labor adjustments in the two 
countries are easy to identify. German job security laws and prevailing German 
practice discourage the adjustment of employment to changes in the demand for 
labor that may not prove to be permanent and make rapid employment adjustment 
difficult, while the German unemployment insurance system encourages reductions 
in hours during periods of slack demand and the relatively low overtime premium 
may encourage adjustment of overtime hours. In the United States, in contrast, 
there are no legal barriers to layoffs, the unemployment insurance system offers 
positive incentives to lay workers off rather than reduce their weekly hours, and the 
relatively high mandatory overtime premium may discourage adjustment through 
variation in overtime hours. Our results suggest chat the higher coses of adjusting 
employment levels in Germany are offset, in most cases, by lower costs of adjusting 
average hours, so chat the adjustment of total labor input in the two countries is 
similar. Our findings concerning the adjustment of inventories in response to 
demand changes support this conclusion, albeit indirectly. If the costs of adjusting 
labor input were significantly greater in Germany, we might expect that employers 
would use stocks of finished goods inventories to buffer fluctuations in demand to a 
greater degree than in the United States. In fact, we find little evidence to suggest 
that inventories are used for this purpose in either country. 
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Taken as a whole, the evidence reported in this chapter casts doubt on 
allegations that dismissal legislation in West Germany has seriously hampered 
German firms' ability to adjust their labor input in response to changing demand 
conditions. Our findings suggest that, given the presence of appropriate supporting 
institutions, strong worker job security can be compatible with employers' need for 
flexibility in staffing levels. 
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NOTES 
For summaries of recent changes to employment protection laws in Western Europe, see 
Maury (1985), Vranken (1986), and Houseman (1990). 
2 For an elaboration of these arguments, see OECD (1986) and Soltwedel (1988). 
3 Wall Street journal, October 12, 1993. 
4 Required notice periods can be circumvented through voluntary severance agreements 
under which workers quit in return for some monetary compensation. Such agreements 
have been common. A 1990 decision of the Federal Constitutional Court declared the dis-
parate treatment of blue-collar and white-collar workers in advance notice law to be uncon-
stitutional and ordered parliament to pass new legislation providing for equal notice. 
5 German dismissal law and the role of the works coun;:il in the event of a collective 
dismissal are discussed by Bruche and Reissert (1984), Sengenberger (1985), and Weiss 
(1985). 
6 The German short-time system is discussed by Flechsenhar (I 980) and Grais (1983). 
7 See General Accounting Office (1986) for survey results on the incidence of advance 
notice and severance pay. 
8 At least 50 workers must be affected, and therefore small establishments are exempted 
from any notice requirement. The requirements of advance notice also apply if 500 or 
more workers are laid off, even if they do not constitute at least one third of the work 
force. 
9 Unemployment Insurance Financial Data, published by the U.S. Department of Labor, 
contains data on weekly benefit amounts, weekly wages in covered employment, and the 
duration of benefit receipt. Vroman (1989) discusses alternative estimates of the degree 
of experience rating. 
10 Formal models of the effects of employment adjustment costs on both employment and 
hours are surveyed by Nickell (1986) and Hamermesh (1993). Burdett and Wright 
(I 989) model the effect of access to short-time compensation through the UI system. In 
their model, the short-time compensation subsidy associated with imperfect experience 
rating increases employers' reliance on hours adjustments and raises the volatility of 
average hours relative to the volatility of employment. Even in a perfectly experience 
rated UI system, giving liquidiry-constrained employers access to short-time benefits for 
their workers may produce the same result. Hamermesh (1993) discusses the effects of 
overtime premia on the choice between hours and employment adjustments. 
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11 The model we use here to estimate employment and hours adjustment differs from those 
employed in our earlier work. In Abraham and Houseman (1993) we use a finite 
distributed lag model to describe the response of employment and total hours to changes 
in shipments. In Abraham and Houseman (1994) we use Koyck models to estimate 
separately the adjustment of employment and the adjustment of total hours to demand 
changes. Neither model allowed the adjustment of employment and average hours to be 
interrelated. In addition, neither model allowed for the direct comparison of employ-
ment and average hours adjustment. 
12 We also estimate models with data that had not been seasonally adjusted. In general, the 
results are quite similar to those reported in this chapter. 
13 The automobile industry is the only industry included for which the German and U.S. 
definitions are not wholly comparable; the German classification includes bicycles, 
whereas the U.S. classification does not. 
14 We estimate standard errors associated with the simulated adjustment paths using 
"bootstrap" methods. Specifically, we use Monte Carlo simulation techniques to perturb 
randomly the estimated coefficients in equations (la) and (lb), and generate new 
simulated paths of adjustment for employment and hours. The reported standard errors 
are calculated as the standard deviation of the values at the associated lag lengths of 100 
Monte Carlo simulations. 
15 As noted above, the German street vehicles industry includes bicycles whereas the U.S. 
auto industry does not. 
16 Houseman (1988) did report slower total hours adjustment in the German than in the 
U.S. steel industry using a finite distributed lag model. In Abraham and Houseman 
(1993), in which we used a model similar to that in Houseman (1988), we found that 
once differences in demand conditions were taken into account, differences in total hours 
adjustment in the German and U.S. primary metals industry largely disappeared. 
17 These results are available upon request. 
18 Figure 2 in Katz and Meyer (1990) indicates that the aggregate new job hazard, a 
measure of the instantaneous probabiliry that an unemployed person will take a new job, 
is about 0.025, while the results in their Table 6 suggest that, all else the same, the new 
job hazard is roughly 40 percent lower for persoHs who initially expect to be recalled to 
their previous job. Given that about 75 percent of their sample begins their layoff spell 
expecting to be recalled, a reasonable estimate of the new job hazard for this group is 
about 0.021. This is the hazard assumed in arriving at the numbers in the text. 
19 There also would be some voluntary attrition during an extended period of short-time 
work, but quit rates are typically far below the loss rates from temporary layoff status 
implied by Katz and Meyer's figures. 
20 Katz and Meyer (1990: 981). 
21 Figure 2 in Katz and Meyer (1990) indicates that the aggregate recall hazard, a measure 
of the instantaneous probabiliry that an unemployed person will be recalled to the 
previous job, averages about 0.050 during the first 15 weeks following a layoff, then 
drops to about 0.010. The results in their Table 6 suggest that the recall hazard is about 
10 times greater for persons who initially expect to be recalled than for persons who do 
not. A reasonable estimate of the recall hazard for persons who begin their spell 
expecting to be recalled is 0.065 during the first fifteen weeks of a layoff spell and about 
0.013 thereafter. These are the hazards used to compute the numbers in the text. 
22 Podgurskyand Swaim (1987: 216). 
23 Seitchik and Zornitsky (1989: 67). 
24 One key difference between our approach and that in Topel (1982) is in the modeling of 
demand. Topel attempts to distinguish between anticipated and unanticipated demand 
shocks. While this issue is of theoretical interest, whether one can disentangle 
anticipated from unanticipated demand shocks econometrically is highly questionable. 
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25 We also have estimated equations (la) and (lb) over the 1980-1990 period for 
Germany and the United States. Estimated employment and hours adjustment is very 
similar to that in the model including inventories fit for the same time period. 
26 See Blinder and Maccini (1991) for a review of this literature. 
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APPENDIX 
The German production employment, hours and shipments data come from a monthly 
employer survey conducted by the Statistisches Bundesamt. These data are published 
monthly in Fachserie 4: Produzierendes Gewerbe, Reihe 4.1.1: Beschaeftigung, Umsatz und 
Energieversorgung der Untemehmen und Betriebe im Bergbau und im Verarbeitenden Gewerbe, 
issued by the Statistisches Bundesamt. Complete post-1985 shipments data were not 
available for the German paper industry. For that reason, we have not estimated models for 
the 1980-1990 period for paper. The German shipments data were deflated by a producer 
price index for basic industries, capital goods, consumer goods or food and tobacco, as 
appropriate. Because of a break in the German industry series, we do not use data prior to 
1970. German finished goods inventory data come from a survey by IFO-Institute fur 
Winschafcsforschung. Thi~ ~urvey is conducted four times a year during the months of 
February, May, August, and November. 
U.S. employment and hours data come from the Bureau of Labor Statistics' monthly 
Employment, Payroll, and Hours survey, as published monthly in Employment and Earnings. 
U.S. shipments and finished goods inventory data were obtained from the Bureau of the 
Census's Manufacturers' Shipments, Inventories, and Orders data set; these data are 
published in Current Industrial Reports: Manufacturers' Shipments, Inventories, and Orders, 
which appears annually. Finished goods inventory data are not available for the U.S. auto 
industry. In addition, as explained below, complete inventory series were not available for all 
industries on a consistent basis. The U.S. shipments and inventory data were deflated using 
either the durable goods or the nondurable goods producer price index. 
With the exception of the producer price deflators, all series used in the analysis were 
obtained on magnetic media in unadjusted form and seasonally adjusted using the X-11 
procedure in SAS. Because production employment was measured at the end of the month 
in Germany, but at mid-month in the United States, we transformed the German 
production employment numbers, defining: 
(3) 
These transformed numbers were used in all analyses. 
The industries included in our analysis were matched using a bridge between the German 
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SYPRO industry codes and the 1972 U.S. SIC industry codes developed by Hideki 
Yamawaki. Except for the automobile industry, all correspond to 2-digit SIC classifications. 
The U.S. SIC system was revised in 1987. All of the U.S. employment and hours adjustment 
equations summarized in Table 12.1 were estimated using data on a 1972 SIC basis. The 
1987 SIC revisions resulted in major changes in the composition of SIC 36, electrical 
equipment, and SIC 38, instruments. We were unable to obtain recent finished goods 
inventory data on a 1972 basis and pre-1988 employment and hours data for these 
industries are not available on a 1987 basis. Therefore they are excluded from our analysis of 
employment, hours and inventories adjustment. The 1987 revisions also affected the 
comi-"osition of SIC 32, stone, clay and glass, and SIC 35, nonelectrical machinery, though 
in a much less significant way. For these industries we estimate the employment, hours, and 
inventories models summarized in Table 12.2 using data on a 1987 SIC basis. 
All of the U.S. series are constructed using a "link relative" approach, meaning that the 
percentage change in the series value between period t and period t- 1 is first calculated 
using data from those establishments filing returns in both periods, and the period t value 
then determined by applying this percentage change to the period t- 1 value. The German 
series are not constructed in this way. Whether for this or some other reason, the German 
shipments series were considerably noisier than the corresponding U.S. series even after they 
had been seasonally adjusted. For that reason and because German inventory data are only 
available on a quarterly basis, we averaged the monthly data for both countries to construct 
quarterly observations, which have been used in the reported analysis. Again, however, 
making this adjustment had no important effect on any of our findings. 
Neither country's data series are adjusted for the effect of strikes. We have added strike 
dummies to our estimating equations for the German automobile, primary metals, and 
printing industries in those quarters affected by large strikes. This has the effect of slightly 
reducing the estimated adjustment of hours worked to changes in output. 
The data used in the preparation of Figure 12.2 make use of monthly data on the number 
of manufacturing workers collecting short-time payments. These numbers were taken from 
Amtliche Nachrichten der Bundesanstalt for Arbeit-Jahreszahlen (various issues). 
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Table 12.3 Production Employment and Hours Adjustment: Selected Coefficient 
Estimates from an Interrelated Factor Demand Model 
Germany au a12 /J, a2, a22 fJ 2 
Manufacturing 0.831 0.075 0.172 -0.443 0.158 0.396 
(0.030) (0.029) (0.026) (0.060) (0.084) (0.050) 
Textiles 0.884 0.058 0.143 -0.269 0.372 0.256 
(0.032) (0.038) (0.023) (0.052) (0.089) (0.048) 
Apparel 0.868 0.166 0.173 -0.278 0.343 0.149 
(0.027) (0.048) (0.023) (0.056) (0.100) (0.049) 
Paper 0.912 0.154 0.033 -0.176 0.128 0.299 
(0.062) (0.068) (0.035) (0.157) (0.188) (0.062) 
Printing 0.817 0.086 0.202 -0.306 0.056 0.160 
(0.032) (0.053) (0.024) (0.055) (0.107) (0.041) 
Leather 0.776 0.067 0.192 -0.413 0.296 0.276 
(0.034) (0.048) (0.031) (0.064) (0.090) (0.058) 
Stone, Clay, and Glass 0.870 0.001 0.120 -0.180 0.312 0.185 
(0.024) (0.049) (0.015) (0.042) (0.085) (0.025) 
Primary Metals 0.806 0.035 0.080 -0.395 -0.139 0.432 
(0.064) (0.031) (0.016) (0.163) (0.082) (0.043) 
Nonelectrical Machinery 0.839 0.037 0.014 -0.218 0.489 0.125 
(0.183) (0.043) (0.014) (0.061) (0.097) (0.040) 
Electrical Equipment 0.767 0.094 0.128 -0.485 0.265 0.517 
(0.120) (0.039) (0.036) (0.056) (0.073) (0.059) 
Autos 0.883 0.103 0.127 -0.402 -0.040 0.482 
(0.020) (0.023) (0.014) (0.117) (0.097) (0.061) 
Instruments 0.785 0.194 0.131 -0.242 0.362 0.126 
(0.063) (0.061) (0.029) (0.057) (0.101) (0.033) 
United States 
Manufacturing 0.493 0.241 0.536 -0.182 0.629 0.216 
(0.040) (0.106) (0.037) (0.021) (0.068) (0.028) 
Textiles 0.297 0.185 0.265 -0.211 0.289 0.226 
(0.116) (0.109) (0.055) (0.081) (0.221) (0.063) 
Apparel 0.605 0.085 0.127 -0.110 0.567 0.061 
(0.156) (0.145) (0.041) (0.041) (0.107) (0.018) 
Paper 0.344 0.648 0.245 -0.132 0.635 0.063 
(0.096) (0.174) (0.055) (0.043) (0.206) (0.030) 
Printing 0.861 0.348 0.059 -0.049 0.596 0.039 
(0.033) (0.173) (0.017) (0.020) (0.184) (0.014) 
Leather 0.600 0.086 0.212 -0.152 0.521 0.094 
(0.132) (0.159) (0.041) (0.030) (0.093) (0.027) 
Stone, Clay, and Glass 0.631 0.165 0.315 -0.127 0.627 0.129 
(0.052) (0.171) (0.042) (0.016) (0.065) (0.016) 
Primary Metals 0.380 0.113 0.372 -0.215 0.512 0.150 
(0.062) (0.173) (0.032) (0.022) (0.072) (0.013) 
Nonelectrical Machinery 0.545 0.286 0.515 -0.148 0.749 0.164 
(0.053) (0.182) (0.071) (0.020) (0.068) (0.030) 
Electrical Equipment 0.573 0.615 0.374 -0.080 0.719 0.070 
(0.076) (0.228) (0.059) (0.017) (0.085) (0.021) 
Autos 0.397 -0.004 0.433 -0.186 0.416 0.189 
(0.056) (0.126) (0.032) (0.021) (0.080) (0.020) 
Instruments 0.720 0.452 0.195 -0.062 0.695 0.108 
(0.129) (0.201) (0.057) (0.014) (0.084) (0.034) 
Table 12.4 Production Employment, Production Hours, and Inventories Adjustment: Selected Coefficient Estimates from an Interrelated Factor 
Demand Model 
Germany all a12 a13 /31 a21 a22 a23 fJ 2 a31 a32 a33 /33 
Manufacturing 0.860 0.098 0.003 0.159 -0.316 -0.010 -0.004 0.475 -0.076 0.086 0.765 -0.048 
(0.036) (0.039) (0.013) (0.025) (0.088) (0.094) (0.031) (0.060) (0.318) (0.442) (0.136) (0.256) 
Textiles 0.944 0.146 -0.021 0.138 -0.197 -0.053 0.007 0.625 0.120 0.455 0.606 -0.339 
(0.031) (0.042) (0.011) (0.029) (0.198) (0.106) (0.035) (0.087) (0.365) (0.492) (0.128) (0.336) 
Apparel 0.896 0.141 0.020 0.125 -0.142 0.104 0.029 0.235 -1.424 1.112 0.177 0.194 
(0.053) (0.077) (0.014) (0.041) (0.091) (0.132) (0.023) (0.069) (0.632) (0.916) (0.161) (0.479) 
Printing 0.788 -0.013 -0.001 0.148 -0.302 -0.181 -0.005 0.718 11.443 6.102 0.222 -1.137 
(0.089) (0.071) (0.003) (0.061) (0.297) (0.136) (0.007) (0.140) (4.268) (3.403) (0.154) (2.947) 
Leather 0.808 0.028 0.036 0.138 -0.335 -0.023 0.064 0.320 -1.503 -0.212 0.819 0.567 
(0.057) (0.066) (0.010) (0.037) (0.112) (0.128) (0.020) (0.072) (0.559) (0.768) (0.113) (0.427) 
Stone, Clay, 0.798 -0.091 -0.014 0.080 0.136 0.074 -0.033 0.259 1.757 -0.639 0.204 -0.150 
and Glass (0.119) (0.065) (0.016) (0.024) (0.199) (0.109) (0.026) (0.040) (1.223) (0.673) (0.162) (0.246) 
Primary 0.839 0.063 0.014 0.090 -0.260 -0.135 0.005 0.368 0.051 -0.476 0.518 -0.116 
Metals (0.114) (0.040) (0.010) (0.022) (0.143) (0.126) (0.023) (0.059) (0.573) (0.693) (0.129) (0.283) 
Nonelectrical 0.875 0.118 -0.032 0.019 -0.286 0.222 -0.051 0.099 0.394 -1.746 0.815 0.363 
Machinery (0.080) (0.060) (0.012) (0.019) (0.093) (0.206) (0.024) (0.050) (0.327) (0.625) (0.087) (0.209) 
Electrical 0.790 0.057 -0.020 0.071 --0.403 -0.010 -0.007 0.493 -0.368 -0.416 0.323 -0.116 
Equipment (0.372) (0.051) (0.016) (0.047) (0.068) (0.103) (0.027) (0.081) (0.593) (0.611) (0.656) (0.484) 
Autos 0.949 0.029 0.006 0.098 -0.183 0.043 -0.005 0.607 -2.819 -0.308 0.583 -1.978 
(0.046) (0.026) (0.003) (0.022) (0.291) (0.176) (0.019) (0.113) (1.796) (1.030) (0.125) (0.849) 
Instruments 0.773 0.283 0.001 0.183 -0.287 0.200 0.008 0.166 1.290 -1.155 0.119 -1.205 
(0.044) (0.090) (0.013) (0.028) (0.083) (0.242) (0.022) (0.056) (0.555) (1.127) (0.162) (0.357) 
(continued) 
Table 12.4 (Continued) 
United States au a,2 a,J /J, a2, a22 a23 /J2 aJ, a32 a» /JJ 
Manufacturing 0.497 0.039 -0.101 0.470 -0.187 0.569 -0.028 0.208 0.448 -0.237 0.840 -0.260 
(0.040) (0.145) (0.027) (0.040) (0.031) (0.126) (0.021) (0.036) (0.193) {0.780) (0.132) (0.219) 
Textiles 0.604 -0.050 -0.107 0.248 -0.407 0.488 -0.003 0.275 0.317 0.164 0.725 -0.077 
(0.093) (0.070) (0.043) (0.042) (0.072) (0.149) (0.043) (0.061) (0.201) (0.194) (0.162) (0.090) 
Appard 0.728 0.117 -0.076 0.095 -0.076 0.541 -0.020 0.063 1.441 -0.117 0.658 0.055 
(0.141) (0.156) (0.032) (0.043) (0.102) (0.185) (0.029) (0.049) (0.530) (0.559) (0.175) (0.167) 
Printing 0.851 0.524 -0.049 0.082 -0.040 0.698 -0.004 0.013 0.193 -2.034 0.270 0.742 
(0.041) (0.149) (0.016) (0.025) (0.037) (0.135) (0.015) (0.023) (0.501) (1.235) (0.228) (0.210) 
Leather 0.638 -0.120 -0.200 0.127 -0.116 0.461 -0.048 0.037 0.187 -0.239 0.504 0.066 
(0.173) (0.208) (0.059) (0.043) (0.050) (0.237) (0.043) (0.037) (0.178) (0.556) (0.432) (0.147) 
Stone, Oay, 0.505 0.556 -0.196 0.201 -0.160 0.595 -0.015 0.124 0.298 0.266 0.777 -0.291 
and Glass (0.066) (0.202) (0.055) (0.042) (0.036) (0.110) (0.030) (0.023) (0.142) (0.435) (0.118) (0.090) 
Primary 0.335 0.189 0.022 0.379 -0.169 0.430 -0.047 0.123 0.324 -0.735 0.958 0.152 
Metals (0.109) (0.310) (0.069) (0.060) (0.031) (0.113) (0.022) (0.020) (0.131) (0.586) (0.098) (0.087) 
Nonelectrical 0.383 0.197 -0.070 0.531 -0.193 0.763 -0.014 0.159 0.686 -0.686 0.616 -0.345 
Machinery (0.082) (0.302) (0.055) (0.101) (0.020) (0.082) (0.012) (0.028) (0.260) (1.194) (0.305) (0.296) 
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A comparison with the U.S. Labor Market 
Ronald Schettkat 
INTRODUCTION 
The spirit of economics in the 1980' s was clearly of unregulated markets producing 
optimal outcomes. Regulation was regarded as an impediment to otherwise well-
functioning markets. Labor market institutions in Germany and in Europe in 
general were the prime target of free market advocates and indeed the performance 
of European labor markets looked quite bad, with its high levels of unemployment 
and low rates of job growth. 1 The far less regulated U.S. labor market produced 
high rates of employment growth and decreasing rates of unemployment despite a 
growing labor force. In contrast, employment in Europe was stagnating and 
unemployment was rising or remaining at high levels. 2 
The U.S. became the major example for the assumed power of unfettered labor 
markets in which incentives are undistorted. The labor markets of the European 
welfare states were blamed for distorting the incentive structure resulting in 
immobility in the labor market-a development that was termed "Eurosclerosis" 
(Giersch 1985). Welfare state institutions may, on the other hand, have positive 
effects on economic development as well. Unemployment insurance, for example, 
can stabilize demand; employment protection can stabilize employment, etc. Institu-
tions are not that easy to change but with the current restructuring in Eastern Europe 
the choice of institutions is a hot issue. It is therefore important to investigate 
whether institutional changes in Germany mainly during the 1970's may have caused 
the functioning of the labor market to deteriorate. A quick glance on labor mobility 
figures seems to support this view: Labor turnover in the U.S. is higher than in 
Germany but the figures dropped in both countries over time. (See Figure 13.1.) 
Aside from the fact that higher rates of mobility (labor turnover) do not 
necessarily result in higher flexibility (see Sengenberger 1987) it is also unclear 
whether high labor turnover leads to high employment growth and low unemploy-
ment or whether the causation goes in the other direction-that is, that turnover is 
high when unemployment is low. The relationship between unemployment and 
hiring for the German economy will be analyzed using the concept of the hiring 
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Figure 13.1 Mobility in Different National Labor Markets 
Source: Emerson (1988) 
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chain. We then discuss trends in the Beveridge curve, estimate matching functions 
and make use of change duration curves. To begin with, a brief overview of 
changes in the main institutions of the German labor market is presented. In the 
conclusion some thoughts on the expansion of long-term unemployment in 
Germany are considered. 
THE DEVELOPMENT OF LABOR MARKET 
INSTITUTIONS IN GERMANY: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 
The German labor market is certainly subject to laws, but at the same time strong 
unions and strong employers' associations negotiate about a substantial part of 
working life. Some of the regulations clearly limit the degree of discretionary 
decisions for firms but there are also regulations that open opportunities and thus 
increase flexibility. 3 Educational standards is one such case where regulations 
establish markets. Another example is subsidized short-time work (see for an 
interesting evaluation Abraham and Houseman 1993), which opens up a short-
term alternative to dismissals. Some of Germany's regulations seem to be rather 
archaic for a modern industrialized society, as for example, regulated shopping 
hours which lead to overcrowded shops on Saturday mornings and in the evenings. 
Although this regulation seems to be anachronistic and inconvenient for the 
consumer, it may nevertheless be very efficient4 because trade is restricted to a few 
hours (Thurow 1988). However, although quite outdated, this is not the most 
important regulation. Most of the criticism focuses on dismissal protection, 
codetermination laws and labor standards set in collective bargaining. 
Many economists in Germany subscribe to the view of an overregulated, 
"Eurosclerotic" labor market. The argument rests, on the one hand, on the cross-
country comparison between Germany and the U.S. and, on the other hand, on 
the longitudinal comparison of Germany in the 1960's with the late 1970's and 
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1980's. The cross-national U.S.-German comparison concludes that from less 
regulated U.S. labor markets with higher labor turnover and growing employment 
that more regulations in Germany led to lower turnover and undesirable employ-
ment performance. The results of these debates were recommendations to the 
federal government for deregulation provided by a group of economists.5 
The next section reports briefly on some of the most important legal changes and 
provides an overview for the following analysis. Pages 317-30 analyze whether 
the proclaimed malfunction of German labor markets can be found in the 
statistics. 
Social Security Insurance 
Critics of the welfare state claim that social security affects incentives in two ways: 
1 It distorts incentives for the employed because social security contributions lower 
individual incomes and these affect efforts negatively; and 
2 it reduces the incentives for those relying on the benefits of the system because it 
reduces their efforts as well. 
Unemployment benefits, for example, reduce the pressure to accept jobs, lead to 
less intense searching for work and thus pushes up the reservation wage.6 
Contributions to the social security system-which are evenly shared by employees 
and employers-have indeed increased substantially in Germany: In 1963 the 
overall contribution (employers' and employees' contribution) was 25 percent, in 
1976 it was 32.5 percent, and in 1990 it was 36 percent of gross income. The main 
subsystem of social security in Germany-unemployment insurance, health 
insurance, pension insurance-will be discussed briefly. 
Unemployment Imurance 
Probably the most important part of the social security insurance system with 
respect to labor markets is unemployment insurance, which provides a broad range 
of services.7 First of all it is an insurance against income losses (unemployment 
benefits are currently 68 percent of the net income [63 percent for singles]). It also 
provides unemployment assistance-a means-tested fallback position for those 
whose unemployment benefits have expired (usually after 1 year)-training 
measures, and public work programs, etc. 8 
One frequently mentioned explanation for high German unemployment is the 
generosity of unemployment benefits. But the share of unemployed persons who 
receive unemployment benefits, either unemployment insurance benefits or 
unemployment assistance, decreased from about 75 percent in the 1960's to 
roughly 65 percent in the 1980's. Furthermore, the share of the unemployed who 
collect unemployment benefits is higher when the unemployment rate is low 
(Schettkat 1992a). The composition of unemployment benefits has changed in 
favor of unemployment assistance (Arbeitslosenhilfo), which is means-tested and 
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lower than unemployment benefits. In the beginning of the 1970's less than 10 
percent of the unemployed received unemployment assistance, but by the mid-
1980' s this share rose to more than 25 percent. At the same time, the share of the 
unemployed who received the higher unemployment insurance benefits decreased 
from 65 percent to less than 40 percent (Cramer 1986; Ermann 1988). 
The decreasing share of beneficiaries among the unemployed can partially be 
explained by the changing composition of unemployment sources. A higher inflow 
of those "not in the labor force" (nonpanicipation) has brought about a decline in 
the share of those who are eligible for unemployment benefits. In other words, the 
source of the inflow into unemployment is important. The inflow from nonpanici-
pation into unemployment as a share of the overall inflow rose substantially from 
the mid-1970's, while the share of flows from employment into unemployment 
dropped accordingly. Nonparticipation as a source of the unemployment inflow 
gained importance, and those coming from nonparticipation are usually not 
eligible for unemployment benefits. Thus, the composition of the inflow explains 
part of the decreasing share of recipients of unemployment benefits. Long duration 
of unemployment will lead to a decrease in the share of persons who receive 
employment insurance benefit as well. The period during which unemployed 
persons can receive unemployment insurance benefits is limited to 12 months 
(some exceptions, introduced in the mid-1980's, extended the periods for older 
workers, see Maier and Schettkat 1990). After that period the unemployed can 
receive unemployment assistance, which is less than the insurance benefit, and 
eligibility for unemployment assistance depends on household income (means-
tested). Not only did the share of beneficiaries decrease but the incentive (as 
measured by the replacement rate) as well. This result calls into question attempts 
to blame high German unemployment rates on unemployment benefits. A similar 
result has been obtained for the U.S. (Burtless 1983). 
Health Insurance 
In case of absence from work caused by sickness an employee receives his wage up to 
6 weeks from his employer.9 The Social-Democratic/Free-Democrat government 
extended the continuation of income payments to blue-collar workers in case of 
sickness (Lohnfortzahlung im Krankheitsfalle). Up to that point it was legally provided 
to white-collar workers only although collective agreements may have already 
included blue-collar workers in this provision. If a worker is still not able to work 
after 6 weeks, the health insurance-which is obligatory for almost all employees-
will pay means-tested health insurance benefits. The employment contract continues 
during this time. Health costs overall have risen substantially in recent years. 
Pension Insurance 
The pension system was substantially revised in 1957 when the so-called dynamic 
pension, which links pensions to income trends, was introduced. The next big 
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reform was the introduction of the "flexible retirement age" in 1973, which allows 
workers to retire at 63 instead at 65 without any actuarial adjustments of their 
pension. Although this measure was introduced for social reasons, it turned out to 
be an effective labor market measure in the 1974 recession (Schettkat 1987). In 
addition, the pension age for the disabled has been reduced and pensions for those 
people who have to stop work because of health reasons have gained importance. 
Another important measure is the pension for long-term unemployed, which 
provides a pension from age 60 after an unemployment period of 12 months. 
Distinguishing the unemployed by one-year age groups shows that leaving 
unemployment into nonparticipation peaks at the age of 60 years and accounts for 
more than 93 percent of those who leave unemployment at this age. In the older 
and younger age groups, this share is much lower (ANBA 1989: 661). In this way 
unemployment has become the first step into early retirement, and also leads to 
long durations of unemployment for older unemployed. 
Early retirement has been a widely used measure to reduce company labor forces 
in West Germany (Kiihlewind 1988). It is an instrument for companies to reduce 
both the size and the age of their work force and to improve the skill structure 
(Schusser 1987). Although measures were taken to prevent firms from using 
unemployment as an entry into early retirement (Maier and Schettkat 1990), it is 
still important in this way. 
The outcome of this trend in early retirement is that the older unemployed are 
not regarded as candidates for vacant jobs by employers, and most of them do not 
expect to find a new job. In this sense they are not part of actual labor supply, 
either in the employers' view nor in their own view. It is hard to label this process 
in insider-outsider terms since it is the core group of the insiders who becomes 
unemployed. And it is difficult to label this process as hysteresis because preselec-
tion is already made with the understanding that the dismissed older workers are 
"early pensioners," although they have to suffer unemployment for some time. 
This, however, might not occur in times of tight labor markets and not without 
political measures that at least support the process (Schettkat 1992a). 
Collective Bargaining 
The right to form coalitions of employees or employers is guaranteed in the German 
constitution (Artikel 9 GG). Germany is less exceptional with respect to the degree of 
unionization (which is about 35 percent) but much more with respect to the degree 
of organization of employers (more than 90 percent; see Keller 1991). Collective 
agreements define wage rates, wage differentials between skill groups, working times, 
vacations, and the like. Collective agreements can be extended to those employers 
who do not belong to employers associations if it is requested by unions or the 
employers association. The legal extension of collective agreements is important 
mainly in construction and retail trade where several small employers exist. 
Government should not intervene in collective bargaining ( Tarifautonomie). 
Unions and employees are obliged to refrain from taking strike action during the 
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period of collective bargaining. Only after a collective agreement is terminated and 
a new contract could not agreed on, can unions call for strike action, in which case 
it has to be supported by a substantial majority of its members. Employers can lock 
out workers in the case of industrial conflict. 
Although strike activity is quite low in Germany, a few conflicts have been 
solved only after substantial action. The most prominent strikes have been the 
1956-1957 strike in Schleswig Holstein's metal industry, where the main goal was 
the continuation of wage payments in the case of sickness; 10 the steel workers' 
strike about working time reduction in 1978; the printing workers' strike on the 
introduction of new technology, employment protection and training in 1978; the 
metal and printing workers' strike on shorter working hours in 1984; 11 and the 
strikes in banking and the public service in 1992. 12 Probably the most important 
fact is that the last two strikes were about wages, whereas the former conflicts were 
on more general working conditions. 
Collective bargaining is important in Germany but the view of Germany as a 
country with centralized wage negotiations is certainly overstated. Although the 
metal workers' union (IG-Metall) may be identified as a wage leader, there is 
substantial variation in wage levels and wage increases across industries (Wagner 
1989). Nevertheless, in comparison between the U.S. and Germany, the former 
can be characterized as an economy with highly decentralized wage setting and 
highly flexible wages, whereas German wage setting is certainly more centralized 
and less flexible but not uniform (Bell 1986; Vogler-Ludwig 1985; Schettkat 
1992c). 
Codetermination 
Two levels of codetermination have to be distinguished: Codetermination at the 
plant level and at the firm level. Employees in all establishments with more than 5 
workers have the right to form a works council. In 1972 a new Works Constitution 
Act (Betriebsverfasungsgesetz) was introduced, stipulating that management in 
establishments with 20 or more employees needs the approval of the works council 
in the case of hiring, dismissal, or transfer. 13 In all establishments with works 
councils, management needs to consult the works council in case of dismissals. 
Management also needs to negotiate in case of substantial overtime hours and 
short-time work and in case of mass dismissal (see for the definition under 
employment protection) about severance payments (Hase et al. 1992). 
The spirit of the Works Constitution Act is based on sincere cooperation of works 
councils and management. In case of conflict, arbitration committees 
(Einigungsstellen) are established; they are chaired by a person acceptable to both 
sides. Works councils are obliged to keep peace and are not allowed to call for strikes. 
At the firm level, workers are represented in the supervisory boards. The 
Codetermination Act of 1976 defines that in all corporations outside of steel and 
mining-where stronger codetermination rights (Montanmitbestimmung) apply-
with more than 2,000 employees, half of the seats on the supervisory boards are 
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reserved for worker representatives, who must represent the main groups of 
employees (blue-collar, white-collar, middle management) and who are elected 
partly by the corporation's employees and partly by the unions. However, the 
chairman of the supervisory board cannot be elected against the vote of the owners 
and in case of conflict the chairman has two votes. This guarantees that the final 
decision is always made by owners. 
At the macroeconomic level, a so-called konzertierte Aktion (concerted action) 
was established after the recession of 1967 by the Social-Democratic minister for 
economic affairs, Karl Schiller, to serve as a mechanism for economic coordination. 
The concerted action group consisted of leading representatives of the employers' 
associations, unions, and the government. The group was intended to provide a 
forum for information sharing and discussion in order to avoid potential conflicts. 
Opinions on whether it was effective or not are numerous. The unions refused to 
participate in the group after the employers' association brought the introduction 
of the new Codetermination Law (1976), which unions already regarded as a 
compromise compared to the Montanmitbestimmung, before the supreme court 
which in 1979 decided that the law is compatible with capital owners' rights as 
defined in the constitution. 
Employment Protection 
As a rule, labor contracts are unlimited contracts in Germany, although some 
qualifications apply. With the Employment Promotion Act of 1985 the govern-
ment followed the idea that employment levels can be increased if fixed-term 
contracts are allowed for. Such contracts had been legal before but under the 
Employment Promotion Act no reason for the limitation of the contract need be 
stated anymore. The main law regulating employment protection is the 
Kundigungsschutzgesetz (Dismissal Protection Act) from 1969, which states that 
dismissals have to be justified by economic reasons or reasons related to the 
performance of the employee. Employers are obliged to investigate alternative to 
dismissals, that is they have to offer other comparable jobs in the firm-if 
available-even if this requires some training. Unjustified dismissals are illegal. 
Dismissals as well as hirings require consultations with the works council, which, 
however, has to follow rules as well. 
Unless voluntary severance is agreed on, notice must be given from two weeks to 
six months prior to dismissal, depending on age, seniority, and occupation. In case 
of collective dismissals, the works council must be consulted. For establishments 
with 60 to 250 employees, dismissals of more than 10 percent of the work force 
are considered collective. The 1969 Dismissal Protection Act makes the employer 
liable for the cost of up to 6 months' retraining in case of inadequate notice. The 
1972 Works Constitution Act requires that management and the works council 
negotiate a social plan specifying compensation for those collectively dismissed 
(Hase et al 1992). The average social plan calls for severance pay equal to 5 to 10 
months' earnings (Sengenberger 1987). 
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Apprentices, although legally employees, get contracts limited to their training 
period. The contracts terminate when the apprentice passes his examine and the 
firm is free to offer the freshly launched skilled worker (Facharbeiter) a regular 
employment contract but the firm is by no means obliged to do so. Apprentices are, 
however, an excellent pool for recruitments. If a firm hires its own apprentices, it 
hires employees who already have firm-specific knowledge, whose occupational 
skills are taught by the firm itself, whose performance have been evaluated over 
about 3 years, and who are in some way insiders. 14 
Summary of Institutional Changes 
Many of the laws affecting labor markets were introduced in the late 1960's and the 
l 970's and clearly have increased employees' rights. However, just as it is mistaken 
to believe that a uniform wage rate determined by the metal workers' union exists 
in Germany, so is it also a mistake to believe that an employment protection law 
will exclude dismissals. There is wage variation, although much lower than in the 
U.S., and it is possible to dismiss workers but dismissal needs to be justified. 
Nevertheless, the extension of employees' rights coincided with the increase in 
unemployment and it was natural to investigate whether a causal link between these 
two events exists. The "natural" rate of unemployment may have increased because 
of these institutional changes. The chapter now investigates whether trends in the 
dynamics of the labor market support this view. 
EXPLAINING THE DECLINING MOBILITY IN THE 
GERMAN LABOR MARKET 
The average duration of unemployment in the U.S. has been very stable over time 
(see Table 13.1) compared to the German trend. In Germany the average duration 
of unemployment has increased with every recession from 1974 on. Longer 
durations of unemployment in Germany are reflected in declining job finding rates 
(hirings from unemployment divided by unemployment) 15 which declined 
substantially in the middle of the 1970's and again in the l 980's (see Figure 13.2). 
This seems to be support for the hypothesis that the German labor market has 
become 'sclerotic'. But a declining job finding rate indicates, first of all, that it has 
become more difficult for the unemployed to find a job, which is not necessarily 
caused by a malfunctioning of the labor market. Even with constant absolute hiring 
figures and rising unemployment, one will end up with an explanation that 
overstates labor market rigidity if one relies on the job finding rate. 
If other reasons for unemployment, such as demand deficiency, are allowed for, 
a hiring index-independent from actual unemployment-is more appropriate. 
Moreover, if competition within and between industries, labor laws, industrial 
relations, etc. are claimed to influence hiring decisions-or more general labor 
turnover-one expects that hiring depends on the size of the economy, which may 
be measured by employment. One such indicator is hiring from unemployment 
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Table 13.1 The Distribution of Unemployment by Duration in the U.S. and in 
Germany(%) 
U.S. 
Duration in weeks 
Years <5 5-14 15-26 >26 -:2:.52 -:2:.104 Median Average 14 Average?' 
1975 41.80 25.41 12.95 19.33 n.a. n.a. 8.40 14.20 n.a. 
1980 43.13 30.74 14.76 11.36 n.a. n.a. 6.50 11.90 15.59 
1985 46.04 28.76 10.65 14.55 n.a. n.a. 6.80 15.60 8.86 
1990 46.10 32.00 11.80 10.10 n.a. n.a. 5.40 12.10 14.24 
1991 40.10 32.30 14.50 13.00 n.a. n.a. 6.90 13.80 15.43 
FRG 
Duration in weeks 
Years <4 4-11 12-12 -:2:.26 -:2:.52 -:2:.104 Median Average 1 Average2 
1975 16.41 25.53 21.23 36.83 9.60 1.28 n.a n.a 15.50 
1980 17.66 27.50 18.62 36.22 15.72 7.40 n.a 27.73 15.91 
1985 12.32 20.16 15.83 51.69 22.40 14.07 n.a 50.27 32.43 
1990 14.10 21.10 16.20 48.51 24.23 15.90 n.a 57.63 26.87 
1991 15.20 23.10 16.40 45.27 23.53 15.20 n.a 58.07 27.40 
Source BLS: Employment and Earnings, Bundesanstalt fur Arbeit (ANBA) 
FRG: The original data is grouped by the month. Weeks are therefore approximations only. 
Notes-. 
"= dl!ration of the unemployed at September 30, in the FRG; annual average of duration of the 
unemployed in the CPS. 
"= duration computed under the steady state assumption (duration= stock/outflow). 
plus hiring from "out of the labor force" divided by employment (hiring rate). 
This ratio produces a different picture of labor mobility in the German labor 
market (see Figure 13.2). Mobility has increased rather than decreased. The odds 
for the unemployed to be hired (job finding rates) have dropped dramatically but 
the hiring rate (hiring from employment) has increased. 
Nevertheless, overall hiring as a ratio to employment has fallen in Germany 
from the early 1970's (see Figure 13.3), but hiring can be made from nonemploy-
ment (unemployment and out of the labor force) and from employment. The 
latter (intraemployment hiring) has decreased substantially in Germany since the 
early 1970' s. Although there are some measurement problems in the data (see 
Rudolph 1984; Reyher and Bach 1988) the difference between the overall hiring 
ratio and the ratio for hiring from nonemployment can be taken as a good 
approximation for intraemployment hiring. 
The probabilities for hiring from the two populations (nonemployment and 
employment) is influenced by the tightness of the labor market. In a tight labor 
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Figure 13.2 Hiring from Nonemployment as a Ratio of Employment and as a Ratio of 
Unemployment in Germany (1970-1989), in percent 
Source: Computations are based on the Arbeitskriiftegesamtrechnung (Reyher and Bach 1988). 
Notes: Hires per employee (hiring rate) are computed by hires from unemployment and 
nonparticipation divided by employment. 
Hires per unemployed (job finding rate) are computed by hires from unemployment 
divided by the unemployed. 
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Figure 13.3 The Ratio of Overall Hires, Intraemployment Hires, and Hires from Non-
employment for Germany (1970-1991) 
Source: Computations are based on the Arbeitskriiftegesamtrechnung (Reyher and Bach 1988). 
Notes: The overall hiring ratio is computed as overall hires divided by initial employment. 
The nonemployment hiring ratio is computed by all hires from unemployment and 
nonparticipation divided by employment. 
market hiring is more likely to take place from the ranks of other firms' employees 
because the pool of the nonemployed job seekers is small and this most likely causes 
subsequent hiring activity in the firms that lose employees. 
The effect of hiring on vacancies and thus on successive hiring activity can be 
described as a multiplier process. Suppose that at t= I a once-and-for-all increase in 
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the number of vacancies occurs and that these vacancies are filled. If hiring is made 
from nonemployment, the process stops; but if hiring is made from employment, 
that is from the ranks of other firms' employees and given that this firm did not 
plan to reduce its work force, hiring to replace the worker will take place and the 
process continues. A hiring chain occurs in such a continuing process (Akerlof 
et al. 1988; Schettkat 1992a). The impact on hiring activity in the economy of a 
once-and-for-all increase in jobs, therefore, depends on the probability with which 
initial hiring is made from employment. 16 
The probability that hiring will be made from employment [prob(e)] obviously 
depends on the quantity of excess labor supply and its quality. Mismatch between 
labor demand and supply would reduce the pool of the nonemployed regarded as 
potential candidates in the view of employers and hence increases prob(e). A large 
influx of young and skilled workers in the pool of the unemployed, on the other 
hand, would most likely reduce prob(e). However, prob(e) also depends on the 
specific labor market. It will be higher for jobs of highly skilled, experienced 
workers than for less skilled jobs. For the economy as a whole prob(e) will depend 
on the economic situation. In recessions with a large pool of unemployed it will be 
more likely that hiring can be made from among the unemployed whereas in 
booms it will be more likely that hiring is made from employment. 
If the decrease in intraemployment hiring in Germany is caused by a shorter 
hiring chain, that is that recruitments are increasingly made from nonemployment 
and thus do not cause additional hiring efforts, one expects a negative relation 
between intraemployment hiring (job-to-job mobility) and the excess supply of 
labor. In the absence of mismatch, the unemployment rate would be a good 
indicator for the excess supply of labor (Dow and Dicks-Mireaux 1958). If, 
however, hysteresis effects or mismatch occur, part of the unemployed would not 
be regarded as actual labor supply and the unemployment rate would consequently 
overestimate actual excess labor supply. There is empirical evidence for Germany 
that hysteresis processes-caused by preselection in interaction with pension laws 
and low labor demand-occurred after the 1982 recession {Schettkat 1992a). A 
simple regression of intraemployment hiring on the unemployment rate as a proxy 
for excess labor supply, and the share of long-term unemployment in overall 
unemployment as a proxy for mismatch produced the following result: 
LIEH= -1.82- 0.32 UE+0.03 LUE 
(-10.9) (-5.4) (1.9) 
Maximum likelihood first order autocorrelation regression R 2 (adj) = 0.89, 
Durbin-Watson= 1.6; Rho= 0.32 (1.1), N = 20, time period: 1970 to 1989, 
t-values in parentheses 
with: 
LIEH = intra-employment hiring divided by employment (/EH) transformed to 
log (/EH[percent] / (I 00 - IEH [percent]) 
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UE = unemployment rate [registered unemployment divided by dependent labor 
force (in percent)] 
LUE= share of long-term unemployment (more than 2 years) in overall 
unemployment 
The regression equation suggests that an increase in the unemployment rate (the 
excess supply of labor) reduces intraemployment hiring, but that an increase in 
the share of long-term unemployment increases intraemployment hiring. This 
result is consistent with the hiring chain model and suggests that the drop in the 
overall hiring ratio in West Germany, which is due to decreasing intraemploy-
ment hiring, is mainly caused by a shortening of the hiring chain. This, however, 
is hardly an indicator for worsening labor market mobility and even less for 
worsening flexibility, but rather the effect of macroeconomic conditions on micro 
level activity. Since a long hiring chain produces a lot of hiring costs in the 
economy, a situation when firms can satisfy their labor demands from non-
employment represents a situation of high flexibility gains. Hiring activity in 
the economy cannot be explained from the micro perspective alone but it 
is, instead, strongly influenced by macroeconomic labor market conditions 
(Schettkat 1994). 
ANALYSIS OF THE FUNCTIONING OF LABOR MARKETS 
Variations of aggregate demand are usually identified with movements along a 
stable Beveridge curve whereas variations of the pace of structural change, of 
mismatch, and of the functioning of the labor market are identified with shifts of 
the curve. 17 The matching function is a more general method for the analysis 
of changes in the functioning of labor markets although related to the 
Beveridge curve. The matching function can be interpreted as a production 
function which combines two input factors, vacancies and unemployed. The 
higher the unsatisfied demand for labor (vacancies) and the higher the excess 
supply of labor (unemployment), the more contacts can be made (given a constant 
search intensity) and the more contracts can be made (hirings, given stable hiring 
standards and a sufficient skill mix). Changes in the functioning of labor markets 
will be identified by changing coefficients or by a trend. A third method for the 
analysis of the functioning of labor markets are change-duration curves in which 
unemployment and vacancies are decomposed into a Bow and a duration 
component. 
Beveridge Curve Analysis 
Figure 13.4 displays Beveridge curves for the U.S. and Germany for the periods 
1963 to 1985 and 1970 to 1991, respectively. For the U.S. the general picture 
suggests an outward shift of the Beveridge Curve from the 1960's to the 1980's 
(see Figure 13.4).18 The German Beveridge curve shows a rightward shift with 
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Figure 13.4 The U.S. and German Beveridge Curves 
Sources-. Top panel: BLS data and Abraham (1987) for the adjusted help-wanted index. 
Bottom panel: Bundesanstalt for Arbeit, and Schettkat (1993) for the adjusted vacancy data. 
every recession from 1963 to 1982, but since then the curve seems to have shifted 
leftward. Contrary to the German data the outward shifts in the U.S. are less 
pronounced in the adjusted 19 than in the unadjusted data, but they are visible in 
both curves. The visual inspection of the German curve suggests breaks in the 
function in the middle of the l 970's and again in the early 1980' s. Wolfgang Franz 
(1987, 1991; Franz and Siebeck 1992) published several sophisticated econometric 
analyses of the German Beveridge curve. The result of an analysis for breaks in the 
function are summarized as follows (Franz and Siebeck 1992: 32): "The entire 
regression period from 1961 to 1988 is characterized by three significant breaks 
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which caused changes of the slope and the location of the curve. In 1975 the 
structural relation was changed by a significant intercept dummy and the slope of 
the second curve is flatter. In 1980 we found a significant impact of a slope 
dummy: the curve shifts out and is flatter for the empirically relevant levels of v 
(vacancies, RS). The last interruption in 1983 was caused by both types of 
dummies: The curve shifts out but at the same time it becomes very steep."20 
The Franz analysis continues by investigating the impact of various mismatch 
indicators. If mismatch is the cause for changes in the Beveridge curve described by 
the dummies, then some of the structural breaks may be explained by variables 
representing mismatch. The indicator for unskilled mismatch, which is defined as 
the difference between the aggregate rate of vacancies for unskilled workers and the 
rate of unskilled unemployment, can capture some effects of the dummy variables. 
This indicator developed in line with aggregate unemployment.21 
An indicator for occupational mismatch dropped substantially over time (Franz 
and Siebeck 1991: 35). This is to say that skill mismatch-at least as far as it is 
measured in the available statistics-did not, against popular views, increase from 
the 1970's to the 1980's. Slight increases of occupational mismatch indicators from 
the early 1980's to the late 1980's did not occur because labor demand (vacancies) 
increased in expanding occupations more than the supply of labor. On the 
contrary, the occupational mismatch indicator increased because labor supply in 
expanding occupation grew at a higher rate than labor demand. The increase in the 
mismatch indicator is thus caused by a lead of labor supply against labor demand 
which is cenainly not the meaning of increasing mismatch we have in mind if we 
use this term (Schettkat 1992a, 1989). 
In a regression with the rate of unskilled long-term unemployment as the 
mismatch indicator only an intercept dummy for 1983 is reported and this now has 
a significant negative coefficient (Franz and Siebeck 1991: 44). Controlling for 
long-term unskilled unemployment the outshift of the Beveridge curve now 
becomes an inward shift (estimating period 1974 to 1988). The mismatch problem 
thus was mainly a problem of unskilled, long-term unemployment and Franz and 
Siebeck mention that long-term unemployment is not exogenous to the unemploy-
ment process but rather endogenous. 
The Matching Function 
The analysis of the functioning of labor markets using the Beveridge curve requires 
strong assumptions: A stable Beveridge curve requires constant hires (it is an iso-
hiring-curve) or in other words variations of hires will shift the Beveridge curve 
although this is not necessarily related to changes in the functioning of labor 
markets. The Beveridge curve is stable only under the condition of constant hires. 
This can easily be seen if the matching function: 
lnH;,,,+ •> = C + a In lfc,.,+ •> + P In 'Vc,,t+ 0 (1) 
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is written in the usual Beveridge curve formulation: 
C f}_ lnHi,.r+ •> 
In Vi~,+ •> = - - - In\{,,,+ •> + ---
a a a 
with: 
Hc,,,+ll = cumulated hires (matches) during the period from tto t+ 1. 
C= constant 
U = unemployment 
V = vacancies 
(la) 
Constant hires-the condition for a stable Beveridge curve-together with the 
common assumption of a fixed labor force (which allows for mobility between 
employment and unemployment only) leads variations in vacancies and unemploy-
ment to be caused by variations of duration only because the flows are fixed. This is 
to say that high unemployment is caused by long unemployment duration whereas 
vacancy duration will be short in this situation. This is in line with the theoretical 
foundations of the Beveridge curve developed by Dow and Dicks-Mireaux (1958). 
They argued that given low unemployment, hiring will be difficult and will thus 
lead to long vacancy durations whereas unemployment duration will be short in 
this situation. However, the formulation of the Beveridge curve as in formula (la) 
shows that variations in hiring (caused by a higher pace of structural change, 
shorter durations of employment contracts, or an expansion of employment; see 
Schettkat 1992a} lead the curve to change its position. 
An estimation of the Beveridge curve including a variable for variations in hires 
produced the following result: 
u, = -0.17 + 
(-0.49) 
0.02 + ..!_ + 0.5 .tongue+ 16.9 .Sub-ue - 2.9 .d83 
(12.2) v, (7.5) (4.7) (3.7) 
R2 = 0.976, OW= 1.79, t-values in parantheses, period: 1970 to 1991 
with: 
u, = unemployment rate [registered unemployed, average over the year divided 
by labor force (employees plus unemployment)] 
v, = vacancy rate (reported vacancies, average over the year divided by labor 
force) 
tongue= share of long-term unemployment (2 years and more) in all 
unemployment 
sub-ue= substitution rate of the exchange between unemployment and employ-
ment divided by employees [sub-ue= 0.5.(ue+ eu-1 ue- eu I}, where ue 
is the flow from unemployment into employment divided by employment; 
eu is the flow from employment into unemployment] 
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The estimation suggests that increases in the substitution rate for the flows between 
employment and unemployment have shifted the Beveridge curve outwards. 
Controlling for the flows and the share of long-term unemployment causes the 
dummy for 1983 to be negative. 
The basic idea behind the matching function is that matches (hires) are more 
easily made the more persons are unemployed and the more vacancies are opened 
CTackman et aL 1989; Blanchard and Diamond 1989). The probability of a contact 
under the assumption that workers contact a specific vacancy only once is then 
given by: 
prob(contact) = VJ U (2) 
The specification of V and U is important because it has a strong influence on the 
calculated contact probability. Commonly the stocks of V and U are used in 
analyses but stocks are the result of inflows and duration. Because the contact 
probability depends on all vacancies which exist during a certain period and the 
number of persons who search for a job during the period, flows rather than stocks 
should be used for the specification of the variables if durations are substantially 
shorter than the period and if duration varies. 
Blanchard and Diamond (1989) estimated for the U.S. the matching function 
displayed in columns 1 and 2 of Table 13.2. They experimented with several 
different specifications and functional forms for the matching function but 
concluded that constant returns to scale and the log-linear Cobb Douglas function 
seems to be reasonable. 22 
Estimates of matching functions in Germany are shown in columns 3 to 10. 23 
Hiring from (registered) unemployment can be expected to depend on the size of 
the pool of the unemployed as long as the unemployed match the skill require-
ments of jobs. The flow from unemployment to employment is expected to 
increase whenever the pool of the unemployed expands because hiring from 
unemployment is an alternative to hiring from employment (job-to-job mobility). 
It reduces the compensatory component of vacancies and thus shortens the hiring 
chain. Overall hires (hires from unemployment plus job-to-job mobility), on the 
other hand, are expected to be high whenever the hiring chain is long, that is when 
it is difficult to hire, when job-to-job mobility is high, and when unemployment is 
low. That is, vacancies are partly endogenous to the labor market situation.24 
Therefore, it is likely that OLS estimates of the matching function are biased if the 
length of the vacancy chain varies, that is if the excess supply of labor varies. The 
regressions for hires displayed in Table 13.2 confirm these considerations. 
In the regressions for hires from unemployment (columns 3 to 6 in Table 13.2) 
the vacancy stock is significantly positive (equation 3) and remarkably close to the 
estimates of Blanchard and Diamond for the U.S. (column 2).25 Vacancy inflows, 
however, show a negative although insignificant coefficient (equation 4). This 
indicates the sensitivity of matching function estimates to the specification of the 
variables. The time trend is significantly negative in the estimates using stocks but it 
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Table 13.2 Estimates of Matching Functions 
U.S. 
Buttler/ Cramer 
(Blanchard/ Diamond}' Germany Mediated 
Hires from Hires from 
Independent Al/Hires Unemployment Hires from Unemploymenl AI/Hirei Unemployment 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 JO 11 
constant 0.52 1.84 2.19 3.67 -1.77 4.29 6.80 2.45 3.65 1.64 -1.79 
7.50 1.10 1.90 1.16 -0.54 3.66 12.28 4.87 9.78 2.61 
u 0.35 0.59 0.67 - - - 0.04 - - - 0.54 
3.90 2.90 6.61 - - - 0.85 - - - 2.60 
Uin - - - 0.85 0.91 0.82 - 0.03 0.02 0.07 
4.50 5.73 3.99 - 1.09 0.98 1.97 
V 0.54 0.21 0.19 - - - 0.24 - - - 0.45 
6.90 3.30 1.99 - - - 5.28 - - - 3.60 
Yin - - - -0.35 0.39 -0.40 - 0.68 0.52 0.74 
-1.53 1.20 -1.49 - 18.81 14.20 16.22 
EiEj - - - - -0.20 - - - 0.04 
-2.86 - - - 5.54 
trend/100 -0.15 -0.02 -2.96 0.80 -0.11 0.09 0.35 0.22 0.42 0.09 -0.36 
-2.40 -0.20 -3.24 1.14 -0.17 1.19 0.79 1.91 5.42 0.77 -1.70 
(continued) 
Table 13.2 (Continued) 
U.S. 
Buttler/ Cramer 
(Blanchard/ Diamond)" Germany Mediated 
Hires from Hires from 
Independent All Hires Unemployment Hires from Unemployment' Al/Hires6 Unemployment 
Variables 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 JO 11 
Method OLS OLS OLS OLS IV' OLS OLS OLS IV'' OLS 
Rz 47.00 41.00 95.87 91.15 94.14 97.62 89.80 97.65 99.19 91.98 84.00 
SER - - 0.07 0.10 0.08 0.10 0.03 0.02 0.01 0.02 
DW 2.40 0.80 1.06 1.18 1.19 1.23 1.59 1.82 1.76 2.34 1.21 
data monthly monthly annual annual annual annual annual annual annual annual monthly 
period 68:2-81:12 68:2-81:12 71-91 71-91 71-91 71-91 71-91 71-91 71-91 71-91 83:1-90:12 
Notes: 
• unemployment and vacancies lagged 1 month; vacancies are the integral of the stocks of hdp-wanted ads over the month (Blanchard/Diamond 1989: 25); 
unemployment is unemployment in the middle of the month; in regression 2 constant returns to scale are imposed and unemployment is unemployed workers minus laid 
off workers plus out of the labor force but want a job. 
b adjusted vacancy inflow (see Scherrkat 1993). 
• unemployment and vacancy at the end of the month. 
U = unemployment (stock) 
Uin • inflow into unemployment 
V = vacancies (stock) 
Yin• inflow of vacancies 
EiEj • job-to-job mobility 
italics• t-values 
all variables in logs 
IV'= Yin instrumented on EiEj-1. EiEj. 
IV"= Vm instrumented on EiEj-1. EiEj. 
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is insignificant if flows are used. Including job-to-job mobility (EiEj in equation 5) 
leaves the time trend and vacancies insignificant. The instrumental variable 
estimation (column 6) produces a similar pattern. For overall hires the relevance of 
the variables is almost the reverse. Here it is vacancies which is highly significant 
(see columns 7 to 10 in Table 13.2) and unemployment is insignificant in OLS 
regression but significant in the instrumental variable estimation (column 10). The 
trend is positive but not always significant. 
The regressions suggest that the pool of the unemployed influences hires from 
unemployment substantially. 26 But this is not to say that employment or hiring as 
such is labor supply determined. Rather it means that hiring from unemployment 
is shortening the hiring chain and thus leads the coefficient of vacancies (gross labor 
demand) to become insignificant or even negative. The time trend, although not 
always significant, for hires from unemployment as well as for overall hires, is 
positive if the variables are specified in flows rather than in stocks. A positive time 
trend indicates an improvement of the functioning of the German labor market 
instead of an deterioration. 
This result is in contrast to findings of Buttler and Cramer who found a negative 
time trend in their regression of mediated hires from unemployment (column 11 
of Table 13.2). The divergence in trends may be explained by the different 
specifications of the variables, the method used, the different periods, but it may 
also reflect differences in the dependent variable (hiring from unemployment versus 
mediated hires from unemployment). Mediated hires from unemployment are not 
only influenced by the functioning of labor markets but also by the efficiency of 
the mediation service. 
Change Duration Curves 
Unemployment and vacancies can be decomposed into inflows and duration which 
are combined in change-duration curves (Schettkat 1992a). In a pure business 
cycle, where an aggregate shock does not affect the skill composition in the 
economy, the vacancy inflow will increase if the economy moves out of a recession 
(point A in the vacancy diagram of Figure 13.5). Increasing labor demand will be 
easily satisfied out of the large pool of unemployed and the duration of vacancies 
will remain low. At some point hiring will become more difficult. This point will be 
at zero unemployment in an "ideal" labor market with homogeneous labor and no 
frictions but in a real labor market, at some positive level of unemployment, 
vacancy duration will increase until labor demand actually diminishes (after point 
B). At the end of the recession the change-duration curve will arrive at point A 
again. The illustration of a pure business cycle for unemployment resembles that 
for vacancies but a recession is characterized by long durations of unemployment 
(point A in the unemployment diagram of Figure 13.5). Unemployment duration 
will shrink in the expansionary period and will be at the minimum in the boom 
(point B). Short vacancy durations occur with long unemployment duration and 
vice versa. 
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Figure 13.5 Change-duration Curves for Unemployment and Vacancies in Germany 
(1964-1991) 
Source. Computations are based on data of the Bundesanstalt for Arbeit. 
Note. The durations are computed with the steady state assumption, duration = stock 
(beginning of the year)/outflow over the year. 
Increasing mismatch or an impaired functioning of the labor market is indicated by 
outward shifts of both the change-duration curves for vacancies and unemployment. 
Each business cycle would occur at longer average durations than the preceding one. 
The labor market is not a closed system and flows cross the borders. Allowing for 
flows across the labor force borders (i.e., an exchange between the labor force and 
"out of the labor force" and an increasing labor force, the vacancy and the 
unemployment curve can shift in different directions. It is possible, for example, 
that vacancies get filled with new labor market entrants. There is no recruiting 
problem at all, but the unemployed are regarded as less favorable (because of skill 
mismatch or simply because of signaling). Unemployment duration would shift 
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Figure 13.6 Change-duration Curve for U.S. Unemployment 
Source. Computations are based on BLS data. 
Note. Average duration is computed with the steady state assumption, duration = stock 
(beginning of the year)/outflow over the year. 
Figure 13.5 also displays the actual developments for Germany. Obviously the 
change-duration curve for unemployment has shifted outwards with every business 
cycle. 27 The business cycle shows the described loops but each business cycle 
occurred at a longer duration. In the case of an increasing malfunctioning of the 
labor market a similar movement for the change-duration curve of vacancies is 
expected but here the business cycle loops occurred with shorter and shorter average 
durations. This is hardly support for the view that recruiting has become more 
difficult in Germany. Increases in the average duration of unemployment occurred 
in the U.S. as well (Figure 13.6) although on a much less severe level. 
AN INSTITUTIONAL HYSTERESIS EXPLANATION FOR 
PERSISTENT GERMAN UNEMPLOYMENT 
The analysis of the vacancy chain shows that the decrease in overall hiring activity 
can be explained by a decrease in intraemployment hiring. Job-to-job mobility 
declined because of changing macroeconomic conditions, that is an excess supply 
of labor. In tight labor markets more hiring has to be made from the ranks of the 
employed, which creates succeeding hiring activity and lengthens the hiring chain. 
The decline in mobility in the German labor market was the result of an excess 
supply of labor. Hiring from the ranks of the unemployed increased, whereas job-
to-job mobility declined. The analysis of the Beveridge curve concluded that the 
apparent structural breaks in the curve disappear if control is made for long-term 
unemployment. The analysis based on change-duration curves uncovered the rise in 
the duration of unemployment for every business cycle, which is certainly an 
indication for malfunctioning. At the same time, however, hiring was getting easier 
and the divergent trends in the change-duration curves for unemployment and 
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vacancies have to be explained in terms of an interplay of macroeconomic trends 
and labor supply development.Although the duration of unemployment increased 
with age it cannot be seen as a variable solely determined by individual character-
istics. It is certainly influenced by macroeconomic labor demand. 
The duration of unemployment is a positive function of age and, furthermore, 
the unemployed aged 50 years and older suffered from increasing unemployment 
duration even after 1986, whereas unemployment of the younger age groups 
declined slightly. About 50 percent of the unemployed aged 55 to 60 years enter 
nonparticipation if they leave unemployment (ANBA 1989: 661) and for those 
who move from unemployment into "out of the labor force," the duration of 
unemployment was almost twice as high as for those who leave unemployment into 
new jobs. Obviously, older unemployed face a lower job finding rate than younger 
workers. 
But why are the elderly becoming unemployed at all in a system that provides so 
much employment stability? First of all, there is job turnover caused by the closure 
of establishments, but closures are only a small fraction of overall job turnover. 
Contrary to all rumors in the community of economists, West German labor law 
allows for dismissals, but layoffs must be justified and often a Sozialplan (severance 
payment) has to be offered. A Sozialplan can also be an instrument to make 
unemployment "attractive," and it is often agreed that older colleagues should leave 
because a pension offers them an "alternative" to work. It is a common view, that it 
is better to have "young" pensioners rather than an unemployed youth. There are 
different ways of entering into early retirement, for example disability pensions. 
The German pension laws allow for early retirement at the age of 60 years after an 
unemployment period of at least 12 months. Distinguishing the unemployed by 
one-year age groups shows that leaving unemployment into "out of the labor force" 
(pension) peaks at the age of 60 years and accounts for more than 93 percent of 
those who leave unemployment. In the older and younger age groups, this share is 
much lower {ANBA 1989: 661). In this way unemployment has become the first 
step into early retirement, and thus leads to long durations of unemployment. 
Empirical evidence for early retirement as a measure for the reduction of the 
firm's labor force is pretty well established {Kiihlewind 1988; Warnken and 
Ronning 1989; Semlinger 1990) There is a clear trend toward early retirement. The 
result of this trend to early retirement is that the older unemployed-in addition 
to other disadvantages they carry-are not regarded as candidates for vacant jobs 
by employers, and most of those unemployed do not expect to find a new job. 28 
Another source that structures unemployment and yields to hysteresis is the 
access to training. If training on the job is important or if only employment offers 
access to training and retraining this produces a serious disadvantage for the 
unemployed. They cannot keep up with skill requirements and at the same time 
employers might not be willing to invest in their training because unemployment 
may signal a "lemon." Empirical evidence suggests that access to jobs with new 
technology is given to "insiders" first (Schettkat 1989), that technological progress 
saves unskilled labor but that it is complementary to skilled labor {Kugler et al. 
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1990), and that trammg and retraining is a positive function of initial skills 
(Ewers et al. 1990). In a selection process for training and retraining the 
nonemployed are already disadvantaged and this is especially true for older 
workers because the potential payoff period for investments in training is low. 
This is a serious disadvantage in an economy which constantly increases the skill 
requirements. 
A recession and slow employment expansion in connection with a restructuring 
process has given a double disadvantage to the unemployed, who became older and 
unemployed for ever longer periods. Older employees did not have the chance to 
reenter employment after becoming unemployed because they were regarded as less 
flexible. Moreover, long-term unemployment leads to a deterioration of human 
capital and cuts the access to skill development. In a situation in which there was a 
growing supply of young labor, firms recruited younger people whose skills were 
already likely to be modern or whose periods of employment seemed to be long 
enough to repay investments in training. In this sense, "normal" unemployment 
ends up as structured unemployment (Schmid 1980) as the result of the interaction 
of macroeconomic employment conditions, labor supply expansion, and 
intergenerational skill differentials. The result of such a hysteresis process clearly is 
structured unemployment. 
NOTES 
For a critical analysis "on the view that the U.S. does not have an unemployment 
problem" see Freeman (1988). 
2 These differentials in employment trends, however, were already apparent in the 1960's 
when Europe was the- shining example for U.S. labor policies (Schettkat 1992). 
3 Flexibility is used with several different meanings (for an overview see Boyer 1987). Here 
it is defined as opportunities for actions. That is a greater variety of options increases 
flexibility. 
4 That is, that restricted shopping hours improve productivity which is measured by the 
productivity of the employed only (measured in output per working hour or per person 
employed) and disregarding time and effort of consumers. 
5 See Donges (1992) for an overview. 
6 Giersch et al. (1992: 204) argue that unemployed workers are freed to accept jobs which 
pay less than 50 percent of their previous job because the social security system provides 
an alternative income. The wage differentials chosen for the example make clear that the 
social security system provides an impediment against substantial income losses and thus 
sets up an barrier against overly downward wage flexibility. Burtless (1983), however, 
finds that high replacement rates in Europe cannot explain the U.S.-European 
difference in unemployment rates. 
7 See also Chapter 10 in this volume. 
8 Part of the cost of the provision of services (unemployment assistance, for example) are 
financed by overall taxes instead of insurance contributions (see Schmid et al 1992). 
9 For small firms an insurance against the cost of continuation of wage payments exists. 
Currently it is debated whether the first two days of a sickness should be excluded from 
the continuation of wage payments. 
10 Currently there is a debate on whether wage payments should continue after the third 
day of sickness. 
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11 During this conflict the conservative government took a clear position against a shoner 
working hours and offered as an alternative an early retirement program which was 
favored by some unions as well (see Scharpf and Schenkat 1986). 
12 In 1993 there was a strike over the fulfillment of a collective agreement that defined the 
increase of wages in East Germany. 
13 If a works council exists. 
14 See Chapter 8 in this volume for an evaluation of the system. 
15 The higher the demand for labor (vacancies) and the higher the excess supply of tabor 
(unemployment), the more contacts can be made (given a constant search intensity). 
16 For large ts the sum of vacancies created by this once-for-all increase in jobs would 
follow a geometric distribution. 
V= dv+ dv prob(e)+ dv prob(e)+ ... 
for large t: V= dv 1/(1 - prob(e)) 
with: V= sum of additional vacancies; dv= increase in vacancies (jobs, hires); 
prob(e)= probability that hiring is made from employment (intraemployment hiring). 
17 Although recent analysis shows that shifts of the Beveridge curve can have many causes 
(see Borsch-Supan 1991; Schettkat 1992a). 
18 Vacancy data for the U.S. is constructed with the "help-wanted index," which is based 
on the number of help-wanted advenisements. The base year for the index is 1967. To 
control for the expansion of the economy, the help-wanted index is normalized by 
dividing it by the number of nonagricultural employees (see Medoff 1983). A 
comparison of the normalized help-wanted index with vacancy data collected in surveys 
in some states showed that the normalized help-wanted index seems to be a reasonable 
proxy for vacancies (Abraham 1987: 213). 
19 Adjustments of the help-wanted index have been made by Katharine Abraham (1987) to 
adjust for the shift to white-collar work which is more heavily advenised. 
20 The shifts in the Beveridge curve using corrected vacancy statistics are more pronounced 
than in the unadjusted data, but the shifts do occur in the original data as well 
(Schettkat 1993). 
21 The rate of unskilled unemployment and the rate of long-term unemployment were 
additional indicators used by Franz and Siebeck (1991: 45). 
22 There are several specificities with respect to the construction of the data used by 
Blanchard and Diamond (1989). Hires have been constructed as the flow from 
unemployment and from out of the labor force into employment (taken from the CPS 
series adjusted by Abowd and Zellner 1985) plus job-to-job mobility which they assume 
to be constantly 40 percent of all quits which are estimated by the manufacturing quit 
rate. Quits are highly procyclical and on average job-to-job mobility is equal to job-to-
job mobility in Germany shows a very different pattern (see Figure 13.3). The vacancy 
indicator has been developed by Katharine Abraham (1987) and is based on the so-called 
help-wanted index. 
It is imponant to note that the Blanchard and Diamond analysis is based on flow data 
for hires and on quasi flows for vacancies (which is the integral over the stocks of help-
wanted ads over a month) but for unemployment a stock (middle of the month) is used. 
23 Tests on the stationarity (the null) of the variables used in the regressions (see Table 
13.2) were insignificant. 
24 Overall vacancies in the economy can be decomposed into a component representing 
expected variations in the employment level and another component representing 
compensatory hires: V'=.E+ C'; where V'=vacancies (flow), .E=expected change in 
employment level, C' = compensatory hires. 
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25 Buttler and Cramer (1991) estimate a function for mediated hires regressed on 
unemployment and vacancies stocks. They get coefficients similar to those obtained by 
Blanchard and Diamond (1989). 
26 In La yard et al (1991), for example, employed and unemployed job seekers are regarded 
as competing with each other about existing vacancies. Actually vacancies are substan-
tially influenced by the compensatory component of hiring and are thus not exogenous 
but rather endogenous to the labor market situation. 
27 The average duration of unemployment and vacancies has been computed under the 
steady state assumption: dur= X/X', where dur= duration, X = Stock at t- 1, X' 
outflow during the period. The steady state assumption is, of course, almost never 
fulfilled but it produces nevenheless a reasonable approximation (Freiburghaus 1978). 
Making use of the outflows leads the average duration to be unbiased by variations of 
the inflows. 
28 Funhermore, since 1986 unemployed who are 58 years or older can declare that they are 
not looking for work anymore. In this case they receive unemployment benefits until 
they get a pension at 60 years and they are dropped from the unemployment statistics. 
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